TRACING A DISCURSIVE SHIFT TOWARDS SECURITISATION IN EU ENERGY POLICY LEGITIMATION VIS-À-VIS UKRAINE DURING THE 2005-2006 AND 2008-2009 GAS CRISES

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Abbreviations

APEC: Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre
AI: artificial intelligence
CDA: critical discourse analysis
CDS: critical discourse studies
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CorpLingA: corpus linguistic approach
DHA: discourse-historical approach
DP: discursive psychology
DPA: dispositive analysis approach
DRA: dialectical-relational approach
EaP: Eastern Partnership
EP: European Parliament
EU: European Union
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
IR: International Relations (scholarly field)
IEA: International Energy Agency
IPA: Interpretive Policy Analysis
MCDA: multimodal approaches
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDT: Political Discourse Theory
RPA: Rhetorical Political Analysis
SCA: socio-cognitive approach
SocSem: social semiotics
SLEGM: Single Liberalised Electricity and Gas Market
ST: securitisation theory

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

QM: Q methodology

Introduction

The subject of this doctoral dissertation is the legitimation of European Union (EU) energy discourse regarding Ukraine. Specifically, this dissertation analyses how the EU has legitimised its energy policy towards Ukraine during the gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009.

The motivation to conduct this research has been the recent renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine since February 24, 2022, and its consequences for the European Union's energy security. These consequences are major.

Since Russia's renewed war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has found itself in a new energy crisis.[1] Energy is actively being used as a weapon by Russia against the European Union. Russian gas exports to the EU have decreased significantly[2] and in September 2022 the Nord Stream pipelines have been sabotaged, completely interrupting the flow of Russian gas to Germany under the Baltic Sea.[3] Pepe calls the impact of the Russian invasion on the EU's energy policy a "sea change".[4] The EU has presented REPowerEU as its plan to reform its energy system in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[5] Therefore, the EU's energy policy is changing rapidly and an understanding of these changes is not only highly relevant as a research topic, it is also necessary. The future of the EU's energy balance is at stake.

In this light, the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009 are of special interest. These crises can be seen as embryonic examples of the 2022 gas crisis. In January 2006, gas was cut off towards Ukraine, but gas still flowed from Ukraine to European countries. The 2009 gas crisis was much more severe: gas was cut off to Ukraine and for two weeks, no gas flowed to the EU at all. This was a situation the EU has never found itself in before, nor would it again until the year 2022. In a situation of crisis, you can expect actors to change their behaviour. REPowerEU is an example of the EU changing its behaviour: the EU claims to be getting rid of Russian fossil

[1] "Timeline – EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine," *European Council* (website), accessed March 7, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/timeline-eu-response-ukraine-invasion/.
[2] Vitaly Yermakov, ""Catch 2022" for Russian gas: plenty of capacity amid disappearing market – Key Takeaways for Year 2022 and Beyond," *The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies* (January 2023): 2.
[3] Yermakov, ""Catch 2022" for Russian gas," 8.
[4] Jacopo Maria Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock: the short and long-term impact on EU energy security," *Geopolitics and Energy Security in Europe: How do we move forward?* (FES Just Climate and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: 2023): 9.
[5] "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition,*" *European Commission* (website), accessed March 7, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. * stands for: updated 18 May 2022.

fuels entirely in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[6] The question remains why the EU only reacted in this rigorous manner now. As the literature review will show, the gas crisis of 2006 has had a significant impact on the EU's energy policy. If that is the case, how could the EU have been impacted to the extent it was in 2022? An analysis of the EU's legitimation of its energy policy during the 2006 and 2009 gas crises can provide a better understanding of this question by showing how the EU reacted to the gas cuts of those years.

A crucial component in such an analysis is an understanding of how the EU understood energy security at the time. As the literature review will show, energy security is a highly contested concept. Since we can expect actors to change their behaviour during crisis situations, we can expect the 2006 and 2009 gas crises to have had an impact on the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security. By understanding the evolution of the EU's understanding of energy security during the previous gas crises of 2006 and 2009, this dissertation will provide context that will help future research to understand the 2022 gas crisis. Therefore, the current socio-political context of the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2022 energy crisis have been major inspirations for this research and this dissertation aims to provide a better understanding of this context.

In order to analyse the EU's legitimation of its energy policy, Michał Krzyżanowski's[7] three-step normalisation model will be applied to a corpus of data collected for the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. Krzyżanowski's model is part of the discourse-historical approach (DHA), which is an approach within critical discourse analysis (CDA).[8] Since the aim of this dissertation is to analyse if and if so to what extent the EU's understanding of energy security has evolved during the two gas crises, Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model is the perfect tool for analysing the EU's legitimation of its energy policy, as it is specifically designed to determine whether a discursive shift has taken place.[9] Discursive shifts as seen by Krzyżanowski consist of three stages: the introduction of a discourse, the spreading of that discourse and the discourse contributing to a deeper change in norms of public expression.[10] Therefore, if any shift in discourse has taken place, Krzyżanowski's model is able to detect it. A more elaborate discussion on Krzyżanowski's model and how it will be applied to the corpus

[6] "REPowerEU," *European Commission* (website), accessed March 7, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131.
[7] This model will be elaborated upon in the Chapters on the literature review and the methodology.
[8] Michał Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism: imaginaries of immigration, moral panics and the discourse of contemporary right-wing populism," *Social Semiotics* 30, no. 4 (2020): 508.
[9] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 511.
[10] Ibid., 508.

of data will follow in the literature review and the Chapter on the theoretical background and methodology respectively.

The application of Krzyżanowski's model places the contribution of this research in the scholarly domain of discourse analysis. Previously, the application of the three-step normalisation model has been limited to a specific type of discourse: right-wing and racist discourse.[11] This research applies the model to a different type of discourse altogether: legitimation in the field of International Relations (IR). In its essence, this dissertation has aimed at testing the applicability of Krzyżanowski's model to IR discourse. Its subsequent success means that this dissertation has made a major contribution to the field of both IR and discourse analysis. Now that it has been determined that it is possible to apply the model to an actor like the European Union, venues for future research have been opened up. For example, future research could apply the model to different state-actors like Ukraine and Russia. In addition, the model could be tested to non-Western discourse. For example, increasingly belligerent Chinese discourse vis-à-vis Taiwan could be analysed. Further recommendations for future research will be elaborated upon in the Conclusion of this research.

One could argue that the focus of the analysis on just EU discourse is a limitation to this research. This, of course, was an active choice. As stated above, analysing the EU's discourse in this dissertation by applying the three-step normalisation model was a test. Now that this test has succeeded, can other actors be considered. In addition, a focus on just the European Union's energy legitimation discourse turned out to fit the scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, if Russian discourse would have been included in the analysis, another important actor (arguably the most important actor), Ukraine, would have lacked complete agency, which is difficult to justify when while conducting a discourse analysis and considering the context of the renewed invasion of 2022: Ukraine is literally fighting for its survival.

The objectives of this dissertation are manifold. First, the main objective of this research is to identify how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security evolved during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. Second, by conducting this research, this dissertation aims to fill a gap in International Relations literature. Other objectives of this research are listed in the chapter on the methodology employed in this dissertation. Related to these objectives are, of course, the research questions. The main research question that is answered in this doctoral dissertation is

[11] This will be explained in further detail in the literature review. The literature that is referred to is: Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 503-527 and Michał Krzyżanowski, "Normalization and the discursive construction of "new" norms and "new" normality: discourse in the paradoxes of populism and neoliberalism," *Social Semiotics* 30, no 4 (2020): 431-448.

"To what extent is it possible to identify a discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine by applying the three-step normalisation model on discursive shifts during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009?" This research question and others[12] will be answered by applying Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model to the gas crises of 2006 and 2009.

Krzyżanowski's model is part of the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse analysis. As such, the DHA of CDA is the methodology of this dissertation. The theoretical background is discourse analysis and its concepts in general. A detailed explication of theoretical background and the methodology will follow in Chapter II. In employing the DHA and the three-step normalisation model, this dissertation traces the concept of *discursive shifts* as conceptualised by Krzyżanowski[13] in EU texts on its energy policy regarding Ukraine. By analysing the EU's legitimation of its energy policy vis-à-vis Ukraine through a formal-content related analysis of argumentation schemes, this dissertation determines that the EU uses legitimation as a strategy in order to normalise the securitisation of its energy policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. This is the main conclusion of this dissertation: a discursive shift towards securitisation has occurred during both gas crises, which resulted in a broader discursive change of securitisation of the EU's energy policy discourse towards Ukraine that expanded the EU's concept of energy security to include sustainability and environmental aspects besides the security of supply. Krzyżanowski's model has been applied to a corpus of data that consists of 101 texts. In these texts, 927 argumentation schemes were found and individually analysed. Each individual argumentation scheme with its accompanying legitimation schemes can be found in the Appendices.

This doctoral dissertation is structured as follows. First, a literature review will be presented which will focus on the dominant conceptions of energy policy, energy security, the EU's understanding of energy security, discourse analysis and the main theoretical concepts of discourse analysis related to this dissertation. This literature review will show that the application of the three-step normalisation model to the field of IR is a major contribution to the field, since this has not been done before. Second, Chapter II will outline the theoretical background and the methodology. This Chapter will explicate how the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse analysis relates specifically to this dissertation. Third, as part of

[12] There are thirteen research questions in total. These are outlined in Chapter II.
[13] Michał Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts: Analysing EU policy discourses on climate change," in: P. Cap and U. Okulska (eds) *Analysing New Genres in Political Communication* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013): 105.

the DHA, Chapter III will provide the macro socio-political context. This consists of two parts. First, the broader context of the renewed Russian invasion of 2022 will be outlined, as this is the context that this dissertation is situated in. It is this context that this aims to clarify with its analysis. Second, the immediate context of EU-Ukraine relations before and during the Orange Revolution will be provided as well as the consequences of the Orange Revolution for EU-Ukraine relations. It is this context in which the case studies, the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, are situated. Chapter IV will provide an overview of the collected data and the analysis proceeds in Chapters V and VI. Chapter VII will compare the data found in Chapters V and VI and determine to what extent a discursive shift has taken place and what the consequences of these results are. Implications for future research are included in this Chapter. Lastly, the Conclusion will summarise the findings of this research, after which the Bibliography and the Appendices will follow. The Appendices contain both the entire corpus of data and the step-by-step analyses of the legitimation strategies.

Before this dissertation proceeds to the Literature Review, it is necessary to provide more context to the writing of this research. As with any PhD project, this research has shifted orientation over the past four years. Initially, this dissertation aimed to discursively trace the origins of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. When this research was started in 2019, the war in the Donbas region of Ukraine had not ended, but it had more or less stabilised. In December 2019, there was an agreement between Russia and Ukraine to achieve a ceasefire before the end of that year.[14] Therefore, prospects for a resolution of the conflict seemed better than before. A major escalation did not seem to be looming on the horizon. In hindsight, this perspective seems naïve. Nevertheless, Russia's renewed invasion of February 24, 2022 and its results came as a shock to many in the Western world. Most Western experts expected a quick Russian victory.[15] Taras Kuzio states that Russian narratives had been making their ways into the Western analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.[16] After the war started and Ukraine stood its ground, many Western analysts started to realise that their previous analyses were wrong. While it is clear that this overhaul in thinking came too late, the realisation that the Western perspective needed to

[14] Holly Ellyatt, "Russia and Ukraine make small steps toward peace, but no big leap." *CNBC* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/10/russia-and-ukraine-agree-to-ceasefire-by-the-end-of-2019.html.

[15] See: Taras Kuzio, "How Western Experts Got the Ukraine War So Wrong," *Geopolitical Monitor* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/how-western-experts-got-the-ukraine-war-so-wrong/ and Tatiana Vorozhko, "Three Reasons Most Analysts Were Wrong on War in Ukraine," *Voa News* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/three-reasons-most-analysts-were-wrong-on-war-in-ukraine/6974782.html.

[16] Tatiana Vorozhko, "Three Reasons Most Analysts Were Wrong on War in Ukraine," *Voa News* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/three-reasons-most-analysts-were-wrong-on-war-in-ukraine/6974782.html.

be changed has been a welcome development. This dissertation has also needed to adapt to the new situation.

Initially this dissertation wanted to get to the bottom of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013-2014. The plan was to analyse EU and Russian discourse from 2005 to 2013 and to trace how this discourse evolved historically in order to identify whether, and if so to what extent, it would have been possible to predict the events of 2014 through an analysis of intentions behind legitimations in policy. The initial plan was to analyse three time periods: the first two gas crises, the introduction of the Eastern Partnership and the introduction of the Association Agreement.

During the collection of data and the initial analysis it became clear that this project was too ambitious. Conducting a critical discourse analysis manually takes a lot of time and this research had to be finished within a given time period. Therefore, it was decided to change the scope of the research and limit it to an analysis of the first two gas crises. When Russia launched its renewed invasion in February 2022, the manual analysis of the EU's discourse (see the Appendices) of that time period was finished. Since the invasion had severe impacts on the EU's energy security[17] and all data analysed up to that point was related to energy, it was decided to shift the focus of the dissertation to EU energy security. In addition, the previous frame of the research (one of "competition" over Ukraine between the EU and Russia) was deemed to be subject to the problem identified by Kuzio[18]: it framed Ukraine as a weak state, which could be a reflection of a Russian narrative. Therefore, the frame of the research had to be changed. With this shift in aims of analysis, the tools of analysis had to be adjusted and it was then that Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model was found along with the gap in International Relations literature. The combination of the shift away from the previous frame, the data on energy policy and the application of the three-step normalisation model made this research a useful contribution to literature on discourse analysis and International Relations. Incidentally, the decision to focus on the EU's energy policy turned out to be a highly relevant one.

No researcher or research project can be perfect. However, by outlining the evolution of this research, I hope to have shown that in the writing of this doctoral dissertation, I have

[17] Alex Lawson, "'Energy battle' between Europe and Russia not over, says global watchdog," *The Guardian* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/feb/23/energy-battle-europe-russia-international-energy-agency.
[18] Tatiana Vorozhko, "Three Reasons Most Analysts Were Wrong on War in Ukraine," *Voa News* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/three-reasons-most-analysts-were-wrong-on-war-in-ukraine/6974782.html.

tried my best to adapt to the situation as best as I could, as befits a researcher applying a critical discourse analysis.

Chapter I – Literature review

1.1 Introduction

The following literature review reflects the interdisciplinary approach of this doctoral dissertation. The research method that will be applied throughout this dissertation is the discourse-historical approach (DHA) of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is an interdisciplinary approach. While it is "fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language,"[19] context needs to be taken into account, since one needs to look beyond spoken or written text and also theorise and describe both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects create meanings in their interaction with texts.[20] As such, concepts like energy policy, energy security and the European Union's understanding of these concepts form crucial context for this dissertation. Therefore, this literature review will cover several topics, ranging from energy policy and energy security to critical discourse analysis. An overview of the definitions of these concepts is crucial in order to fully grasp the context surrounding the analysis. As will be shown below, energy policy is difficult to define and it always has to be seen in its appropriate context. That is why the EU's understanding of energy policy has to be explained in this literature review. This chapter will outline the dominant understandings within the EU on energy policy and energy security. It is one of the aims of this dissertation to see to what extent the EU's understanding of energy policy vis-à-vis Ukraine has evolved after the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. The literature review will help in providing background information on energy policy and its components.

In addition, the theoretical background of the analytical framework employed in this dissertation will be explained. The most important aspects of Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model will be outlined and, most importantly, the literature review will explain how the application of this model will contribute to the literature.

The choice of the authors examined regarding the topic of energy policy and energy security has to be explained. The research of this dissertation will focus on the legitimation of energy policy discourse of the EU regarding Ukraine in the period 2005-2009. The publications of these authors roughly coincide with this timeframe. An understanding of the dominant

[19] Ruth Wodak, "What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and its developments," in: *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001): 2.
[20] Wodak, "What CDA is about," 2-3.

conceptions of energy and energy security at that time is a prerequisite for the analysis of this dissertation.

1.2 Energy policy

Any attempt at defining energy policy reveals the complexity of the term. As Aalto et al. show, energy represents a significant component of economic development.[21] As such, it is one of the keys objectives of the state to develop policies and strategies to balance a country's energy supply and consumption. Aalto et al. define energy policy by referring to Goldemberg and Johansson and Owen: energy policy concerns all activities of the energy industry, including the extraction and development of resources, energy production, the transport and distribution of energy resources and end products as well as the consumption of energy.[22] Aalto et al. highlight the fact that energy policy spans several sectors of policy: economic policy, environmental policy, foreign policy, security policy and social policy. Referring to Tosun et al., Aalto et al. show that because energy policy spans several policy sectors, many actors from different fields interact in an attempt to formulate energy policy.[23] It is clear that energy policy is a complex subject for which there is no one easy definition.

Aalto et al. try to narrow the scope of the term energy policy by looking at developed countries specifically. For member states of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), energy policy focuses on three key objectives: security of supply, markets and environmental sustainability.[24] However, the authors acknowledge that the term is rather complex by stating that "The cross-sectoral and dynamic character of energy policy, whereby it affects and is affected by a large number of factors and actors, eschews any efforts to arrive at a general definition that would fully cover its multifaceted nature."[25] This explains, according to Aalto et al., why relatively few definitions of energy policy exist in the scholarship on the issue. Aalto et al. mention a few authors as having come up with short and generic definitions: Prontera, Hoppe et al. and Wang et al. These will now be considered in detail, since Aalto et al. do not do consider these sources in detail.

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[21] Pami Aalto, Ilkka Ruostetsaari, Kim Talus and C. Johannes Muth, "Energy Policies in the Context of Sustainable Development," 1-11, in: *Affordable and Clean Energy. Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals*, W. Leal Filho, A. Azul, L. Brandli, P. Özuyar and T. Wall (eds). Springer, Cham. 2019: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71057-0_10-1.
[22] Aalto et al., "Energy Policies in the Context of Sustainable Development," 1-11.
[23] Ibid., 1-11.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

Prontera's definition of energy policy draws from other scholars, much like Aalto et al.'s definition. Prontera draws from McGowan to state that "Energy policy involves interventions in the sectors of coal, electricity, oil and gas, as well as nuclear and renewable energy, and the activities aimed at improving energy efficiency in supply and consumption."[26] Prontera defines this definition as more general and in order to define energy policy more precisely the author uses another distinction by McGowan between official energy policy and unofficial energy policy.[27] Official energy policy can be defined as a strategy that is clearly elaborated and explicitly formulated by the government, in order to govern the current and future energetic balance. Unofficial energy policy on the other hand involves those policies that the government adopts for different reasons but that influence the energy sectors, the firms operating within the energy sectors and the energy balance, be it intentionally or accidentally.[28] Another differentiation made by Prontera is between energy policy as a whole and specific subsets of intervention within this broader set.[29] Prontera states that from this distinction it is possible to "individuate for each country a general energy policy, various specific policies for the different sources of energy …, and other decisions aimed at intervening on trasversal problems."[30] Prontera then goes on to identify specific characteristics of energy problems. Comparing Prontera's definition of energy policy with Aalto et al.'s attempt at defining energy policy, it does indeed seem short and generic. Nevertheless, Prontera engaged the concept in a similar manner as Aalto et al. did: both scholars drew from existing literature.

Hoppe et al. is interesting because their article presents key theoretical concepts from the discipline of energy studies and shows how they can be of use in multidisciplinary energy research.[31] After defining energy policy in general, Hoppe et al. specifically review academic literature on the use of policy study concepts in academic literature on energy policy in The Netherlands. Hoppe et al. state that energy policy can be defined in different ways and that energy policy differs per country.[32] They compare the United States, the European Union and the Netherlands in this regard. In the United States, energy policy addresses the issues of energy production, distribution and consumption, and energy policies are basically formulated to

[26] Andrea Prontera, "Energy Policy: Concepts, Actors, Instruments and Recent Developments," *World Political Science Review* 5, no. 1 (2009): 2.
[27] Prontera, "Energy Policy," 2.
[28] Ibid., 2-3.
[29] Ibid., 3.
[30] Ibid. Spelling mistake is part of the quote.
[31] Thomas Hoppe, Frans Coenen, Maya van den Berg, "Illustrating the use of concepts from the discipline of policy studies in energy research: An explorative literature review," *Energy Research & Social Science* 21 (2016): 12.
[32] Hoppe et al., "Illustrating the use of concepts from the discipline of policy studies in energy research," 13.

combat energy problems. The European Union, on the other hand, uses energy policy to make sure that three objectives are met: to safeguard secure supplies to ensure reliable provision of energy; to ensure that energy providers operate in a competitive environment that ensures affordable prices for consumers; and to stimulate sustainable energy consumption, to lower greenhouse gas emissions, pollution and fossil fuel dependence. In the Netherlands, energy policy is defined as the set of policy measures and instruments to assure reliable, affordable and clean supply of energy carriers, on the short and long run to spur sustainable, economic development of economies on both the macro, micro and meso level. Hoppe et al. state that "In sum, energy policy concerns the set of policy instruments that are used to ensure reliable, affordable, clean energy provision, and spur economic development."[33] While this definition is indeed short, it goes beyond Prontera's definition in that it provides more specificity on supply and demand.

Wang et al. developed a visualisation of research trends worldwide in energy policy studies over the past five decades in order to analyse what role academic policy research has played in influencing the directions of policy outcomes and how research has intertwined with notable issues globally.[34] The findings of their article are an aid to decision makers drawing insights from specific policy studies within a fully transparent view of the historical context on a global scale. Their article does not look at the definition of energy policy, but at how research on energy policy has developed. The findings of the article correspond with the observations made by the scholars considered above: Wang et al. state that their research shows that research on energy policy is a multi-disciplinary endeavour with many actors and stakeholders operating at different levels in national and international contexts.[35] Disciplines like economics, sociology, geography, political science, philosophy, engineering, urban planning and environmental studies formed the backbone of energy policy research. Wang et al. therefore provide a welcome extra understanding on energy policy: they show that not only energy policy itself is multi-disciplinary and spanning across policy areas,[36] the research that is done in relation to energy policy is also multi-disciplinary and involves multiple policy areas.

While being short and generic,[37] these definitions do provide important insights into what energy policy comprises. Energy policy differs per country and its actualisation depends

[33] Hoppe et al., "Illustrating the use of concepts from the discipline of policy studies in energy research," 13.
[34] Xiaoling Wang, Jatin Nathwani, and Chunyou Wu, "Visualisation of International Energy Policy Research," *Energies* 9, no. 2 (2016): 1.
[35] Wang et al., "Visualisation of International Energy Policy Research," 11.
[36] As shown by Aalto et al., Prontera and Hoppe et al.
[37] In the words of Aalto et al., 1-11.

on context, energy policy spans multiple policy areas and the research into energy policy confirms this.

Aalto et al. mention several authors that grasp the fact that energy policy spans multiple policy areas: Braun and Glidden, and Tosun.[38] Of these, Braun and Glidden might have the simplest definition: "Energy policy guides how a country uses energy and from what sources it gets energy. It can be crafted proactively to achieve certain outcomes or reactively to address the already existing problematic issues. The government writes laws, issues orders, or crafts incentives and disincentives to implement and enforce the policy. Energy policy affects transportation, heating, business, households, the military, and imports and exports…"[39] Aalto et al. state that Braun and Glidden acknowledge the important role of the government regarding energy policy, which is something that is further emphasized by Tosun, whose definition of energy policy starts by mentioning that it comprises the rules concerning energy sources.[40]

Concluding, this overview of definitions of the concept of energy policy has shown that energy policy is a complex term that comprises multiple policy areas. It is therefore multifaceted and its definition is actually contextual, which makes it hard to grasp. For the purposes of this dissertation, which analyses EU energy policy legitimation vis-à-vis Ukraine, it is therefore important to look at how the EU defines energy policy.

1.3 EU energy policy

Before getting into the scholarship on the EU's energy policy, the general principles should be defined. According to the European Parliament, at the core of the EU's energy policy are "A variety of measures aiming to achieve an integrated energy market, security of energy supply and a sustainable energy sector".[41] The challenges facing the EU in the field of energy as defined by the European Parliament are issues like increasing import dependency, limited diversification, high and volatile energy prices, growing global energy demand, security risks affecting producing and transit countries, the growing threats of climate change, decarbonisation, slow progress in energy efficiency, challenges posed by the increasing share of renewables, and the need for increased transparency, further integration and interconnection in energy markets. This definition reflects the main conclusions on energy policy in general

[38] Aalto et al., "Energy Policies in the Context of Sustainable Development," 1-11.
[39] Timothy F. Braun and Lisa M. Glidden, "Basic energy and policy concepts," in: *Understanding energy and energy policy* (Zed Books, London: 2014): 29-30.
[40] Aalto et al., "Energy Policies in the Context of Sustainable Development," 1-11.
[41] Matteo Ciucci, "Energy policy: general principles," *Fact Sheets on the European Union – European Parliament* (website), accessed January 24, 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/68/energy-policy-general-principles.

that we have seen above: energy policy is a complex issue that spans several policy areas. This is true for the EU, albeit in its own specific context.

The legal basis for the EU's energy policy is Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).[42] Specific provisions can be found in different Articles of the TFEU. The specific objectives of the EU's energy policy are formulated by the Energy Union in 2015.[43] First, the EU aims to diversify Europe's sources of energy, ensuring energy security through solidarity and cooperation between EU member states. Second, the EU aims to ensure the functioning of a fully integrated internal energy market, to enable the free flow of energy through the EU through adequate infrastructure and without technical or regulatory barriers. Third, the EU aims to improve energy efficiency and to reduce dependence on energy imports, to cut emissions and to drive jobs and growth. Fourth, the EU aims to decarbonise its economy and move towards a low-carbon economy in line with the Paris Agreement. Fifth and last, the EU aims to promote research in low-carbon and clean energy technologies, and to prioritise research and innovation to drive the energy transition and to improve its competitiveness.

The legal basis of Article 194 of the TFEU and the objectives identified by the Energy Union in 2015 relate to the EU's current energy policy. The case studies that will be considered in this dissertation have as their timeframe 2005-2006 and 2008-2009. The TFEU went into force outside of the timeframe considered for this research. Therefore, in order to understand the EU's conceptualisation of energy policy in relation to the scope of this dissertation, we have to consider the scholarship that deals with EU energy policy before the TFEU went into force.

Haghighi, in a book that claims to be "the first comprehensive assessment of the various internal and external measures undertaken by the European Union to guarantee security of oil and gas supply"[44], gives an overview of the issue of energy in the framework of the policies of the European Union. Haghighi shows that since the inception of the European Communities, efforts have been undertaken to include the energy sector in the overall framework of European policymaking.[45] The debate on the pooling of energy markets can be traced back as far as the creation of the Treaty Establishing the Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty Establishing

[42] Ciucci, "Energy policy: general principles," *Fact Sheets on the European Union – European Parliament* (website), accessed January 24, 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/68/energy-policy-general-principles.
[43] Ciucci, "Energy policy," *Fact Sheets on the European Union – European Parliament* (website), accessed January 24, 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/68/energy-policy-general-principles.
[44] Sanam S. Haghighi, "Energy Security," in: *Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries*, eds. Andrew Robertson, and Hang Wu Tang (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc: 2007): i.
[45] Haghighi, "Introduction," in: *Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries*, eds. Andrew Robertson, and Hang Wu Tang (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc: 2007): 4.

the European Atomic Energy Community. However, member states were too reluctant to pool their energy markets, so a common energy policy did not materialise. Haghighi shows that a first success in this direction occurred in 1996 when the Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity was created, which was followed by the Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas in 1998. Since the pooling of energy markets together was a new phenomenon, the focus was on securing an efficient and functioning internal energy market. The regulation of this market focused on the internal security of energy supply, while the external security of supply was overlooked.[46] So, Haghighi shows us that demand management issues (like energy saving, energy efficiency, climate change) were increasingly addressed at the Community level, while dependence on external sources of energy was not really addressed.[47]

According to Tekin and Williams, the EU only started to appreciate the urgency of energy security in 2006, after the first gas crisis.[48] Before that, no significant common policy on energy had emerged yet, since it was considered to be something strategic by the member states,[49] which is also shown by Haghighi above. Member states simply did not want to transfer sovereignty in this field to the EU. In November 2000 already the Commission highlighted the risks and shortcomings of this individualistic approach that the member states took regarding energy.[50] In March 2006, after the first gas crisis, a new Green Paper called for an actual common strategic objective in terms of energy.[51] Since, according to Tekin and Williams, the EU has little influence over the regions critical to its energy security (the Caspian Basin, Russia and the Middle East), the EU could turn to Turkey, which could play a favourable role in providing the EU with influence over its energy producers.[52] The rest of the article relates how Turkey could help the EU in each of these regions respectively. Tekin's and Williams' article highlights how the first gas crisis has played a very significant and transformative role in the EU's understanding of energy. In fact, the authors suggest that it was only after the first gas crisis that there was an EU-wide understanding of the need to meet the EU's core objectives regarding energy.[53]

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[46] Haghighi, "Introduction," in: *Energy Security*: 4-5.
[47] Ibid., 5.
[48] Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security: The Pipeline Connection," *East European Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (January 2009): 419. The first gas crisis refers to the situation in 2006 during which gas supplies to Ukraine were cut off from Russia. This affected the EU, since at that time four fifths of Russian gas exports to Europe went through Ukraine.
[49] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," 420.
[50] Ibid., 420.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., 422.
[53] Ibid., 420.

Kaveshnikov shows how since the beginning of the 2000s, integration was seen as the primary solution of the problem of EU energy security through the single liberalised electricity and gas market (SLEGM).[54] The main task of the SLEGM was liberalisation, which had as its aim to establish a high level of competition between energy companies which, in turn, should lead to the levelling of energy tariffs in different member states and to a general price reduction. Kaveshnikov quotes Noël from an ECFR Policy Brief from 2008 that "the most efficient solution to the Russian gas problem lies not in the development of an external energy policy, but in further restructuring the EU's internal market".[55] Kaveshnikov then repeats Noël's point that a liberalised market such as envisioned by SLEGM would create a maximum degree of solidarity among European gas consumers and increase collective security through redistribution of gas flows in cases of crises. What is interesting here is the fact that only integration was seen as a solution to the EU's energy security issues. There seemed to be an assumption that gas from Russia would keep flowing, which is especially interesting when considering that Noël's policy brief was written in 2008, before the second gas crisis occurred during which gas flows from Russia to Europe were halted completely. While an integrated an internal energy market could mitigate the effects of supply crises by redistributing gas flows, it cannot solve the issue of gas flows being halted entirely.

A closer look at the policy brief reveals that Noël indeed argues that the national differences in gas dependency on Russia in the EU would not matter too much if there were a single European gas market.[56] Furthermore, Noël argues that "Europe wants to depoliticise the EU-Russia gas relationship in order to integrate Russian gas imports into a competitive pan-European gas market and to maximise the volumes it can import from Russia."[57] This is an argumentation that this dissertation contests: as the discourse analysis will show, after first gas crisis the EU's energy policy legitimation vis-a-vis Ukraine started to become securitised, which is the exact opposite of depoliticisation.

