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The domain of the right? Explaining national parliamentary preferences on EU-related self-empowerment

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Abstract

In the academic debate about the deficits of representative democracy in the European Union the views of members of parliaments about their EU-oriented roles remain largely unknown. Against this background, we exploit a novel dataset from an author-designed survey conducted in seven national parliaments to unravel MPs’ preferences with regard to their EU-oriented empowerment. Our findings allow to identify the dominant cognitive schemas mobilized among parliamentarians which attribute particular legitimacy-related meanings to proposed institutional reforms. They point to a stronger explanatory power of party ideological position over national constitutional orientations, with right wing parties being more supportive towards parliamentary empowerment than their centre and centre-left counterparts, and mainstream parties being more sceptical of it than radical groups on both sides of the spectrum.

Introduction

It has been widely recognized in the literature that the European Union’s (EU) suffers from a deficit of representative democracy (Mair, 2013; Vauchez, 2014; Lindseth, 2017) while parliamentarization at the EU level through the creation of the supranational European Parliament (EP) is not sufficient to legitimize European integration (Crum & Fossum, 2009; Bellamy & Kröger, 2014). One of the ways to address this shortcoming was the attempt to strengthen the position of national parliaments (NPs) as important intermediaries between the multiple European *demoi* and their Union (Nicolaidis, 2013). In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) recognized for the first time the formal role of national legislators in the EU’s political architecture, considering them as institutions “actively contributing to the good functioning of the Union” (Article 12 TEU) and granting them a direct role in the EU legislative process as guardians of the subsidiarity principle (Kiiver, 2012). Over a decade later, the Lisbon provisions have not only proved administratively demanding and politically limited in their effects (Cooper, 2018), but most of all they have assigned NPs a somehow frustrating position of veto players in the process of further integration.

In this context, one of the recommendations of the recently concluded Conference on the Future of Europe is to endow NPs with the right to present proposals for legislative initiatives to the European Commission (the so-called “green card”)¹ thus granting them a constructive role in the EU governance architecture. While scholars remain divided as to whether NPs should have the right to co-create policy solutions at the EU level (Cagé et al., 2023; Hennette et al., 2017 inter alia) or rather focus on scrutinizing their executives (De Wilde & Raunio, 2018 inter alia), we know very little about preferences of the primary stakeholders - national parliamentarians - as to their institutions’ European roles. It remains a puzzle how the file and rank MPs envisage their own EU-oriented empowerment, what sort of mechanisms aimed at strengthening their position in EU affairs they prefer, and how these choices are related to MPs’ national and ideological affiliations.

In this paper, we exploit a novel dataset from an author-designed survey conducted between 2021 and 2022 among members of seven national parliaments in Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Belgium to address the above-mentioned questions. Specifically, we intend to identify how, on the one hand, MPs’ national constitutional orientations and, on the other, party ideology affect their preferences as to the need for, and the shape of, potential reforms aimed at strengthening NPs in the current EU institutional framework. In doing this, we undertake the first attempt to probe the actual parliamentary support for the creation of a European transnational assembly composed of national MPs - the idea proposed by a group of researchers around Thomas Piketty and aimed at increasing the accountability and legitimacy of EU economic governance (Hennette et al., 2017; 2019). Of interest here is also which of these factors better explain parliamentary stances in this respect.

We believe that adopting the perspective “from within” by exploring the actual preferences of the core actors is important for several reasons. First, it will shed light on MPs’ self-perceptions as role-takers in the EU multi-level political system and reveal to what extent parliamentary views are homogeneous or divergent across Europe. Second, it will allow to reassess the sense and feasibility of potential institutional reforms strengthening the powers of NPs postulated by some politicians and experts as a way to reduce the EU's democratic deficit. The latter one has been compounded by the recent COVID-19 pandemic which increased marginalization of parliamentary actors vis-à-vis the executives (Borońska-Hryniewiecka & Fromage, 2022; Sacriste, 2020). Third, through aggregating the obtained parliamentary preferences to the level of EU political groups, it will reveal what kind of

transnational coalitions, if any, can be built across parties to further increase parliamentary leverage in the European political space. Finally, by identifying cognitive schemas which MPs use to evaluate the proposed mechanisms, our analysis allows us to assess to what extent strengthening of NPs within the EU policy-making is considered by MPs as a boost to European democracy, or a threat to EU integration.

Our findings indicate that to evaluate the proposed reforms, parliamentary respondents use two cognitive schemas of interpretation which attribute particular legitimacy-related meanings to EU institutional reforms. When guided by national constitutional orientations they confront an intergovernmental understanding of the EU legitimacy construction - placing the locus of control within national governments - with a federalist one which foresees a stronger role for the supranational EP. Following the partisan ideological line, they choose between a more conservative and sovereignist understanding of the appropriate EU governance model and a more liberal and cosmopolitan one. The conducted analysis reveal that MPs' preferences towards reforms aimed at strengthening NPs in the EU affairs are more strongly affected by their party ideological position rather than by national constitutional orientations. In this respect, the right wing parties tend to be more supportive towards parliamentary empowerment than their centre and centre-left counterparts, and mainstream parties tend to be more sceptical of it than radical parties on both sides of the spectrum. However, faced with an institutional solution that defies these bi-polar patterns, such as the transnational parliamentary assembly, national parliamentarians have the difficulty to classify it according to their dominant cognitive schemas, which effectively hampers their choices.

The paper begins by revisiting the state of the art and highlighting its main shortcomings. We then outline theoretical proposals and hypotheses regarding the two variables of interest. The next section presents this research methodology, including the survey design and analytical model. We then turn to the presentation of the results in view of our theoretical expectations. The article concludes with a discussion of the results and setting avenues for future research.

