@misc{Zygmunt_Tomasz_W_2022,
 author={Zygmunt, Tomasz and Próchnicki, Maciej},
 copyright={Copyright by Wydział Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2023},
 address={Wrocław},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2022},
 publisher={E-Wydawnictwo. Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna Biblioteka Cyfrowa. Wydział Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego},
 language={pol},
 abstract={Contemporary research shows that judges are susceptible to factors that go beyond deliberative legal thinking. Such factors are embodied in various aspects of judges’ situation, moral beliefs, work and life environment, emotional and psychological states of mind, acquired experience, and institutional or political influence. Nowadays, one of the most interesting and controversial aspects of judicial decision making is judicial intuition, being the subject of the growing number of analyses. One example is the article of Anna Tomza: “Judicial intuition in the Current American Jurisprudence – Review of Positions”. The Author provides an original critique of the psychological approach to judicial intuition and proposes different perspectives – such as logical – instead. The presented work is a response to Anna Tomza’s article. We point out several concomitant problems and propose a different perspective to the following claims made by the Author: American Jurisprudence is abandoning the psychological concept of intuition, the psychological perspective on legal intuition is pointless, that intuition is a priori irrational, or that the research on intuition without etymological inquiry is always methodologically incorrect.},
 title={W obronie psychologicznego ujęcia intuicji sędziowskiej : artykuł polemiczny},
 type={text},
 doi={10.34616/145044},
 keywords={legal intuition, hunch, legal realism, legal naturalism},
}