Kaveshnikov points out that in September 2009, the EU adopted the Third Package, which was a set of measures that would improve the functioning of the SLEGM.[58] The Third Package increased state control over the energy sector, which, according to Kaveshnikov, is an indirect acknowledgement that a liberalised energy market is unable to guarantee the

[54] Nikolay Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security in relations between Russia and the European Union," *European Security* 19, no. 4 (2010): 591.
[55] Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security," *European Security* 19, no. 4 (2010): 591.
[56] Pierre Noël, "Beyond Dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas," *ECFR Policy Brief* (November 2008): 2.
[57] Noël, "Beyond Dependence," *ECFR Policy Brief* (November 2008): 2.
[58] Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security," *European Security* 19, no. 4 (2010): 592.

investment required for infrastructure development. This can be linked to the point made earlier that the EU instead of depoliticising its energy policy continued to securitise its energy policy legitimation. Kaveshnikov mentions that the EU did gain significant competences in the energy sector with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.[59] However, under Lisbon, which is still in force at the time of writing, EU member states are still completely free to regulate the energy production in their territory and the import of energy resources, including the choice of suppliers. Therefore, it remains to be seen to what extent the inclusion of energy into the Treaty of Lisbon actually helps in creating a single EU energy policy. As the Treaty of Lisbon went into force after the second gas crisis,[60] this is not a question that will be considered during this dissertation.

This section has highlighted how the EU's energy policy was a sensitive issue for the individual member states, which prevented it from becoming an EU-wide policy until its inclusion into the Treaty of Lisbon. Furthermore, when energy was discussed at the Community level, it concerned demand management issues, not the dependence on external sources of energy like transit countries or supplier countries. In addition, there is a clear focus on energy security in the EU's energy policy. However, the EU has only started to focus on energy security since the first gas crisis in 2005-2006 altered the EU's understanding of energy. It is clear that energy security plays a core role in the EU's energy policy. Given this clear focus, the term energy security needs to be addressed. While the discussion above has proceeded with a general understanding of the term "energy security", it has to be acknowledged that this term is quite contested. In order to understand the EU's energy policy (and thereby its legitimation discourse on energy policy), it is necessary to understand what energy security exactly is and subsequently how the EU understands it.

In addition, this section has highlighted the importance of the first gas crisis of 2005-2006 for the development of the EU's energy policy. It was after this first gas crisis that the Commission called for the Member States to agree on a common strategic objective regarding energy.[61] This significance is one of the reasons that this dissertation will focus on the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 as case studies. Another reason for this focus is the disruption in gas flows from Russia to the EU following the 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine by Russia. This will be elaborated upon in the methodology chapter.

[59] Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security," *European Security* 19, no. 4 (2010): 594.
[60] The Treaty of Lisbon went into force on 1 December 2009; the second gas crisis ended at the end of January 2009.
[61] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," 420.

1.4 Dominant definitions of energy security

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an international organisation "created to ensure secure and affordable energy supplies"[62], which makes its definition of energy security relevant in any discussion on energy security. According to the IEA, energy security is "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price."[63] Furthermore, the IEA distinguishes between long-term and short-term security.[64] Short-term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy system to react to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance, whereas long-term energy security deals with investments to supply energy in line with economic developments and environmental needs.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also has a definition of energy security: "having stable access to energy sources on a timely, sustainable and affordable basis."[65] This definition is effectively the same as the IEA's overall definition of energy security. The OSCE does not make a distinction between long-term and short-term energy security however. The organisation does state why energy security is an important part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security: access to security is not only crucial in supporting the provision of basic needs, but it is first and foremost a precondition to economic growth, political stability and prosperity.[66] Here we see that the OSCE creates a direct link between energy security and security in general, which is something the IEA does not do in the definition on its website.

NATO also links energy security to security in general, by stating that energy security plays an important role in the common security of NATO allies, and that the disruption of energy supply could affect security within the societies of NATO member and partner countries.[67] Furthermore, the alliance states that the disruption of energy supply could have an impact on NATO military operations. Here we see that NATO mainly focuses on the supply side of energy security, which means that the focus is on the short-term aspect of the IEA's definition of energy security is considered. The long-term aspect of energy security is touched upon by NATO in an almost indirect manner: NATO states that "In times of the global energy

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[62] "Energy Security," *International Energy Agency* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security.
[63] "Our work on energy security," *International Energy Agency* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security.
[64] Our work on energy security," *International Energy Agency* (website), accessed October 9, 2022, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security.
[65] "Energy Security," *OSCE* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.osce.org/oceea/446236.
[66] "Energy Security," *OSCE* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.osce.org/oceea/446236.
[67] "Energy security," *NATO* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm.

transition, energy efficiency and innovative energy solutions help the military to become more sustainable, while maintaining operational effectiveness."[68]

The European Commission has an interesting approach to energy. On its website regarding the topic of "energy", the Commission states the following: "EU policies aim to deliver secure, sustainable and affordable energy for citizens and businesses."[69] This definition is similar to the one stated by the IEA and the OSCE. However, under the heading "Energy security", the Commission states that "The EU works to ensure that energy supplies from abroad are secure and affordable."[70] Here we see the same interesting deviation from the IEA definition of energy security as done by NATO: the EU only focuses on the energy supply side of energy security. The actual Commission website related to energy security does not tell us much: it merely shows the following headings: "EU Energy Platform", "Secure gas supplies", "Gas storage". "Diversification of gas supply sources and routes", "Security of electricity supply", "EU oil stocks", "Offshore oil and gas safety", "Oil and gas licensing", "Critical infrastructure and cybersecurity" and "Energy supply and pandemics".[71] This page indeed only displays information on energy supplies from abroad. This website gives the impression that the EU only focuses on the short-term part of the definition of energy security provided by the IEA, namely the ability of the energy system to react to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance. Related to energy security, the Commission does not talk about long-term energy security whatsoever.

This outline of definitions of energy security by several international organisations has given an overview of how the concept is used. This overview is necessary in order to examine how energy security is understood by the European Union. Before we acquire an understanding of the EU's definition of energy security, the scholarship on energy security itself has to be considered.

1.5 Scholarship on energy security

Cherp and Jewell wrote a paper on the concept of energy security. In their short overview of the evolution of the literary field of energy security, they state that energy security emerged as a policy problem in the early 20th century in connection with supplying oil for

[68] "Energy security," *NATO* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm.
[69] "Energy," *European Commission* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/index_en.
[70] "Energy," *European Commission* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/index_en.
[71] "Energy security," *European Commission* (website), accessed October 8, 2022, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security_en.

armies.[72] Academic work on the concept of energy security started in the 1960s and the oil crisis of the 1970s solidified the field. In the late 1980s and 1990s interest in the field decreased following the stabilisation of oil prices and the receding threat of embargoes, in the 2000s however interest in the field re-emerged because of several factors: an increase in demand in Asia, disruptions of gas supplies in Europe and the pressure to decarbonise energy systems. In their introduction, Cherp and Jewell make a distinction between contemporary and classic energy security studies.[73] In classic energy security studies, in the 1970s and 1980s, energy security meant stable supply of cheap oil under threats of embargoes and price manipulations by exporters. Contemporary energy security studies look beyond oil supplies and look at a wider range of issues. In addition, energy security is now linked to other energy policy problems such as mitigating climate change and providing equitable access to modern energy. Thus, Cherp and Jewell state, the concept of energy security implicit in the classic studies has become the subject of re-examination. The authors state that it is "a common observation that energy security means different things in different situations and to different people."[74] For them, the different meanings of energy security do not necessarily mean the existence of different concepts of energy security. Rather, Cherp and Jewell state, in some cases the same concept of energy security may find a different expression under different conditions. This, the authors state, stresses the need for conceptual clarity. In the remainder of their article Cherp and Jewell critically analyse an influential scheme of classifying energy security, the four As of energy security (availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability), and propose to define energy security as the low vulnerability of vital energy systems, since this conceptualisation allows for addressing questions that bring together insights from several scientific disciplines to advance the science of energy security, as well as support informed policy making, better policy analysis and learning.[75] In short, their definition allows for a broader scope of the concept of energy security.

Regarding the four As of energy security that Cherp and Jewell mention, two of these (availability and affordability) are at the heart of the International Energy Agency's mainstream definition of energy security and they were featured in the classic energy security studies in the 1970s and 1980s.[76] Accessibility and acceptability, the other two As, were among the global

[72] Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell, "The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As," *Energy Policy* 75 (2014): 415.
[73] Cherp and Jewell, "The concept of energy security," 415.
[74] Ibid., 416.
[75] Ibid., 418 and 420.
[76] Ibid., 416.

energy goals proclaimed by the World Energy Council in 2000 but they were only connected to energy security in the 2007 Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APEC) report. Since this report, the four As have features prominently in the energy security literature.[77] Cherp and Jewell's article makes it crystal clear that there is no single definition of the concept of energy security, which corresponds with the plethora of definitions we have seen above by, *inter alia*, the IEA, the OSCE, NATO and the European Commission.

In their paper, Ang et al. conducted a survey of 104 studies, ranging from 2001 to June 2014, on the concept of energy security.[78] Their findings are that the definition of energy security is contextual and dynamic in nature. In addition, the scope of energy security has expanded over the years, with a growing emphasis on aspects such as environmental sustainability and energy efficiency. Ang et al. acknowledge that there is no consensus on a widely accepted definition of energy security.[79] The main themes of energy security that they found are energy availability, infrastructure, energy prices, societal effects, environment, governance and energy efficiency.[80] Regarding energy availability, Ang et al. state that diversification and geopolitical factors are the key issues that determine the availability of energy.[81] In particular, concerns about war and destabilised regimes can lead to disruptions in oil and gas supplies. An interesting set of definitions is given here. First, a country has high source diversity if that country imports energy from many different countries. Second, a country with large land area has higher potential for spatial diversity, as it can distribute energy facilities across different places. Spatial diversity can also be promoted by a distributed generation of renewable energy. Third, a country can enhance its energy mix diversity by having a more balanced energy supply of different types. Fourth, technological diversity is important for countries that rely on renewable energy sources which are intermittent.[82] Fifth, a country can diversify the transportation and the delivery of its energy imports by enhancing transport route diversity. An idea mentioned here is that having multiple supply pipelines can reduce the dependence on any individual pipeline.

What is interesting about Ang et al.'s definition of energy availability is that it highlights the importance of security of supply while promoting a distributed generation of renewable energy. By defining energy availability in this way, Ang et al. go beyond a traditional

[77] Cherp and Jewell, "The concept of energy security," 417.
[78] B. W. Ang, W. L. Choong, and T.S. Ng, "Energy security: Definitions, dimensions and indexes," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review* 42 (2015): 1077.
[79] Ang et al., "Energy security," 1078.
[80] Ibid., 1081.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.

understanding of the security of supply that relates to the short-term security of energy as defined by the IEA. By including a focus on renewable energy, Ang et al. also take long-term energy security into account.

When it comes to infrastructure, Ang et al. have a clear focus on the security of supply. They state that "Infrastructure is integral in providing stable and uninterrupted energy supply."[83] This focus on the security if supply is also visible in their definition of energy prices: according to Ang et al., energy prices determine the affordability of energy supplies.[84] A focus on long-term energy security is visible again in their discussion on societal effects, the environment and governance.[85] Most importantly, they mention the energy trilemma as a more holistic view that can address multiple competing energy goals, since it is not sufficient to deal with energy security in isolation of other important energy issues.[86] The energy trilemma is defined as "balancing the trade-offs between three major energy goals, namely energy security, economic competitiveness, and environmental sustainability."[87] Ang et al. specifically state that a comprehensive treatment of the concept of the energy trilemma in the energy security literature is lacking.[88] This highlights the fact that the short-term aspects of energy security are still dominant in the literature.

To summarise, Ang et al.'s discussion of energy security is comprehensive. Because the literature does not give proportional attention to long-term energy security, Ang et al. try to highlight the energy trilemma. Their discussion of the existing dominant understandings of energy security highlights a focus on the security of the supply of energy.

Dannreuther states that energy security is a complex issue that does not seem to fit the contemporary debates in International Relations.[89] It is primarily seen as a non-military transnational issue, but it does not necessarily fit in the post-Cold War agenda of non-traditional security threats like climate change. Like authors mentioned earlier, Dannreuther recognises that energy security is a multifaceted concept that goes beyond denoting securing aces to oil, as "it may potentially include the complex security inter-linkages of different energy resources, externalities like climate change, or the energy insecurities of poor people lacking access to basic modern energy systems."[90] Dannreuther mentions a social constructivist perspective on

[83] Ang et al., "Energy security," 1081.
[84] Ibid., 1082.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid., 1089.
[87] Ibid, 1090.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Roland Dannreuther, "Energy security and shifting modes of governance," *International Politics* 52, no. 4 (2015): 466.
[90] Dannreuther, "Energy security and shifting modes of governance," 467.

energy security that holds that energy security has no actual underlying objective reality.[91] Rather, energy security should be seen as an arena where different voices seek to securitise their particular understanding of key risks and threats. Dannreuther goes beyond the social constructivist perspective however and states that energy security is not merely a question of contending discourses and that the broader context of the global political economy also has a determining effect on which particular securitisation of energy assumes dominance.[92] The material conditions of international security politics are critical for understanding how different dimensions of security are given a concrete form and meaning. Therefore, Dannreuther argues, although the concept of energy security is constructed, it is not arbitrarily constructed and it must be understood in relation to the structural conditions of the international political economy and broader changes in global security governance.

Dannreuther's article continues and shows how in specific periods a generalised mode of governance helped to define the meaning of energy security in that period. In the last period covered by Dannreuther (one that focuses on a path towards a possible state-capitalist order[93]), he states that general shifts in the balance of power between the West and major gas and oil producers and the willingness of those producers to resist Western preferences have led to a heightened securitisation of energy, which reflects greater anxiety among the dominant Western powers.[94] Dannreuther links this directly to the greater pessimism in the West concerning Russia and its unwillingness to conform to EU norms and practices. In this sense, Dannreuther's conception of energy security as constructed in relation to particular structural conditions related to a specific period is of interest to this dissertation. His conception would assume that the EU's definition of energy security would differ in tandem with differing circumstances. In order to see to what extent this is the case, we need to examine the scholarship on the EU's understanding of energy security, which will be done in the next section.

1.6 The European Union's understanding of energy security

In her book, Haghighi agrees that the term energy security is in its essence a contested term. According to Haghighi, the debate over what constitutes energy security is an ongoing debate and the debate has become one of the most controversial topics among energy scholars.[95]

[91] Dannreuther, "Energy security and shifting modes of governance," 467.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid., 475.
[94] Ibid., 476.
[95] Sanam S. Haghighi, "Security of Energy Supply in Europe: An Analysis," in: *Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries*, eds. Andrew Robertson, and Hang Wu Tang (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc: 2007): 9.

Haghighi points out several aspects of the debate that are contested: while Europe's reliance on imported energy from external sources, high energy prices, the possible depletion of energy reserves and regional supply shortfalls are all said to have strong implications for energy security, some experts may emphasise one of these as being more important than another and some experts do not agree with the perspective that the world energy reserves are depleting. For each of these aspects, Haghighi why it is of importance for Europe.[96] While defining energy security, Haghighi points out that it is important to distinguish between two sources: oil and gas, since the transportation and storage of each is different and thus each requires its own perspective when it comes to energy security.[97] What is important to note here is that Haghighi himself already narrowed his definition of energy security down to the short-term aspect of the IEA's definition, which is visible in the following quote: "Clearly, the rise in consumption results in the increased importation of energy sources that are mostly used in the European Union, which in turn necessitates the designing of an efficient framework to secure energy supply."[98] What we see here is an explicit focus on securing energy supply. Haghighi's definition of energy security has to be seen from this perspective. This perspective corresponds with what we have seen on the official website of the European Commission regarding energy security: the focus is on securing the supply of energy. Later in this chapter, Haghighi states that energy security is "multi-faceted … makes it difficult to provide a definition of energy security that is accepted by all."[99] He then turns to a definition similar to the one provided by the IEA: adequacy of energy supply at a reasonable price, which, according to Haghighi, suggests that energy should be physically available and its price should be reasonable. Importantly, Haghighi points out that there is a difference between the definition of oil security and gas security. Based on several references, Haghighi defines gas security as "'the guarantee that *all the gas volumes demanded* by customers will be available at a reasonable price.'"[100] In the same vein, he defines oil security as "'reliable and adequate supply of energy for a reasonable price'."[101] The difference here is that if gas supplies are disrupted, other fuels like coal or oil could substitute gas and keep a sector running. Gas security would be obtained in such a scenario. Regarding oil however this is more difficult, as in some sectors it cannot be substituted by other energy sources. Therefore, is oil supply is disrupted, a whole sector could

[96] Haghighi, "Security of Energy Supply in Europe," 9-13.
[97] Ibid., 13.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid., 14.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.

stop functioning. Continuing, Haghighi shows a definition from the European Commission on energy security from the Green Paper of 2000, wherein the Commission focuses, again, on energy supply security.[102] Haghighi does touch upon the demand side of energy security. She does so, interestingly enough, in the framework of the security of energy *supply*: "… the policy on security of energy supply can be divided into two different categories: security measures on the demand side and those on the supply side".[103] It is therefore clear that according to Haghighi, energy security in relation to the European Union is a security of the supply side of energy.

This is also true for Luciani. In a paper, Luciani explains what the security of supply for gas markets means, and he states that "Security of supply may be defined as the guarantee that all the gas volumes, demanded by non-interruptible (firms or protected) customers, will be available at a reasonable price."[104] This definition resembles the broader definition of energy security of the IEA, but when taking into account the two aspects of energy security as defined by the IEA, Luciani's definition focuses on the short-term aspect of energy security, since his focus is on the availability of these supplies and therefore refers to the supply-demand balance.

In a policy report on Eurasian energy security, Mankoff discusses the EU's energy security. He states that the emergence of Russia as the dominant player in Eurasia has made the EU's dependence on the former Soviet states for its energy security increasingly problematic.[105] He states that in order to address the sources of the EU's vulnerability, the EU should achieve greater coordination among its member states and their strategy should focus initially on building an integrated European gas market with an agreed framework governing Russian participation.[106] In the long run, Mankoff argues, the EU needs to diversify the sources of its energy in order to reduce the overall role of Russian oil and gas. We see here that Mankoff addressed both the short- and long-term aspects of energy security covered by the IEA's definition of energy security. The short-term aspect of energy security of the system being able to react to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance would be addressed by an integrated gas market with agreed Russian participation, and the long-term aspect of energy security would be addressed by a diversification of the sources of energy which would reduce the overall role of Russia in the EU's energy framework. Mankoff argues that achieving gas market integration will require treating energy security increasingly as a common European concern

[102] Haghighi, "Security of Energy Supply in Europe," 15.
[103] Ibid., 16.
[104] Giacomo Luciani, "Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets. What is it and What is it not?" *Nota di Lavoro* no. 119.2004 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM): September 2004): 2.
[105] Jeffrey Mankoff, "Eurasian Energy Security," *Council on Foreign Relations* (February 1, 2009): 3.
[106] Mankoff, "Eurasian Energy Security," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 4.

and an overall strategy based on integration and diversification offers the best chance of promoting Russia's transformation into a fully dependable participant in Europe's energy market and of insulating Europe against possible disruptions.[107]

The IEA, with its leading definition on energy security, wrote a report in 2008, where it evaluates the EU's energy policy. The organisation states that energy security is a pressing issue for the EU in energy policy and that it has rapidly risen in the Commission's priority list because of increasing import dependence of the EU and high energy prices.[108] Furthermore, the report states that import dependence is not a problem in itself, since the EU is a population-rich, modern industrialised economy, which is unlikely to achieve self-sufficiency in energy supply. On the other hand, "The important issues are the management of supplier relations and of energy systems, enabling the investment of critical infrastructure, achieving diversification of supply and preparing adequately for potential supply disruptions."[109] The IEA identifies the diplomatic relations with external suppliers as an area where a more prominent role for the Commission could be beneficial for the security of supply for the EU.[110] When the EU is able to speak with one voice, acting consistent and in a unified manner will be crucial to moving towards closer relationships between the EU and external suppliers on which it will increasingly depend in the future. What we see here is that the IEA frames the EU's import dependency as a given which will increase in the future. This would explain the focus that we see by the EU on the security of the supply of energy: it is a given and it will only increase, which is due to the nature of the EU's economy. The chapter of the report dedicated to the EU's energy security is titled "Security of energy supply".[111] The report states that energy security is being addressed by the EU by pursuing closer relations with external suppliers, increasing international and internal connections and reducing demand and increasing domestic supplies within the EU. The report shows that the EU's net energy import is higher than that of all OECD member countries, which is used as a justification for the EU focusing on the supply side of energy security. Furthermore, the IEA states that since 2005, several events made energy security of supply a major issue in European energy policy, such as the rise of fossil fuel prices since 2004, the interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Ukraine in January 2006, a major electricity blackout in November 2006, the development of the internal energy market and the political commitment

[107] Mankoff, "Eurasian Energy Security," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 6.
[108] *International Energy Agency Policies Review: the European Union – 2008* (OECD/IEA: 2008): 9.
[109] *International Energy Agency Policies Review: the European Union*: 9.
[110] Ibid., 10.
[111] Ibid., 59.

of the EU to a transition to a high-efficiency, low-carbon energy system.[112] According to the report, it is a consequence of these events and developments that energy security policy has been recognised as a major challenge for the EU.[113] Therefore, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) now also deals with the energy sector (to a limited extent) and an Action Plan on an Energy Policy for Europe 2007-2009 advocates the creation of an internal market as the best guarantee of supply security. Furthermore, the EU should continue its efforts in the field of a common external energy policy and, interestingly, "In support of security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability goals of the EU energy policy"[114] the external policy addresses issues such as the promotion of the diversification of energy imports. We can therefore see that according to the IEA, the main focus of the EU's energy security policy is based on the security of supply.

In his book, Biresselioglu states that energy security and geopolitics are essentially intertwined, since geopolitics is about directly securing energy resources.[115] Biresselioglu states that "A geopolitical risk lies at the heart of energy security concerns, mainly related to the security of supply, when the international political and economic system is strained or in turmoil as a result of power politics and competition among leading states and/or actors, or when a local or regional conflict threatens to obstruct supply routes."[116] Because of this, Biresselioglu states that the EU's energy security and in particular the need for diversification will depend more and more on the ability of the EU to function as a strong and cohesive geopolitical player. We see that Biresselioglu, much like Luciani, the IEA and Haghighi, defines the security of supply as the main focus when it comes to the EU's energy security. Biresselioglu uses a framework by Yergin in order to explain the EU's energy security concept and Turkey's possible role in it.[117]

Traditionally, to maintain energy security, countries had to adhere to several principles: the diversification of supply, resilience, integration and information.[118] However, Yergin states, the past several years have shown that the concept of energy security should be expanded in two critical dimensions: the recognition of globalisation of the energy system and the acknowledgement of the fact that the entire energy supply chain needs to be protected.[119]

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[112] *International Energy Agency Policies Review: the European Union*, 78-79.
[113] Ibid., 79.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, "Geopolitics and Energy Security: The Inevitable Connection," in: *European Energy Security: Turkey's Future Role and Impact* (Palgrave MacMillan: 2011): 9.
[116] Biresselioglu, "Geopolitics and Energy Security," 9.
[117] Ibid., 17.
[118] Daniel Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 75-76.
[119] Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 76-77.

Biresselioglu quotes Yergin in a different section of his paper where Yergin states that "the definition of energy security includes not only diversification, but a wider approach which requires that one takes into account 'the rapid evolution of the global energy trade, supply-chain vulnerabilities, terrorism, and the integration of major new economies into the world market'".[120] In essence, Yergin states that "Diversification will remain the fundamental starting principle of energy security for both oil and gas"[121] but that the wider context needs to be taken into account as well.[122] Biresselioglu uses Yergin's framework to analyse the EU's energy security and regarding diversification he states that the EU's main problem is a lack of energy supply diversity.[123] Therefore, again, we see a focus on the security of the supply of energy.

Any discussion on the EU's understanding of energy security and discourse should include Knodt. Knodt analysed the development of three energy frames within the EU's integration process.[124] These three frames are the security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. Knodt's research uses the main assumptions of social-constructivist institutionalism and interpretive policy analysis.[125] More specifically, Knodt's methodology focuses on the perception and interpretation of problems and solutions. There is an assumption that the meaning of objects is attributed within a process of interpretation. Instead of preferences being set interests, as rational choice would theory would suggest, preferences are constructed through interaction within a dynamic process instead. In order to analyse the process of interpretation and the construction of preferences, there is a need to identify how actors give meaning to a situation within a specific discourse, frame it and communicate it. This is where framing comes in. Knodt quotes Entman in order to define framing and states that to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in order to promote particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation or treatment recommendation.[126] Important here is to note that a frame does not reflect reality and a problem neutrally but it constructs or reconstructs meaning. There is the assumption that actors who frame certain issues form groups, which is why Knodt focuses on discourse coalitions that are formed by European institutions and the member states on the issue of energy.

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[120] Biresselioglu, "Geopolitics and Energy Security," in: *European Energy Security* (Palgrave MacMillan: 2011): 17.
[121] Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 82.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Biresselioglu, "Geopolitics and Energy Security," in: *European Energy Security* (Palgrave MacMillan: 2011): 17-18.
[124] Michèle Knodt, "EU energy policy," in: *Handbook of European Policies – Interpretive Approaches to the EU*, eds. Hubert Heinelt and Sybille Münch (Edward Elgar Publishing: 26 January 2018): 224.
[125] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 225.
[126] Ibid., 225.

Knodt shows that in the early years of European integration (until the 1990s) two frames were dominant: competitiveness and the security of supply.[127] In the 1990s, the sustainability frame gained prominence.[128] Especially relevant for this dissertation is Knodt's discussion of the 2006 and 2009 gas crises. Here, Knodt argues that a nexus between security and solidarity emerged as a result of the 2006 crisis.[129] According to Knodt, one of the results of the emergence of the security frame and the advocacy in favour of it by the discourse coalition formed around Poland is the anchoring of energy policy in the EU's primary law in the Lisbon Treaty, which creates the responsibility for all member states to ensure energy security.[130] In addition, the emergence of this security frame led to rivalry with the sustainability frame, which in turn led to the deadlock that EU energy policy found itself in at the time of publication of Knodt's work.[131] Knodt continues and argues that there is a distinction between member states: northern and western EU member states support the sustainability framework, whereas the eastern member states support the narrative of possible supply shortages due to the Ukrainian-Russian gas disputes.[132]

Knodt's work is not only relevant for this dissertation in the sense it deals with the same topic of EU energy policy and discourse, but it also worth noting that both researches yield similar results. This dissertation argues that a discursive shift towards the securitisation of the EU's energy policy legitimation occurred in 2006 and continued into 2008-2009, which is similar to Knodt's claim of the frame of security having arisen as a result of the gas crises. It is important to note however that while these results are similar, they do not point to the same exact thing. Knodt's research focuses explicitly and exclusively on the framing of discourse by the EU. Hence, the focus is on how the EU interprets, makes sense of and then communicates on a situation. In essence, Knodt portrays how the EU interpreted the gas crises and responded to the gas crises as a result of that interpretation. In that sense, the methodology of this dissertation is more objective. This dissertation does not analyse the interpretation that the EU constructed of the energy crises, rather, this research analyses whether and if so to what extent and when a discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy discourse and whether this discursive shift is part of a broader discursive change. Both this research and Knodt's work therefore analyse the element of security in the EU's energy discourse, but the results are

[127] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 226-228.
[128] Ibid., 228-230.
[129] Ibid., 231.
[130] Ibid., 233.
[131] Knodt's work was published in 2018.
[132] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 237.

inherently different, albeit related. One could argue that the discursive change of securitisation observed in this dissertation is similar to the frame of security observed by Knodt. Indeed, these results are similar, but a key difference is that Knodt's work focuses on how the EU interprets a situation, whereas this dissertation analyses statements by the EU objectively. Knodt argues that EU energy policy entered into a deadlock because of the emergence of the security frame; this dissertation argues that the discursive shift towards securitisation points to a discursive change in EU energy policy. These results are fundamentally different. In applying discursive shifts, this dissertation will pin-point exactly when a discursive shift has taken place and how the EU has employed specific legitimations in order to normalise this discursive shift. As will be explained later, a discursive shift includes a process of normalisation, which in turn can lead to a new hegemony of discourse. Therefore, if a discursive shift towards the securitisation of energy can be discerned during the gas crisis, this means that much more has emerged than a mere shift in frames. Therefore, this dissertation and the methodology it employs goes beyond Knodt's work: it provides a deeper understanding as to why and how the frame of security mentioned by Knodt has been implemented. The relatedness of both research points not only to the relevance of this dissertation, but also to the quality of Knodt's work. By expanding upon Knodt's observation, this dissertation will add to the academic debate.

Another recent contribution to the literature is made by Knodt and Ringel in a book chapter in which they analyse EU energy policy from a discourse perspective. Here, the three frames of the EU's energy policy are discussed again. Knodt and Ringel state that the three frames were first jointly established in the European Commission's Green Paper of 2006,[133] which is something that Knodt also established in her previous work.[134] In essence, this book chapter argues the same that Knodt argued in her previous work: that the framing of European energy policy has changed over time, and that during energy supply crisis the security of supply frame has gained dominance.[135] In general, much of Knodt's earlier findings are repeated in this contribution. As this work is so similar to Knodt's earlier work, the results are similar to this dissertation. Again, by applying the framework of discursive shifts this dissertation is going to dive deeper into the phenomenon of shifts in discourse and therefore goes beyond the work of Knodt and Ringel.

[133] Michèle Knodt and Marc Ringel, "European Union Energy Policy: A Discourse Perspective," in: *Handbook of Energy Governance in Europe*, eds. Michèle Knodt and Jörg Kemmerzell (Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022): 123.
[134] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 231.
[135] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 237 and Knodt and Ringel, "European Union Energy Policy," 138.

This section has highlighted the different aspects of the EU's understanding of energy security. It is clear that for the EU, energy security means the security of supply of energy. It will be interesting to see whether this understanding of energy changed after the two gas crises, as could be suggested following Dannreuther's definition of energy security. In general, this section of the literature review on energy has shown dominant understandings of energy policy and energy security. It is important to note that the concept of energy security is a contested subject, with several authors giving several definitions. Therefore, Cherp and Jewell's comment on energy security is important to keep in mind: the definition of energy security is different in different situations for different actors.[136] This dissertation is not going to adhere to any one definition of energy policy itself. Rather, this dissertation will analyse how the EU's conception of energy security has changed during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009. While the literature states that the EU's understanding of energy security is focused on the supply side of energy, the legitimation of its energy policy discourse might point to something different. It has to be pointed out that this literature review has shown that energy was not conceptualised as an EU policy before the Treaty of Lisbon.[137] This literature review has also shown that it was after the first gas crisis of 2006 that the Commission recommended a common EU policy on energy and that only after this energy security gained importance for the Union.[138] Therefore, given their immense importance for EU energy policy development and therefore potential importance in shaping the EU's understanding of energy security, the gas crises will be used as case studies in this dissertation.

Another interesting contribution to the field has been the work of Knodt, who argues that the EU has applied three different frames to its energy policy and that the dominance of these frames differs over time. This observation of a difference in frames is a very useful contribution to the field, but it lacks in the sense that it focuses on how the EU has interpretated a situation. The framework of discursive shifts is by definition more objective and goes beyond the mere observation of a difference in frames: it will be determined exactly when, how and why discourse has shifted. Knodt's work does provide useful hypotheses for this dissertation, which will be elaborated upon in the methodology section in Chapter II.

[136] Cherp and Jewell, "The concept of energy security," *Energy Policy* 75 (2014): 416.
[137] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," 419-420.
[138] Ibid., 420.

1.7 Literature on critical discourse analysis

Now that the field of energy policy and energy security has been analysed, it is necessary to analyse the field of discourse analysis related to International Relations. A more detailed introduction to the theoretical background (discourse analysis) and the methodology (CDA) employed in this dissertation will outlined in Chapter II. This section is going to focus on the application of discourse analysis and, more specifically, critical discourse analysis in International Relations.