State of the art and its shortcomings

The literature on national parliaments in the EU is undoubtedly abundant. Much has been written about national parliaments' formal standing in the EU (inter alia Maurer, 2002; Winzen, 2012; Karlas, 2012; Auel et al., 2015), the actual parliamentary use of the various mechanism at hand (inter alia Fromage & Fasone, 2016; Cooper 2018; Malang & Leifeld,

2021) as well as how recent crises have affected parliaments' position in the EU governance architecture (inter alia Jancic, 2017; Borońska-Hryniewiecka & Fromage, 2022). Scholars and experts have also come up with new conceptualizations of the post-Lisbon roles of NPs (Auel & Neuhold, 2017; de Wilde & Raunio, 2018) and issued recommendations on how to strengthen their position in EU affairs (COSAC, 2022). Yet, this rich state of the art largely lacks analyses "from within" which would provide us with core actors' perspective on the abovementioned issues (cf. Winzen, 2022). While some valuable comparative studies of parliamentary EU-related preferences are based on pre-2000 data (Wessels, 2005), the latest attempts are limited to role-orientations of the members of EU committees (Kinski, 2021), or to the area of EU monetary and fiscal reforms (Blesse et al. 2022).

Some feedback with respect to parliamentary stances on broader institutional reforms can be tracked in the COSAC² bi-annual reports. However, these studies are conducted on the basis of questionnaires addressed at the level of parliamentary administrations or committee chairs, and reflect the general institutional position of the chambers. In this vein, the 38th COSAC report (2022) conducted in an aftermath of the CoFoE reveals that majority of chambers have no official opinion with respect to citizens' recommendations on EU institutional changes issued as a result of the Conference. We believe that at the time when the EU is reflecting on how to increase its democratic legitimacy and institutional sovereignty such results call for a more in-depth analysis identifying the actual stances of national democratic representatives with respect to their roles in the EU.

Theoretical expectations

The literature on parliamentary adaptation to EU integration offers various explanations with regard to the factors influencing parliamentary reforms. Some of them point to contextual variables such as the formal powers of NPs, or the level of public euroscepticism (Benz, 2004; Raunio, 2005; Karlas, 2012). Others take a more actor-oriented perspective assuming that MPs hold beliefs about the appropriate and democratic design of the EU (cf. Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998; Wessels, 2005). They all however point to the heterogeneity of national contexts as one of the main obstacles to further empowerment of NP's in EU affairs. Since the focus of this work is on MPs' preferences with regard to their self-empowerment in the EU, we employ the latter approach by focusing on two dimensions of parliamentary identification - the national and party ideological one. While we do not discard other indirect factors which might be at play, we assume that the processes of socialization which MPs undergo in their

national and party political contexts inevitably shape their cognitive schemas about the appropriate organization of political systems which, in turn, determine their preferences as to EU reforms and the EU- oriented roles of parliaments.

National constitutional orientations

We depart from the premise, that while the most pronounced dividing line among politicians goes along party political orientations, MPs from various parties of the same country share a common historical, national and institutional cognitive schema of the design of their constitutional systems (Diez Medrano, 2003; Risse, 2004). In line with Wessels (2005) and Winzen (2017) we further agree that these understandings, varying across the countries, have a strong impact on MPs’ beliefs about the proper mechanisms of legitimacy and the construction of accountability in the EU. In this vein, we follow Hooghe (1999) as well as Hooghe & Marks (2001: 151) in assuming that MPs from federal countries tend to be more supportive of multi-level governance and sharing of sovereignty across different territorial levels within the EU than those from unitary states. The latter ones are expected to defend a more intergovernmental Europe where member states act as key pillars of effective and legitimate governance. Consequently, depending on whether MPs come from states whose socialization schemas tend toward intergovernmental or federalist conceptions of the ideal political organization of the EU (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998; Rittberger, 2005), they either opt for strengthening NPs, or for empowering the supranational institution of the EP, as a means of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU.

Therefore, we assume that (H1): *MPs with more intergovernmental national constitutional orientations will show stronger support for strengthening NPs in the EU than those with more federalist national orientations.*

Following the same logic, with respect to the type of reforms preferred by MPs, we assume that (H2): *MPs with more intergovernmental national constitutional orientations will show stronger support for mechanisms aimed at safeguarding national competences while those with more federalist orientations will support for pro-integration mechanisms.*

While these EU-oriented preferences surely depend on MPs’ partisan identity (with conservative parties tending towards more intergovernmental models and culturally liberal parties towards federal models), for the sake of testing the national constitutional variable we

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3 assume after Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) and Winzen et al. (2015) that the common national
4 context of parties in the same member state has a specific effect compared to ideological
5 differences among parties. That is why in our operationalization of MPs' national
6 constitutional orientations we account for the constitutional structure of the state (see
7 methodology section below).

11 12 13 *Party ideology*

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16 The literature agrees that political parties' attitudes to EU integration are conditioned by a
17 combination of their positioning on the economic left/right axis and their cultural orientations
18 according to the GAL-TAN scale (Hooghe et al., 2002; Winzen, 2017). For the purpose of the
19 following inquiry we broadly classify right wing parties as culturally conservative and
20 economically liberal, centrist parties as culturally and economically liberal, and left as
21 culturally liberal and economically interventionist. Authors agree that conservative parties,
22 who in general are associated with more nationalist and sovereignist attitude defending
23 national culture and sovereignty against the external pressures of international organizations,
24 tend to argue for rebalancing of power between the EU and its Member States (Hooghe et al.,
25 2002; Winzen, 2017). At the same time, liberal centrist and liberal left-wing parties are much
26 more supportive towards further EU integration and/or federalisation (Chapel Hill, 2019;
27 Winzen, 2017, 42). The study of the recent political manifestos of the French and German
28 Liberals, or the German, Italian and French Social Democrats illustrate this position. Taking
29 into account that European integration - understood as a further transfer of competences to the
30 EU level - inevitably weakens the legislative and oversight capacities of NPs, we assume that
31 parties' stances on EU integration will be inversely related to their preferences on
32 empowering NPs. While the conservative, right wing parties view NPs as legitimate locus of
33 sovereignty and democratic control with regard to EU policy of their member states, centrist
34 and left wing MPs might perceive them as potential veto players who weaken the integration
35 process in order to safeguard their national competences.

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38 Therefore we assume that (H3): *Right and centre-right MPs will show stronger support*
39 *towards strengthening NPs in the EU than their left and centre-left counterparts.*

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42 As regards the specific mechanisms to strengthen NPs in EU affairs, we further hypothesize
43 that (H4): *While right-wing MPs will show stronger support towards mechanisms*

safeguarding national competences, left-wing MPs will show stronger support for pro-integration mechanisms.

