@misc{Wiśniewski_Jakub_Bożydar_Legal_2017,
 author={Wiśniewski, Jakub Bożydar},
 copyright={Copyright by Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego Sp. z o.o.},
 address={Wrocław},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2017},
 publisher={Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego},
 language={eng},
 abstract={According to the contractarian perspective, a public good can be thought of as not so much a good that meets the technical neoclassical criteria of non-rivalness and non-excludability, but as one that is produced on a purely contractual basis, thus necessarily increasing the utility of all the involved parties. In this paper, by critically examining Nozick’s “emergent” contractarianism and Buchanan’steleological contractarianism, I shall argue that no such contractual origin can be plausibly attributed to territorial monopolies of force, and that therefore legal monocentrism — the view that the public goods of law and defense can be provided exclusively by territorial monopolies of force — fails the relevant efficiency test as conceived on a contractarian basis. This, in turn, implies that legal polycentrism, one of whose constitutive features is precisely its unambiguously voluntary and contractual character, should be considered as a superior system in this context},
 title={Legal polycentrism and contractarianism},
 type={text},
 doi={https://doi.org/10.19195/2084-4093.23.2.5},
 keywords={legal polycentrism, contractarianism, public goods, public choice, conceptual unanimity, institutional entrepreneurship},
}