Influential scholars in the field of CDA include Van Dijk, Reisigl, Wodak, Fairclough and Krzyżanowski.[139] Reisigl, Wodak and Fairclough have been influential in the field of CDA for a long time.[140] More recently, Krzyżanowski has made significant contributions.

According to Wodak, CDA as a network of scholars emerged in the 1990s.[141] CDA itself is thus relatively young. The field of discourse analysis as a whole is just a bit older. Wodak explains how from the 1970s onwards forms of discourse and text analyses appeared that were slowly moulded into the framework that came to be known as CDA.[142] Therefore, scholars that were active in the formation period of CDA in the 1990s are considered to be influential in the early stages. First, an analysis of Fairclough's major work is in order.

1.7.1 Discursive change

Fairclough's main contribution that is relevant to this dissertation is that of discursive change. Krzyżanowski shows that discursive change is a notion that was originally introduced by Fairclough in 1992.[143] The concept of hegemony is essential in understanding Fairclough's concept of discursive change. Fairclough states that the concept of hegemony "provides a way of theorizing change in relation to the evolution of power which allows a particular focus upon discursive change, but at the same time a way of seeing it as contributing to and being shaped by wider processes of change."[144] Hegemony, according to Fairclough, is leadership as much

[139] Articles by Reisigl and Wodak on the method of critical discourse analysis will be used in the chapter on the theoretical background.
[140] See, for example, Ruth Wodak, *Disorders of Discourse* (London: Longman, 1996); Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 258-284, in: *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* ed. T. van Dijk (London: Sage, 1997); Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Polity Press, 1992); Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)," 87-121, in: *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage (2nd revised edition), 2009) and Martin Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies*, eds. John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (Routledge, 2017).
[141] Wodak, "What CDA is about," 4.
[142] Ibid., 5.
[143] Michał Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 102.
[144] Norman Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," in: *Discourse and Social Change* (Polity Press: 1992): 92.

as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. It is "the power over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an 'unstable equilibrium.'"[145] After discussing the concept of hegemony further, Fairclough turns towards a focus on the processes whereby ideological complexes come to be structured and restructured, articulated and rearticulated.[146] Such a conception of hegemonic struggle, in terms of the articulation, disarticulation and rearticulation of elements, is in harmony with what Fairclough earlier stated about discourse, namely the dialectical view of the relationship between discursive structures and events; seeing discursive structures as order of discourse conceived as more or less unstable configurations of elements and adopting a view of texts which centres upon their intertextuality and how they articulate prior texts and conventions.[147] An order of discourse can be seen as a discursive facet of the contradictory and unstable equilibrium which constitutes a hegemony. In turn, the articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in a hegemonic struggle. Here Fairclough has shown how a discourse can be a representation of hegemony. Fairclough continues and states that discursive practice, the production, distribution and consumption of texts is a facet of hegemonic struggle, which contributes to the reproduction or transformation not only of the existing order of discourse but also through that of existing social and power relations.[148] Here Fairclough links a transformation of discourse to a transformation of hegemony. In essence, the concept of hegemony provides a matrix and a model for discourse: a matrix, in the sense that the concept provides a way of analysing the social practice within which the discourse belongs in terms of power relations, in terms of whether they reproduce, restructure or challenge existing hegemonies; and a model, in the sense that the concept provides a way of analysing discourse practice itself as a mode of hegemonic struggle, reproducing, restructuring or challenging existing orders of discourse.[149] Further in his chapter Fairclough links the concept of hegemony to his concept of discursive change. Fairclough has two focus points when it comes to discursive change: change in the textual dimension, and change in orders of discourse. In relation to change and the textual dimension of discourse, Fairclough states that change leaves traces in texts, in the form of the co-occurrence of contradictory or inconsistent elements (i.e. mixtures of formal and informal styles, technical and non-technical vocabularies, markers

[145] Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," 92.
[146] Ibid., 92-93.
[147] Ibid., 93.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid., 95.

of authority and familiarity, etc.).[150] At first, interpreters can perceive these contradictory or inconsistent elements as a patchwork that is not connected. However, a tendency of discursive change can become naturalised and can become a new convention. A process of naturalisation like this is essential to establishing new hegemonies in the sphere of discourse. Again, what we see here is that Fairclough makes a link between a change in discourse and a change in hegemony. Fairclough then turns to his second focus, change in orders of discourse. Here he states that as producers of discourse and interpreters of discourse combine discursive conventions, codes and elements in new ways in innovatory discursive events, they are cumulatively producing structural changes in orders of discourse: they are *dis*articulating existing orders of discourse and *re*articulating new orders of discourse, new discursive hegemonies.[151] These structural changes could be limited to a discourse that is particular to a specific institution, but they could also transcend the institution and affect the societal order of discourse. Fairclough states that while investigating discursive change, the focus should be on both the discursive event (the change that is visible in a text) and wider structural changes (that form new hegemonies and that may transcend to affect the societal order of discourse), since "it is not possible to appreciate the import of the former for wider processes of social change without attending to the latter, just as it is not possible to appreciate how discourse contributes to social change without attending to the former."[152] In a new chapter, Fairclough then provides examples of discursive change that were affecting the societal order of discourse at the time he wrote his book, one of which was elimination of overt markers of hierarchy and power asymmetry in types of institutional discourse where power relations are unequal.[153] An example of this is a tendency towards informality.[154] Fairclough explains this by referencing Kress (1986) and Fowler (1988), who have observed that various types of professional/public and education discourse have become increasingly conversational, which is part of a major restructuring of the boundaries between the public and private domains. Other examples of discursive change analysed by Fairclough are the commodification of discourse[155] and the technologization of discourse.[156] In sum, Fairclough's notion of discursive change has given the field a particular method of analysing discourse that enables an analysis of how discourse

[150] Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," 97.
[151] Ibid., italics added.
[152] Ibid., 98.
[153] Norman Fairclough, "Discourse and Social Change in Contemporary Society," in: *Discourse and Social Change* (Polity Press: 1992): 203.
[154] Fairclough, "Discourse and Social Change in Contemporary Society," 204.
[155] Ibid., 207-215.
[156] Ibid., 215-218.

changes and the effects that this may have. Of importance to this research in particular are the notions that discursive change has to be analysed both in terms of the discursive event and in terms of the structural changes. The analysis of the discursive event allows an examination of change in discourse in a particular moment, the analysis of structural changes allows an examination of change in discourse that leads to new hegemonies and that could affect the societal order of discourse. In a way, Fairclough's concept of discursive change could be linked to Dannreuther's constructivist approach to energy security. Dannreuther recognised that energy security is a constructed concept but that it is also important to take certain structural factors into account in order to determine what one's definition of energy security is.[157] The constructivist approach to energy security recognises the fact that the definition of a concept can change over time. This could be interpreted as a change in discourse. Since this change in discourse is linked to structural factors, it closely resembles Fairclough's notion of discursive change, since for Fairclough a change in discourse should be observed in tandem with a change in the social context.[158] This linkage shows the constructivist aspects of Fairclough's discursive change.

Fairclough's contribution to the field is not limited to the notion of discursive change: the approach to discourse analysis he takes in his book has been widely adopted in the literature. For example, Kuo uses Fairclough's multidimensional approach to explore discursive changes in Taiwanese society.[159] Han draws upon Fairclough to analyse some of the ways in which Chinese judges change their discursive construction civil judgments due to ongoing judicial reforms in China.[160] Cox and Hassard look at discursive recontextualisation in a public health setting and in their discussion on discursive change Fairclough is widely referenced.[161] Similarly, Reyes-Rodríguez uses Fairclough's book to build his theoretical framework,[162] while Gu uses Fairclough "as a supplement to the investigation of discourse in a more abstract sense"[163] in a paper that analyses how Chinese college students discursively constructed English learner identities in and through processes of interaction and how English learner and

[157] Dannreuther, "Energy security and shifting modes of governance," 467.
[158] Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," 98.
[159] Sai-Hua Kuo, "Social change and discursive change: analyzing conversationalization of media discourse in Taiwan," *Discourse Studies* 9, no. 6 (2007): 743-765.
[160] Zhengrui Han, "The discursive construction of civil judgements in Mainland China," *Discourse & Society* 22, no. 6 (2011): 743-765.
[161] Julie Wolfram Cox and John Hassard, "Discursive Recontextualisation in a Public Health Setting," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 46, no. 1 (2010): 121-122.
[162] Antonio Reyes-Rodríguez, "Discursive strategies in Chavez's political discourse: voicing, distancing, and shifting," *Critical Discourse Studies* 5, no. 2 (2008): 134-135.
[163] Michelle Mingyue Gu, "The discursive construction of college English learners' identity in cross-cultural interactions," *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies* 7, no. 4 (2010): 304.

user identity and learner language use were mutually constructed.[164] It is clear that Fairclough's work has had quite some impact and has been used in several fields, ranging from sociology to legal studies. It has also featured in the field of International Relations. For example, Annabell and Nairn have used Fairclough to examine the discursive construction of national identity by the Flag Consideration Panel.[165] Gebregeorgis has used Fairclough to analyse how gender is constructed in school material in Ethiopia.[166] De Simone and Scano use Fairclough's three-dimensional framework to explain how hegemonic masculinity shapes discourses of sameness aimed at silencing gender inequality in medicine.[167] In short, Fairclough's work has been influential in the field of International Relations and beyond. Fairclough's understanding of discourse, discursive change and how it is linked to the concept of hegemony will form the theoretical framework of the analysis of this dissertation. However, a contemporary critical analysis of discourse cannot be conducted without understanding the recent contribution to the field by Krzyżanowski. Krzyżanowski's concept of discursive shifts and the model he introduced to analyse them will form the analytical framework of this research.

1.7.2 Discursive shifts

Krzyżanowski has elaborated on Fairclough's notion of discursive change by introducing "discursive shifts". Krzyżanowski states that discursive change (as introduced by Fairclough) allows the tracing of the dynamics of discourse at the macro-level, thus the larger frames of contemporary public discourses.[168] Krzyżanowski then analyses respectively Fairclough's major forms of discursive change: the commodification and the economisation of discourse.[169] Krzyżanowski states that "Whereas discursive change encompasses macro-level frames of reference for the production and reception of discourses by specific social actors, it surely requires a related category which would allow for the actual observing of the change in discourse at the micro-level.[170] This, he states, should be the notion of discursive shifts, which should mainly be seen in a relational way which looks at discourses historically or diachronically. The notion helps grasping systematically the actual multidimensional rather

[164] Gu, "The discursive construction of college English learners' identity in cross-cultural interactions," 298.
[165] Taylor Annabell and Angelique Nairn, "Flagging a 'new' New Zealand: the discursive construction of national identity in the Flag Consideration Project," *Critical Discourse Studies* 16, no. 1 (2019): 96.
[166] Mehari Yimulaw Gebregeorgis, "Gender Construction Through Textbooks: The Case of an Ethiopian Primary School English Textbook," *Africa Education Review* 13, no. 3-4 (2016): 119-140.
[167] Silvia De Simone and Claudia Scano, "Discourses of sameness, unbalance and influence: dominant gender order in medicine," *Journal of Gender Studies* 27, no. 8 (2018): 914.
[168] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 102.
[169] Ibid., 104-105.
[170] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 105.

than unidirectional shifts in discourses over time. Since in the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse analysis discourse is seen as historical, discursive shifts are primarily based on the process of recontextualisation of elements of different discourses, however rarely in a non-linear way, but in a process which allows for the simultaneous promulgation of different types of practices and entails the creation of new or hybrid discourses.[171] According to Krzyżanowski, discursive shifts do not only rely on transformation but also on discursive continuity. Overt discursive continuity allows social actors to produce discourses which remain seemingly unchanged, while in fact actors are already recontextualising elements of other discursive practices. Covert discursive continuity shows discourse as profoundly changing while in fact retaining many of its former features. This can also be seen as overt discontinuity. When analysing the categories of discursive change mentioned by Fairclough, Krzyżanowski states that his article will argue that the tendency of the commodification of discourse "has indeed been one of the central types of discursive dynamics of recent decades and underlies the development of perhaps even larger trend of the so-called *economization of discourse*."[172] Krzyżanowski therefore also expands upon the category of discursive change mentioned by Fairclough. Krzyżanowski goes even further by stating that the economisation of discourse is just one type of discursive change relevant to the analysis of EU discourse on climate change (which is the focus of his paper).[173] Krzyżanowski then mentions other major forms of discursive change that are "prevalent nowadays"[174] and that can be traced in EU discourse on climate change: the securitisation of discourse, which, according to Krzyżanowski, is a part of the even larger process of the globalisation of discourse. The idea that there are different types of discursive change is significant, since it allows us to categorise the type of possible discursive change that has occurred during the two gas crises. In the article where Krzyżanowski introduces discursive shifts, he shows that where EU discourse on climate change is characterised by discursive change, which frames climate change as a threat, this discursive change is accompanied by discursive shifts on the micro-level.[175]

Therefore, by introducing the notion of discursive shifts, Krzyżanowski has expanded upon Fairclough's notion of discursive change. Fairclough recognised that an investigation into discursive change should focus on both the discursive event and the wider structural changes

[171] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 106.
[172] Ibid., 105.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid., 126.

and it was clear that a change in discourse is visible as a discursive event in a text,[176] however it is Krzyżanowski who stated that *because* a discursive change should be visible on the micro-level in a text, it deserves a category on its own that researchers could look for.

The notion of discursive shift is widespread in the literature, however not in the way that Krzyżanowski coined it. For example, Campbell et al analyse a discursive shift in discourse on menstruation, however, the authors rely on a visual analytical lens,[177] not on Krzyżanowski's theoretical framework.

Nakane et al analyse how Japanese women's discourse (stylistic practice) across life stages varies.[178] Their research focuses on shifts in discourse in relation to style shifting, whereas Krzyżanowski's notion of discursive shifts relates specifically to discursive change and thus changes related to macro-socio-political changes.

Bevitori and Johnson look at whether and how any significant discursive shifts can be identified in global newspaper discourse in relation to risk and resilience in the context of climate change.[179] The authors were able to uncover specific patterns of meanings in the discourse on climate change.[180] This does indeed amount to a type of discursive shift, but again not in the framework that Krzyżanowski coined, which allows for the examination of cover and overt (dis)continuity in relation to shifts in discourse.

The actual further application of Krzyżanowski's notion of discursive shifts seems to have been limited to work by Krzyżanowski himself. His most recent contribution in this regard is an article in which Krzyżanowski and Krzyżanowska analyse how the recent discourse of the 'new normal', used during the pandemic, marks the advent of a new approach to 'crisis' in the normalisation of far-right populist politics.[181] More specifically, the authors argue that the approach to crisis currently displayed in the public and political domain, especially its far-right or right-wing sections, has been undergoing a significant discursive shift: instead of being discursively constructed and being augmented or downplayed, "crisis has frequently been

[176] Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," 98.
[177] Rachel Campbell, Olivia Freeman and Valerie Gannon, "From overt threat to invisible presence: discursive shifts in representations of gender in menstrual product advertising," *Journal of Marketing Management* 37, no. 3-4: 217.
[178] Ikuko Nakane, Kaori Okano, Claire Maree, Chie Takagi, Lidia Tanaka and Shimako Iwasaki, "Varying orientations to sharing life stories: A diachronic study of Japanese women's discourse," *Language in Society* 51 (2021): 577.
[179] Cinzia Bevitori and Jane Helen Johnson, "Risk and resilience in a changing climate: a diachronic analysis in the press across the globe," *Text&Talk* 42, no. 4 (2022): 547.
[180] Bevitori and Johnson, "Risk and resilience in a changing climate," 565.
[181] Michał Krzyżanowski and Natalia Krzyżanowska, "Narrating the 'new normal' or pre-legitimising media control? COVID-19 and the discursive shifts in the far-right imaginary of 'crisis' as a normalisation strategy," *Discourse & Society* 33, no. 6 (November 2022): 805.

moving to be operationalised as a given. This has taken place with the obvious aim of legitimising and pre-legitimising the ideologically driven strategic-political actions of, in particular, the far right."[182] Here we clearly see how Krzyżanowski and Krzyżanowska relate the relation between a wider discursive change (a change in the discourse on crisis, related to the COVID-19 pandemic) to the discursive responses to that discursive change visible in discursive shifts on the micro-level by analysing three interlinked government documents.[183]

In another article, Krzyżanowski and Ekman look at ongoing discursive shifts on immigration in Swedish newspaper editorials.[184] The authors state explicitly that discursive shifts are related to the concept of discursive change and they "allow tracing meso- and micro-level changes in discourse – for example, within specific media outlets, political parties, and the like – but by relating them to the wider, macro-level facets of discursive change."[185] The main argument of their paper is that discursive shifts appear in spaces of legitimisation of public discourses such as mainstream news media and therefore elements that were previously deemed unacceptable and located outside the ethics of public discourse and public expression become gradually normalised.[186]

In an essay, Krzyżanowski and Krzyżanowska illustrate the extent to which 'crisis' as a concept has had an impact on public perceptions and discourses of contemporary migration in Poland.[187] The authors argue that there has been a moment in which crisis and immigration discourses came together and that this moment of connection has arisen as part of recent political strategies of the Polish government. They argue that the connection between crisis and immigration is the result of two discursive shifts that occurred in Poland.[188] Again, the focus is on right-wing rhetoric.

What we therefore see is that Krzyżanowski's notion of discursive shift has not been applied widely in the literature as of now by scholars besides Krzyżanowski, Krzyżanowska and Ekman. This could be due to its relative novelty. What makes the concept of discursive shifts highly relevant to this dissertation is its analytical potential. It has this potential, because in a later article, Krzyżanowski manages to create an analytical model around the concept which allows for a systematic tracing of the concept.

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[182] Krzyżanowski and Krzyżanowska, "Narrating the 'new normal' or pre-legitimising media control?" 809.
[183] Ibid., 812.
[184] Mattias Ekman and Michał Krzyżanowski, "A populist turn? News editorials and the recent discursive shift on immigration in Sweden," *Nordicom Review* 42, no. 1 (2021): 67.
[185] Ekman and Krzyżanowski, "A populist turn?" 72.
[186] Ibid., 72-73.
[187] Natalia Krzyżanowska and Michał Krzyżanowski, "'Crisis' and Migration in Poland: Discursive Shifts, Anti-Pluralism and the Politicisation of Exclusion," *Sociology* 52, no. 3 (2018): 612.
[188] Krzyżanowska and Krzyżanowski, "'Crisis' and Migration in Poland," 613.

Krzyżanowski developed a multi-step normalisation model which allows analysing how radical or often blatantly racist discourse can be introduced into the public domain and also evolve into an acceptable and legitimate perspective in perceptions of immigrants and refugees.[189] More specifically, normalisation is seen here as a part of a wider multi-step process of strategically orchestrated discursive shifts wherein discourses characterised by extreme positions have been enacted, gradated or perpetuated and eventually normalised as an integral part of right-wing populist agenda. This multi-step normalisation model directly refers to the discursive shifts. The model shows that after public discourses are initially enacted or introduced, they are nowadays strategically gradated/perpetuated (in other words, spread and settled) in the public domain before eventually becoming normalised.[190] Therefore, public discourses cause not only a change in language, but also a change in wider norms and patterns of perception and discursive representation and construction of social issues and groups. In Krzyżanowski's article, the focus is on right-wing populist political strategies, but the model that is proposed is applicable to discourse in general. In the model, discursive shifts are viewed as consisting of three stages which recognise the complexity of how discourse is introduced into the public domain, how it then spreads further and settles across the public domain and social fields along with their key spaces and genres and how it finally contributes to deeper change in norms of public expression.[191] Necessarily, these stages might overlap. These stages are first, enactment; second, gradation/perpetuation and third, normalisation.[192] According to Krzyżanowski, enactment is "the first phase of a *discursive shift* wherein discourse is strategically introduced – or enacted – by means of recontextualisation into the public domain with "new" discursive elements, including themes and arguments, as well as various linguistic means which support their realisation.[193] In this stage the key link between the global level of discursive change and the context- and actor-specific discourse is established. Wider ideas and concepts with context- and actor-specific meaning is also announced in this stage. Gradation/Perpetuation is the second stage, in which a combination of discursive elements takes place to form a new discourse. In addition, the new discourse is diffused and reinforced across various social fields, spaces and genres.[194] In this stage, it helps to look at discourse in a hierarchical manner, since recontextualisation has to be seen in a hierarchical manner as well.

[189] Michał Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism: imaginaries of immigration, moral panics and the discourse of contemporary right-wing populism," *Social Semiotics* 30, no. 4 (2020): 503.
[190] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 505.
[191] Ibid., 508.
[192] Ibid., 508-509.
[193] Ibid., 508.
[194] Ibid., 509.

If a discourse is recontextualised from its primary context to a secondary context, it is thus diffused into a new social field, hence allowing it to settle in a new context, where it is then perpetuated. Therefore, if a discourse is enacted in a specific political field in the first stage, it can be seen to have perpetuated if it becomes visible in a different political field. Then, it has passed on to the second stage. The last stage, normalisation, serves as evidence that not only the discourse as such changed during a discursive shift, but also that the discursive shift has contributed to a deeper change of norms of public expression.[195] According to Krzyżanowski, this can be seen by the existence of borderline discourse which links elements of previous and new discourse. In addition, the development of new norms within which radical and unacceptable views are used, camouflaged in quasi politically correct and acceptable themes, is another type of evidence for this according to Krzyżanowski. This refers to right-wing (populist) discourse, but it can be applied to discourse in general: if a discursive shift has taken place, new norms do not necessarily have to be unacceptable. They can also be new ideas that were previously not seen in the discursive field. The main point of the model for general use is that it allows researchers to pin-point when and where exactly a discursive shift has taken place and how that shift has taken place. Key in the last stage is legitimation. As Krzyżanowski states, "… legitimizations, pre-legitimizations and imaginaries all figure in both the construction of "moral panics" and their subsequent normalisation."[196] Legitimisations and pre-legitimisations allow the legitimation of views and opinions, as well as the normalisation of radical or deviant positions along traditional discursive patterns of legitimation by for example referencing authority or moral values. They therefore play a crucial role in the normalisation process of discursive shifts. That is why legitimation will be an important part of this dissertation. In another article, Krzyżanowski shows how an increasing use of particular discursive legitimations "… are often used as foundational resources for the normalising strategies analysed."[197] Here, the link between legitimation and normalisation, part of the stages of discursive shift, is established.

The application of the notion of discursive shifts in relation to discursive change, as coined by Krzyżanowski, has been applied mainly to discourses of far-right political elements. Like discursive change however, the notion of discursive shifts can be applied to virtually any analysis that is related to discourse analysis, as long as it is related to discursive change.

[195] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.
[196] Ibid., 510.
[197] Michał Krzyżanowski, "Normalization and the discursive construction of "new" norms and "new" normality: discourse in the paradoxes of populism and neoliberalism," *Social Semiotics* 30, no 4 (2020): 433.

Applying it to EU policy legitimation is exploring a whole new field, which makes this dissertation a welcome addition to the field.

The three-step normalisation proposed by Krzyżanowski will prove very useful in the analysis of this dissertation, as this model allows for a systemic tracing of a possible discursive shift. One of the criticisms raised against CDA is the fact that the method at times fails to approach texts systematically.[198] This could lead to potential bias in text analysis.[199] This crucial element is addressed by implementing the three-step systematic normalisation model.

Legitimation and normalisation are important aspects of Krzyżanowski's model. Before elaborating upon how legitimation relates to the model, the concept itself has to be discussed.

1.7.3 Legitimation

Legitimation in relation to discourse is a concept that has also been frequently employed to analyse the discourse of right-wing populists, as in Wodak's *The Politics of Fear*. In her first chapter, Wodak follows a definition of legitimation created by Berger and Luckmann, which states that "… Legitimation is the process of 'explaining' and justifying. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. It is important to understand that legitimation has a cognitive as well as a normative element. In other words, legitimation is not just a matter of 'values'. It always implies 'knowledge' as well."[200] Based on this definition, Van Leeuwen and Wodak introduced a framework for analysing the language of legitimation that consists of four categories: authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis.[201] Authorisation legitimation occurs when there is a reference to authority, which can be a person, tradition, custom or a law. The second category, moral evaluation, means legitimation by reference to value systems. Third, rationalisation is legitimation by reference to knowledge claims or arguments. Last, mythopoesis is legitimation that is achieved by narratives. These narratives are often small stories or fragments of narrative structures about the past or the future. The framework developed by Van Leeuwen and Wodak, it being based on the definition of legitimation by Berger and Luckmann, relates directly to normalisation as understood by Krzyżanowski in relation to the three stages of discursive shifts.

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[198] Ruth Breeze, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics," *Pragmatics* 21, no. 4 (International Pragmatics Association, 2011): 504.
[199] Breeze, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics," 504.
[200] Ruth Wodak, "Chapter 1: Populism and Politics: Transgressing Norms and Taboos," in: *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (SAGE Publications Ltd: 2015): 5.
[201] Wodak, "Chapter 1: Populism and Politics," 6.

Legitimation understood in this fashion has been applied to the field. For example, Hart and Winter apply the term in a multimodal CDA, where the authors argue that legitimation strategies are multimodal, which means that they are enacted not only through speech, but also through gesture.[202] In the end, the authors conclude that gesture is an integral part of a set of specific moves identified by the CDA as fundamental to the communication of prejudice and the legitimation of discrimination and exclusion (denial, othering, proximisation and quantification), in the context of spoken discourse.[203]

Yu's article aims to investigate the dominant gendered discourses surrounding a so-called leftover myth which portrays single women past the age of 27 as leftover, i.e. unwanted by men for marriage.[204] Yu investigates Chinese English-language news, as these media outlets claim to be more liberal. In doing so, Yu finds that while both legitimation and delegitimation strategies are found in the patriarchal and resistant discourses, the delegitimation strategies occur more frequently to challenge the leftover myth than legitimation strategies to perpetuate it.[205]

Koralewska and Zielińska aim to reconstruct the way in which the Polish anti-abortion discourse, as seen in the Polish right-wing-press, constructs negative views about abortion, and to identify the legitimation mechanisms employed to sustain its interpretations.[206]

Peled-Elhanan examines how the outcomes of massacres are legitimised in Israeli secondary school history books through a complex rhetoric that involves both verbal and visual means.[207] Peled-Elhanan specifically refers to the types of legitimation mentioned by Van Leeuwen and Wodak of authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis.[208]

KhosraviNik applies legitimation to discourse on Iran's nuclear programme. More specifically, KhosraviNik distinguishes broad discursive approaches of a newspaper "in terms of a global, overarching, political-macro-legitimatory approach versus a local, restricted micro-legitimatory approach towards identities of Self and Other and the nature of the political conflict

[202] Christopher Hart and Bodo Winter, "Gesture and legitimation in the anti-immigration discourse of Nigel Farage," *Discourse & Society* 33, no. 1 (2022): 35.
[203] Hart and Winter, "Gesture and legitimation in the anti-immigration discourse of Nigel Farage," 50.
[204] Yating Yu, "Perpetuating and/or resisting the "leftover" myth? The use of (de)legitimation strategies in the Chinese English-language news media," *Feminist Media Studies* 22, no. 3 (2022): 715.
[205] Yu, "Perpetuating and/or resisting the "leftover" myth?" 728.
[206] Inga Koralewska and Katarzyna Zielińska, "'Defending the unborn', 'protecting women' and 'preserving culture and nation': anti-abortion discourse in the Polish right-wing press," *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 24, no. 5 (2022): 673.
[207] Nurit Peled-Elhanan, "Legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books," *Discourse & Society* 21, no. 4 (2010): 377.
[208] Peled-Elhanan, "Legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books," 382.

over Iran's nuclear programme."[209] KhosraviNik specifically follows the discourse-historical approach (DHA) within CDA[210] and found two major tendencies: macro-legitimatory and micro-legitimatory strategies.[211] KhosraviNik is one of the few scholars that look at the macro- and micro-level when it comes to legitimation strategies.

Omelicheva develops an approach to authoritarian legitimation and examines discursive appeals to legitimacy by Kazakh and Uzbek presidents.[212] However, in addition to analysing the discourse of these presidents, Omelicheva tries to assess the effectiveness of the employed discourse, which is done by assessing survey data.[213] Therefore, rather than assessing legitimation of discourse per se, Omelicheva goes beyond and tries to assess the effectiveness of that legitimation.

This overview of the application of the concept of legitimation as understood by the CDA has shown that the concept has been applied in rather specific cases. Furthermore, very few scholars have applied the concept in the manner that Krzyżanowski has applied it: in relation to discursive shifts and micro-macro levels of analysis. There is a gap to fill in the literature, since the application of legitimation in Krzyżanowski's manner has only been done by Krzyżanowski himself. The next section will discuss the concept of normalisation and how it relates to legitimation and Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model.

1.7.4 Normalisation, legitimation and the three-step normalisation model

As the three stages of discursive shifts will form an important part of the analysis of this dissertation, the concept of normalisation and its relation to legitimation has to be assessed thoroughly. These form the last stage of the model.

As Krzyżanowski shows, normalisation is a term that has only relatively rarely been used in social or political contexts.[214] He states that if it is used in social and/or political contexts, it is usually in a negative case: classifying normality and excluding people, ideas and objects that are not considered normal. According to Krzyżanowski, normalisation is most commonly about the construction and introduction of a certain new normative order.[215] He then gives a definition of when normalisation takes place: "Normalization hence takes place when

[209] Majid KhosraviNik, "Macro and micro legitimation in discourse on Iran's nuclear programme: The case of Iranian national newspaper Kayhan," *Discourse & Society* 26, no. 1 (2015): 52.
[210] KhosraviNik, "Macro and micro legitimation in discourse on Iran's nuclear programme," 58.
[211] Ibid., 63.
[212] Mariya Y. Omelicheva, "Authoritarian legitimation: assessing discourses of legitimacy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," *Central Asian Survey* 35, no. 4 (2016): 481.
[213] Omelicheva, "Authoritarian legitimation," 489-491.
[214] Krzyżanowski, "Normalization and the discursive construction of "new" norms and "new" normality," 434.
[215] Ibid., 435.

new norms and ideas of social order, strategically constructed in discourse, become – or are strategically assumed to become – part and parcel of mainstream or common thinking."[216] Normalisation requires critical analysis since it often takes place unnoticed. It often takes place unnoticed whenever an implied "natural" path dependency is presented as part of designed actions of social political and economic actors.[217] Krzyżanowski goes on to show that normalisation has been researched broadly, especially when the term is seen as a process of introduction of new norms.[218] He shows that there are two wider tendencies in the majority of recent social science research on normalisation. First, there a post-Foucauldian and macro-social tendency, which looks at normalisation in a top-down way, meaning that it is a key strategy of wider social discourses which through their hegemonic power regulate social reality and impose (via the introduction and legitimation of norms) the conduct of social groups and individual. Second, there is a tendency to see normalisation in a more horizontal or processual manner, meaning that it should be seen as a token of social and individual behaviour and conduct in specific cultures embedded by public/private organisations or other social contexts. Krzyżanowski then goes on and shows how the field of discourse analysis has written on normalisation in/as a discourse.[219] He first discusses the idea of naturalisation, first introduced by Fairclough in 1992, which denotes the capacity to naturalise ideologies, or, in other words, to win acceptance for ideologies as non-ideological common sense. Naturalisation in this sense is used as a token of a wider process of hierarchisation of discourse, which in Fairclough's case was a strategically building of the distinction between dominant and dominated discourses. Another approach touched upon by Krzyżanowski is developed by Gavriely-Nuri in 2013, where she empirically looks at discourses which normalise war in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[220] Krzyżanowski summarises Gavriely-Nuri's views on normalisation by stating that she said that normalisation takes place by means of similar discursive strategies, regardless of the context. In most cases, these strategies are euphemisation, naturalisation, legitimation and symbolic annihilation. Several other perspectives on normalisation by other scholars are mentioned by Krzyżanowski, such as Link's perspective on the changing wider logic of normalisation in the context of the gradual demise of liberal democracy[221], Krzyżanowski and Ledin's work where they argue that normalisation entails the creation of a specific borderline

[216] Krzyżanowski, "Normalization and the discursive construction of "new" norms and "new" normality," 435.
[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid., 435-436.
[219] Ibid., 439.
[220] Ibid., 440.
[221] Ibid.

discourse that essentially presents "uncivil" ideas related to unacceptable norms of social conduct as legitimate and acceptable, and Wodak's work on right-wing populist discourse and its wider impact on the normalisation of radical-right views across the political spectrum.[222]

Here we have to return to Krzyżanowski's take on the concept of normalisation. In the article where he introduces the model of the three stages of discursive shifts, he also elaborates on how the concept of normalisation is treated in this model. On the one hand, Krzyżanowski's view of normalisation "draws extensively on Foucauldian conceptions, and in particular on the view that normalisation is rooted in a wider, social reordering of discourse and is a part of regulating the introduction and legitimisation of new norms, indeed often in stark contradiction to existent and acceptable social values."[223] Foucault's devotion to imaginaries as part of normalisation models, along with the centrality of the distinction of social actors and groups in the process, is just as crucial for Krzyżanowski to emphasise how normalisation is formed discursively and how it relies on imaginary distinctions and difference-building processes. Vaughan's conception, which inspired the second tendency of research on normalisation as identified by Krzyżanowski,[224] is also relevant for the conception of normalisation in the model of discursive shifts: normalisation is enabled as well as evidenced by the development of a peculiar language of normalisation which skilfully introduces new social norms.[225] Normalisation is then seen as an inherently gradual process: ranging from the introduction of new norms and the eradication of old ones, through the legitimation of a new normative order, down to acceptance of what was previously deemed as unacceptable as acceptable and ways of doing and thinking. The combination of both tendencies (the post-Foucauldian top-down approach and Vaughan's horizontal perspective) is crucial in highlighting how legitimations, pre-legitimations and imaginaries are all present in the construction of moral panics and their subsequent normalisation. Krzyżanowski goes on and shows how a borderline discourse can be constructed from this. This dissertation will not touch upon borderline discourse, it will focus on discursive shifts and its three stages, and to what extend a possible discursive shift has become normalised in the EU's energy legitimation discourse. The link between legitimation, normalisation and Krzyżanowski's model has thus been established.