More specifically, the empirical literature shows that the party political spectrum of EU support is well illustrated by an inverted-U where mainstream parties including Liberals, Greens, Social or Christian Democrats are generally supportive of European integration, while opposition to the EU is usually situated at the extremes, represented by radical left and right parties (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006). While on the far left end of the spectrum such position is dictated by economic antipathy to capitalism, on the far right it expresses the cultural defence of a national community. Again, taking into account that more integration inevitably weakens control and legislative capacities of NPs, we assume that radical parties' stances on EU integration will be inversely related to their preferences on empowering NPs.

We therefore predict that (H5): *Radical parties on both sides of the spectrum will show stronger support towards increasing the powers on NPs in the EU than mainstream parties and opt for mechanisms which directly empower NPs vis-a-vis EU institutions.*

Methodology

To test our hypotheses, we exploit novel data from the authors-designed survey conducted between November 2021 and January 2022 among MPs from seven national parliaments (French Assemblée Nationale, German Bundestag, Belgium Chambre des Représentants, Danish Folketing, Polish Sejm, Italian Camera and the Spanish Congreso)³. While those chambers are not fully representative of the mother population being the whole body of national MPs in all EU member states, our sample was selected to meet the criteria of geographical and geopolitical representativeness. It includes larger and smaller Member States, eurozone and non eurozone members, founding and more recent EU members, as well as parliaments possessing various levels of formal strength in EU affairs. In case of bicameral parliaments, we focused on the lower chambers due to their more prominent formal position in EU affairs.

The questionnaire (available in online Appendix 3) inquired whether national parliaments should play a stronger role in the EU policy-making; which mechanisms MPs consider most appropriate to strengthen the position of national parliaments in the EU affairs¹, and whether a

¹ For the detailed list of options please see Appendix 3

European Assembly composed of national parliamentarians from EU Member States should be created in order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union.

Our questionnaire was sent simultaneously by e-mail via the Limesurvey platform to 3018 parliamentarians of the seven states, in their original language (6 versions). Fifteen days after the initial mailing, we re-launched the questionnaire and then contacted the MPs directly by phone thus fulfilling the highest standards identified for this type of survey (Bailer, 2014). Of the 3018 MPs to whom the questionnaire was sent, we received 369 questionnaires back (12 %), a result which is above those empirically identified for survey in general populations usually reached by computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI). However, upon closer scrutiny we have decided to remove 206 questionnaires that were not properly filled, i.e. leaving most of the questions unanswered or containing only biographical information. Our final sample therefore consists of 163 fully filled questionnaires.⁴ Though the response rate is barely meaningful in itself (Bailer, 2014), it is a good illustration of the increasing difficulty of obtaining high responsiveness in online surveys among political elites whose mother population is not large and consists of individuals whose day-to-day priorities leave little room for academic questionnaires (Vis & Stolwijk, 2020).

Despite the adequate size of our sample (Sapra, 2021), we have taken precautions to ensure its representativeness of the mother population. First, in line with other studies of this type (i.e. Blesse et al., 2020), we conducted a non-response analysis on the selected final sample which revealed certain distortions in the population interrogated.⁵ To remedy this and ensure reliability of our findings, we have conducted sample adjustment with respect to both nationality and political group affiliation for each of the seven chambers under study.⁶ In line with the accepted practice (Carey, 2009; Bailer, 2014), we assigned weights to correct for differential response rates in the two categories of interest thus obtaining results which can be treated as robust predictors of MPs' opinion on EU affairs.

Analytical model

The first independent variable – national constitutional orientations – is operationalized through a combination of two components: party leadership support for the EP (as devised by Winzen, 2017) and member state institutional structure (building on Hooghe & Marks, 2001). In this vein, we create a novel indicator combining attitudinal and institutional components reflecting both the more dynamic parliamentary orientations and more stable, structural

context. In case of the first component, using Chapel Hill Expert Survey indicator of individual national parties' leadership position on the powers of the EP (1 - least supportive of increasing EP's powers, 7 - most supportive) we calculated an aggregate, weighted indicator of parliamentary support for the EP for each national chamber under study to reflect its actual political composition at the time of the survey (Belgium 6,23; Spain 5,70; Germany 5,16; France 5,66; Denmark 4,9; Poland 4,71 and Italy 4,13). In order to better account for national structural tendencies and cognitive schemes that favour federalism (Delreux and Randour, 2015; Wessels, 2005, Rittberger, 2005) we combined the obtained scores with indicators of constitutional federalism as developed by Hooghe & Marks (2001) by assigning coefficients of +4 in case of federal states, i.e. Belgium and Germany, +3 in case of strongly decentralised states, i.e. Spain and Italy, and +2 in case of France.⁷ As a result, we have obtained the following final indicators of national constitutional orientations: Belgium 9,23; Germany 8,16; Spain 7,70; France 6,66; Italy 6,13; Denmark, 4,93; and Poland 4,71, where Belgian MPs' orientations are classified as most federalist and Polish MPs as most intergovernmental.

Since our research is interested in the potential transnational coalitions and political opinion of MPs, the second variable – party ideological orientations – was operationalized at the level of EU party groups taking into account partisan affiliation of the respondents. Although the survey was addressed to national MPs, respondents were also asked to indicate their party affiliation at the EU level. In cases where the individual response did not indicate EU affiliation, it was attributed manually by the authors according to the official EU affiliation of their national parties. Consequently, for example: German CDU MPs were recoded as EPP, Polish PiS MPs as ECR and French LFI as GUE. This allowed us to compare, and even aggregate, the national responses of parliamentarians from different countries “as if” they participated in one European political space. As regards party ideological orientation on the political spectrum, in our analysis we treat ID and ECR as radical right, EPP as centre-right, RENEW as centre, S&D as centre-left, Greens as left and GUE as radical left. For a more adequate representation of the radical right-wing eurosceptic parties, whose responses are the most difficult to obtain, we merged the results coded for MPs from the national parties affiliated to ECR and ID.

National parliamentary preferences unpacked

With respect to the question whether NPs should play a stronger role in the EU policy-making our data reveal that a large majority of our respondents (65%) are in favour, 21 % have no

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3 opinion and 14% declare to be against. On the one hand, such results confirm parliamentary
4 recognition of the need of a reform, but on the other they reveal that over 1/3rd of MPs is
5 sceptical of their own self-empowerment, or is against it. This only confirms the stance of
6 Wessels (2005) that national parliaments are not a homogeneous block and the assumption
7 that they should be “naturally” in favour of increasing their own role at the expense of
8 supranational institutions is not as unequivocal as expected.
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15 With regard to the factors which shape MPs’ preferences (Table 1), the conducted analysis
16 reveals that party ideology has a significantly stronger explanatory power (Model 2) than
17 national constitutional orientations (Model 1). The results show stronger support towards
18 strengthening of NPs in case of the right and centre-right respondents (ECR+ID, EPP),
19 decreasing towards the centre (RENEW) and left-wing groups (S&D) thus confirming
20 hypothesis H3. We can observe that the full Model 3 also indicates significant relationship
21 between party ideology and MPs’ preferences in this context.
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
42 **Table 1. National parliaments should play a stronger role in EU policy-making:**
43 **General linear regression models**
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	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Belgium	-0.31472		-0.4785
Denmark	0.00692		0.0548
Spain	0.07127		-0.0707
France	0.10537		0.1935
Italy	0.64924*		0.2750
Poland	0.30214		-0.3375
Germany	Ref.		Ref.
GREEN		-1.858***	-1.9839***
GUE		-1.751***	-1.9953***
NI		-0.734	-1.1060*
PPE		-1.174***	-1.2450***
RENEW		-1.636***	-1.9374***
S&D		-1.791***	-1.9504***
ECR&ID		Ref.	Ref.
Model fit			
F	1.25	8.49***	4.81***
R ²	0.05	0.25	0.28
adj R ²	0.01	0.22	0.22
N	162	162	162
AIC			
BIC			
ANOVA Omnibus (SS)			
Model	77.0	412***	464.4***
Nationality	77.0		52.6
Party ideology		412***	387.4***
Residuals	1595.6	1261	1208.2
Total	1672.6	1673	1672.6

Note1: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note2: values reported in the table are standardized beta coefficients

At the same time, the relatively higher support for NPs from extreme left GUE than from S&D on the left-side of the spectrum, and a higher support from extreme right (ECR +ID) than EPP on the right side of the spectrum tends to confirm the inverted U hypothesis H5 and is illustrated by the U-curve (Figure 1). While in case of GUE the explanation can be looked for in its socio-economic orientation opting for rebalancing the power relations between EU institutions and the national level in order to reorient EU policy directions from neoliberal into more socially progressive course (cf. European Left, 2019), the motivations of ECR and ID respondents lie in their culturally nationalist and sovereignist orientations.

**Figure 1 National parliaments should play a stronger role in EU policy-making:
by party ideology**



While the effect of national constitutional orientations on MPs' preferences with regard to strengthening national parliaments in EU is less evident (Table 1), we can nevertheless identify a certain tendency whereby MPs from the two federal states (Belgium and Germany) are the most skeptical of strengthening NPs. These findings resonate with the literature claiming that historical experience of federalism has influenced the support of political elites for the federal model of the European integration granting a stronger position to the EP as a supranational source of EU legitimacy (Hooghe & Marks, 1999; Delreux & Randour, 2015).

Strengthening yes, but how?

With respect to the question about concrete instruments to strengthen NPs in the EU policy-making, the highest general support was gained by the option of equipping parliaments with a mandate defining the position of their national government within the EU (36%) as practiced by some Nordic countries, followed by proposing joint strategic orientations of the EU together with the EP (33%); presenting joint legislative proposals with the EP (32%); blocking the adoption of the draft legislative proposal on the basis of subsidiarity breach (30%) and indirect legislative initiative only for the NPs (green card) (26%). The strongest preference for a mandate might illustrate a rather pragmatic approach of MPs who view the domestic empowerment as the most realistic solution, not requiring EU level reforms (cf. Kinski, 2021).

With regard to the explanatory variables, the conducted statistical tests indicate that party ideology is a stronger predictor in case of the mandate, subsidiarity and the green card mechanisms (Table 2). In case of other proposals, nationality and party group do not appear to significantly influence the dependent variable which may call for testing alternative explanations. As regards preference distribution according to the party ideological variable, we find that the right wing MPs affiliated with ECR+ID tend to show a relatively stronger

support for the subsidiarity based veto than other parties, and much stronger than for the green card. At the same time, left wing MPs (GUE, S&D) and Greens show significantly stronger support for the latter one than right-wing MPs. These findings stand in line with our hypothesis H4 that right wing parties will show stronger support for mechanisms safeguarding national competencies than for pro-integration mechanisms.

Table 2. MPs' support for particular strengthening mechanisms – Logistic regression models summaries

	Adopting Mandate	Subsidiarity- based veto	Green card	Strategic forum with the EP	Joint legislative initiative with the EP
Model - Nationality					
Belgium	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.18
Denmark	0.58	0.29	0.36	0.21	0.15
Spain	0.23	0.09	0.47	0.44	0.39
France	0.44	0.23	0.13	0.46	0.45
Italy	0.27	0.29	0.14	0.38	0.19
Poland	0.31	0.18	0.17	0.23	0.17
Germany	0.30	0.16	0.18	0.30	0.30
Model fit					
X ²	6.80	6.64	25.1*	6.66	9.58
R ² _{McF}	0.03	0.13	0.14	0.03	0.05
R ² _{CS}	0.04	0.12	0.14	0.04	0.06
R ² _N	0.06	0.20	0.22	0.06	0.08
AIC	220	166	177	220	206
BIC	245	188	221	245	230
Model – Party ideology					
GREEN	0.25	0.00	0.29	0.39	0.38
GUE	0.51	0.20	0.48	0.11	0.11
NI	0.49	0.00	0.30	0.25	0.11
PPE	0.44	0.06	0.02	0.29	0.24
RENEW	0.88	0.08	0.16	0.39	0.30
S&D	0.26	0.12	0.35	0.40	0.37
ECR&ID	0.30	0.27	0.14	0.28	0.16
Model fit					
X ²	24.40*	34.90**	18.40**	4.80	4.43
R ² _{McF}	0.07	0.22	0.11	0.02	0.02
R ² _{CS}	0.09	0.19	0.11	0.03	0.03
R ² _N	0.13	0.31	0.16	0.04	0.04
AIC	211	152	172	222	211
BIC	236	195	197	247	236
Model– Nationality & Party ideology					
France	0.67	0.31	0.28	0.42	0.46
Italy	0.13	0.18	0.08	0.33	0.18
Poland	0.44	0.10	0.22	0.18	0.15