It is important to mention here that normalisation can be directly linked to Fairclough's term of discursive change. In essence, Krzyżanowski's normalisation and its application in the

[222] Krzyżanowski, "Normalization and the discursive construction of "new" norms and "new" normality," 441.
[223] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 510.
[224] Krzyżanowski, "Normalization and the discursive construction of "new" norms and "new" normality," 438.
[225] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 510.

three-step normalisation model is an elaboration on Fairclough's understanding that a discourse can become a new hegemony when a discursive change is naturalised.[226] A naturalisation of a discursive change can be observed as a normalisation of a discursive shift on the micro-level. To what extent normalisation of a discursive shift has taken place can be traced by analysing the categories of legitimation in discourse. Therefore, Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model builds upon and extends Fairclough's notion of discursive change and makes it systemically traceable.

This section on normalisation has shown how this concept has been treated in the literature. Different perspectives on the concept exist and it is clear that it can be applied in various ways. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the concept has not been treated extensively in the literature as of now. What is most relevant for this dissertation is the notion that normalisation is a part of Krzyżanowski's stages of discursive shifts. In the analysis, this research will examine whether and if so, to what extend a discursive shift has been normalised in the EU's energy discourse regarding Ukraine. This section has also shown how normalisation relates to legitimation and how it is a part of Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model. Therefore, the notion of discursive shifts has been fully covered. Its accompanying model created by Krzyżanowski has been explained and the relation of discursive shifts to discursive change as coined by Fairclough has been explained.

1.8 Summary of the literature review

This literature review been a reflection of the multidisciplinary character of this dissertation.

First, energy policy and its definitions have been discussed. This provided a critical overview on how to understand energy policy in general. This also served as background information for an understanding of energy security.

Second, an overview of energy security and its definitions has been given. This paved the way for a discussion on the scholarship on energy security. This discussion showed that the concept is essentially a social construct, which allows for a critical understanding of the EU's conceptualisation of energy security. The understanding that energy security is a social construct, the definition of which depends on the actors, context and structural conditions involved, provides us with one of the first objectives of this dissertation: an analysis of the extent to which the EU's understanding of energy security has changed throughout the gas

[226] Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," 97.

crises of 2006 and 2009. This literature review has shown that the first gas crisis has had extensive influence on the EU's energy policy, hence, the focus on the gas crises as case studies is justified.

The manner in which the EU's understanding of energy security will be analysed is where this dissertation will make its main contribution to the literature. The application of Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model will form the analytical framework that will make this analysis possible. The three-step normalisation model is rooted in discourse analysis and the literature review has discussed this field in several sections.

The section on discursive change as coined by Fairclough has provided the background information for understanding the three-step normalisation model. Fairclough's work has been influential in the field, but an analysis of discursive change in the context of EU discourse has not been conducted before. Therefore, by focusing on EU discourse, this dissertation will already make a major contribution to the field. The main aim of this dissertation related to discursive change is to find out to what extent a discursive change has taken place, i.e., to what extent a new hegemony in EU energy policy discourse (vis-à-vis Ukraine) has emerged after the gas crises of 2006 and 2009.

The three-step normalisation model is centred around the notion of discursive shifts as coined by Krzyżanowski. Discursive shifts are a concept related to discursive change: a discursive change should be visible on the micro-level in texts as a discursive shift. The three-step normalisation model, also created by Krzyżanowski, allows for a systematic tracing of discursive shifts. It will allow this research to determine to what extent a discursive shift has been enacted, gradated/perpetuated and normalised. Regarding normalisation, legitimations play a pivotal role.

The three-step normalisation model is crucial for this research. One of its main strengths is that it allows for systematic tracing, which takes away the main critique on CDA that its approach is not systematic enough and that there is therefore a danger of bias on the part of the researcher.

The three-step normalisation model has thus far only been applied to right-wing or racist discourse. This dissertation will apply the model to the EU in the field of IR for the very first time, which makes this dissertation a major contribution to the field.

Another area where this dissertation will contribute to the literature, is its focus on Ukraine and the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. The focus on Ukraine and the gas crises is relevant for several reasons. First, the gas crisis the EU found itself in after the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 needs to be better understood. An analysis of how the EU legitimised its

energy policy vis-à-vis Ukraine in the period 2005-2009 will aid in gaining a better understanding to what extent the EU's understanding of energy security changed. The gas crises of 2006 and especially 2009 are the only moments comparable to what happened after 2022. Understanding how the EU acted and why in 2006 and 2009 will provide context for understanding how the EU acted after 2022. Second, the gas crises have had a tremendous impact on the EU's energy policy, as has been shown above. Therefore, the gas crises are good case studies for a study focused on conducting an analysis of how the EU's conception of energy security evolved. Third, the three-step normalisation model needs context in order to be applicable. An analysis of EU energy discourse in general would not make sense in the scope of this model. Therefore, a focus on Ukraine and the gas crises creates the right parameters in which the model can be applied. Since this has not been done before, this will be a major contribution to the field.

Chapter II – Theoretical background and methodology

2.1 Conceptualisation of research

The literature review has shown that the gas crisis of 2006 has had an enormous impact on the evolution of the EU's energy policy. In addition, we have seen that energy policy is rather difficult to define, as is the case with energy security. The literature review has also pointed out that it was only after the gas crisis of 2006 that the EU started to really pay attention to energy security. Since energy security is essentially a social construct,[227] it should be possible to analyse how the EU's conception of energy security changed after the 2006 gas crisis by analysing discourse. This was the first inspiration to conduct this research. The second inspiration has been of a more critical nature. After Russia's renewed invasion of 2022, the EU entered another gas crisis as Russia reduced gas supplies to Europe.[228] The only gas crises comparable to the one that occurred after 2022 are the ones that occurred in 2006 and 2009. As stated before, the 2006 gas crisis had a big impact on the EU's energy policy and supposedly also on its conception of energy security. If the impact was that significant, why did we enter another crisis in 2022? Did the EU not have time enough to improve its energy security, or was its definition flawed to begin with? It is the aim of this dissertation to find out whether an analysis of how the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 impacted the EU's concept of energy security could provide context that could help answer these questions. A good method for analysing a change in a conceptualisation of energy security is discourse analysis. This research has chosen to apply the discourse-historical approach (DHA) of critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to answer the research questions and complete the objectives of this research. An in-depth explanation of how this approach relates to this research will follow in section 2.2.

The scope of the research is narrowed down to an analysis of EU energy policy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine. In 2004, right before the first gas crisis of 2006, Ukraine delivered 80 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe.[229] Ukraine has therefore been pivotal during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 and, since the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine of 2022, EU-Ukraine relations have been more important than ever. Ukraine has submitted a formal application to join the EU in February 2022 and the country has been granted candidate status in June 2022.[230]

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[227] See Dannreuther, "Energy security and shifting modes of governance," 467.
[228] Sam Meredith, "Russia has cut off gas supplies to Europe indefinitely. Here's what you need to know," *CNBC* (website), accessed February 9, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/06/energy-crisis-why-has-russia-cut-off-gas-supplies-to-europe.html.
[229] Jonathan Stern, "Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe: the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis of 2006." *Asia-Pacific Review* 13, no. 1 (2006): 33.
[230] "Ukraine," *European Council* (website), accessed February 9, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/.

The period 2005-2009 also was one in which the EU and Ukraine became closer. After the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko decidedly pursued entry into the European Union.[231] Therefore, given the importance of EU-Ukraine relations in general and the importance of EU-Ukraine relations in the field of energy, this research has decided to narrow down its scope to an analysis of EU energy policy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine.

In addition, it has to be kept in mind that this dissertation is, in its essence, a test. Applications of the concept of discursive shifts and therefore the analytical framework of the three-step normalisation model have previously been limited to a specific type of discourse: right-wing and racist discourse.[232] This research applies the model to a different type of discourse altogether: legitimation of EU energy policy discourse in the field of International Relations (IR). Therefore, once this research has been proven successful, it can be applied to other actors and its scope can be broadened as well.

Based on this conceptualisation, the following objectives and research questions have been determined.

Table 1: Objectives of research[233]

Main objective: to identify how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security evolved during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009.
Second objective: to identify to what extent a discursive change in the EU's energy discourse regarding Ukraine has occurred by identifying to what extent a discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation vis-à-vis Ukraine during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009. **Third objective:** to determine to what extent a discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first (2006) and second (2009) gas crisis.

[231] Stephen Velychenko, "Introduction. Ukraine: EU Member or a Second Belarus?" in: *Ukraine, the EU and Russia – History, Culture and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Velychenko (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 1.
[232] See, for example, Rachel Campbell, Olivia Freeman and Valerie Gannon, "From overt threat to invisible presence: discursive shifts in representations of gender in menstrual product advertising," *Journal of Marketing Management* 37, no. 3-4: 217; Ikuko Nakane, Kaori Okano, Claire Maree, Chie Takagi, Lidia Tanaka and Shimako Iwasaki, "Varying orientations to sharing life stories: A diachronic study of Japanese women's discourse," *Language in Society* 51 (2021): 577; Cinzia Bevitori and Jane Helen Johnson, "Risk and resilience in a changing climate: a diachronic analysis in the press across the globe," *Text&Talk* 42, no. 4 (2022): 547; and Bevitori and Johnson, "Risk and resilience in a changing climate," 565 and lastly Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 503-527.
[233] Own elaboration.

Fourth objective: to apply the three-step normalisation model to the corpus of data in order to find out to what extent a discursive shift has occurred in the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first (2006) and second (2009) gas crisis.

Fifth objective: to determine the legitimation strategies employed by the EU regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis.

Sixth objective: to determine the legitimation strategies employed by the EU regarding Ukraine during the second gas crisis.

Seventh objective: to compare the legitimation strategies of the EU regarding Ukraine employed during the first and second gas crisis.

Eighth objective: to determine what type of possible discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation.

Ninth objective: to determine the significance of a possible discursive shift for EU energy policy legitimation.

Tenth objective: to determine what type of possible discursive change has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation.

Eleventh objective: to determine the significance of a possible discursive change for EU energy policy legitimation.

Twelfth objective: to determine how the EU has defined energy security during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009.

Thirteenth objective: to fill the literature gap in International Relations (IR) by applying the three-step normalisation model to the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first (2006) and second (2009) gas crisis.

Fourteenth objective: to determine recommendations for future research.

Fifteenth objective: to determine how this research is useful in understanding the 2022 gas crisis.

Table 2: Research questions[234]

Main research question: To what extent is it possible to identify a discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine by applying the three-step normalisation model on discursive shifts during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009?	
Sub-questions:	How did the EU legitimise its energy policy regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis of 2005-2006?
	To what extent are discursive shifts visible in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis of 2005-2006?
	How did the EU legitimise its energy policy actions regarding Ukraine during the second gas crisis of 2008-2009?
	To what extent are discursive shifts visible in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during second gas crisis of 2008-2009?
	How do the legitimation strategies employed by the EU during the first gas crisis compare to those employed during the second gas crisis?
	When was the possible discursive shift enacted?
	When did the possible discursive shift gradate/perpetuate?

[234] Own elaboration.

	To what extent is the possible discursive shift normalised?
	To what extent is a discursive change visible in EU legitimation strategies after comparing both gas crises?
	How did the EU define energy security during the two gas crises?
	What are possible ventures for future research in this field?
	To what extent can the outcome of this research help in explaining the 2022 gas crisis?

The hypotheses have been determined based on the literature review, the objectives of this doctoral dissertation and the research questions.

The main objective of this dissertation is to identify how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security evolved during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. As Knodt argued that a security frame emerged after the 2006 crisis,[235] the main hypothesis is that the EU's understanding of energy security evolved through a securitisation of its energy policy.

The main research question that this dissertation will answer is "To what extent is it possible to identify a discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine by applying the three-step normalisation model on discursive shifts during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009?" Knodt's argument that a security frame emerged after the first gas crisis also informs the second hypothesis: that the discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009 consists of the securitisation of EU energy policy.

The third hypothesis was determined based on the idea of "normative power Europe" as coined by Manners.[236] Manners shows that in the early 2000s the EU has made its external policy informed and conditional on norms.[237] Therefore, it is the expectation of this research that before the 2006 gas crisis happened, the EU would legitimise its argumentations with moral

[235] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 231.
[236] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-258.
[237] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 241.

legitimations, which refer to value systems.[238] The third hypothesis is that prior to the peak of the first gas crisis, the EU legitimised its energy policy predominantly with moralisation legitimations.

The literature review has suggested that the 2006 gas crisis had a significant impact on the evolution of the EU's energy policy, hence the fourth hypothesis is that it was at this moment in time that the discursive shift towards securitisation was enacted.

The fifth hypothesis is built upon the idea that the EU's understanding of energy security is evolving after the first gas crisis and that this is visible in the types of legitimations that the EU employs. There are several categories of legitimations that will be used in the analysis of this research, which will be elaborated upon below. Taking into account the idea that the 2006 gas crisis has had a significant impact on the EU's energy policy, this dissertation hypothesises that during the second gas crisis, the EU legitimised its energy policy predominantly with rationalisation legitimations. Rationalisation legitimations refer to knowledge claims or arguments[239] and they can be sub-divided into separate categories like instrumental rationalisation with a goal or outcome orientation.[240] When it concerns a goal orientation, a purpose is involved.[241] Therefore, a presence of rationalisation legitimations would suggest a conscious effort by the EU to change its legitimations and therefore their conceptualisation of energy security.

The sixth hypothesis was built with the idea in mind that the second gas crisis of 2009 would be reinforcing the changes that occurred after the first gas crisis of 2006. Following the three-step normalisation model, this means that if changes in discourse are reinforced and become commonplace, the discursive shift has entered the stages of gradation/perpetuation and normalisation. The sixth hypothesis is therefore that during the second gas crisis, the discursive shift towards security is both perpetuated and normalised.

In that light, the seventh hypothesis can be seen as built upon the other assumptions: keeping all previous hypotheses in mind and assuming that the discursive shift has normalised, the seventh hypothesis is that the normalisation of the security legitimations leads to a discursive change in EU energy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine.

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[238] Wodak, "Chapter 1: Populism and Politics," 6.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Theo van Leeuwen, "The Discursive Construction of Legitimation," in: *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis* (Oxford University Press: 2008): 113-117.
[241] Van Leeuwen, "The Discursive Construction of Legitimation," 114.

The last hypothesis is built on findings in the literature again: most scholars focus on the security of supply when discussing what energy security means for the European Union.[242] Therefore, this dissertation hypothesises that the security of supply is the core determinant of the EU's conceptualisation of energy security.

The hypotheses are shown in an overview in Table 3.

Table 3: Hypotheses[243]

Main hypothesis (H1): the EU's understanding of energy security evolved in the form of a securitisation of its energy policy	
Other hypotheses:	**H2:** The discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009 consists of the securitisation of EU energy policy.
	H3: Prior to the peak of the first gas crisis, the EU legitimised its energy policy predominantly with moralisation legitimations.
	H4: After the peak of the first gas crisis, a discursive shift towards security is enacted by the EU.
	H5: During the second gas crisis, the EU legitimised its energy policy predominantly with rationalisation legitimations.
	H6: During the second gas crisis, the discursive shift towards security is both perpetuated and normalised.
	H7: The normalisation of the security legitimations leads to a discursive change in

[242] See, for example: Biresselioglu, "Geopolitics and Energy Security," in: *European Energy Security* (Palgrave MacMillan: 2011): 17-18; Yergin, "Ensuring Energy Security," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 82; *International Energy Agency Policies Review: the European Union*: 79; Giacomo Luciani, "Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets. What is it and What is it not?" *Nota di Lavoro* no. 119.2004 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM): September 2004): 2; and Haghighi, "Security of Energy Supply in Europe," in: *Energy Security*, 13.

[243] Own elaboration.

	EU energy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine: the securitisation of energy discourse.
	H8: The security of supply is the core determinant of the EU's conceptualisation of energy security.

The hypotheses and research questions will be verified and answered by conducting the discourse-historical approach (DHA) of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The coming sections will explain the theoretical background of discourse analysis and will outline why the DHA of CDA is the approach that is most suitable to conduct this research.

2.2 Theoretical framework – the discourse historical approach (DHA) of critical discourse analysis (CDA)

The discourse historical approach of the method critical discourse analysis is both the theoretical framework and the methodology for this dissertation. The DHA is an approach rather than a theory per se, so in order to explain how the DHA works, this chapter will be divided in three parts. The first part is going to explain the theoretical background of discourse analysis and its main approaches, along with explicating why the discourse historical approach (DHA) of critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the proper approach for this doctoral dissertation. The second part of this chapter will explain the CDA and the DHA in more detail and the third part will explicate how the DHA will be applied as a methodology specifically to this research. This part will also explain how the analytical framework will be applied in the analysis of the paper.

2.2.1 Theoretical background: discourse analysis

In his book chapter, Van Dijk shows how the field of discourse studies came into being.[244] Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, new closely related disciplines such as semiotics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking, conversation analysis, pragmatics and discourse studies emerged in humanities and the social sciences.[245] There was a methodological common ground between these disciplines, which Van Dijk summarizes as follows: an interest in properties of 'naturally occurring' language use by real language users

[244] Teun A. van Dijk, "The Study of Discourse: An Introduction," in: *Discourse Studies, 5 vols. Sage Benchmarks in Discourse Studies*, ed. Teun A. van Dijk (London: Sage, 2007): xix.
[245] Van Dijk, "The Study of Discourse," xxii.

instead of a study of abstract language systems and invented examples; a study of larger units than isolated words and sentences and new basic units of analysis (such as texts and discourses); the extension of linguistics beyond grammar towards a study of action and interaction; the extension to non-verbal / semiotic aspects of interaction and communication (such as gestures, images, film); a focus on dynamic cognitive or interactional moves and strategies; a study of the role of the social, cultural and cognitive contexts of language use and an analysis of up until then largely ignored phenomena of language use: coherence, anaphora, topics, macrostructure, speech acts, etc.[246]

Van Dijk stresses that it is important to see the emergence of these new disciplines as separate from the revolutionary spirit of the end of the 1960s.[247] The timing of these movements roughly coincided, but the social and political natures of the changes in society did not lead to similar changes in the disciplines. Only with the emergence of critical discourse studies did the two different forms of dissent merge, according to Van Dijk.

Van Dijk goes into detail about further developments and digs deeper into several dimensions of discourse studies (like discourse grammar, stylistics, rhetoric discourse pragmatics, etc.), but those dimensions lead astray from the path of this research. The focus of this dissertation is on critical discourse analysis, and the following overview of approaches to discourse analysis serves to show how CDA can be positioned in the field of discourse analysis.

Approaches to discourse analysis

There are many approaches to discourse analysis. Glynos, Howarth, Norval and Speed name six: political discourse theory (PDT); rhetorical political analysis (RPA); discourse-historical analysis in critical discourse analysis (DHA in CDA); interpretive policy analysis (IPA); discursive psychology (DPs) and Q methodology (QM).[248] Their classification has been summarised in a chart, which is reproduced below in Table 4.

[246] Van Dijk, "The Study of Discourse," xxii.
[247] Ibid., xxiii.
[248] Jason Glynos, David Howarth, Aletta Norval and Ewen Speed, "Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods," *ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Review paper* (August 2009, National Centre for Research Methods, NCRM/014): 5.

Table 4: Classification of approaches to discourse analysis[249]

Discourse analysis type	Typification of Discourse	Objects of Analysis	Linguistic/ Non-Linguistic Parameters	Distinctions between Text and Context	Role of Agency /Subjectivity	Levels of Analysis: Macro /Micro
PDT	Discourse as Ontological Horizon	Change & Stabilization of Discursive Practices	Linguistic & Non-Linguistic Internal to Discourse	Analytical & Not Ontological	Subject as Discourse Position; Subject as lack; Subject as Enjoying	Macro (with Micro Analysis of Texts)
CDA/DHA	Realist Semiotic as a Dimension of Social Relations	Political Discourses	Linguistic= Text; Non-Linguistic=Social Context of Text	Text is Objective; Context is Historical & Subjective	Cognitive	Micro (with Macro Analysis of Social Structures)
IPA	Hermeneutic	Meanings Practices Policy Discourses	Linguistic= Text; Non-Linguistic=Social Context of Text	Analytical & Not Ontological	Expressive Subjectivity Subject of Meaning	Macro (with Micro Analysis of Texts)
RPA	Discourse as Ontological Horizon	Argument Persuasion	Traverses Divide with Emphasis on Pathos and Ethos	Texts=Arguments; Contexts=Discourses	Subject Positions	Micro (with Macro Analysis of Social Structures)
DPs	Personal Traits Constructed through Discursive Interaction	Emotions & Ideology	Traverses Divide	Analytical & Not Ontological	Cognitive (CA Strand) Split Subjectivity (Ideology Critique Strand)	Micro (CA) Macro (IC)

[249] Glynos, Howarth, Norval and Speed, "Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods," 32-33.

QM	Ontology Bracketed	Identification of Shared Discourses	Traverses Divide	Textual	Self-Interpretations	Micro

Many of the approaches outlined above share the same characteristics, as they are all approaches to discourse analysis. Therefore, they are bound to overlap. Nevertheless, a choice has to be made in selecting a specific approach for this dissertation. Looking at the classification, it becomes clear only PDT and DHA in CDA are viable for the present research, since the other approaches are outside the scope of this research. For example, Q Methodology is linked with discursive psychology and both methods are focused on psychology and discourse.[250] The present research is focused on macro-political events and the discourses of energy policies and institutions. Therefore, a focus on psychology is outside the scope of this research. The approach of Interpretive Policy Analysis does overlap with the goal of this research, namely, the interpretation of policy. However, this approach is focused more on the interpretation of policy specifically and the notion of context is less important.[251] For this research, the notion of context is highly important, as will be shown in the sections below. Rhetorical Political Analysis, on the other hand, focuses mostly on an analysis of argumentation.[252] This research focuses on argumentation *and* the context related to it.

Which leaves us with PDT and CDA. PDT's principal objects of investigation are practices or regimes of practices and the aim of the approach is to critically explain the transformation, stabilisation and maintenance of those practices or regimes of practices.[253] Discourses function as ontological horizons, which means that practices are discursive in character. The approach specifically uses a logics approach to political theory and analysis, which has five basic elements: problematisation, retroduction, logics, articulation and critique.[254] The element of logic has a particular meaning here: it is intended "to capture *the purposes, rules and ontological presuppositions that render a practice or regime possible, intelligible and vulnerable*."[255] A three-fold typology of logics is employed by PTD: social, political and fantasmic logics.

[250] Glynos, Howarth, Norval and Speed, "Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods," 28 and 25.
[251] Ibid., 20-25.
[252] Ibid., 13-17.
[253] Ibid., 9.
[254] Ibid., 10.
[255] Ibid., 11.

Both CDA and PDT aim to explain *and* critique discourses and both have a systematic approach for critically analysing discourses. CDA however focuses more on language itself and regards 'language as social practice'[256] and considers the context of language use to be crucial. When CDA talks about discourses, texts proper is meant, i.e. the micro-level, whereas PDT looks more at the macro-level (which can also be seen in the classification chart above). CDA also looks at the macro-level, but in a manner that is more synchronised with the micro-level. This will be elaborated upon below. The aim of the present research is to analyse to what extent a discursive shift in the EU's energy policy discourse (documents, *thus* text) has taken place vis-à-vis Ukraine, from which follows that CDA is the more suitable approach: CDA looks at both the micro- and the macro-level.

2.2.2 Critical discourse analysis

CDA emerged as a network of scholars in the early 1990s.[257] As Wodak states in her book chapter, the term CDA is used to refer to the critical linguistic approach of scholars who find the larger discursive unit of text to be the basic unit of communication.[258] Thus, text is the main unit of analysis in CDA. Wodak defines CDA as "fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language."[259] However, in order to have a fully critical account of discourse, one needs to look beyond spoken or written text and also theorise and describe both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social historical subjects create meanings in their interaction with texts.[260] In other words: context is important. CDA has roots in classical rhetoric, text linguistics, sociolinguistics, applied linguistics and pragmatics,[261] which explains its similarities to the other approaches to discourse analysis outlined above.

According to Wodak, an understanding of the basic claims of Halliday's grammar and his approach to linguistic analysis is essential for a proper understanding of CDA.[262] Halliday stressed the relationship between the grammatical system and the social and personal needs that

[256] Wodak, "What CDA is about," 1. Wodak herself got this quote from: Fairclough and Wodak: 'Critical discourse analysis,' in: *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, volume 2, T. van Dijk (ed.) (London, Sage: 1997).
[257] Wodak, "What CDA is about," 4.
[258] Ibid., 2.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid., 2-3.
[261] Ibid., 3.
[262] Ibid., 8.

language is required to serve and he distinguished three metafunctions of language which are continuously interconnected: the ideational function through which language lends structure to experience (the ideational structure has a dialectical relationship with social structure: both reflecting and influencing it); the interpersonal function which constitutes relationships between participants and lastly the textual function which constitutes coherence and cohesion in texts.[263]

Three important notions in CDA are 'critical', 'ideology' and 'power'.[264] The notion of critique has been understood differently by different scholars within CDA. Some adhere to the Frankfurt School, some to a notion of literary criticism, some to Marx. Wodak states that being 'critical' is understood as having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly and as having a focus on self-reflection as you do research.[265] In any case, the fact that the notion of critique is understood differently by different scholars in CDA shows that multiple approaches exist within CDA and thus shows the variety of CDA as an approach as a whole.

Regarding the notion of ideology, for CDA it is seen as an important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations.[266] One of CDA's aims is to decipher ideologies and thereby demystify discourses. Language is not seen as powerful on its own, it is seen as gaining power by the use that powerful people make of it. According to Wodak, an important perspective in CDA is that a text is rarely the work of any one person.[267] Discursive differences are negotiated in texts, they are governed by differences in power which are themselves in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Thus, CDA argues, texts are often sites of struggle: they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance. As Wodak states, power is signalled not only by grammatical forms within a text, but also by a person's control of a social occasion by means of the genre of a text. It is often within the genres associated with given social occasions that power is exercised or challenged. Hence, again, context is important.

It is important to mention that some scholars now refer to CDA as critical discourse studies (CDS) in order to denote the expansion of CDA into a larger transdisciplinary research

[263] Wodak, "What CDA is about," 8.
[264] Ibid., 9.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid., 10.
[267] Ibid., 11.

domain and to convey a rejection of a language-centred analysis.[268] This is not the case for all scholars however and Catalano and Waugh themselves state that they refer to the approach as CDA/CDS and that their use of either term depends on which term a specific scholar prefers.[269] Later, they explain that for some scholars, CDS denotes the whole field, whereas CDA is then seen as the methodology or analysis in a more narrow sense.[270] Since this dissertation situates itself in the field of International Relations and has language at the centre of its analysis, the research will refer to the approach as CDA instead of CDS.

The growth of CDA into CDS showcases the diversity of the approach. This is acknowledged by Meyer. In his book chapter, Meyer shows that a variety of theories exist in CDA and that thus also a variety of methodologies exist.[271] There is no guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used consistently within CDA, nor do scholars within CDA consistently proceed from the area of theory to the field of discourse and then back to theory.[272] Meyer subsequently names seven theoretical levels that can be found in CDA, which I will reproduce below.[273]

1. Epistemological level: covers theories which provide models of the conditions, contingencies and limits of human perception in general and scientific perception in particular.
2. General social theories (often called 'grand theories'): try to conceptualise relations between social structure and social action and thus link micro-and macro-sociological phenomena. Within this level one can distinguish between the more structuralist and the more individualist approaches. The structuralist approaches provide top-down explanations whereas the individualist approaches provide bottom-up explanations. Many modern theories try to reconcile these two positions and imply the existence of some kind of circularity between social action and social structure.
3. Middle-range theories: focus upon either specific social phenomena (e.g. conflict, social networks) or on specific sub-systems of society (e.g. economy, politics, religion)

[268] Theresa Catalano and Linda R. Waugh, "Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), and Beyond," in: *Critical Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Studies and Beyond* (Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 26, Springer Nature, 2020): 2.
[269] Catalano and Waugh, "Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)", 2.
[270] Theresa Catalano and Linda R. Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," in: *Critical Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Studies and Beyond* (Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 26, Springer Nature, 2020): 155.
[271] Michael Meyer, "Between theory, method, and politics: positioning of the approaches to CDA," in: *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001): 17.
[272] Michael Meyer, "Between theory, method, and politics," 18.
[273] Ibid., 19-20. The seven levels are paraphrased by the author of this dissertation.

4. Micro-sociological theories: try to explain social interaction.
5. Socio-psychological theories: concentrate on the social condition of emotion and cognition.
6. Discourse theories: aim at the conceptualisation of discourse as a social phenomenon and try to explain its genesis and structure.
7. Linguistic theories: try to describe and explain the pattern specific to language systems and verbal communication.

This classification has a lot in common with the classification of the different approaches to discourse analysis by Glynos, Howarth, Norval and Speed outlined earlier. This makes sense, as CDA is an approach within discourse analysis. Like with choosing an approach to discourse analysis, an approach within CDA has to be chosen for this research. Like before, the theoretical levels related to sociology, psychology and linguistics can be ruled out. A sub-approach has to be singled out that has to suit the goals of this research. This sub-approach is the discourse-historical approach (DHA), which will be explained in the next section. Before explaining the DHA, other approaches within the CDA will be outlined.