Germany	0.44	0.19	0.15	0.22	0.23
GREEN	0.46	0.01	0.06	0.43	0.37
GUE	0.29	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.26
NI	0.96	0.02	0.06	0.20	0.10
PPE	0.24	0.02	0.00	0.28	0.20
RENEW	0.19	0.01	0.02	0.33	0.26
S&D	0.25	0.02	0.07	0.38	0.32
ECR&ID	0.49	0.08	0.01	0.35	0.19
Model fit					
X ²	27.00**	27.7**	24.8*	11.7	13.6
R ² _{McF}	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.06	0.07
R ² _{CS}	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.07	0.08
R ² _N	0.21	0.25	0.22	0.10	0.11
N	163	163	163	163	163
AIC	212	159	178	227	214
BIC	255	202	221	271	257
Likelihood Ratio Test (X²)					
Nationality	11.33	5.69	6.43	6.90	9.30
Party ideology	20.22***	6.14	18.92**	5.04	4.07

Note1: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Note2: values reported in the table are estimated marginal means.

Additionally, the overall distribution of parliamentary preferences with respect to ideological positioning as regards the subsidiarity-based veto mechanism takes shape of a U-curve (Figure 2) confirming both hypothesis H4 of a stronger support of the right-wing parties with regard to mechanisms safeguarding national competences as well as hypothesis H5 whereas MPs from extreme ends of the spectrum express higher support for such solutions. At the same time, the distribution of preferences related to the “green card” mechanism follows a similar logic finding its main supporters on the extremes (Figure 2). While MPs affiliated with ECR+ID are less enthusiastic about this solution than about the subsidiarity-based veto, their support is still the highest among the MPs because this mechanism enforces NPs vis-à-vis EU institutions.

Figure 2 MPs’ support for “subsidiarity-based veto” (**p<.01) and the “green card” (p<.15) by party ideology



On the other hand, the relatively high support of this option by GUE could be explained as economically driven whereas a certain correcting power of national proposals could counter-balance the neo-liberal tendencies of the EU (cf. European Left, 2019). Finally, with regard to mainstream MPs, we observe that the green card U-curve is slightly shifted to the right from the subsidiarity one due to the fact that centre-right MPs (EPP) are more supportive of the mechanism safeguarding national competences against the EU and less of the pro-integrationist green card, whereas S&D inversely, in line with hypothesis H4.

With respect to the question about the creation of a European assembly composed of MPs from the 27 Member States, although globally more respondents were against this solution (42%), it is worth noting that over one third of them expressed support for this idea (31%). Taking into account that it is a far-reaching proposal, rather unlikely to be supported by national executives, the level of parliamentary support - close to that of the subsidiarity veto mechanism - might be surprising.

With regard to the explanatory power of our two variables, the created model does not allow us to observe any consistent pattern of preference distribution in line with our hypotheses (Table 3). This may be because, as mentioned above, the proposal of the European Assembly blurs the established frameworks of understanding and evaluation of EU legitimacy. On the one hand, it can be viewed as an additional element of accountability and legitimization of the EU policy decisions, corresponding to the pro-EU and federalist logic (as Piketty et. al argued), while at the same time it can also be understood as a way of increasing the power of NPs vis-à-vis the EU institutions in competition to the EP, thus feeding into the more intergovernmental logic.

Table 3. MPs' support for the creation of European Assembly composed of MPs from 27 MS
General Linear Model summary

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Belgium	-0.02		-0.11
Denmark	0.00		-1.10
Spain	-0.65		-0.97
France	-0.42		-0.43
Italy	1.47		1.84
Poland	-0.33		-0.39
Germany	-1.15		-1.39
GREEN		-0.50	0.06
GUE		-0.59	0.55
NI		0.00	-1.62
PPE		-0.15	-0.25
RENEW		-0.55	-0.53
S&D		-0.39	-0.03
ECR&ID		-0.50	-0.72
Model fit			
F	1.06	0.04	0.63
R ²	0.02	0.01	0.05
adj R ²	0.00	-0.04	-0.03
N	153	153	153
ANOVA Omnibus (SS)			
Model	89.5	3.30	110.1
Nationality	89.5		107.6
Party ideology		3.30	21.4
Residuals	2077	2163.2	2055.6
Total	153	153	153

Note1: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Note2: values reported in the table are estimated marginal means

At the same time, a large number of “no opinions” (27%) indicates the general confusion among the respondents regarding the character of this solution, again pointing to inadequacy of the cognitive schemas mobilized by MPs to characterize and evaluate this reform. Further semi-structured interviews, based on a better understanding of the Assembly's composition and decision-making mechanisms, would be required to verify in what way the MPs interpret this solution.

Our last question inquired whether, in the absence of a consensus among the 27 member states in favour of a European Assembly, MPs would support the idea of bringing together the chambers of those states that so wished, following the model of the Franco-German Assembly. In contrast to the previous question, the majority of our respondents are in favour of this solution, with a 16 points higher support than for the creation of an European Assembly of 27 MS (49% to 33%). This indicates that there is a fair share of MPs who support transnational parliamentarism in the form of enhanced cooperation among those

“willing”. While this could be partly explained by its more voluntary, therefore realistic, character - as it would not require unanimity of MS – further interviews would be helpful to verify this.

From the conducted statistical analyses we see that while both variables do play a role in explaining parliamentary preferences, nationality is a significantly stronger predictor than party ideology (Table 4).

Table 4. MPs’ support for creation of European Assembly of the willing MS
Logistic regression models summaries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Belgium	2.367		3.371
Denmark	0.235		0.199
Spain	0.599		0.602
France	2.515		2.324
Italy	3.765		2.068
Poland	0.253*		0.292
Germany	Ref.		Ref.
GREEN		6.4934	1.603
GUE		3.6897	1.481
NI		27.2808**	11.267
PPE		2.3201	1.745
RENEW		11.1872**	2.542
S&D		7.6259*	3.168
ECR&ID		Ref.	Ref.
Model fit			
X ²	28.0***	16.1*	31.9**
R ² _{McF}	0.14	0.08	0.16
R ² _{CS}	0.18	0.11	0.20
R ² _N	0.24	0.14	0.27
N	142	142	142
Likelihood Ratio Test (X ²)			
Nationality	25.572***		15.82*
Party ideology		13.67*	3.92

Note1: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note2: values reported in the table are weighted odds ratio

There is, however, no clear pattern of preference distribution along the federalist-intergovernmental axes. The obtained results might point to two alternative, but not necessarily exclusive, explanations. First, we can observe stronger support for this solution among MPs from parliamentary chambers who already participate in advanced formats of interparliamentary cooperation such as the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly in case of France and Germany, the Montecitorio format in case of Italy, or the Benelux Parliamentary Assembly in case of Belgium. We might therefore hypothesize that their hitherto experience makes them more inclined to envisage an extended version of such formats. In the second

case, the fact that higher support for enhanced cooperation comes from MPs of the EU founding states might illustrate their ambition to play an avant-garde role in further EU-oriented parliamentary integration without concerns over becoming potentially marginalized. The latter concern is often articulated by Poland which does not want to find itself in a second-tier EU.

With regard to party ideology, we see that such differentiated format of parliamentary cooperation enjoys a relatively higher support from the centre and centre-left MPs (RENEW, S&D and GREEN) than their right wing counterparts. These more pro-integrationist parties might favour this mode of enhanced parliamentary cooperation as a more feasible way to enhance EU democratic legitimacy.

Conclusions and discussion

In light of the shortage of actor-oriented studies of national parliamentary activity in EU affairs, the goal of this article was to examine the preferences of MPs, as primary role takers, towards institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the role of national parliaments in European politics. We have built our inquiry on the premise that these preferences are rooted in MPs' cognitive schemas of the appropriate design of the EU governance and its legitimacy. On the basis of a new survey of parliamentarians from seven national parliaments, we tested in what way MPs' national constitutional orientations measured on the intergovernmental-federalist spectrum; and their party ideology affect their preferences with regard to the need for, and the shape of, potential reforms.

Our overall finding is that while generally parliamentarians share a commitment to strengthening NPs in EU affairs as means to increase the EU democratic legitimacy, there are observable cross-party differences which prevail over cross-national differences. With respect to the question which variable is a better predictor of parliamentary preferences, the conducted analysis indicates that there is a significant effect of party ideology regarding the question whether national parliaments should play a stronger role in EU policy-making. While this result stays in contrast to the findings of Winzen (2017) who argued that constitutional preferences dominate over party differences, it resonates with the recent studies of Blesse et al. (2019; 2020) who point to a higher explanatory power of party ideologies with respect to MPs' preferences on Eurozone and fiscal reforms. With respect to party ideological variable, our results indicate that right wing MPs are significantly more supportive of empowering NPs

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in EU affairs than their centre and the left-wing counterparts. The findings also confirm the inverted U hypothesis (Hooghe et al., 2002) whereas radical parties on both ends of the spectrum are more supportive towards strengthening of NPs than the mainstream parties. While the national constitutional orientations cannot be completely dismissed, our results show that they remain very weak.

The conducted analysis has also revealed that MPs largely disagree over the shape of appropriate reforms. First, none of the five proposed reforms obtained more that 36% of support among our respondents, indicating large variations in parliamentary preferences and an evident lack of critical mass behind a concrete reform agenda. We have also found that while right-wing MPs tend to favour mechanisms safeguarding national competences rather than pro-integration mechanisms, the left wing parties show significantly stronger support for the latter ones. With respect to the two flagship instruments, i.e. subsidiarity-based veto and the green card, our findings stay in line with the inverted-U hypothesis where radical parties on both sides of the spectrum are more supportive towards mechanisms which directly empower NPs vis-a-vis EU institutions. We also find that in case of the mandate, subsidiarity and the green card option there is a significant effect of party ideology on MPs' preferences.

These findings taken together indicate that political choices over the shape of institutional reforms are now more congruent with the party ideological, value-based frameworks of identification of MPs rather than their national constitutional frameworks. This can be considered an important precondition for the emergence of transnational political coalitions in favour of these solutions.

Our hypotheses however have not found confirmation with respect to the question related to the creation of a European transnational Assembly composed of the 27 MS. While over one third of our respondents expressed support for this idea, the obtained results do not provide a clear pattern of preference distribution with respect to both party ideological and national constitutional variable, revealing significant intra-national and intra-party divisions. We assume that in this case, the available cognitive schemas along national or party-ideological axes which parliamentary respondents mobilized with respect to the more conventional reform proposals, were not appropriate to evaluate this novel solution and its potential repercussions with respect to both parliamentary empowerment and EU legitimacy.

Overall, while our findings indicate that political parties are becoming increasingly relevant actors for understanding and evaluating the proposed EU reforms, these results do not provide an optimistic perspective with regard to potential and meaningful parliamentary empowerment in EU affairs. The latter seem to be understood today mainly as a brake on further integration and finds its major support among radical parties on both sides of the political spectrum, albeit for different reasons. Mainstream parties express a rather pragmatic, if not self-restraining, scepticism, even towards mechanisms assigning constructive role for NPs in the EU decision-making process such as the green card. This state of affairs renders the emergence of any significant transnational political coalition rather unlikely. In this context, advocates of a greater parliamentary involvement in the EU policy-making have an uneasy, educational task to perform, that is to convince not only the public opinion, but also primary stakeholders - MPs - that national parliaments, rather than being obstacles to integration, could be legitimate drivers of it.

We however observe one noteworthy evidence stemming from our analysis. In contrast to other proposed solutions, a fair share of MPs (49%) favour the idea of transnational parliamentary cooperation in the EU, in some sort of a flexible arrangement among the willing assemblies, as a sensible way to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU. In this regard, the existing inter-parliamentary formats such as the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly, or the slowly expanding Montecitorio triangle, could serve as an inspiration for other MPs willing to exercise transnational political accountability within the EU multi-level system of governance (cf. Borońska-Hryniewiecka & Kinski, 2022).