First, there is the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA) developed by Fairclough.[274] As Catalano and Waugh explain, the DRA has three basic properties in relation to CDA.[275] It is relational in the sense that it focuses on social relations, rather than on individuals. These relations are dialectical in the sense that they are not fully exclusive or separate from each other and the approach is transdisciplinary because when one analyses dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, the analysis should transcend boundaries between disciplines. Catalano and Waugh explain that Fairclough organises the implementation of the DRA into four stages.[276] First, there is a focus on a social wrong, which is an order that is detrimental to human well-being. Here, special attention should be given to dialectical relations between semiotic moments. Second, obstacles should be identified to addressing the particular social wrong. Third, there needs to be consideration whether the social order has a particular need for the social wrong for the greater god to occur. Fourth, possible ways should be identified to get around the earlier identified obstacles. The core of the DRA is therefore the identification and addressing of a particular 'social wrong'.

[274] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 164.
[275] Ibid., 165.
[276] Ibid., 166.

Second, there is the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) developed by Teun van Dijk.[277] The SCA emphasises the study of cognition in the critical analysis of discourse, communication and interaction and the cognitively mediated relationship between discourse and society. This approach focuses on socially shared representations or perceptions of societal groups and relations.

Third, there are Social Semiotics (SocSem) and Multimodal Approaches (MCDA).[278] Catalano and Waugh treat these as being inherently intertwined from a CDA/CDS point of view.[279] SocSem is focused in both the way that language is used in social contexts and the way we use language to create society as well as the way that society creates language.[280] An approach that uses SocSem focuses on describing the available choices of sign used in communication, in order for us to understand what it is that people are doing with them.[281] Since SocSem is based in semiotics, which classifies language under a larger umbrella category of types of sign-making resources in various modalities, MCDA researchers regard linguistic and visual modes of communication as instances of a single underlying semiotic capacity.[282] SocSem is influenced by, *inter alia*, Halliday, Foucault's notion of discourse, Chomskyan linguistics and French semiotics and therefore the approach states that all communication has underlying patterns and conventions which determine why we do and say certain things.

Fourth, there is Dispositive Analysis Approach (DPA). The DPA is heavily influences by Foucault's theory of discourse.[283] Crucial to Foucault's theory of discourse are questions like what knowledge actually is, how knowledge arises, how knowledge passes on to others and what function knowledge has for constituting subjects and what impact it has on societal shaping and development.[284] The DPA is less concerned with linguistic features of a text than the other approaches found within the CDA and focuses on cultural sciences, or, in other words, the macro level of discourse. Catalano and Waugh quote Graham to summarise what DPA looks for: the approach looks at statements not so much for what they say, but what they do.[285] Meaning: what are the constitutive or political effects of saying this, instead of something else? Foucault's dispositive is extremely important to the DPA. The dispositive is "a thoroughly heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory

[277] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 170.
[278] Ibid., 178.
[279] Ibid., 178-179.
[280] Ibid., 178.
[281] Ibid., 179.
[282] Ibid.
[283] Ibid., 187-188.
[284] Ibid., 188.
[285] Ibid.

decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions".[286] It is essentially the relationship between the interplay of discursive practices, non-discursive practices, manifestations and/or materialisations of these practices. Scholars that practice the DPA go beyond Foucault's notion of the dispositive, like Jäger and Maier, who make an explicit connection among discourses, actions and objects.[287] Foucault himself has not explicitly made this link between the discursive and the non-discursive practices.

Fifth, there is the Corpus Linguistic Approach (CorpLingA).[288] This approach has been developed in order to counter the critique that CDA/CDS has lacked quantitative and comparative methods. CorpLingA therefore uses computer support to analyse large texts of data.[289] This could be useful to measure a certain frequency of metaphors, for example.

Sixth, there are the Cognitive Linguistic Approaches (CogLingA).[290] Cognitive linguistics is concerned with how people make meaning of the world and how people define their everyday realities.[291] These approaches are concerned with how readers construct meaning.

It has to be noted that this list of approaches within CDA/CDS is not exhaustive, as the field is growing. The approaches summed up in this section all show a specific orientation towards a certain methodology or issue area. Some focus only on the macro level of discourse, others focus exclusively on addressing social issues. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) of CDA is an approach that does not give priority to either the micro- or the macro level of discourse, which makes it more versatile than the other approaches mentioned. In addition, the DHA also includes a normative aspect by emphasising the importance of critique. The DHA of CDA has been selected as the approach that this dissertation will adhere to, because of this versatility. The DHA will be elaborated upon in the next section.

2.2.3 The discourse-historical approach (DHA) in critical discourse analysis (CDA)

The discourse-historical approach is one of the most well-known approaches of CDA.[292] The DHA shares several features with other approaches in CDA: proponents of the DHA and

[286] Ibid Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 189.
[287] Ibid., 189.
[288] Ibid.,190.
[289] Ibid., 191.
[290] Ibid., 194.
[291] Ibid., 195.
[292] Martin Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in: *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (Routledge Online: Abingdon, 18 July 2017): 44.

CDA are politically engaged and application-oriented; they make practical claims of emancipation and criticise discursively constituted power abuse, injustice and social discrimination; they put emphasis on the practice-related quality of discourses, the context dependence of discourses, and the constructed as well as constructive character of discourses; they reject a purely formalist and context-abstract view on language; they pay attention to multi-modal macro- as well as micro-phenomena, to intertextual and interdiscursive relationships, as well as to social, historical, political, economic, psychologic and other factors relating to the verbal and non-verbal phenomena of communication.[293] The DHA distinguishes itself from other approaches in CDA by the following features.

First, there is more weight on historical subjects and on the historical anchoring, change and echo of specific discourses than in other CDA approaches.[294] Second, the DHA follows for the principle of triangulation more systematically in extensive research projects. Third, practical critique plays a bigger role in the DHA. Fourth, the concept of rhetoric is more comprehensive than the one suggested by other CDA approaches. Fifth, the argumentation analysis is more important than in other CDA approaches. Sixth, the DHA has a multi-perspectival concept of discourse, meaning that according to DHA a discourse includes various perspectives on social reality, as opposed to a mono-perspectival concept of discourse used in other approaches. Seventh, references to poststructuralist theories are less pronounced and Habermas and Critical Theory play a more significant role.

While the DHA has a strong interest in historical research, history is certainly not its only focus area in its field of discourse studies.[295] Other areas of interest are, *inter alia*, discourse and discrimination; language barriers in social institutions; discourse and identity; discourse and politics and discourse in the media. The DHA considers discourse analysis to be more than just a method of language analysis: it sees it as a multidimensional project that incorporates theory, methods, methodology and empirically based research practices that yield concrete social applications.

Regarding its methodology, Catalano and Waugh show that the DHA is three dimensional.[296] First, specific contents or topics of a specific discourse should be identified. Second, the discursive strategies should be investigated and third, the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations should be investigated. Related to this dissertation,

[293] Selection of features selected from: Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 49.
[294] Again, selection of features selected from: Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 49.
[295] Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 48.
[296] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 175.

this means that for the analysis, first the contents and topics of a text will be determined in order to be able to analyse which legitimations are used as discursive strategies. Then, the legitimations found can be linked back to the context again. A more specific example of this will be given in section 2.6.

The DHA is interdisciplinary in terms of theory, methods, methodology, research practice and practical application.[297] This fits the general idea of the CDA being multidisciplinary; Catalano and Waugh show that studies within CDA/CDS often combine approaches, topics and field of studies and it is therefore "rare to find a researcher who uses only one approach without the influence of, or the borrowing of terminology or concepts from, another."[298] This gives the researcher a broad degree of flexibility in terms of research design. For this research, theory has been "borrowed" from Fairclough and used in the analysis. The three-step normalisation model that will be applied in the analysis is informed by Fairclough's concept of discursive change. In essence, this "borrowing" of theory has been done by Krzyżanowski before, since he created the model which is based on discursive change and he himself situated his study within the DHA.[299] Therefore, the application of the three-step normalisation model showcases how this dissertation is a reflection of the multidisciplinary approach that CDA aims to be.

2.2.3.1 DHA: the main concepts

This section will explain the main concepts of the DHA and show how they relate to this dissertation.

2.2.3.1.1 The DHA as a triangulatory approach

Important to note from the start is that the DHA follows a triangulatory approach. According to Reisigl and Wodak, this "…implies taking a whole range of empirical observations, theories and methods as well as background information into account".[300] Therefore, the DHA is multilevel and involves numerous concepts and definitions. In essence, triangulation is a type of research which fits the DHA. Research being triangulatory means that at several points in an analysis, there is a link between the research to empirical observations,

[297] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 174
[298] Ibid., 161-163.
[299] See: Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 103, and Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 507-510.
[300] Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)," in: *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage (2nd revised edition), 2009): 89.

theories and methods. In relation to this research, this entails constantly linking the theory and the method to the empirical observations found in the analysed data. As Reisigl and Wodak state, how this is done exactly depends on the specific problem.[301] In this case, the theoretical framework is the application of discursive shifts and discursive change, the methodology is the DHA of CDA and the empirical observations are the texts found in the corpus of data. Figures 1 and 2 visualise the triangulatory approach of the DHA.

Figure 1: The DHA as a triangulatory approach[302]



[301] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 89.
[302] Own elaboration based on Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 89.

Figure 2: The DHA as a triangulatory approach related to this dissertation[303]



2.2.3.1.2 Discourse

Figure 3 shows how the DHA conceptualises discourse.

Figure 3: The DHA's conception of "discourse" [304]



[303] Own elaboration based on Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 89.
[304] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 92.

A discourse is considered to be "a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action; socially constituted and socially constitutive; related to a macro-topic and linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view".[305] Therefore, macro-topic-relatedness, pluri-perspectivity and argumentativity are regarded as constitutive elements of a discourse.[306] Reisigl and Wodak state that delimiting the borders of a discourse (and differentiating it from other discourses) is up to the analyst's perspective, since it is not a closed unit, but a dynamic semiotic entity that is open to reinterpretation and continuation.

Since "texts are parts of discourses"[307], a discourse can be seen as an overarching collection box of texts, topics and genres. Texts make speech acts durable over time and thus bridge two dilated speech situations.[308] Texts can be assigned to genres, which can be characterised as 'a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity'.[309] So, for example, a genre can be a speech by a politician, whereas the text he is reading out is the text. As Reisigl and Wodak state, a discourse on for example climate change is created through a range of genres and texts (i.e. TV debates and policies created by the government).[310]

2.2.3.1.3 "Discourse" conceptualised for this dissertation

For this dissertation, EU discourse regarding Ukraine will form the main unit of analysis. Here, we need to discuss which discourse can be treated as EU discourse. In other words, we need to determine how to treat the EU as an actor.

Determining how to treat the EU as an actor in international relations is complicated. A variety of approaches exists on how to approach the EU and to determine what the EU actually is. The Clingendael Institute shows that research on how to define the EU as an actor goes back to the 1970s when the EU was first defined as a 'Civilian Power'.[311] As Manner states in his article, however, it is very difficult to define the EU, since it "has evolved into a hybrid of

[305] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 89.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Ibid.
[308] Ibid.
[309] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 90. Fairclough 1995a: 14 is quoted here by Reisigl and Wodak.
[310] Ibid.
[311] Vincent Delaere and Louise G. Van Schaik, "The EU's Actorness and Effectiveness in International Institutions," in: *EU Representation in the OPCW after Lisbon: Still Waiting for Brussels* (Clingendael Institute, August 1, 2012): 7.

supranational and international forms of governance which transcends Westphalian norms."[312] In defining on how to approach the EU as an actor in the period 2004-2009 in relation to its energy policy, it has to be taken into account that before the gas crisis of 2006, there was no significant common EU energy policy,[313] since the member states simply did not want to transfer sovereignty on energy issues: it was seen as too strategic.[314] Energy was only considered as an EU competence in the Treaty of Lisbon.[315] Therefore, EU-Ukraine energy relations in the timeframe of 2005-2009 were a part of "regular" EU-Ukraine relations. This is the reason that the collection of data proceeded by first collecting all EU-Ukraine discourse in the period 2005-2009 and afterwards narrowing it down to the topic of energy.

In order to determine which actors to take into account regarding the collection of data, the key criteria that this research adheres to is that the actors represent the EU as a whole in their discourse. An example of an actor that will be taken into account is the High Representative, which operates under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Despite the fact that the decision-making procedure of the CFSP is intergovernmental,[316] the goal of the CFSP is far from intergovernmental. Indeed, as Kaczorowska shows: "The realistic objective of the common foreign policy for the EU is more to agree on a common position in international policy (that is, to speak with one voice) than to achieve a unified foreign policy conducted by supranational bodies, with the EU raised to the status of a superpower."[317] In other words, actors representing the EU through its foreign policy are representing a common EU position. It is this type of discourse that will be analysed in this dissertation.

The European Commission is another relevant actor whose discourse is fundamental to analyse. It is after all the Commission that initiates supranational, i.e. EU-wide policy proposals, also on the neighbourhoods. For example, the Commission sends out progress reports on the European Neighbourhood Policy, of which Ukraine is a part. Another example is Communications that are sent out from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Eastern Partnership. This is internal official EU discourse which reflects the EU standpoint on these issues.

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[312] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 240.
[313] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," *East European Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (January 2009): 419.
[314] Ibid., 420.
[315] Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security," *European Security* 19, no. 4 (2010): 594.
[316] Alina Kaczorowska, "Competences of the EU," in *European Union Law* (Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon: 2008): 113.
[317] Kaczorowska, "Competences of the EU," 112.

The same is true for the European Council. When the European Council asks the Commission to prepare recommendations on a certain issue, this can be seen as an EU-wide consensus on an issue.

Therefore, the discourse that will be analysed in this dissertation is discourse from actors that represent EU-wide standpoints. These are: EU Commissioners, meetings of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, EU Council statements, the European Parliament and the High Representative.

Now that is clear from which EU actors' data will be collected, the *type* of data has to be specified. An important distinction that has to be made here is between frontstage and backstage events.

This dissertation will focus on frontstage events. Frontstage events are a specific genre in which discourse is produced.[318] What characterises frontstage events is the fact that this genre is thoroughly manufactured, as opposed to backstage events, which is a genre that is usually inaccessible for the wider public.[319] The distinction between the two is explicated by Wodak and Forchtner: backstage is where the actors are present, but the audience is not.[320] Wodak and Forchtner draw on the definition of frontstage by Goffman, who refers to the genre of frontstage events as the places where actors perform in sanctioned public arenas, stage their work and are perceived by audiences.[321] Compared to this, the backstage genre is the place where politicians can meet informally and can step out of character.[322] Actors that perform on frontstage events are characterised by Goffman as "staged and performed".[323] An example of a frontstage event is a press conference, as explained by Ekström and Eriksson: a press conference is "organised by political institutions with the overall purpose of releasing public statements and making officials available for questions from the public (or, more specifically, from journalists who are assumed to act on behalf of the public)."[324] Ekström and Eriksson state that politicians "literally come forward on a stage arranged for a particular public activity"[325]. According to Ekström and Eriksson, the boundaries between the front and the politics behind the scene (which we could

[318] Mats Ekström and Göran Eriksson, "Press conferences," in: *The Routledge Handbook of Politics and Language*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Bernhard Forchtner (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018): 345.
[319] Ruth Wodak and Bernhard Forchtner, "The fictionalisation of politics," in: *The Routledge Handbook of Politics and Language*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Bernhard Forchtner (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018): 572.
[320] Wodak and Forchtner, "The fictionalisation of politics," 574.
[321] Ibid., 574.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Ibid.
[324] Ekström and Eriksson, "Press conferences," 345.
[325] Ibid., 345.

call backstage events) is carefully arranged, since politicians prepare speeches to announce certain messages while journalists are there to push the boundaries and indicate concealments in questions that go beyond what politicians are prepared to talk about.

All this suggests that politicians might be insincere during frontstage events and that it might thus be more worthwhile to research what is being said backstage, where "politicians can step out of character" and where "facts suppressed in the frontstage and various kinds of informal action may appear, which are not accessible to outsiders."[326] This research choses to focus on frontstage events precisely because backstage events are not accessible to outsiders. It is one of the limitations of this paper that the author is unable to go backstage and analyse what was being said in private meetings. While the EU does publish notes and minutes of the meetings of its various institutions, often the salient parts are left out.[327] Therefore, while this research acknowledges that it would be interesting to analyse the backstage events, this research also acknowledges its limitations and will therefore focus on frontstage events for its immediate language or text internal co-text. Specifically, the frontstage events that will be analysed are press conferences, interviews, press releases and speeches.

The collection of data will be addressed separately in section 2.4.

2.2.3.1.4 Intertextuality, recontextualisation and de-contextualisation

Intertextuality means that texts are connected to other texts, in both the past and the present.[328] These connections are created by, *inter alia*: explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through references to the same events; by transferring main arguments from one text to the next text, etc. Recontextualisation is the process of transferring given elements to new contexts. On the other hand, if an element is taken out of a specific context, de-contextualisation is happening. If then that element is inserted into a new context, recontextualisation is happening. In Figure 3 (shown above), intertextuality is indicated by double dotted arrows, whereas the specific intertextual relationship of the thematic reference of one text to another is indicated by simple broken arrows.[329]

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[326] Wodak and Forchtner, "The fictionalisation of politics," 574.
[327] For example, a Note from the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union to the Permanent Representatives Committee which contains draft "Council conclusions on Ukraine" (6512/05) is only "partially accessible to the public" and specific reservations or introductions from member states are deleted from the document. See: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6512-2005-INIT/en/pdf.
[328] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 90.
[329] Ibid., 92.

2.2.3.1.5 Interdiscursivity

Interdiscursivity means that discourses can be linked to each other.[330] For example, if a discourse is being perceived as topic-related, then a discourse on, say, military spending is linked to subtopics or other discourses like a government budget and national security.

Linked to interdiscursivity is the notion of field of action. This indicates a segment of social reality which constitutes the frame of a discourse.[331] Different fields of actions are defined by different functions of discursive practice and one discourse about a specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and then proceed through another field of action, after which discourses spread to different fields and relate to or overlap with other discourses. In Figure 3, interdiscursivity is indicated by the two big overlapping ellipses of Discourse A and B.[332]

2.2.3.1.6 Context

The DHA takes into account four levels of context around a discourse:[333]

1. The immediate, language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse, i.e. the distinct and unique utterances of politicians.
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, i.e. reformulations, recontextualisation, mediatisation of these utterances.
3. The language external social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific situational context, i.e. the detailed chronology of events.
4. The broader socio-political and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to.

These four levels of context can be visualised as shown below.

[330] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 90.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Ibid., 92.
[333] Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak, "Borders, Fences, and Limits—Protecting Austria From Refugees: Metadiscursive Negotiation of Meaning in the Current Refugee Crisis," *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 16, no. 1-2: 16.

Figure 4: The four levels of context in the DHA[334]



These four levels of context will form the guiding line of the methodology of this dissertation. Each of these levels will be addressed throughout this research, albeit not in the chronological order they are displayed in here.

The fourth level of context

The fourth level of context is where the dissertation will start off with. In order to be able to analyse the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, an understanding of the Orange Revolution and the changes that accompanied it has to be acquired, since the period 2005-2009 was when the new "Orange" Ukrainian government was in power, which shaped EU-Ukrainian relations, which, in turn, means that the context of the Orange Revolution matters for EU-Ukraine energy relations. This is the macro-context that the DHA takes into account, an understanding of which is a prerequisite. The legitimations found at the micro-level have to be related back to and interpreted in light of this macro-level context. As Carvalho rightly states in her paper, time and context are crucial to a well-conducted discourse analysis.[335] Carvalho argues that the discourse-historical approach of CDA has given the field the "most significant contribution to

[334] Own visualisation of Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak, "Borders, Fences, and Limits," 16.
[335] Anabela Carvalho, "Media(ted) Discourse and Society: Rethinking the Framework of Critical Discourse Analysis," *Journalism Studies* 9, no. 2 (13 March 2008): 163-164.

the study of time in discourse processes"[336] and the framework she develops in the paper seems to be directed at other CDA approaches that do not focus on time and context as much as the DHA does. Since this research will use the DHA as its methodology, time and context will be given their due importance as these concepts are central to the approach. Carvalho's framework in defining "critical discourse moments" is useful for this methodology. "Critical discourse moments" are periods in which events occur that may challenge the "established" discursive positions.[337] Carvalho proposes to create a chronology of events in order to identify those moments. Doing so can justify the parameters between which a discourse analysis can be conducted, i.e. a timeframe.

The timeframe for this research is 2005-2009. It is within this period that the two case studies that this research focuses on, the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, are situated. The period of 2005-2009 has been chosen because it is a relatively stable period compared to the years before and after. In 2004-2005, Ukraine experienced the Orange Revolution, which brought a pro-Western government to power.[338] This constituted a complete overhaul of power, which leads to the assumption that this challenged "established" discursive positions and that the EU thus changed its discourse towards Ukraine. Therefore, the starting point of 2005 has been justified. 2009 is the end-point of the timeframe analysed, because 2010 is another critical discourse moment. In 2010, Yanukovych won the Ukrainian presidential elections. As Herron shows, "Press accounts and political observers' assessments suggest that the Yanukovych victory may be a harbinger for significant modifications to Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy orientation."[339] There was even a narrative that the election results were a reversal of the Orange Revolution. The year 2010 can therefore be considered to be another critical discourse moment, in which the EU is assumed to have changed its discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine. The period of 2005-2009 is a relatively stable period that is situated within two critical discourse moments, those of 2004-2005 and 2010.

An understanding of the context of the Orange Revolution is a prerequisite in order to start the analysis of both gas crises. As stated above, the Orange Revolution is considered to be a discourse-defining moment that reshaped the EU's discourse. Therefore, any data collected for the period 2005-2009 (the period during with the "Orange" government was in power in

[336] Carvalho, "Media(ted) Discourse and Society," 164.
[337] Ibid., 166.
[338] *BBC News*, "Profile: Viktor Yuschenko," *BBC News* (website), accessed February 12, 2020, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4035789.stm.
[339] Erik S. Herron, "How Viktor Yanukovych Won – Reassessing the Dominant Narratives of Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election," *East European Politics and Societies* 25, no. 1 (February 2011): 47.

Ukraine) has to be understood in terms of the Orange Revolution. This is why the third chapter of this dissertation will explicate the Orange Revolution as broader macro-level context to this research.

The gas crises itself can also be seen as discourse-defining moments. As we have seen in the literature review, the EU only started to appreciate energy security after the first gas crisis.[340] This suggests that the first gas crisis has had a significant impact on the EU's energy policy legitimation (vis-à-vis Ukraine). The introduction of energy measures in 2009 suggests that the second gas crisis also has had a significant impact on the EU's energy policy.[341] Therefore, this dissertation has decided to take both gas crises as case studies and to analyse to what extent these crises actually impacted the EU's energy policy legitimation vis-à-vis Ukraine.

In addition, this dissertation has to be placed in an even broader context. Any study of EU-Ukraine relations has to take the renewed Russian invasion into account. This is especially true for this dissertation, which analyses the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. After 2022, the EU entered a severe gas crisis. The last time gas supplies to the EU were halted to the extent they have been in 2022, was during the 2009 gas crisis. In order to be able to critically examine the EU's energy policy, the analysis of the 2006 and 2009 gas crises has to be related to the 2022 gas crisis.

Therefore, the fourth level of context will be divided into two parts: the contemporary context, in which the entire research is be situated, and the socio-political historical context, which provides the immediate context necessary for understanding the analysis of the gas crises. Chapter 3 will outline the socio-political context.

The third level of context

The third level of context relates to methodology. In order to be able to collect data, it needs to be clear *which* data needs to be collected. Part of this has been elaborated upon already (which discourse from which actors will be analysed). However, it is not clear yet which specific texts from which time exactly will be analysed. In order to clarify this, a chronology of events of the gas crises has to be created. In addition, the genre of the collected data has to be determined.

In order to outline a chronology of the events that occurred during the gas crises, an overview of context on gas relations has to be given, as this is the institutional frame and

[340] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," 419.
[341] Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security," *European Security* 19, no. 4 (2010): 592.

situational context in which the discursive practices are embedded. An account by Stern serves as a detailed explication of the context of gas relations between the European Union, Ukraine and Russia.

First, Stern shows us why Ukraine is such an important country for the European Union and Russia when it comes to gas relations: in 2004, more than 80 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe were delivered via Ukraine.[342] Ukraine is therefore crucial as a transit country to both the EU and Russia.

Stern illustrates which elements of the Ukrainian-Russian gas relationship need to be in order for a smooth sale and transit of gas: the prices of sales by Gazprom to Ukraine; sales volumes and prices, and transit volumes and tariffs from Central Asia via Russia to Ukraine; volumes of and tariffs for Russian gas in transit across Ukraine to Europe; and storage of Russian gas in Ukrainian underground storages.[343]

In a historical account, Stern goes on to show that in the 1990s, the Ukrainian-Russian gas relationship was characterised by troubles, and that despite progress being made in 1998, a first crisis emerged by the early 2000 as a result of non-payment for the gas and theft thereof by Ukraine.[344] After several attempts of creating better relations, a settlement in 2004 settled debts and the transit of Central Asian gas to Ukraine.[345] This settlement led to assumptions that there was a specific pricing of the gas and that this pricing would be subject to annual negotiation between Gazprom, the main provider of Russian gas, and Naftogaz, the main importer of Russian gas in Ukraine.[346] According to Stern, in 2004 all elements were in place in order for stable energy relations.[347]

By July 2005, several events had uprooted the settlement conducted in 2004, *inter alia* it was not clear whether Ukraine would be buying Turkmen gas supplies directly or from Gazprom; the international consortium intended to address the problems of refurbishing and managing the Ukrainian gas transit network had been abandoned and there was nothing in place to replace it; the security of Russian gas stored in Ukraine had been called into question, therefore the insurance for supplies to Europe during the winter had been called into question; and the price that Russia intended to charge Ukraine for gas could destabilise trade with consequences for European importers of Russian gas.[348] In the last three months of 2005,

[342] Stern, "Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe," 33.
[343] Ibid., 35.
[344] Ibid., 34-36.
[345] Ibid., 36-37.
[346] Ibid., 38.
[347] Ibid., 39.
[348] Ibid., 42.

Gazprom and Naftogaz tried to negotiate but no progress was made.[349] On January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and the 2006 gas crisis had reached its peak.[350]

Based on Stern's account of the first gas crisis, the following chronology of events can be outlined:

Table 5: First gas crisis: chronology of events[351]

Stage 1	stable relations (January 2005 – July 2005)
Stage 2	negotiations on gas prices (October 2005 – January 2006)
Stage 3	peak conflict (January 2006)
Stage 4	resolution and cooldown (January 2006 – March 2006)

It has to be noted that a division into stages of the gas crisis as shown in Table 5 could be seen as contradictory. After all, the purpose of the analysis is to find out whether shifts in the discourse have occurred. It might therefore make more sense to create a division into stages *after* the analysis has been completed. However, this division into stages (and the division for the second gas crisis below) has been made for analytical purposes. The analysis will see the implementation of the three-step normalisation model. The framework of this model aims to pinpoint exactly when a shift in discourse has been enacted, when it has perpetuated and when it has normalised. A division into stages of the gas crises aids in implementing this framework and it has helped in the formulation of the hypotheses. As stated above, one of the hypotheses is that the discursive shift towards the securitisation of the EU's energy policy legitimation started in Stage 3 of the first gas crisis. Therefore, while this division might seem contradictory at first, it actually helps to implement the analytical framework.

Similarly, an outline of context on the second gas will allow the construction of a second table.

A report by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies provides an overview of the second gas crisis. This overview is useful in order to create a chronology of the crisis.

[349] Stern, "Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe," 42.
[350] Ibid., 43.
[351] Own elaboration based on Stern, "Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe," 32-59.

After the first crisis ended in an agreement, no major gas disputes took place between Russia and Ukraine in 2007.[352] 2007 was however a significant year, as this year Timoshenko replaced Yanukovych as prime minister and promised to change the terms on the gas deals conducted with Russia.[353] After Timoshenko put her plans in practice Gazprom started to complain that Ukrainian offtake gas was not covered by contracts anymore.[354] Following this, Putin and Yushchenko concluded a deal in February 2008 that contained provisions that needed to be worked out at corporate level. These negotiations failed in March, after which Gazprom started to reduce the pressure in its pipelines, as in 2006. Naftogaz threatened that it would not be able to guarantee transit to European customers if Russia could not guarantee supply to Ukraine. Before this turned into a real crisis, agreements were signed that strengthened Gazprom's position.

In October 2008 Putin and Timoshenko signed a memorandum on gas,[355] which was followed by a slightly altered corporate agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz.[356] The Oxford report characterises these agreements as progress and as having laid the basis for a much-improved relationship in the gas sphere.[357] However, from October until December, relations started to sour again rather quickly: Naftogaz had accumulated debt which it found increasingly difficult to repay to Gazprom.[358] From mid-December a public dispute started. On December 19, Gazprom stated that if Naftogaz would not make payments before the end of 2008 anymore, no supply contracts for 2009 could be signed. The Ukrainian side denied that it owed Gazprom any money that had to be paid in December.[359]

In November of 2008 Gazprom had already threatened that if no agreement was reached, prices could rise significantly and a few days later Putin (in his capacity as prime minister) stated that if there would be any interference with transit gas, the supplies would be cut off.

While Naftogaz did repay $1,52 billion on December 30, Gazprom insisted that $614 million was still outstanding in fines and penalties.[360] On January 1, Gazprom cut off all supplies to Ukrainian gas consumers, whereas supplies to Europe continued.[361] This marks the start of the peak of the crisis. During the first five days gas continued to flow to Europe in

[352] Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment," *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies* (2008): 10.
[353] Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009," 10-11.
[354] Ibid., 12.
[355] Ibid., 13.
[356] Ibid., 14.
[357] Ibid., 15.
[358] Ibid.
[359] Ibid., 16.
[360] Ibid., 16-17.
[361] Ibid., 19.

relatively substantial volumes,[362] however during a television address on the evening of January 5 Putin announced that gas flows would be reduced, and he instructed Gazprom to tell its European partners about the reason for this action,[363] which suggests that from that moment onwards the gas supplies to Europe were also going to be restricted. On January 7, gas flows stopped entirely,[364] with Gazprom stating that Ukraine closed the system down, while the Ukrainians claimed that Gazprom simply stopped supplying. January 19 was the date that Naftogaz and Gazprom signed a new contract, which meant that only on January 20 gas flows to Europe started again, and it would take until January 22 before gas flows were on their normal levels again.[365]

Based on the outline of the gas crisis provided by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, the chronology of the second gas crisis can be seen in Table 6.

Table 6: Second gas crisis: chronology of events[366]

Stage 1	Relatively stable relations: March 2008 – October 2008
Stage 2	Rising disputes: November 2008 – December 2008
Stage 3	Peak conflict: January 1, 2009 – 20 January, 2009
Stage 4	Resolution and cooldown: January 21, 2009 – March 2009

The second level of context

The second level of context will be addressed in the analysis of the collected data. Only when all data has been collected and the analysis has been completed can it be determined whether any relations between texts are to be found. The analytical framework will look specifically for intertextual relations and recontextualisation.

The first level of context

[362] Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009," 20.
[363] Ibid., 21.
[364] Ibid., 22.
[365] Ibid., 25.
[366] Own elaboration based on Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009," 1-66.