While our study has cast some new light on parliamentary preferences with respect to seven national chambers, the obtained results call for further comparative exploration, most possibly through in-depth, semi-structured interviews in order to identify deeper motivations behind particular parliamentary choices. These efforts could help to better explain what cognitive schemas MPs attach to particular EU reforms, also beyond parliamentary self-empowerment, and indicate areas of inter-parliamentary cooperation which MPs view as still unexploited.

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¹ Proposal 40.2 of the final report on the Conference on the Future of Europe

² Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs which brings together the EU affairs committees of national parliaments, as well as members of the EP.

³ The survey was conducted after the German parliamentary elections of 2021 and reflects preferences of the current members of the Bundestag.

⁴ See online Appendix 1 for the internal sample composition.

⁵ See online Appendix 1 for the non-response analysis.

⁶ See online Appendix 2 for the adjustment method.

⁷ See online Appendix 4 for more information on constructing this indicator.

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For Review Only

Appendix 1 Internal composition of the sample and non-response analysis

Table 1 Composition of the sample by nationality

COUNTRY	NON ANSWER (N)	ANSWER (N)	NON ANSWER (%)	ANSWER (%)
GERMANY	691	43	94,1%	5,9%
BELGIUM	142	6	95,9%	4,1%
DENMARK	165	14	92,2%	7,8%
SPAIN	282	22	92,8%	7,2%
FRANCE	531	39	93,2%	6,8%
ITALY	612	17	97,3%	2,7%
POLAND	438	22	95,2%	4,8%

Table 2 Composition of the sample by political groups

EUROPEAN POLITICAL GROUP	NON ANSWER (N)	ANSWER (N)	NON ANSWER (%)	ANSWER (%)
GUE	132	9	93,6%	6,4%
S&D	550	50	91,7%	8,3%
GREEN	197	18	91,6%	8,4%
RENEW	567	43	93,0%	7,0%
PPE	617	24	96,3%	3,7%
ECR	333	6	98,2%	1,8%
ID	264	5	98,1%	1,9%
NI	201	8	96,2%	3,8%

Table 1 above shows that the response rate for Belgian, Italian and Polish MPs was lower than for other nationalities. Similar distortion was observed with regard to party affiliation. Table 2 shows that the response rate for MPs affiliated with the right or centre-right political groups is lower than for the other groups. A non-weighted sample would therefore be biased by, for instance, under-representing Italian MPs or ECR-affiliated MPs. To remedy this we have conducted a sample adjustment (see online appendix 2).

Appendix 2 Adjustment method

Formula and elements of the adjustment method:

Weighted number of MPs = Raw number of MPs * Weight (Percentage of MPs in reality / Percentage of MPS in the sample)

At the time of conducting the survey, the body of national MPs of the seven chambers considered in this study is as below:

	GUE	GREEN	S&D	RENEW	EPP	ECR	ID	NI	Total
Germany	1,3% n=39	3,9% n=118	6,8% n=206	3,0% n=91	6,5% n=196	0,0% n=0	2,7% n=82	0,1% n=2	24,3% n=734
Belgium	0,4% n=12	0,7% n=21	0,9% n=28	0,9% n=27	0,6% n=17	0,8% n=24	0,6% n=17	0,1% n=2	4,9% n=148
Danemark	0,4% n=13	0,5% n=15	1,6% n=49	1,9% n=56	0,4% n=13	0,0% n=0	0,7% n=20	0,4% n=13	5,9% n=179
Spain	1,2% n=36	0,1% n=3	4,1% n=123	0,6% n=19	2,4% n=74	1,3% n=38	0,0% n=0	0,4% n=11	10,1% n=304
France	1,1% n=32	0,3% n=10	1,0% n=29	12,0% n=363	3,5% n=107	0,1% n=3	0,2% n=6	0,7% n=20	18,8% n=570
Italy	0,3% n=9	1,5% n=45	3,7% n=113	1,4% n=41	3,3% n=101	1,2% n=37	4,4% n=132	5,0% n=151	20,8% n=629
Poland	0,0% n=0	0,1% n=3	1,7% n=52	0,4% n=13	4,4% n=133	7,8% n=237	0,4% n=12	0,3% n=10	15,2% n=460
Total	4,7% n=141	7,1% n=215	19,8% n=600	20,2% n=610	21,2% n=641	11,2% n=339	8,9% n=269	6,9% n=209	100,0% n=3024

Before adjustment, the structure of our sample was as below:

	GUE	GREEN	S&D	RENEW	EPP	ECR	ID	NI	Total
Germany	0,6% n=1	6,7% n=11	11,0% n=18	4,3% n=7	2,5% n=4	0,0% n=0	1,2% n=2	0,0% n=0	26,4% n=43
Belgium	0,0% n=0	1,8% n=3	0,0% n=0	1,2% n=2	0,0% n=0	0,6% n=1	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	3,7% n=6
Danemark	1,8% n=3	1,2% n=2	1,2% n=2	3,1% n=5	0,6% n=1	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	0,6% n=1	8,6% n=14
Spain	1,2% n=2	0,0% n=0	6,7% n=11	0,0% n=0	4,9% n=8	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	0,6% n=1	13,5% n=22
France	1,8% n=3	1,2% n=2	4,3% n=7	14,7% n=24	1,2% n=2	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	0,6% n=1	23,9% n=39
Italy	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	2,5% n=4	3,1% n=5	0,6% n=1	0,0% n=0	1,2% n=2	3,1% n=5	10,4% n=17
Poland	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	4,9% n=8	0,0% n=0	4,9% n=8	3,1% n=5	0,6% n=1	0,0% n=0	13,5% n=22
Total	5,5% n=9	11,0% n=18	30,7% n=50	26,4% n=43	14,7% n=24	3,7% n=6	3,1% n=5	4,9% n=8	100,0% n=163

Hence a discrepancy between reality and the sample as below:

	GUE	GREEN	S&D	RENEW	EPP	ECR	ID	NI	Total
Germany	5%	7%	-3%	-1%	-6%	0%	-2%	1%	2%
Belgium	1%	-1%	0%	-1%	-1%	0%	-1%	0%	-1%
Danemark	1%	1%	1%	-1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	3%
Spain	-1%	7%	-4%	4%	-2%	-1%	1%	0%	3%
France	0%	4%	14%	-11%	-3%	0%	2%	-1%	5%
Italy	0%	1%	-1%	-1%	0%	-1%	-4%	-4%	-10%
Poland	0%	5%	-2%	4%	-4%	-5%	0%	0%	-2%
Total	6%	24%	7%	-5%	-16%	-8%	-3%	-4%	0%

After adjustment on nationality and partisanship, the sample structure is as below:

	GUE	GREEN	S&D	RENEW	EPP	ECR	ID	NI	Total
Germany	1,4% n=2	4,3% n=6	7,5% n=11	3,3% n=5	7,2% n=11	0,0% n=0	3,0% n=4	0,0% n=0	26,7% n=39
Belgium	0,0% n=0	0,8% n=1	0,0% n=0	1,0% n=1	0,0% n=0	0,9% n=1	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	2,6% n=4
Danemark	0,5% n=1	0,5% n=1	1,8% n=3	2,0% n=3	0,5% n=1	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	0,5% n=1	5,8% n=9
Spain	1,3% n=2	0,0% n=0	4,5% n=7	0,0% n=0	2,7% n=4	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	0,4% n=1	8,9% n=13
France	1,2% n=2	0,4% n=1	1,1% n=2	13,2% n=20	3,9% n=6	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	0,7% n=1	20,5% n=30
Italy	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	4,1% n=6	1,5% n=2	3,7% n=5	0,0% n=0	4,8% n=7	5,5% n=8	19,6% n=29
Poland	0,0% n=0	0,0% n=0	1,9% n=3	0,0% n=0	4,9% n=7	8,6% n=13	0,4% n=1	0,0% n=0	15,8% n=23
Total	4,4% n=6	6,0% n=9	20,9% n=31	21,1% n=31	22,8% n=34	9,5% n=14	8,2% n=12	7,1% n=11	100,0% n=148

The sample representativeness was improved, the discrepancy between the adjusted sample and reality being minored:

	GUE	GREEN	S&D	RENEW	EPP	ECR	ID	NI	Total
Germany	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Belgium	0%	0%	-1%	0%	-1%	0%	-1%	0%	-2%
Danemark	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-1%	0%	0%
Spain	0%	0%	0%	-1%	0%	-1%	0%	0%	-1%
France	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Italy	0%	-1%	0%	0%	0%	-1%	0%	1%	-1%
Poland	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Total	0%	-1%	1%	1%	2%	-2%	-1%	0%	0%

Appendix 3 Questionnaire

The role of national parliaments

in the post-pandemic EU policy-making¹

The Coronavirus crisis has profoundly affected the European Union (EU) governance and the European societies themselves. The EU NextGeneration recovery plan decided by the heads of state and government in July 2020, accelerated the process of centralizing the mode of decision-making by the executives of the Member States and the European Union (ECOFIN Council, Eurogroup, European Commission). The €750 billion to be allocated within this plan provides a new lever to strengthen the European coordination of economic and budgetary policies.

On the occasion of the Conference on the Future of Europe, this questionnaire aims to sound out the preferences of members of national parliaments - representatives of European societies – as to the ways in which they could be better involved in the definition of European economic, social, environmental and fiscal policies.

The questionnaire is addressed to members of parliaments of 7 EU countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. The survey is anonymous: no names will be disclosed in any publications that will result from this study.

Biographical data:

European political party of affiliation:

Age:

Gender:

Main parliamentary committee:

Profession:

Year of obtaining the first parliamentary mandate:

¹ The questionnaire was composed of two parts. This paper accounts only for the first part presented above, while the second one related to EU economic governance is still subject of an ongoing research project.

I-Institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the role of national parliaments in the EU

1.1 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: National parliaments should play a stronger role in the EU policy-making.

- Yes
- No

1.2 In case you agree with the previous statement, which mechanism(s) do you consider most appropriate to strengthen the position of national parliaments in the EU decision-making ?

You can choose as many as you want:

- national MPs of each Member State should be able to adopt a mandate defining the position of their national government within the EU Council, as is the case in some northern European countries (i.e. Finland, Sweden, Denmark)
- half of the Chambers of national parliaments of EU Member States should be able to block the adoption of a draft European legislative act in case of its incompatibility with the principle of subsidiarity (currently, half of the national parliaments can only force the Council and the European Parliament to pronounce on the subject)
- a quarter of the chambers of national parliaments of EU Member States should be able to request the European Commission to present a draft legislative proposal
- national MPs should meet together with members of the European Parliament once every two years in a common forum to propose strategic orientations of the European Union
- a majority of the chambers of the national parliaments together with the European Parliament should be able to present a joint legislative proposal to the European Commission
- Other:

II-The idea of creating a European assembly composed of national parliamentarians

2.1 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

A European Assembly composed of national parliamentarians from the 27 Member States should be created in order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU.

- Yes
- No

2.2 If there is no consensus among the 27 Member States in favour of an European assembly, should we start by bringing together the assemblies of those Member States that wish to do so - following the example of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly - in order to strengthen the EU legitimacy.

- Yes
- No

Appendix 4 Constitutional federalism

Constitutional federalism is understood in our paper after Hooghe and Marks (2001; p. 192-194 Appendix 1) as constitutional or legal provisions relating to regional governance in the state as a whole and takes the value from 0-4. The 4-point scale includes the following criteria:

- existence of a functioning regional tier of government
- extensive authoritative competencies, including control over two or more of the following: taxation; police; education policy (including tertiary education); cultural policy; transport and communications policy; economic development; local government; and determination of regional political institutions (e.g., administrative hiring, budget process, timing of regional elections)
- specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed
- a federal state in which constitutional change is co-decided by the central state and regions

Constitutional federalism in selected Member States in 2000 according to Hooghe and Marks (2001):

Germany : 4

Belgium: 4

Spain: 3

Italy: 3

France : 2

Denmark: 0

Poland: 0