The first level of context relates to the empirical data found in the corpus of data. This effectively means that the texts found and analysed are in itself a level of context.

The manner in which these four levels of context are addressed in this dissertation is an example of the triangulatory approach that this research adheres to: at every level of context, the relationship between the empirical data, the theoretical framework and the methodology is intertwined and interrelated. The levels of context applied to this dissertation can be visualised as seen in the figure below.

Figure 5: The four levels of context in the DHA applied to this dissertation[367]



2.2.3.1.7 Discursive change & discursive shifts

The concepts of discursive change and discursive shifts have been extensively covered in the literature review. The conception of discursive change that will be used in this dissertation corresponds to Fairclough's conception of discursive change. Related to this dissertation, the main aim of this research is to find out whether and if so to what extent a discursive change has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. The literature review has suggested that a new frame of security has arisen. The concept of

[367] Own elaboration of the visualisation based on Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak, "Borders, Fences, and Limits," 16.

discursive change, coupled with Krzyżanowski's conception of discursive shifts. allows us to research this in much more detail.

Essentially, by defining discursive shifts, Krzyżanowski elaborated upon Fairclough's point about a discursive change leaving traces in texts and the naturalisation process that transforms those changes into a new hegemonic discourse. Indeed, Krzyżanowski stated that since discursive change encompasses macro-level frames of reverence for the production and reception of discourse by specific social actors, it requires a related category that would allow for observing the change in discourse at the micro-level.[368] Krzyżanowski's conception of discursive shifts in relation to discursive shifts can be seen in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Krzyżanowski's conception of discursive shifts in relation to discursive change[369]



This research will determine. In order to do so, this dissertation will analyse to what extent a discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation, which will be done by applying Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model of discursive shifts to the corpus of data.

In order to determine to what extent a discursive change has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation vis-à-vis Ukraine, this dissertation will introduce a new conception of discursive shifts in relation to discursive change. Instead of taking discursive change as starting point when analysing discursive shifts, as displayed in Figure 6, this dissertation

[368] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 105.
[369] Own elaboration based on: Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 105.

proposes taking discursive shifts as starting point in order to see whether a discursive change has taken place. This is illustrated in Figure 7.

Figure 7: New conception of discursive shifts in relation to discursive change[370]



In doing so, this dissertation will first analyse whether a discursive shift has taken place and then conclude to what extent a discursive change has taken place, rather than the other way around, as Krzyżanowski has done. Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model is crucial in detecting a discursive shift.

2.2.3.1.8 Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model

Krzyżanowski developed a three-step normalisation model that allows a researcher to analyse how discourse can be introduced and evolve into an acceptable and legitimate perspective.[371] The model consists of three stages: enactment, gradation/perpetuation and normalisation.[372] In the first stage, enactment, a discourse is strategically introduced by recontextualising "new" discursive elements, including themes and arguments as well as linguistic means which support their realisation.[373] The second stage, gradation/perpetuation, sees a new discourse form by combining discursive elements. The new discourse is diffused as well and spreads over various social fields, spaces and genres.[374] Hence, if a discourse has

[370] Own elaboration based on Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 105.
[371] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 503.
[372] Ibid., 508-509.
[373] Ibid., 508.
[374] Ibid., 509.

spread to different fields and/or genres, it is possible to say that a discourse has passed on to the second stage. The third and last stage of a discursive shift, normalisation, serves to show that a discourse has contributed to a deeper change of norms of public expression.[375] Therefore, by introducing this framework, Krzyżanowski has elaborated upon Fairclough's notion of discursive change and the naturalisation of discourse to form a new hegemonic discourse. Krzyżanowski's model is visualised in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model of discursive shifts[376]



Applying this model will form the main part of the analysis of this dissertation. As has been shown in the literature review, analysing to what extent a normalisation of a discursive shift has taken place involves an analysis of the legitimation of discourse.[377] Since legitimations are key in determining to what extent a discourse has been normalised, the analysis of the corpus of data this dissertation will start by finding legitimation schemes in the texts. Afterwards, the argumentation schemes of the texts will be deconstructed in order to find out how the policy has been legitimised. Here, we have arrived at the practicalities of the analysis.

Applying the three-step normalisation model requires an understanding of discursive strategies, which will be elaborated upon below.

[375] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.
[376] Figure is based on Figure 1 in Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509. The text in the arrows is from p. 508-509.
[377] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 510.

2.2.3.1.9 Discursive strategies

A discursive strategy is a more or less intentional plan of practices, including discursive practices, adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal.[378] By answering five questions, five types of discursive strategies can be shown by the researcher. These questions are:[379]

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated?

Reisigl created a table with these questions and their various discursive strategies in his book chapter, which are reproduced below in Table 7.

Table 7: Discursive strategies[380]

Questions to approach discursive features	*Discursive strategies*	*Purpose*
How are persons, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically in the discourse in question?	Nomination	Discursive construction of social actors; discursive construction of objects, phenomena, events; discursive construction of processes and actions
What characteristics or qualities are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena, events,	Predication	Discursive characterisation of social actors, objects, phenomena, events,

[378] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 93.
[379] Ibid., 93-94.
[380] Reproduced from: Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 52.

processes and actions mentioned in the discourse?		processes and actions (e.g. positively or negatively)
What arguments are employed in the discourse?	Argumentation	Persuading addressees of the validity of specific claims of truth and normative rightness
From what perspective are these nominations, attributions, arguments expressed?	Perspectivisation	Positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance
Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or mitigated?	Mitigation and intensification	Modifying the illocutionary force of utterances in respect to their epistemic or deontic status

In their book chapter, Reisigl and Wodak added grammatical devices to the discursive strategies.[381]

Table 8: Discursive strategies and their grammatical devices[382]

Discursive strategy	Devices
Nomination	Membership categorisation devices, deictics, anthroponyms; tropes such as metaphors, menonymies and synecdoches; verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions
Predication	Stereotypical; evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups); explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns; collocations; explicit comparisons, similes,

[381] Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 95.
[382] Table adapted from: Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 95.

	metaphors and other rhetorical figures; allusions, evocations and presuppositions/implicatures
Argumentation	Topoi (formal or more content-related); fallacies
Perspectivisation	Deictics; direct, indirect or free indirect speech; quotation marks, discourse markers/particles; metaphors, animating prosody
Mitigation & intensification	Diminuatives or augmentatives; (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctive, hesitations, vague expressions; hyperboles, litotes; indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion); verbs of saying, feeling, thinking

Not all discursive strategies shown above will be used as a concept for analysis in this research. As shown above, the three-step normalisation model focuses on the normalisation of discourse, for which legitimation is important.[383] To analyse how legitimation has been used in a discourse, the discursive strategy of argumentation subject to analysis. This is because they are directly related. Wodak shows that legitimation is the process of explaining and justifying,[384] whereas the discursive strategy of argumentation serves to categorise arguments employed in discourse and to uncover the validity of specific claims of truth and normative rightness.[385] Therefore, the discursive strategy that will be used in the analysis of this dissertation is argumentation, with a focus on uncovering legitimation within this strategy.

[383] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 510.
[384] Wodak, "Chapter 1: Populism and Politics," 5.
[385] Reisigl, ""The Discourse-Historical Approach," 52.

Discursive strategies: argumentation analysis and "topoi"

Reisigl provides an extensive overview of argumentation analysis in the DHA.[386] Reisigl distinguishes between three types of argumentation analysis: functional, formal and content-related analysis.[387]

The formal analysis of argumentation relies on a reduced functional model of argumentation which integrates three basic elements: argument, conclusion rule, and claim.[388] As Reisigl shows from Kienpointner: "…the argument gives the reason for or against a controversial claim, the conclusion rule guarantees the connection of the argument to the claim, and the claim represents the disputed, contested statement that has to be justified or refuted."[389] In the formal analysis of argumentation, the conclusion rule is seen as central. The conclusion rule is an argumentation scheme that is also known as *topos* (*topoi* plural). *Topoi* are central parts of an argumentation that justify the transition from the argument to the conclusion. Reisigl shows that "*Topoi* are not always expressed explicitly, but can be made explicit as conditional or causal paraphrases such as 'if x, then y' or 'y, because x'."[390]

Important to note here is that the formal analysis of argumentation views *topoi* as something abstract, which is what a content-related analysis of argumentation tries to surpass.[391] A content-related analysis of argumentation views argumentation as being topic-related and field-dependent, which means that according to this perspective *topoi* are content-related and typical to specific fields of social action. According to Reisigl, content-related *topoi* tell us more about the specific character of discourse than a purely functional or formal analysis of argumentation would, for example they can uncover more information about justification strategies, which is exactly what this dissertation is aiming to analyse.[392]

This dissertation will employ a combination of a formal analysis with a content-related analysis of argumentation. In other words, while a formal analysis of argumentation will form the basis of the analysis, content will be added to the *topoi* in order to be able to link the analysis to the macro-context of EU-Ukraine relations.

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[386] Martin Reisigl, "Argumentation Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach – A Methodological Framework," in: *Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. Christopher Hart and Piotr Cap (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2014): 67-96.
[387] Reisigl, "Argumentation Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach," 74.
[388] Ibid., 75.
[389] Ibid.
[390] Ibid.
[391] Ibid., 77.
[392] Ibid.

Discursive strategies: categories of legitimation

As we have seen above, a formal-content related argumentation analysis can tell us more about the justification and therefore legitimation of discourse. Legitimation is a concept in discourse that can be divided into four categories, as shown by Van Leeuwen and Wodak.[393] These four categories can be expanded, as Rheindorf and Wodak and Van Leeuwen have shown.[394] The categorisation put forward by Rheindorf and Wodak has been reproduced in Table 9 below.

Table 9: Categories of legitimation[395]

Type of legitimation	Subdivision	Explanation
Authorisation		
Authority	*Personal authority*	Based on institutional status of individuals
	Impersonal authority	Originating from laws, policies, regulations, etc.
	Expert authority	Academic, scientific or other credible expertise
	Role model	Popularity and acceptability of positions held by role models or opinion leaders
Custom	*Tradition*	Acceptability of what is claimed to have always been done
	Conformity	Acceptability of what everyone or most people do
Moralisation	*Abstraction*	Abstract depiction of practices that links them to moral values

[393] Wodak, "Chapter 1: Populism and Politics," 6.
[394] See Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak, "Building 'Fortress Europe': Legitimizing Exclusion from Basic Human Rights," in: *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Migration Control – Language Policy, Identity and Belonging*, ed. Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak (Multilingual Matters: 2020): 123 and Van Leeuwen, "The Discursive Construction of Legitimation," 105-123.
[395] Reproduced from: Rheindorf and Wodak, "Building 'Fortress Europe,'" 122-123.

	Evaluation	Legitimation of positions and practices via evaluative adjectives
	Analogy	Legitimation relying on comparisons and contrasts

Rationalisation		
Instrumental rationalisation	*Goal orientation*	Focused on goals, intention, purposes
	Means orientation	Focused on aims embedded in actions as means to an end
	Outcome orientation	Focused on outcomes of actions as if already known
Theoretical rationalisation	*Definition*	Characterising activities in terms of already moralised practices
	Explanation	Characterising people as actors because the way they do things is appropriate to the nature of these actors
	Prediction	Foreseeing outcomes based on some form of expertise

Mythopoesis	*Moral Tales*	Narrating rewarding decisions and practices of social actors
	Cautionary Tales	Linking nonconformist practices to undesirable consequences

The types of legitimation shown in Table 9 will underpin the analysis of this research. A formal- and content-related analysis of the argumentation schemes located in the texts will uncover the legitimations employed. These legitimations will be categorised according to Table 9. This categorisation of legitimations employed by the EU in its discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine,

linked with the macro-socio-political context, will allow us to determine to whether a discursive shift has taken place and to what extent a possible discursive shift has been normalised. Therefore, the analysis of legitimation is key in the application of the three-step normalisation model.

2.2.3.2 The DHA and its purpose: the notion of "critique"

For the DHA, the concept of "critique" is crucial, since it gives the approach its meaning and worth. A researcher can uncover discourses and show what they mean, but without "critique" the analysis would not be a "critical" discourse analysis: as Reisigl states, the term "critical discourse analysis" was introduced in the 1980s in order to mark a difference from an allegedly "descriptive" discourse analysis.[396] Critique lies at the heart of the approach and it is important to understand how the DHA perceives critique.

According to Reisigl, at least three theoretical sources are relevant for the understanding of the concept of critique as it prevails in the DHA.[397] First, the Critical Theory of the first generation (Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin) inspires the DHA when it comes to criticising oppressive, discriminatory and exploitative ideologies, power abuse and the culture industry. Ideologies are suspected in this case of justifying particular interests and social inequalities under the guise of common public interests. Second, Foucault's understanding of critique as an attitude (which challenges the naturalisation of social relationships) is used.[398] Third, the Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas and his discourse ethics and his theory of deliberative democracy are central points of reference.

By explaining Habermas' four validity claims, Reisigl continues to show us how the concept of critique is viewed in the DHA. (Theoretical) Truth, (expressive) truthfulness, normative rightness and comprehensibility serve as criteria for a differentiated concept of critique in the DHA.[399] Truth will often be at stake in political discourses about the past and in discourses about national identity. The question of truthfulness is crucial in studies on political or rhetorical manipulation and in studies of lying, where also the validity claim of truth comes in. Questions of normative rightness are important, for example, in political discourses justifying or criticising human actions in the past or in discourses involving discrimination. Lastly, the validity claim of comprehensibility forms the basic claim for every communication.

[396] Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 50.
[397] Ibid., 50.
[398] Ibid. Reisigl quotes from Foucault 1990: 12.
[399] Ibid.

The DHA proposes a science that includes critique in all its stages: discovery, justification and application.[400] Three main forms of critique are distinguished in the DHA.[401]

1. Text or discourse immanent critique: relies on rhetorical, text linguistic, pragmatic, politico-linguistic and argumentation theoretical norms or criteria. It is primarily knowledge-related and it assesses conflicts, contradictions and inconsistencies in text-internal or discourse-internal structures.
2. The socio-diagnostic critique: aims at exposing manipulation in and by discourse and it focuses on revealing ethically problematic aspects of discursive practices. It focuses on discrepancies between discursive and other social practices and functions as a form of social control.
3. The prospective critique: aims at reducing dysfunctional communication and language barriers and at improving communication within public institutions.

This research will employ the socio-diagnostic critique. Since the focus of this dissertation is upon the legitimation and hence normalisation behind the discursive practices employed by the EU, the analysis reveals the underlying meaning and purpose of the EU's discourse. This is essential in determining to what extent this research can be helpful for understanding the 2022 gas crisis.

2.3 Criticisms of CDA

CDA (and thus the DHA) is not without criticism. Breeze made an overview in her paper and the most important critiques will be dealt with here. To start with, some scholars accuse CDA practitioners to operate randomly,[402] based on personal whim rather than scholarly principles, while others attack the foundations of the approach. Hammersley is one of those attacking the foundations of CDA. He states that its practitioners claim "to offer a comprehensive understanding of society as a whole and how it functions, which is "superior" to other positions precisely because it is conducted in a spirit of self-reflexive critique".[403] Hammersley states that CDA researchers take for granted the philosophical foundations of the approach as if these were unproblematic which is, indeed, problematic, since according to him

[400] Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 50.
[401] Ibid., 50-51.
[402] Breeze, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics," 498.
[403] Ibid.

its foundations (stemming from the Frankfurt school) do not constitute a solid basis for critical enterprise. Breeze points out that since a large part of CDA's claim to legitimacy rests on the assertion that it conducts research in a self-reflexive critique, "CDA specialists need to pay special attention to this aspect of the epistemological underpinning of their work, and to its methodological implications."[404] This criticism mainly points at the meaning that CDA gives to the concept of "criticism" and being a "critical" approach. Breeze points out that a merging of interpretations by scholars of "being critical" makes the approach seem to lack coherence.[405] It may therefore seem that researchers take a political stance "by an act of will, rather than as a result of extended deliberation based on facts and issues."[406] Thus, Hammersley points out, "if the political stance on which CDA is founded turns out to be not well founded, but merely a product of decisionism, this fits ill with the strong claims made by CDA for itself and its own activities."[407] Breeze points out that researchers in CDA are usually careful to make their own political commitments known before they start interpreting and explaining social phenomena.

Therefore, given this particular criticism on the approach, the author of this dissertation will state his stance towards the research. Essentially, the aim of this dissertation is to find out what informs the EU's discursive practices regarding its energy policies. It is the belief of the author of this research that by uncovering the meaning of the EU's legitimation strategies, lessons can be learned for the future. This is relevant, especially given the current energy crisis that the EU finds itself in. The aims of the author are therefore inherently critical in nature and fit the approach of CDA.

Other criticisms

Another criticism levelled at CDA is the problem of potential bias in text analysis.[408] Breeze points out that especially in the early stages of the existence of the approach, the methodology was flawed: texts were failed to approach systematically.[409] There were issues regarding the sampling of data and whether the data was actually representative. Regarding the representativeness of the data used in this research, the methodology of choosing the data is transparent and will be presented in the part on the methodology.

[404] Breeze, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics," 498-499.
[405] Ibid., 500.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Ibid., 504.
[409] Ibid.

A different criticism attacks CDA's understanding of the relationship between the text and the reader.[410] Often, "the problem about the obtaining of evidence about the effects of the texts on the reader or listener is one that is rarely even raised in CDA research."[411] Critics state that CDA research proceeds on the basis that there is a simple, one-to-one relationship between the text and the reader. Critics say that it is not that easy and the issue of reader response is discussed further by Breeze.[412] The issue of reader response will be addressed little, but accordingly in this research. The analysis will focus little on reader response, because it is not in the scope of this research to analyse what a French worker thinks about a speech Ferrero-Waldner gave about Ukraine or the EU's energy policy. As stated above, the scope of the discourse will be the text and speech uttered by EU actors about its energy policy regarding Ukraine and thus the research will limit the analysis of reader response of the discourse to the actors involved in the analysis.

As of now, most criticisms summed up by Breeze have been addressed. It is the hope of this research that by addressing these criticisms it is made clear that this dissertation tried to eliminate the flaws in the approach of CDA and to conduct a critical discourse analysis as sound as possible.

2.4 Securitisation

As the hypotheses have shown, this dissertation expects to find that the EU's understanding of energy security has evolved in the form of a securitisation of the EU's energy policy. Securitisation is a broad concept that requires elaboration. This section will outline how securitisation will be understood in this dissertation.

Securitisation in International Relations is usually called securitisation theory (ST). It is a theory that states that "an issue becomes a matter of emergency politics/a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state or to some other entity, but rather because a powerful securitising actor argues that something constitutes an existential threat to some object that needs to be dealt with immediately if the objective is to survive."[413] Floyd states that in regular ST a performative speech act only evolves into a complete securitisation when a designated audience accepts a speech act. Upon acceptance by the audience, the issue has moved out of the sphere of 'normal' politics and into the realm of emergency politics, where

[410] Breeze, "Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics," 508.
[411] Ibid., 512.
[412] Ibid., from 510.
[413] Rita Floyd, "Introduction," in: *Security and the Environment – Securitisation Theory and the US Environmental Security Policy* (Cambridge University Press: May 2010): 1.

exceptional measures can be taken to deal with the issue. As Cardoso dos Santos shows, the Copenhagen School understands security as a speech act that is capable of influencing the decision-making process about security issues.[414] Since securitisation is a speech act, the link between securitisation and discourse analysis is therefore quickly made.

Cardoso dos Santos states that "Depending only on the illocutionary force of the speech act, and not on the audience's reaction, the Copenhagen School has characterised Securitisation Theory (ST) as self-referential."[415] Important is the distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary speech acts. Perlocutionary speech acts refer to what happens by saying something, illocutionary speech acts refer to the results of saying something.[416] An illocutionary speech act is a meaningful utterance that is coupled with a performative force, while a perlocutionary speech act is a meaningful utterance coupled with a certain force that brings about an unconventional effect. Cardoso dos Santos states that Floyd shows that ST makes use solely of the illocutionary act.[417] Cardoso dos Santos further states that there is a debate on whether a speech act itself is capable of securitising an issue or whether an audience's perception and response should be added. Floyd rejects the idea that securitisation could be an inter-subjective process between a securitising actor and a certain audience.[418] Indeed, Floyd states that "In my formulation, a securitisation is successful simply when it is brought into existence."[419] Thereby Floyd specifically "rejects the idea that securitisation could be an inter-subjective process between a securitising actor and certain audience. She adopts a self-referential perspective on securitisation, emphasising that in questions of national security, the power to securitise is solely vested in official political authorities."[420] An interesting point that Floyd mentions is that according to the Copenhagen School, securitisations that do not adhere their criteria, fail to be successful securitisations.[421] Floyd states however: "The crucial point here is that even if a securitisation is not followed by the actions which constitute the School's criteria for success, the securitiser still has reasons why they securitised."[422] And indeed, this is crucial, as it shows that an unsuccessful securitising act is still a securitising act. This dissertation will aim to identify the existence of a securitising act in the EU's discourse, not the

[414] Marcos Cardoso dos Santos, "Identity and Discourse in Securitisation Theory," *Contexto Internacional* 40, no. 2 (May/August 2018): 229.
[415] Cardoso dos Santos, "Identity and Discourse in Securitisation Theory," 230.
[416] Ibid., 232.
[417] Ibid.
[418] Ibid., 232-233.
[419] Rita Floyd, "A revised securitisation theory," in: *Security and the Environment – Securitisation Theory and the US Environmental Security Policy* (Cambridge University Press: May 2010): 54.
[420] Cardoso dos Santos, "Identity and Discourse in Securitisation Theory," 232-233.
[421] Floyd, "A revised securitisation theory," 54.
[422] Ibid., 54-55.

success of said securitising act. Therefore, an analysis of the audience's perception of said securitising act is not part of the analysis. An analysis of the audience's perception of a possible securitisation of EU discourse would consist of analysing Russian discourse, Ukrainian discourse and discourse from all EU member states in response to the securitising act. This is outside the scope of this dissertation, as the main aim of this research is to test to what extent Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model can be applied to a new field of discourse. Therefore, this dissertation will adhere to Floyd's conception of securitisation (it is successful simply when it is brought into existence) and understands securitisation to have taken place if it is visible in discourse that an actor is linking energy to security. If that is the case, an official political authority has securitised an issue and for this dissertation that counts as a securitised discourse.

2.5 Summary of theoretical background

This theoretical background has shown the different approaches to discourse analysis and has singled out the discourse-historical approach of CDA as the approach most suitable to employ in order to answer the main research question of this doctoral dissertation. The DHA's two-fold focus on text analysis (the micro-level) and context (which includes a focus on the macro-level) and its recent theoretical expansion (by Krzyżanowski) with the notion of discursive shifts make this a qualified approach. The application of the three-step normalisation model in combination with the formal- and content-related argumentation analysis provides a systematic methodology that will be able to achieve the main objectives of this doctoral dissertation. In addition, the key concept of securitisation and this dissertation's understanding thereof has been outlined.

2.6 Collection of data

This section will give an example of how the collection of data has proceeded. First, it has to be made clear that the collection of data proceeded in accordance with the division of the gas crises into four stages. An example will be given for the first stage of the first gas crisis.

Following the chronology of events of the first gas crisis, the following corpus of data has been collected for the first gas crisis regarding EU discourse. These texts have been selected on their relevance regarding the actor uttering discourse (the actor being representative of EU-wide discourse) and its argumentation schemes. Furthermore, as explained above, the texts have been selected based on these texts being frontstage events.

Table 10: Corpus of data for Stage 1 of gas crisis 1[423]

Text	Date	Genre
1: Press release on European Parliament vote on statement on Ukrainian elections https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/dn_05_44	January 12, 2005	Press release
2: Press release on Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner at the inauguration of new Ukrainian president Yushchenko https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_81	January 21, 2005	Press release
3: Speech by High Representative Javier Solana at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (pdf file)	January 24, 2005	Speech
4: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: „Europa als globaler Akteur – Aktuelle Schwerpunkte Europäischer Außen- und Nachbarschaftspolitik" – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_30	January 24, 2005	Speech
5: Speech by Ferrro-Waldner: Remarks to Foreign Affairs Committee – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_41	January 25, 2005	Speech
6: Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner at the Conference of the Graz Process https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_74	January 28, 2005	Speech
7: Press release on the 2637th meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations of the Council of the European Union https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_05_15	January 31, 2005	Press release
8: Q&A session of Condoleezza Rice, Ferrero-Waldner and Barroso with journalists https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_84	February 9, 2005	Press conference

[423] Own elaboration.

9: Cover note from Co-secretary of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council sent to the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council containing the text of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (pdf file)	February 14, 2005	Cover note
10: Press release on Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's visit to Ukraine https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_186	February 16, 2005	Press release
11: Transcript of EU press release after eight meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (6428/05) (pdf file)	February 21, 2005	Press release
12: 2641st Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_05_34	February 21, 2005	Press release
13: EU-Ukraine – Strengthening the Strategic Partnership – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_05_57	23 February 2005	Memo
14: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Eine Partnerschaft der Erneuerung – Europas strategische Prioritäten für das 21. Jahrhundert – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_139	7 March, 2005	Speech
15: EU-Ukraine Ministerial Troika – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_362	29 March 2005	Press release
16: Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner: "Europe's Neighbours – Towards Closer Integration" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_253	April 22, 2005	Speech
17: Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner: "The EU and Ukraine – What Lies Beyond the Horizon?" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_257	April 26, 2005	Speech
18: Press release on the EU and Ukraine strengthening energy cooperation https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_504	April 28, 2005	Press release

19: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Europas Herausforderungen im 20. Jahrhundert: Innovation, Integration und Internationalität – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_264	1 May, 2005	Speech
20: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union - Herausforderungen und Perspektiven – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_281	13 May, 2005	Speech
21: Speech by Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy Margot Wallström: "Transnational Democracy – the Road Ahead for Europe?" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_342	June 10, 2005	Speech
22: Transcript of EU press release after the ninth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (10047/05, Presse 146) (pdf file)	June 13, 2005	Press release
23: Interview of High Representative Javier Solana with newspaper День: https://m.day.kyiv.ua/en/article/day-after-day/javier-solana-ball-ukraines-court	June 14, 2005	Interview
24: EESC supports Ukrainian civil society in the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ces_05_76	June 28, 2005	Press release EESC

2.7 Analysis – example

Any sound discourse analysis contains an example of how the analysis has proceeded, before the results of the analysis are presented. This section will outline how the analysis of the corpus of data has proceeded. Since the DHA is three dimensional,[424] the analysis will follow three main steps.

First, specific contents or topics of a specific discourse should be identified. This is the coding section. Second, the discursive strategies should be investigated. This entails an analysis of the discursive strategy of argumentation and the legitimation schemes that can be found within those. Third, the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations should

[424] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 175.

be investigated. In this section the results of the analysis will be linked to the broader socio-political context.

2.7.1 Coding the data & analysis

An important part of the analysis has been the coding of the data. Once the division into argumentation schemes and legitimations was made, the argumentation schemes could be coded per topic. This section will explicate how the data has been coded. An example text from a press release on a statement given by the European Parliament (EP) on the Ukrainian elections will be provided. This example will show how an argumentation scheme can be located and how legitimations can be uncovered. Coding this text proceeded by answering the following leading questions:

1. Which action is legitimised?
2. Which argument is used to legitimise this action?
3. Which claim is made in this argument?
4. Which *topos* is used in this argumentation?
5. Which category of legitimation is it?

Example text

> *"MEPs welcomed the "substantially fair elections held on 26 December" in Ukraine, in a resolution adopted by 467 votes in favour, 19 against and 7 abstentions. They congratulated the Ukrainian people for resolving a political crisis and "setting their country firmly on the path towards democracy" in a non-violent and mature way. They said it was now time to consider other forms of association with Ukraine besides the Neighbourhood Policy, giving the country a clear European perspective, possibly leading to EU membership."*[425]

Several actions are legitimised in this text.

First, the MEPs congratulated the Ukrainian people. The first argument that is made to legitimise this action is the fact that the Ukrainian people have resolved a political crisis. The second argument is that the Ukrainian people have set their country firmly on the path towards

[425] Press release on European Parliament vote on statement on Ukrainian elections, accessed August 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/dn_05_44.

democracy in a non-violent and mature way. Both of these arguments are instrumental rationalisations with the "outcome" orientation, as the focus of this argumentation is on the outcome of the Ukrainian people having performed an action and the effects of that action. The second argument also refers to value systems (non-violence and maturity), which means that the second argument also belongs to the moralisation legitimation category, with the "abstraction" orientation, as the action of setting Ukraine on a path towards democracy is categorised with an abstract moral value. Both of these arguments lead to the claim that therefore, the MEPs congratulating the Ukrainian people is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is one of explanation, as the argumentation focuses on explaining the action of the MEPs.

The second action that is legitimised is the MEP's stating that it was now time to consider other forms of association with Ukraine besides the Neighbourhood Policy. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, the MEPs invoke an earlier argument, namely the fact that the Ukrainian people have set their country on the path towards democracy in a non-violent and mature way. That this argument is employed, can be seen by the use of the word "now": only *now* it is time to consider other forms of association with Ukraine besides the ENP. As this argument is the same as the one employed in the previous argumentation structure, it also belongs to the same categories: it is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation and it also belongs to the moralisation category, with the "abstraction" orientation. The *topos* for this first argument is one of conditionality: only now, when the Ukrainian people have performed this action, can the MEPs make this statement.

The second argument that the MEP's use to legitimise their action, is that this considering of other forms of association should be done because doing so could lead to a certain outcome: giving the country a country a clear European perspective could possibly lead to EU membership. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the "means" orientation, as there is an aim embedded in the action of considering other forms of association: possible EU membership for Ukraine. The *topos* for this second argument is one of explanation, as the argument tries to explain why the action is legitimised.

Together, these two arguments lead to the claim that it is therefore legitimised that the MEPs state that it is now time to consider other forms of association for Ukraine.

2.8 Summary of Chapter II

This chapter has provided an overview of the theoretical framework and the methodology employed in this dissertation. The next chapter will outline the broader macro socio-political context of the Orange Revolution. The following chapters will perform the analysis.

Chapter III – Socio-political and historical context of EU-Ukraine relations

This chapter is going to provide an overview of the socio-political and historical context on EU-Ukraine relations. This overview will be divided into two parts. First, an overview of EU-Ukraine relations since the 2022 renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine will be given. Any research on EU-Ukraine relations requires an understanding of this context. The renewed Russian invasion has impacted the European security order,[426] also in terms of energy: an EU decoupling of energy from Russia has been started.[427] Therefore, an understanding of the context of the renewed invasion serves as a general context to this research.

The second part of this chapter will provide the context of EU-Ukraine relations up until 2004-2005. This serves as more immediate context through which to understand the analysis provided in the forthcoming chapters. In the years 2004-2005 Ukraine experienced the Orange Revolution, which ended with the instalment of Yushchenko as president. It is the contention of this research that the Orange Revolution shaped the way in which the EU perceived Ukraine; therefore, the revolution provided the context of the gas crises (i.e. the critical discourse moments) which will be the case studies of this research. It is with this reason that the impact of the Orange Revolution on EU-Ukraine relations will be examined in the second part of this chapter.

Taken together, the context of EU-Ukraine relations of 2022 and 2004-2005 will provide the fourth layer of context that the DHA takes in to account: the broader socio-political context.

3.1 Socio-political and contemporary context

This first part of the chapter will outline the contemporary context that frames this doctoral dissertation. This will allow the creation of the link between the 2022 gas crisis and the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 analysed in this dissertation. In order to do so, this first part is structured as followed. First, the consequences of the 2022 invasion for systemic governance and the EU's strategic outlook will be outlined. Second, the consequences of the invasion for

[426] See, for example, "European Security Order," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)* website, accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/topics/dossiers/russias-war-against-ukraine-and-its-consequences/european-security-order, where the SWP explains that Russia's war of aggression represents an attempt to reshape the European security order and that this has implications beyond Ukraine's borders. Examples they mention are Sweden and Finland deciding to join NATO, increased defence spending by European states and the EU awarding Ukraine candidacy status.
[427] Jacopo Maria Pepe, "Executive Summary," *Geopolitics and Energy Security in Europe: How do we move forward?* (FES Just Climate and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: 2023): 2.

EU-Ukraine relations in general will be outlined. Third and last, the consequences for the EU's energy policy will be explicated.

3.1.1 Socio-political and contemporary context – the 2022 renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine: consequences for systemic governance and the EU's strategic outlook

The renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine has consequences across the globe. The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik states that the war has drastic implications for regional and global food supplies, food stockpiles and prices.[428] The SWP also states that the war has implications for global governance issues, concerning systemic competition between western liberal democracies and authoritarian systems as well as the power constellations between Russia, China and the United States. This last point is also highlighted by Sloss and Dickinson. In their essay, Sloss and Dickinson state that since around 2008, a key trend in international relations has been the rise of autocracy and a corresponding decline of democracy.[429] Their essay analyses states' responses to the recent expansion of the war in Ukraine and they show that most autocratic states do not support a liberal international order and opposition from China and Russia makes it increasingly unrealistic to try to maintain a global liberal order.[430] The response from liberal democratic states to the war in Ukraine has been an informal cooperation intended to uphold a plurilateral international order that is consistent with liberal values. This order is more effective in the long term if it is codified in new treaties and institutions and therefore, Sloss and Dickinson argue, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the need for new plurilateral treaties and institutions to facilitate cooperation among liberal democracies across the globe. Crucial is their assessment that the responses from both autocratic and liberal states to the war in Ukraine are evidence that a liberal plurilateral order is emerging.[431] This suggests that the war in Ukraine has confirmed or codified the trend of the growing influence of autocracies and the decline in democracies that the Sloss and Dickinson defined in their introduction.[432]

That the divergence between autocracies and democracies is causing complications, becomes clear when looking at the issue of food security. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused issues with grain imports, which means that a country like Egypt now has to look for

[428] "Global impact," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)* website, accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/topics/dossiers/russias-war-against-ukraine-and-its-consequences/global-impact.
[429] David L. Sloss and Laura A. Dickinson, "The Russia-Ukraine War and the Seeds of a New Liberal Plurilateral Order," *The American Journal of International Law* 116, no. 4 (October 2022): 798.
[430] Sloss and Dickinson, "The Russia-Ukraine War and the Seeds of a New Liberal Plurilateral Order," 799.
[431] Ibid., 806.
[432] Ibid., 798.

immediate replacement of imports.[433] Bettina Rudloff states that the EU should try to develop constructive partnerships and cooperation mechanics with countries like China and India.[434] However, Sloss and Dickinson describe the dangers of becoming dependent on China for critical materials and supplies.[435] Indeed, Sloss and Dickinson describe this dilemma by stating that eliminating economic interdependence with China is neither realistic nor desirable, but that a partial decoupling to reduce supply chain vulnerability in areas of strategic significance is supported by compelling geopolitical considerations.[436] Therefore, the Russian invasion has highlighted the EU's dependence on countries like China and it has forced the EU to rethink its strategic position and outlook in the world. This also rings true for the EU-US relationship. In October 2022, the US had provided $53 billion in aid to Ukraine, whereas the EU lagged behind with $30 billion.[437] This has improved, as shown by the *Ukraine Support Tracker*: as of December 2022, the EU has increased its aid provision and now EU aid surpasses the aid pledged by the US.[438] Nevertheless, while Christopher Trebesch from the *Kiel Institute for the world economy* states that "The large new EU pledges are a welcome development, given the major role of this war for European security.",[439] the initial lag in European aid provision shows that the EU is still very much dependent on the United States when it comes to European security. This is especially concerning when taking into account the possibility of a re-election of Trump to the office of President of the United States in 2024. Trump threatened to not defend NATO against Russia.[440] This, together with the renewed invasion and the fact that the US has shifted its focus to competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region, has sparked debate on

[433] Anna Hörter and Bettina Rudloff, "The Ukraine war and food security in Africa: "Meeting the acute needs is not solving the general problem."" *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)* website, accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-ukraine-war-and-food-security-in-africa-meeting-the-acute-needs-is-not-solving-the-general-problem.
[434] Hörter and Rudloff, "The Ukraine war and food security in Africa," accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-ukraine-war-and-food-security-in-africa-meeting-the-acute-needs-is-not-solving-the-general-problem.
[435] Sloss and Dickinson, "The Russia-Ukraine War and the Seeds of a New Liberal Plurilateral Order," 807.
[436] Ibid.
[437] Liana Fix and Jeffrey Mankoff, "Europe Has to Step Up on Ukraine to Keep the U.S. From Stepping Back," *Council on Foreign Relations (cfr)* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/europe-has-step-ukraine-keep-us-stepping-back.
[438] "Ukraine Support Tracker: Europe surpasses the U.S. in total committed aid," *Kiel Institute for the world economy* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/media-information/2022/ukraine-support-tracker-europe-surpasses-the-us-in-total-committed-aid/.
[439] "Ukraine Support Tracker: Europe surpasses the U.S. in total committed aid," *Kiel Institute for the world economy* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/media-information/2022/ukraine-support-tracker-europe-surpasses-the-us-in-total-committed-aid/.
[440] Aaron Blake and Michael Birnbaum, "Trump says he threatened not to defend NATO against Russia," *Washington Post* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/22/trump-says-he-threatened-not-defend-nato-russia/.

the EU's strategic autonomy that has been picked up by German Chancellor Scholz.[441] Therefore, the invasion of Ukraine has had a major impact on the European security order and it has caused a much-needed debate within the EU on its strategic outlook.

3.1.2 Socio-political and contemporary context – the 2022 renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine: the state of EU-Ukraine relations

Lonardo shows that after the invasion in February 2022, EU member states faced a choice: intervening in the war and risking escalation, or witnessing Ukraine getting defeated.[442] Lonardo states that the atrocities in Ukraine show that the member states decided to go for an option that resembles the second option, despite the rhetoric and other forms of support that the EU is providing to Ukraine. This is reflected in German hesitancy towards sending weapons to Ukraine.[443] Nevertheless, despite the slow start, weapon deliveries have been stepped up, but now, new issues have come to the fore: the West cannot keep up with Ukrainian requests for ammunition delivery since its stockpiles are depleting.[444] In addition, a possible delivery of fighter jets again sparks discussion of red lines.[445] Therefore, while Western states are resolved in their dedication to a Ukrainian victory, their approach towards helping Ukraine is a cautious one to say the least. Of course, this differs per member state. Poland has been one of the staunchest supporters of Ukraine, stating that it would send tanks to Ukraine themselves if Germany would not allow it to do so.[446] Therefore, support per member states differs, which makes it difficult for the EU to agree to a common position.

Lonardo shows that an EU narrative around four themes have crystallised after the war, with some of these themes pre-dating the renewed invasion.[447] First, the EU frames this clash as one that is not only a clash between two geopolitical actors, but between two worldviews.

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[441] Bart M. J. Szewczyk, "Scholz and Macron Have a Perilous Ambition for Europe," *Foreign Policy* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/08/european-strategic-autonomy-eu-security-macron-scholz-ukraine-defense-nato/.
[442] Luigi Lonardo, "EU Diplomacy: Foreign Policy Response to the War and Future EU-Russia Relations," in: *Russia's 2022 War Against Ukraine and the Foreign Policy Reaction of the EU – Context, Diplomacy, Law* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2022) 39.
[443] Holly Ellyatt, "Germany promised Ukraine weapons but hasn't delivered. Now, anger toward Berlin is rising," *CNBC* (website), accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/16/ukraine-slams-germany-for-failing-to-send-it-weapons.html.
[444] Lili Bayer, "West struggles to deliver on Zelenskyy's defense wish list," *Politico* (website), accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/west-struggles-to-deliver-on-volodymyr-zelenskyys-defense-wish-list-ukraine-russia-war/.
[445] Bayer, "West struggles to deliver on Zelenskyy's defense wish list," *Politico* (website), accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/west-struggles-to-deliver-on-volodymyr-zelenskyys-defense-wish-list-ukraine-russia-war/.
[446] "Ukraine updates: Poland could send tanks without approval," *DW* (website), accessed February 17, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-poland-could-send-tanks-without-berlins-approval/a-64485896.
[447] Lonardo, "EU Diplomacy," 46.

The EU prefers a rules-based international order, while Russia on the other hand wants to impose a power-based international order. Second, despite its initial hesitancy to intervene, the EU puts forward the narrative that its response to the war was revolutionary.[448] The EU has promised to invest in its defence capabilities, to reduce its energy dependence and to build a more robust economic base. Nevertheless, Lonardo rightly states that while the political unity shown by the EU member states and the West more broadly was unusual, "A closer look at the legal framework and the nitty gritty of what the EU actually did shows that the rhetoric's inflated tones are not (yet?) entirely warranted."[449] In other words, the EU might frame its response as revolutionary, in terms of what actually has been done, much remains to be worked out. The third narrative put forward by the EU is that the EU is not a party to the conflict and that this conflict is one between Russia and Ukraine.[450] Fourth and last, the EU has put forward the narrative that Ukraine belongs to the European family.[451] This narrative also holds that Ukrainian membership in the EU is a politically attainable objective. In this regard, it is worth noting that the EU has acted on its narrative. The EU has granted Ukraine candidacy-status.[452] On February 28, 2022, four days after the renewed invasion was started by Russia, Ukraine applied for EU membership. On June 17, 2022, the European Commission issued its opinion on the Ukrainian application for EU membership and on June 23, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine. In February 2023, "EU leaders acknowledged the considerable efforts that Ukraine has demonstrated towards meeting the objectives underpinning its candidate status for EU membership."[453]

While the granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine provides the Ukrainian government with a tangible reward for its efforts of Europeanisation, it remains to be seen whether Ukraine will be able to join the Union anytime soon. Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community in 1987 and was declared "eligible to join the EU" in 1999.[454] Accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey started in 2005. Turkey has not been able to join the EU yet, despite the fact that it did not and does not have a war going on in its territory. Lonardo highlights several issues that Ukrainian membership would give rise to.[455] First,

[448] Lonardo, "EU Diplomacy," 46.
[449] Ibid., 47.
[450] Ibid., 48.
[451] Ibid.
[452] "Ukraine," *European Council* (website), accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/.
[453] "Ukraine," *European Council* (website), accessed February 15, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/.
[454] "Türkiye," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 15, 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/turkiye_en.
[455] Lonardo, "EU Diplomacy," 55.

Ukraine joining the Union could upset other candidate states, like Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia and Moldova. Second, it is not clear whether the EU would want to take in another country with contested border, like Cyprus. Third, possible Ukrainian membership of the EU sparks a conceptual debate about what the border of the 'Europe' actually are. Morocco's EU membership application was denied since it was "not an European state."[456] If Ukraine can join, what about Georgia?[457] These issues show that Ukrainian membership of the European Union is not certain whatsoever and therefore, Lonardo calls the prospect of Ukrainian membership in the EU largely symbolic at this stage.[458]

Nevertheless, EU-Ukraine relations have, arguably, never been better. As the second part of this chapter will show, the EU previously has kept Ukraine at a distance. Since the late 1990s, Ukraine has always had the ambition to join the Union,[459] but the EU never showed any real sign of accepting the country into its ranks.[460] After the 2022 invasion, this seems to have changed for good.

3.1.3 Socio-political and contemporary context – the 2022 renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine: consequences for EU energy policy

The EU's energy policy has been impacted majorly by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Pepe goes so far as to even name it a "sea change",[461] because immediately after the war started, the European Commission presented the REPowerEU plan to reduce dependence on Russian gas by two-thirds before the end of 2022 and to phase out Russian gas supplies before 2030. Indeed, the Commission presents REPowerEU on its website as "its response to hardships and global energy market disruption caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine."[462] The Commission states that there is a double urgency to transform the EUs energy system: first, there is a necessity to end the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels, since these are used as an economic and political weapon by Russia and they cost EU taxpayers nearly 100 billion euros

[456] Lonardo, "EU Diplomacy," 55. Spelling mistake in the original quote.
[457] Ibid., 56.
[458] Ibid., 53.
[459] Oleksiy Semeniy, "Ukraine's European Policy Choice as an Alternative Choice – Achievements, Mistakes and Prospects," in: *Ukraine, the EU and Russia – History, Culture and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Velychenko (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 126.
[460] Marc Maresceau, "EU Enlargement and EU Common Strategies on Russia and Ukraine. An Ambiguous but Yet Unavoidable Connection," in: *EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach,* ed. Christophe Hillion (Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004): 202.
[461] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 9.
[462] "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. * stands for: updated May 18, 2022.

per year; and second there is the necessity to tackle the climate crisis. REPowerEU focuses on energy savings, the diversification of energy supplies and an accelerated rollout of renewable energy to replace fossil fuels in homes, industry and power generation.

At the same time the Commission presented REPowerEU, the EU has also adopted the EU External Energy Strategy.[463] The EU External Energy Strategy is aimed at facilitating energy diversification and building long-term partnerships with suppliers, including cooperation on hydrogen or other green technologies. In the Commission's words: "The Strategy interlinks energy security with the global clean energy transition via external energy policy and diplomacy, responding to the energy crisis created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the existential threat of climate change."[464] In addition, the EU will continue to support the energy security and green transition of Ukraine, Moldova and other partner countries in its immediate neighbourhood, meaning that the EU aims to not only transform its own energy policies, but also those of its partners. It is important to note that the EU External Energy Strategy had been commissioned before the 2022 invasion: on January 25, 2021.[465]

The framing of REPowerEU around the EU's dependency on Russian fossil fuels has to be explained. One might wonder whether the EU does not have any other energy sources besides Russian fossil fuels. Eurostat shows that for its own energy consumption, the EU is dependent mostly on fossil fuels: in 2020, the EU's dependency rate (the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs) was 58%.[466] In that same year, petroleum products accounted for two-thirds of energy imports into the EU. Natural gas accounted for 27% of energy imports and solid fossil fuels for 5%. And indeed, the EU's main dependency is on Russia, followed by Norway. The EU's dependency on Russian fossil fuels is extreme and the decision by the EU to end its dependence on Russian energy after the invasion could be framed as a watershed moment in EU energy policy.

In addition to the almost complete dependence on Russian gas and the risks posed by climate change one can add the weaponization of energy supplies as reason why the EU wishes to transform its energy policy. The war in Ukraine has weaponised the import of gas. Pepe

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[463] "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. * stands for: updated May 18, 2022.
[464] "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. * stands for: updated May 18, 2022.
[465] REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. * stands for: updated May 18, 2022.
[466] "From where do we import energy?" *Eurostat* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html.

shows that while Russia's share in EU gas imports shrank from 43% to 9% since the beginning of the war, this is more the result of Russia's decision to decrease its supplies to the EU and single EU member state activism, rather than the result of coordinated EU action.[467] In June and July of 2022 Russia had been reducing gas supplies to Europe through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and in August 2022 Russia shut it down entirely blaming problems with equipment. [468] It is clear that Russia uses gas as a means of pressure[469] and that it has been doing so for decades.[470] However, that means of pressure has almost completely disappeared in relation to the EU since explosions disabled the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines.[471]

In September 2022 leaks in both Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines have been found, with Norway and Denmark reporting that explosions caused the leaks and EU Commission president Von der Leyen suggested that the pipelines have been sabotaged. While the cause behind the leaks has not been discovered at the time of writing,[472] it is clear that Russian gas exports to the EU will not resume any time soon. Pepe states that the events of Nord Stream 2 show how energy supplies and infrastructure are now being used both as leverage to maximise geopolitical dividends or as a target of asymmetrical warfare.[473] The last option would assume that Russia is responsible for the potential sabotage, but neither the EU nor the US has blamed Russia for the events.[474] In any case, it is clear that the EU's energy supplies have literally become weaponised after the invasion.

This weaponization of energy supplies explains the EU's rationale for reforming its energy policies. Pepe states that the EU's experience with Russia shows that in order to prevent similar shocks in the future, security and military considerations, industrial-technological competition, and sovereignty aspirations need to be factored in when designing energy relations, energy markets and access to secure energy than cost calculations, efficiency or open

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[467] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 9.
[468] "Nord Stream 1: How Russia is cutting gas supplies to Europe," *BBC News* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60131520.
[469] Sergey Vakulenko, "Shutting Down Nord Stream Marks the Point of No Return for Russian Gas," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (website), accessed February 17, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87837.
[470] Jonathan Elkind, "Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda," in: *Energy Security – Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications* (Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.: 2010): 136-137. Elkind shows how Russia forced Turkmenistan to shut its gas wells after both countries failed to reach an agreement on the purchasing price of gas. In addition, on the eve of Georgian elections in the year 2000, Gazprom cut gas supplies to Georgia. Elkind also shows a quote by Kremlin spokesman Peskov that links an increase in gas price to disloyalty to Russia in the form of a wish to join NATO.
[471] Sergey Vakulenko, "Shock and Awe: Who Attacked the Nord Stream Pipelines?" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (website), accessed February 17, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88062.
[472] 16 February 2023.
[473] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 9.
[474] Nord Stream 1: How Russia is cutting gas supplies to Europe," *BBC News* (website), accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60131520.

markets.[475] So far, REPowerEU's focus on saving energy, diversification and the accelerated rollout of renewables[476] does not show an understanding of Pepe's recommendations. Rather, it underlines what Pepe calls "the limits of the EU's liberal-regulatory power and its energy governance to secure energy supplies in a geopolitical context increasingly marked by realpolitik."[477]

Therefore, while the EU seems to have had a 'geopolitical awakening',[478] it remains to be seen whether this awakening will translate into its energy policy. It is here that this doctoral dissertation can make its contribution. Pepe shows that the 2022 invasion has "augmented and highlighted the long-term trends already unfolding. The return of great power rivalry, the fragmentation of the liberal world economic order and the disruption of energy and industrial supply chains, and the weaponization of energy have all had a direct negative impact on global energy governance mechanisms (largely dysfunctional), on the relations between products and consumers, and the relation between state and markets long before the war."[479] Therefore, Pepe suggests that the EU could have known about the possible effects of the energy disruption seen after the 2022 invasion. And indeed, the EU has been subject to a disruption in gas supplies before. The last time gas supplies to the EU were halted to the extent they have been in 2022, was during the 2009 gas crisis. In 2006, gas supplies were disrupted as well. As the literature review has shown, the 2006 gas crisis has had a significant impact on the evolution of the EU's energy policy.[480] It is in this light that this dissertation aims to analyse the EU's energy policy legitimation during the 2006 and 2009 gas crises. If a discursive shift towards securitisation has taken place, as suggested in the hypotheses, the EU's inability to transform its energy policy before the 2022 invasion is worth significant criticism. It is in this broader context that this dissertation will carry out its research.

This section has outlined how the EU's energy policy has been impacted by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, this section has provided the broader context for the analysis of this dissertation by showing how an analysis of the 2006 and 2009 gas crises can contribute to a criticism on the EU's response to the 2022 disruption in gas flows. It has to be stated that any explanation of the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is by definition

[475] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 10.
[476] REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 17, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131.
[477] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 9.
[478] Borrell quoted in Lonardo, "EU Diplomacy," 41.
[479] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 9.
[480] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," 419.

incomplete, as the events are happening at the time of writing.[481] Nevertheless, a short overview with significant events has been provided. The next section will start the second part of this chapter and will outline the immediate context necessary for the analysis of the research.

3.2 Socio-political and historical context

This second part of the chapter will outline the immediate context necessary for understanding the analysis of this dissertation. As explained in the methodology chapter, an understanding of EU-Ukraine relations before the Orange Revolution and the changes that the Revolution accompanied it has to be acquired. Therefore, this part will focus on the historical context of EU-Ukraine relations up until the Orange Revolution, the Orange Revolution, and the consequences of the Orange Revolution.

3.2.1 Socio-political and historical context – On conceptions of Ukrainian history

As A. Kraft van Ermel shows in his doctoral dissertation, the concept 'Ukraine' is a human construction, which means that it will mean different things to different people.[482] A. Kraft van Ermel shows that because of this, the idea of 'Ukrainian history' is equally complicated.[483] Soviet policymakers framed Ukrainian people as part of a broader Soviet people, Russian policymakers would state that Ukraine is part of a broader Russian nation. A. Kraft van Ermel uses a definition of history that proceeds from Ukraine's borders since its independence in 1991, which focuses "on the history of the people who have lived there and how they have perceived themselves and each other".[484] A. Kraft van Ermel shows that recent historical studies of Ukraine have made use of this definition of Ukrainian history.[485] This definition therefore looks at the histories of the people in the territory of the current borders of Ukraine. This doctoral dissertation recognises Ukraine's complicated and multi-faceted history, but an analysis of Ukrainian history before 1991 would not contribute to the analysis of the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. The application of the DHA requires an overview of the macro-socio-political context that the discursive practices that are being analysed are embedded into[486] in order to conduct the analysis. Therefore, the next section will focus on EU-Ukraine relations

[481] February 17, 2023.
[482] Nicolaas A. Kraft van Ermel, "Introduction," 3. In: *On the Crossroads of History. Politics of History in Ukraine and Questions of Identity in Post-Cold War Europe (1991-2019).* Doctoral dissertation. University of Groningen, 2020.
[483] A. Kraft van Ermel, "Introduction," 3.
[484] Ibid.
[485] Ibid., see his footnote 8.
[486] See: Rheindorf and Wodak, "Borders, Fences, and Limits," 16; and Reisigl and Wodak, "The DHA," 89.

since 1991, the period in which an independent Ukraine made its own decisions on the world stage. A. Kraft van Ermel used his definition of Ukrainian history that focused on the histories of people in its borders since 1991 because the use of this definition allows a focus on the people that lived there and their perception of themselves and of each other.[487] Hence, this definition gives agency to the Ukrainian people. Before outlining the general context of EU-Ukraine relations since the independence of Ukraine in 1991, the following section will analyse Ukrainian nation building after its independence. Giving agency to the Ukrainian people is extremely important and that is what needs to be emphasised here: 1991 was the first time[488] the Ukrainian people were finally totally free to determine by themselves how they perceive themselves and each other.

3.2.2 Socio-political and historical context – Ukrainian independence & nation building

In his dissertation, A. Kraft van Ermel gives political context to Ukrainian independence.[489] He shows that before the Ukrainian declaration of independence, the Verkhovna Rada already adopted a declaration of state sovereignty in June 1990.[490] A referendum on December 1, 1991 confirmed the declaration of independence, as 92,32% of voters supported it, including a big majority in Luhansk (83,86%) and Donetsk (83,90%) and a close majority in Crimea (54,19%).[491] This is important to mention, because these regions are regions contested by Russia after 2014. It should be clarified why this contestation is not relevant.

In 2014, Russia has annexed Crimea after an illegal referendum and it started interfering in Ukraine's eastern Donbass region.[492] Russia claims that these regions want to be a part of Russia and has annexed four regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) after another illegal referendum on 30 September, 2022.[493] It is clear that these regions supported Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union and Russian rule in 1991. This is where A.

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[487] A. Kraft van Ermel, "Introduction," 3.
[488] As A. Kraft van Ermel shows, Ukrainian attempts at establishing states in the 20th century lacked internal cohesion and popular support. See A. Kraft van Ermel, "Introduction," 4.
[489] Nicolaas A. Kraft van Ermel, "Nation Building and Post-Communist Transition: Appropriating Ukraine's Pasts (1991-2004)," 85. In: *On the Crossroads of History. Politics of History in Ukraine and Questions of Identity in Post-Cold War Europe (1991-2019).* Doctoral dissertation. University of Groningen, 2020.
[490] A. Kraft van Ermel, "Nation Building and Post-Communist Transition," 85.
[491] Ibid.
[492] Paul Kirby, "Donbas: Why Russia is trying to capture eastern Ukraine," *BBC News* (website), accessed February 17, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938544.
[493] "Referendums on Joining Russia in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson: What Impact on Conflic," *RULAC: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts* (website), initiative of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, accessed February 17, 2023, https://www.rulac.org/news/referendums-on-joining-russia-in-luhansk-donetsk-zaporizhzhia-and-kherson-w.

Kraft van Ermel's definition of Ukrainian history comes in again that gives agency to the Ukrainian people. The referendum of 1991 was conducted by Ukrainians, for Ukrainians in a period in which the Ukrainian people were able to define their own perspectives and future. The referenda of 2014 and 2022 were illegal under international law and they were held at gunpoint.[494] Therefore, the results of the referenda of 2014 and 2022 can and should be disregarded and should not be used as an argument to contest the results of the 1991 referendum. The results of the 1991 referendum show that Ukrainians wanted a future in which they are able to decide by themselves for themselves.

A. Kraft van Ermel shows that Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika enabled the growth of a nationalist movement in Ukraine called the People's Movement of Ukraine.[495] This movement stated that Ukraine was a nation of its own right and that it was not just Russia's 'little brother'.[496] A. Kraft van Ermel further shows that it was not just nationalism that led to Ukrainian independence.[497] Another important factor was the fact that the communist ruling elite had a large stake in proclaiming independence. Leonid Kravchuk, leader of the national communists, won the first presidential elections.

A. Kraft van Ermel shows that Ukrainian independence could only happen because of a so-called "Grand Bargain": since nationalism had such a small appeal, nationalists could only achieve independence with support of the communist establishment.[498] A deal was made: the nationalists would not challenge the national communists' hold on power, as long as the national communists would support Ukrainian independence. This deal explains the large continuity between Soviet and independent Ukraine in terms of administrative structure, government institutions and even the constitution.[499] Kravchuk started a policy of Ukrainization in order to keep his part of the deal. A. Kraft van Ermel shows that Hrushevskyi's model of Ukrainian history was used in Ukrainian nation building.[500]

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[494] The 2014 referendum in Crimea was held after Russian troops had taken control over the peninsula. See: "Timeline: Political crisis in Ukraine and Russia's occupation of Crimea," *Reuters* (website), accessed February 17, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-timeline-idUSBREA270PO20140308. The 2022 referendum was held under Russian occupation, however, as RULAC shows, under no circumstance does an occupying power acquire sovereignty over occupied territory. Therefore, the referendums were illegal. See: Referendums on Joining Russia in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson: What Impact on Conflic," *RULAC: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts* (website), initiative of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, accessed February 17, 2023, https://www.rulac.org/news/referendums-on-joining-russia-in-luhansk-donetsk-zaporizhzhia-and-kherson-w.

[495] A. Kraft van Ermel, "Nation Building and Post-Communist Transition," 85.

[496] Ibid., 85.

[497] Ibid.

[498] Ibid., 86.

[499] Ibid.

[500] Ibid. 87.

In 1994, Leonid Kuchma was elected, after which he scaled down Ukrainization and focused on economic reform.[501] Kuchma's election promise had been to stop Ukrainization altogether, but the Ukrainian state needed these policies to justify its existence and the basic policy outlined by Kravchuk was kept. Kuchma stayed in power until 2004,[502] when the elections were held that would trigger the Orange Revolution.

This section has shown that since its independence in 1991 up until 2004, Ukraine has been trying to redefine itself as a country. A policy of Ukrainization was implemented that stayed in place, while pragmatic issues like the economy were also an important focus for the new governments. This section has therefore provided background on the first years of Ukrainian nationhood after its independence in 1991. The Orange Revolution will be analysed in the section below.

3.2.3 Socio-political and historical context – The Orange Revolution

As Bredies, Umland and Yakushik show, much research into the Orange Revolution has been published.[503] Important is as well that Bredies et al. mention that the outcome, impact and achievements of the Orange Revolution have become matters of dispute. Their book is an important source on the Orange Revolution, as it tries to widen "the variety of approaches towards explaining the emergence, course and results of the Orange Revolution."[504] First, an overview of the events of the Orange Revolution will be given. After, the Revolution will be put in context by assessing its consequences for Ukraine.

In 2004, presidential elections were held in Ukraine in which two candidates were the main contenders: Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko.[505] Yanukovych was supported by Russian president Vladimir Putin, who promoted Yanukovych in interviews and public meetings in the week before the first round of the election.[506] Yushchenko, on the other hand, campaigned on anticorruption.[507]

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[501] A. Kraft van Ermel, "Nation Building and Post-Communist Transition," 88.
[502] Ibid., 109.
[503] Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik, "Approaches to a 'Watershed' in Ukrainian Politics," in: *Aspects of the Orange Revolution III. The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections*, eds. Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (*ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart: 2014): 7.
[504] Bredies et al., "Approaches to a 'Watershed' in Ukrainian Politics," 7-8.
[505] Oleksa Eliseyovich Zasenko, "Ukraine," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (website), accessed February 10, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine#ref275918.
[506] Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March – April 2005): 49.
[507] Zasenko, "Ukraine," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (website), accessed February 10, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine#ref275918.

The elections were contested. Exit polls had shown that Yushchenko occupied a leading position, with 52% of the votes, whereas Yanukovych was shown to have acquired 43% of the votes.[508] Later, however, when the official results came in, Yanukovych had beaten Yushchenko by 2,5%.[509] Allegations of fraud were made throughout the day of the elections and the poisoning of Yushchenko months before the election[510] might be the most striking evidence that the elections were not conducted in a fair manner.

A day after the elections, amid nationwide protests, Yushchenko installed himself as president and called for a nationwide general strike.[511] At that moment, Ukraine had three presidents: the outgoing but still incumbent Kuchma; Yushchenko and the official winner Yanukovych. After days of massive protests, the Ukrainian parliament declared the poll invalid and the supreme court annulled the results of the elections.[512] New elections were held. These new elections, conducted on December 26, 2004 saw Yushchenko win with 52%, whereas Yanukovych received 44% of the votes.[513] Yushchenko was inaugurated as president of Ukraine on January 23, 2005.[514]

Taken together, these events (the massive protests, the poisoning of Yushchenko and the annulment of the election results and the subsequent win of Yushchenko) came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Now, we can look into the consequences of the Orange Revolution for the country.

Arel states that the "Orange Revolution was the single most momentous political event in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but it rests on a paradox."[515] This paradox, according to Arel, consists of the fact that the Orange Revolution was about a movement towards Europe, but that the Revolution itself owns its existence to a strong nationalism that focuses on Ukraine. What is a complicating factor is that Ukrainian society was suffering a severe crisis of legitimacy, according to Arel.[516] He shows that 44% refused to accept that the popular uprising in the final round of elections on December 26 on the Maidan Square was legitimate. On the other hand, the supporters of the Revolution (52%) refused to accept the

[508] Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," 35-36.
[509] Ibid., 36.
[510] Ibid., 37.
[511] Ibid., 45.
[512] Ibid., 45-46.
[513] Ibid., 46.
[514] Zasenko, "Ukraine," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (website), accessed February 10, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Independent-Ukraine#ref275918.
[515] Dominique Arel, "Why and How It Happened – Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, but Without the East," in: *Aspects of the Orange Revolution III. The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections*, eds. Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (*ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart: 2014): 35.
[516] Arel, "Why and How It Happened – Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, but Without the East," 36.

concerns of the non-Orange supporters as legitimate. Arel shows that this cannot be dismissed as normal dynamics of a winner/loser electoral outcome, since the pro-and non-Orange constituencies were strikingly geographically organised.[517] Therefore, Arel states the government that was formed in January 2005 excluded Eastern Ukraine, which was a first since the creation of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s. Arel goes on to show that it were the western and central regions of Ukraine that mobilised in support of the Orange Revolution, while the eastern and southern regions did not.[518] Therefore, the Orange revolution "conquered only half of the country, and that half is highly geographically concentrated."[519] According to Arel, this has to do with how people in Ukraine related to their national identity. Therefore, while the "Orange Revolution was about the birth of the Ukrainian political nation, that is, of the capacity for a population to organize independently of the state and, in times of crisis, to defy the state",[520] the biggest challenge after the Orange Revolution would be to extend the political nation to the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.[521]

This view by Arel emphasises the division in Ukrainian society between people (and their regions) regarding their support for the Orange Revolution. This is important to keep in mind, especially since the after the Revolution Donbas media have "raised the specter of Galicia taking over Ukraine".[522] Russian rhetoric in relation to the renewed invasion of 2022 seems to have taken up on this rhetoric and intensified it by claiming that the Maidan revolution of 2014 has been a coup and that Nazi's are attacking Donbas and are willing to do the same to Crimea.[523]

Katchanovski reinforces this observation about a regional division and its importance for the country after the Orange Revolution. He states that in all presidential and parliamentary elections held in Ukraine since its independence in 1991, western regions have backed nationalist and pro-Western candidates while eastern regions have tended to vote for pro-communist and pro-Russian candidates.[524] Katchanovski shows that many academic studies have examined various aspects of regional political decisions in post-Soviet Ukraine that

[517] Arel, "Why and How It Happened – Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, but Without the East," 36.
[518] Ibid., 43.
[519] Ibid.
[520] Ibid., 52.
[521] Ibid.
[522] Ibid., 42.
[523] United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 24 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," *S/2022/154*, 5/8.
[524] Ivan Katchanovski, "Why and How It Happened – Regional Political Cleavages, Electoral Behavior, and Historical Legacies in Post-Communist Ukraine," in: *Aspects of the Orange Revolution III. The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections*, eds. Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (*ibidem*-Verlag, Stuttgart: 2014): 54.

identified cultural, religious, ethnic and economic factors that affect regional electoral and political attitudes.[525] Katchanovski in particular analyses the effect of historical legacy on voting behaviour.[526] His analysis on voting results from all national parliamentary and presidential elections held between 1991 and 2006 confirms the existence of strong and persistent regional cleavages: western Ukrainian regions were more supportive of pro-nationalist and pro-Western parties than eastern Ukrainian regions.[527] Eastern Ukrainian regions were more favourable towards the Soviet Union and Russia. Katchanovski states that the results of his study imply that the regional differences in electoral behaviour and attitudes toward major historical issues would not disappear in the near future.[528] This is especially important in relation to the Orange Revolution, which did not enjoy support from the whole country,[529] but the result of which effected the whole country in the form of a new government.

Therefore, it is important to realise that the Orange Revolution was not supported unequivocally throughout the whole country and that the Revolution did not solve the existing divisions. Rather, if Arel is to be believed, the Revolution could have increased the divisions by excluding perspectives from eastern Ukraine from the government.[530]

In 2005, Wilson stated that "Even if the Orange Revolution ultimately disappoints expectations at home, there can be no doubt that it has profoundly changed the international environment."[531] Wilson stated that the Revolution "has challenged the regional slide into semi-authoritarianism, forced Russia to rethink its role in the world, and will, it is hoped, prompt Brussels to re-examine its policy on Europe's institutional expansion."[532] In hindsight, we can say that Wilson might have been a bit too optimistic. It is not clear what Wilson meant by "the region", but it is clear that Belarus and Russia have slid into complete authoritarianism. Arguably, Hungary has slid into semi-authoritarianism.[533] Russia has certainly not rethought its role in the world, rather, it has doubled down on shaping the world to its image by attempting to conquer Ukraine and thereby undermining the Western liberal order. Nevertheless, Wilson's

[525] Katchanovski, "Why and How It Happened – Regional Political Cleavages, Electoral Behavior, and Historical Legacies in Post-Communist Ukraine," 55.
[526] Ibid., 58.
[527] Ibid., 76.
[528] Ibid., 77.
[529] Arel, "Why and How It Happened – Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, but Without the East," 43.
[530] Ibid., 36.
[531] Andrew Wilson, "The International Implications," in: *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London: 2005): 174.
[532] Wilson, "The International Implications," 174.
[533] Jorge Liboreiro and Sandor Zsiros, "Hungary is no longer a full democracy but an 'electoral autocracy,' MEPs declare in new report," *Euronews* (website), accessed February 20, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/15/hungary-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-but-an-electoral-autocracy-meps-declare-in-new-repor.

statements do portray the general feeling of optimism that the Orange Revolution produced for Ukraine and its neighbouring countries at that time.

Regarding nation-building, Matsiyevsky states that from 2005-2010 Ukraine was rated a "free" country by Freedom house.[534] However, democracy was not consolidated under Yushchenko, since Ukraine's democratisation was superficial and subject to internal conflicts.[535] In addition, rent-seeking behaviour among Ukrainian elites prevented them from institutionalising the rules of the democratic game, which allowed Yanukovych as Yushchenko's successor to quickly expand his authority and to establish control over the legislature and judiciary.[536] Matsiyevsky's research shows that the Orange Revolution has in fact been a democratising force for Ukraine, albeit superficial and short-term. Matsiyevsky also shows that Yanukovych has been able to undo this democratisation fairly easily. Just one year after Yanukovych came to power, the Freedom House expressed concern over Ukraine's democratisation process.[537] Therefore, while short-lived, the Orange Revolution did present a significant change for Ukrainian politics.

This section has outlined the events of the Orange Revolution and their context. More specifically, the effects of the Revolution for the Ukrainian nation have been presented and it has been shown that the Revolution did not take away the division in political attitudes among the Ukrainian population. In addition, it did not cause a political change in its neighbours. Nevertheless, the Revolution did produce a democratising force for Ukraine, albeit a short-lived one. Now that the effects of the Orange Revolution for Ukraine have been presented, the EU policies towards Ukraine can be outlined. Afterwards, EU policies during and after the Orange Revolution will be analysed.

3.2.4 Socio-political and historical context – EU approaches towards its new neighbourhood & Ukrainian independence

According to Semeniy, the EU's attitude towards the newly independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union consisted of two approaches: one towards the central and eastern European states that focused on membership of those countries into the European Union, and one towards the former Soviet states which focused on cooperation alone.[538] Regarding Ukraine

[534] Yuriy Matsiyevsky, "Western Leverage, Russia's Resistance and the Breakdown of the Yanukovych Regime," in: *Ukraine After Maidan: Revisiting Domestic and Regional Security*, eds. Tomasz Stępniewski and George Soroka (*ibidem*-Verlag: Stuttgart: 2018): 138.
[535] Matsiyevsky, "Western Leverage, Russia's Resistance and the Breakdown of the Yanukovych Regime," 138.
[536] Ibid., 138-139.
[537] Ibid., 139.
[538] Semeniy, "Ukraine's European Policy Choice as an Alternative Choice," 126.

specifically, the EU was interested in disarmament and nuclear weapons, whereas Ukraine was interested in political and economic assistance and a legal framework for future relations. In 1994 a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed between the EU and Ukraine.

Semeniy describes how Ukraine has, since the end of the 1990s, actively promoted the idea of future membership of the EU.[539] Semeniy suggests that while periods of stagnation in this promotion were in the interests of most EU officials, the EU nevertheless continued to extend cooperation with Ukraine, which was exemplified with the 1999 Common Strategy policy document, which specifically "welcomed 'Ukraine's European choice'"[540] and outlined several main objectives: support for democratic and economic reforms in Ukraine; a joint solution of European problems and mutual cooperation in the context of EU enlargement. Semeniy continues and states that the next step in the extension of EU-Ukrainian cooperation, the European Neighbourhood Policy, was criticized by Ukraine as it put the country in the same line with a group of Mediterranean countries with no mention of possible future membership.[541] Semeniy does mention that this criticism, combined with the Orange Revolution and the adopted EU-Ukraine Action Plan, has led to more options for cooperation being on the table, but that membership was still off the table.

This account of the EU's approach towards Ukraine directly after its independence shows that from the EU's perspective, cooperation with and democratic reform in Ukraine were imperative. However, in contrast to the wishes of the Ukrainian government, the possibility of future membership has been ruled out by the EU from the start. The EU was acting pragmatically.

Another account of the EU's approach towards Ukraine after its independence comes from Maresceau. He states that as his study was being finalised, new reflections on the neighbourhood relations of the enlarged EU were coming in.[542] This shows that the EU was still processing how to engage with its new neighbourhood. As Maresceau put it: "… the issue of new proximity relations of the enlarged EU is something very concrete and real … The EU now starts to realise this."[543] About the Common Strategy document Maresceau states that it is difficult to define what the EU meant with the expression of strategic partnership.[544] He even goes so far as to state the following: "Actually, it could be anything as long as it does not come

[539] Semeniy, "Ukraine's European Policy Choice as an Alternative Choice," 126.
[540] Ibid.
[541] Ibid., 127.
[542] Maresceau, "EU Enlargement and EU Common Strategies on Russia and Ukraine," 187.
[543] Ibid.
[544] Ibid.

too close to EU membership itself."[545] Maresceau goes on to describe the contents of the Common Strategy as hollow. While this account of the Common Strategy is very critical, it does show us what scholars at the time thought of the EU's approach to Ukraine: as something not yet coherent yet.

Maresceau continues his explication of the EU's approach towards Ukraine by stating that while it is clear that Ukraine aims ultimately at accessing the EU, the EU's perception on Ukraine's place in Europe is more complex.[546] Maresceau states that this complexity was visible in the 1996 Action Plan for Ukraine. In it, the EU proposed support for a plethora of things (economic and social reform, integration in the European security architecture, support for regional cooperation, assistance in reforming the energy sector and the deepening of bilateral contractual relations), but the EU refused to include Ukraine in its enlargement strategy.[547] What the EU did state was that "over the long term, it (was) a matter for the EU to take note of the request of the Ukraine authorities to secure a firmer anchorage in the European structures and possible membership in the EU."[548] While examining the Common Strategy, Maresceau suggests that the EU acted out of self-interest, since an understanding of the new neighbour (Ukraine) was indispensable if the EU wished to achieve a safe enlarged EU.[549] Maresceau states that for the EU, Ukraine's geographic location is pre-eminently strategic and that the Common Strategy did not take Ukraine's European expectations into consideration.

The image that both Maresceau and Semeniy paint of the EU's approach towards Ukraine before the Orange Revolution is one in which the EU acted out of pragmatism and self-interest.

3.2.5 Socio-political and historical context – the EU & the Orange Revolution

Youngs states that EU policy related to the Orange Revolution "is widely cited as one of the most notable recent successes in European foreign policy, in which member state governments and EU institutions acted in a united and concerted fashion in favour of democratic transition."[550] Youngs also states that since 2004, EU member states have strongly disagreed over whether to offer Ukraine the prospect of membership and that these

[545] Maresceau, "EU Enlargement and EU Common Strategies on Russia and Ukraine," 187.
[546] Ibid., 199.
[547] Ibid.
[548] Ibid.
[549] Ibid., 202.
[550] Richard Youngs, "EU Policy on Ukraine During and Since the Orange Revolution: 'A door neither closed nor open'" in: *Making EU Foreign Policy – National Preferences, European Norms and Common Policies*, ed. Daniel C. Thomas (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 31.

disagreements have only widened after 2004, as political crises culminated in Ukraine and the Orange politicians were defeated in the 2010 elections.[551] Hence, Youngs states, this can be seen as two separate case studies when it comes to EU foreign policy: one in which agreement among EU member states emerged (after the success of the Orange Revolution) and one in which the lowest common denominator prevailed (after the transition period of the Revolution).

Youngs shows that prior to the elections of 2004, EU policy towards the Ukrainian government constituted a shifting balance between engagement and pressure for democratic reform.[552] The EU did not support popular protests that erupted in Ukraine in 2000, nor did it offer material support for the democratic opposition that took shape after 2001.[553] Even in 2004 the EU's response to shifting underlying political conditions was slow.[554] Yushchenko's campaign was entirely funded by Ukrainians and despite the EU's rhetorical commitments in favour of Ukrainian democracy, in the autumn of 2004 the EU appeared to be "indecisive and reluctant to intervene."[555] While the EU's decision of backing the Orange Revolution seems straightforward, Youngs shows that this decision was not taken without considerable debate.[556] Whereas most support for the Orange Revolution came from the Polish, Slovak, Dutch, British and Swedish governments, the Germans, French and Spanish were more reluctant in their support.[557] After the second round of elections, which was clearly manipulated, the EU changed to a stick approach. Youngs shows that French and German positions only changed when Russia itself concluded that defeat for the incumbent regime was inevitable.[558]

As Roth explains, the Orange Revolution arguably changed Western perceptions of Ukraine.[559] This appeared to open a window of opportunity for upgrading EU policy towards Ukraine. It is also clear that in its immediate response to the Orange Revolution, the EU carefully avoided either offering, or excluding a membership prospect and limited itself to upgrading the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.[560] Roth shows that the Orange Revolution created high expectations for Ukraine: Yushchenko made a four-step plan for EU membership and the EU's close engagement in the crisis and its praise for the repeat elections raised Ukrainian

[551] Youngs, "EU Policy on Ukraine During and Since the Orange Revolution," 31.
[552] Ibid., 32.
[553] Ibid., 33.
[554] Ibid.
[555] Ibid., 34.
[556] Ibid., 34-37.
[557] Ibid., 37.
[558] Ibid., 39.
[559] Mathias Roth, "EU-Ukraine relations after the orange revolution: The role of the new member states," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 8, no. 4 (12 May 2008): 506.
[560] Roth, "EU-Ukraine relations after the orange revolution," 506.

expectations.[561] Yushchenko also lobbied EU governments after the Revolution. Nevertheless, Roth shows that opinions within the EU on how to respond diverged.[562] Roth identifies four groups: first, a group that was promoting the offering of a membership prospect to Ukraine, consisting of the European Parliament, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia, Hungary, Denmark and the Baltic States; second, silent supporter of group one, consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and, arguably, Germany and Austria; third, a more sceptical group, consisting of Spain, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus that silently opposed offering Ukraine an accession prospect; and fourth, the group that was most outspokenly against offering a membership perspective, consisting of France, the Benelux, Italy and Greece, aligned with the Commission and the Council Secretariat.[563] Roth shows that these group dynamics come to the fore when the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was discussed. In particular, the group advocating for a membership perspective for Ukraine found the Action Plan to be insufficient for Ukraine, should the opposition emerge victorious in the Orange Revolution.[564] A consensus emerged that the Action plan would remain the chief instrument for promoting closer EU-Ukraine relations and integration in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Commission decided to use the Action Plan as a means to exert leverage in the crisis: it made its adoption dependent on the free and fair conduct of repeat elections. The Action Plan was expanded on several points with an addendum, but Roth shows that none of these points were actually controversial.[565] The addendum did create the opportunity to accelerate EU-Ukraine integration, but this was made conditional on Ukraine' reform progress.[566] Actual perspectives on future possibilities of Ukrainian membership of the EU was not given, due to diverging regional preferences, financial concerns, negotiations with Turkey and the ratification process of the constitutional treaty.[567]

Roth's account shows us that divisions within the EU on EU-Ukraine relations did not disappear after the Orange Revolution. In contrast, it is clear that the four groups all pursued their own interests. Nevertheless, the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and its addendum that were made conditional on the conduct of free and fair elections shows that as a whole, the EU became more favourable towards the idea of EU-Ukrainian integration. Hence, the Orange Revolution did have a positive effect on EU-Ukraine relations.

[561] Roth, "EU-Ukraine relations after the orange revolution," 509.
[562] Ibid., 510.
[563] Ibid.
[564] Ibid., 512.
[565] Ibid., 514.
[566] Ibid.
[567] Ibid., 515.

3.3 Summary of Chapter III

The second part of this chapter has demonstrated that the Orange Revolution has been a pivotal moment in EU-Ukraine relations. The Orange Revolution resulted in significant changes for Ukraine. An example is the force of democratisation that tried to take hold in Ukraine. It was superficial and short-lived, but it did alter Ukraine's political orientation significantly. In addition, while the EU's internal divisions and their respective interests regarding Ukraine did not change much after the Orange Revolution, the EU as a whole did become more in favour of EU-Ukrainian integration. This is most visible in the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and its addendum. Again, this supports the idea that the Orange Revolution has been a critical discourse moment after which the EU potentially altered its discourse, making this a good starting point for a discourse analysis. In addition to that is the crucial fact that the results of the Orange Revolution were arguably short-lived. This means that the time the "Orange" government was in power was a unique moment in history, which provides a timeframe for the analysis of this dissertation. It reinforces the fact that the Orange Revolution was an uprooting event in EU-Ukraine relations. This, in addition, makes the EU's legitimation of its discourse is directly dependent on the context of the Orange Revolution, since it is this discourse that provided for the context in which this discourse was produced. This chapter has therefore provided for the immediate context necessary in order to start the analysis.

Chapter IV – Overview of data

This Chapter will give an overview of the aggregation of the data collected from both gas crises. This general overview will be elaborated upon in the following Chapters.

The overview presented in this Chapter has been acquired by following the three-dimensional approach of the DHA as mentioned in the methodology. It is worth repeating what this entails. There are three steps that need to be followed: first, specific contents or topics of a specific discourse should be identified in a text.[568] Second, the discursive strategies should be investigated and third, the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations should be investigated.

4.1 Step 1: identifying specific contents or topics of a specific discourse – Total topics found in corpus of data

Table 11 starts with an overview of the topics found in both case studies. The table shows us that besides "energy," other topics were found in the corpus of data. When this research was conducted, it was not yet clear that the focus of the EU's discourse would be on energy. It is part of the DHA to discover which topics are dominant. Therefore, only after the identification of topics in the corpus of data had been completed, could the conclusion be made that for both case studies, "Energy" is clearly the dominant topic. This is followed by the "European Neighbourhood Policy" and "Reforms".

Table 11: Topics and their frequencies found in data collected for the period January 2005 – March 2006 & March 2008 – March 2009[569]

Topic	Frequency	Dominant Topics
Energy	354	1. Energy 2. ENP 3. Reforms 4. ENP Action Plan 5. Eastern Partnership 6. EU foreign policy 7. Orange Revolution
ENP	131	
Reforms	83	
ENP Action Plan	73	
Eastern Partnership	59	
EU foreign policy	48	

[568] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 175.
[569] Own elaboration.

Orange Revolution	37	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	29	
Visa	21	
EU membership	17	
Free Trade Area	16	
Association agreement	16	
Civil society	11	
EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement	7	
WTO	4	
Transnistria	3	
Environment	2	
Defence	2	
PCA	1	
EU-Russia relations	1	
EU internal market	1	
Values	1	
Crisis management	1	

The next step of the methodology of the DHA is then to find out which *topos* is connected to the found topics. This is already part of the formal-content related analysis. As Reisigl has shown us, content-related *topoi* tell us more about the specific character of discourse.[570] After the specific *topoi* have been identified, we can move on to the second step. Table 12 shows the *topoi* found in relation to the dominant topic of "energy".

[570] Reisigl, "Argumentation Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach," 77.

Table 12: *Topoi* and their frequencies for data collected for the period January 2005 – March 2006 & March 2008 – March 2009, related to the topic of "Energy"[571]

Topos	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy security	125	1. Energy security
Cooperation	46	2. Cooperation
Integration	41	3. Integration
Problem solving	26	4. EU effectiveness
EU effectiveness	40	
Danger	26	
Evaluation	20	
Diversification	7	
Development	3	
Interdependence	6	
Solidarity	5	
Safety	3	
Reforms	3	
Completion	2	
Cost	1	
Solution	1	
Green energy	1	

Table 12 shows us that from all *topoi* related to the topic of "energy", *energy security* is the dominant *topos*, followed by *cooperation*, *integration* and *EU effectiveness*. This shows us that energy security was an important focus of the EU's energy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine.

Based on this table alone, it is not clear why this is the case. The following Chapters will elaborate on this. The frequent employment of the other *topoi* (*cooperation, integration* and *EU effectiveness*) furthermore shows a diversity in the discourse, since not all legitimations have a focus on security.

4.2 Step 2: identifying and investigating discursive shifts

The second step of the DHA is identifying and investigating the discursive shifts of a discourse. This has been done according to each *topos* found per topic. In. Table 13, we can see

[571] Own elaboration.

the total employment of all legitimation strategies found in the corpus of data regarding the topic of "Energy". The instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation was most dominant, followed by the instrumental rationalisations with the means and goal orientations.

Table 13: Legitimation strategies employed in total for the period January 2005 – March 2006 & March 2008 – March 2009, regarding the topic of "Energy"[572]

Legitimation strategy	Frequency	Dominant legitimation strategy
Authorisation: authority – personal authority	30	1. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation 3. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	32	
Authorisation: authority – expert authority	2	
Authorisation: custom – tradition	5	
Authorisation: custom – conformity	1	
Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	92	
Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	129	
Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	165	
Theoretical rationalisation: definition	14	
Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	10	
Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	18	
Moralisation: abstraction	6	
Moralisation: analogy	7	

[572] Own elaboration. Tables related to legitimation strategies are not descending in frequency, as the order is determined by the legitimation strategy.

Moralisation: evaluation	4	
Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	4	

Table 14 breaks the employment of legitimation strategies down into a division of those strategies per *topos*.

Table 14: Frequency of legitimation strategy employed regarding *topoi* related to the topic of "Energy", for the period January 2005 – March 2006 & March 2008 – March 2009[573]

Topos	Legitimation strategy	Frequency	Dominant strategy
Energy security	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	10	1. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation 3. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	14	
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	2	
	Authorisation: custom – conformity	1	
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	52	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	30	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	62	
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	5	

[573] Own elaboration.

	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	2	
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	4	
	Moralisation: analogy	2	
	Moralisation: abstraction	4	
	Moralisation: evaluation	1	
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1	
Cooperation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	4	1: Instrumental rationalisation: means & outcome orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2	
	Authorisation: custom – conformity	1	
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	21	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	21	
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	2	

	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	3	
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1	
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	2	
Integration	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	4	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 3. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	4	
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1	
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	9	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	20	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	12	
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1	
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1	

	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2	
	Moralisation: analogy	1	
	Moralisation: evaluation	1	
Danger	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	4	1. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	5	
	Authorisation: authority – expert authority	1	
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1	
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	6	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	14	
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	5	
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1	

	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	3	
	Moralisation: abstraction	1	
	Moralisation: analogy	1	
	Moralisation: evaluation	1	
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1	
EU effectiveness	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	4	1. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	6	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	17	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	30	
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	3	
	Moralisation: analogy	1	
	Moralisation: evaluation	1	
Diversification	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	Authorisation: authority – expert authority	1	
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1	
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2	
Safety	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2	
Problem solving	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	2	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2	
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	14	

	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	9	
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1	
Development	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2	1: Instrumental rationalisation: goal & means orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2	
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1	
Solidarity	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	1	1: Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation & theoretical rationalisation: explanation
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2	
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	2	
	Moralisation: abstraction	1	
Evaluation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	5	

	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	9	3. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	7	
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1	
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1	
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	3	
Reforms	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1	
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2	
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1	
Interdependence	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2	

	Moralisation: analogy	2	
Completion	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	3	
Solution	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1	
Green energy	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1	
Cost	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1	

4.3 Step 3: investigating the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations

In the third step of the DHA, the legitimation strategies found are related to the macro socio-political context. The aggregation of data shown above suggests a fluctuation in the discourse. While "Energy" is the dominant topic and *energy security* is the dominant *topos*, the data shows that *cooperation, integration* and *EU effectiveness* are also frequently employed *topoi*. Based on these aggregate tables, it is difficult to say when, for example, *energy security* was most frequently employed and when *integration* was most frequently employed. There is also no information on the specific context of the text where a *topos* is found. It is therefore not possible to relate these aggregate tables to linguistic means and its context. This also makes it impossible to apply Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model. In order to be able to do so, an analysis of each case study individually is needed. This will allow for a complete formal-content related analysis. This will be done in the following Chapters. The total corpus of data will be divided into two case studies, which are subdivided into four stages each, as shown in the methodology chapter. Not all argumentation schemes found will be shown in Chapters V and VI. A selection will be made to illustrate the findings. A complete list of argumentation schemes and their respective legitimations can be found in the Appendices.

Chapter V – Analysis of the first gas crisis: 2005-2006

5.1 Overview of the first gas crisis

Before proceeding to the analysis of the discourse per stage, the division of the chronology of events of the first gas crisis has to be recalled. This chronology of events can be found in Table 5.

Table 5: First gas crisis: chronology of events[574]

Stage 1	stable relations (January 2005 – July 2005)
Stage 2	negotiations on gas prices (October 2005 – December 2005)
Stage 3	peak conflict (January 2006)
Stage 4	resolution and cooldown (January 2006 – March 2006)

Based on this table, we can highlight several expectations. Since in Stage 1 the relations were stable, we can expect there to have occurred no significant change in discourse. In Stage 2, there were negotiations on gas prices between Ukraine and Russia, which might or might not lead to a change in the EU's discourse. As Stage 3 is the peak of the conflict, we can expect a change in discourse to be enacted here. Stage 4 will have to show whether the shift in discourse is perpetuated, or whether a different dynamic in discourse was started.

The sections below will proceed according to the three steps of the DHA stipulated in the previous Chapter: first, specific contents or topics of a specific discourse are identified in a text.[575] Second, the discursive strategies area investigated and third, the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations should be investigated.

[574] Own elaboration based on Stern, "Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe," 32-59.
[575] Catalano and Waugh, "The Main Approaches to CDA/CDS," 175.

5.2 Step 1: overall data of first gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006

Table 15: Topics found in first gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006[576]

Topic	Frequency	Dominant topics
ENP	82	1. ENP 2. Energy 3. ENP Action Plan 4. Reforms 5. Orange Revolution 6. EU foreign policy
Energy	75	
ENP Action Plan	67	
Reforms	59	
Orange Revolution	35	
EU foreign policy	25	
EU membership	14	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	8	
Visa	7	
Free Trade Area	6	
Civil society	3	
Transnistria	2	
WTO	2	
PCA	1	

Table 15 shows us that the topic of "European Neighbourhood Policy" was the dominant topic employed overall in the data collected for the first gas crisis. This is followed closely by the topic of "Energy" and the "ENP Action Plan". Given the fact that for the total corpus of data (both gas crises) "energy" is the dominant topic, we have an indication that a shift in discourse took place either during the first gas crisis, or during the second gas crisis.

Table 16 shows us the dominant *topoi* employed in relation to the topic of "Energy". Here we see that *energy security* is the dominant *topos* employed during the first gas crisis. This is followed closely by *integration* and later by *cooperation*. Since *integration* and *energy security* are employed almost equally in frequency, we cannot be sure yet whether a securitisation of discourse took place during the crisis, or whether *energy security* was employed in equal frequency throughout the crisis.

[576] Own elaboration.

Table 16: *Topoi* found in first gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006, related to the topic of "Energy"[577]

Topos	Frequency	Dominant topos
Energy security	23	1. Energy security
Integration	22	2. Integration
Cooperation	10	3. Cooperation
Danger	6	
EU effectiveness	6	
Development	3	
Problem solving	2	
Safety	2	
Diversification	1	

5.3 Step 2: identifying and investigating discursive shifts

Table 17 shows us that throughout the first gas crisis, the means orientation of the instrumental rationalisation was most frequently employed in relation to the topic of "Energy". This indicates that the EU was trying to achieve a particular goal through a certain means with its legitimations, hence, this suggests a very utilitarian approach to energy by the EU.

Table 17: Legitimation strategies employed in first gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006, related to the topic of "Energy"[578]

Legitimation strategy	Frequency	Dominant legitimation strategy
Authorisation: authority – personal authority	2	1. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 3. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	6	
Authorisation: authority – expert authority	2	
Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	18	

[577] Own elaboration.
[578] Own elaboration.

Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	40	
Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	27	
Theoretical rationalisation: definition	3	
Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	4	
Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	4	
Moralisation: abstraction	1	
Moralisation: analogy	2	
Moralisation: evaluation	1	
Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1	

Table 18 breaks the employment of legitimation strategies down in relation to their connected *topoi*.

Table 18: Frequency of legitimation strategy employed regarding *topoi* related to the topic of "Energy"[579]

Topos	Legitimation strategy	Frequency
Energy security	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	10
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	7
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	13
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1

[579] Own elaboration.

	Moralisation: abstraction	1
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1
Cooperation	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	7
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	4
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	2
Integration	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	5
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	16
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	5
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
	Moralisation: analogy	1
	Moralisation: evaluation	1

Development	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Danger	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Authorisation: authority – expert authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
EU effectiveness	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	6
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
Problem solving	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
Diversification	Authorisation: authority – expert authority	1
Safety	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1

The following parts will analyse the legitimation discourse of the first gas crisis by looking at individual stages, as indicated in the beginning of this Chapter.

5.4: Step 3: investigating the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations

5.4.1 Stage 1 – Stable relations: January 2005 – July 2005

Table 19: Stage 1: stable relations: January 2005 – July 2005[580]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topics
Orange Revolution	29	1. ENP 2. ENP Action Plan
ENP	55	
ENP Action Plan	54	
Reforms	28	
Free Trade Area	4	
Visa	4	
EU foreign policy	6	
Energy	**2**	
EU membership	3	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	4	
Civil society	3	
Transnistria	2	

Table 19 shows us that in the first Stage, the dominant topics were the "European Neighbourhood Policy" and the "ENP Action Plan". "Energy" as a topic was present in the margins, employed only twice.

Below, Table 20 shows that when the topic of "energy" was discussed, the only *topoi* employed related to that topic were those of *cooperation*.

Table 20: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 1[581]

Topic	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Cooperation	2	Cooperation

[580] Own elaboration.
[581] Own elaboration.

We can therefore conclude that in Stage 1, there was no focus on the security of energy. Instead, when "energy" was discussed, the focus was on cooperation. The following example elaborates on this.

In Text 12, we see the following argumentation scheme:

"*To enhance cooperation in key sectors, including energy, transport, environment and health as well as in private sector development. Preparations will be made for a high-level dialogue on energy and related issues and the environmental dialogue will be upgraded.*"[582]

The action that is legitimised here is that preparations will be made for a high-level dialogue on energy and related issues and the environmental dialogue will be upgraded. This is legitimised by the argument that this is done in order to enhance cooperation in key sectors, including energy, transport, environment and health as well as in private sector development. Therefore, the claim is, the making of preparations for a high level-dialogue is legitimised. This argumentation is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the focus is on an aim embedded in the action: the preparations are made *in order to* enhance cooperation in key sectors. The *topos* of this argumentation is therefore one of *cooperation*.

Text 17 shows the other argumentation scheme that revolved around the *topos* of *cooperation*:

"We are also pushing forward our cooperation in the energy sector, and I am very pleased that my colleague, Commissioner Piebalgs, is going to Ukraine tomorrow to help push the high-level energy dialogue forward."[583]

The action that is legitimised in this text is Commissioner Piebalgs going to Ukraine tomorrow. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, there is the fact that the EU is also pushing forward its cooperation in the energy sector. This argument revolves around an established fact and its effects: the fact that the EU is

[582] 2641st Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations, accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_05_34.
[583] Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner: "The EU and Ukraine – What Lies Beyond the Horizon?", accessed September 23, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_257.

pushing forward its cooperation in the energy sector. Therefore, this argumentation is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation.

The second argument is that Piebalgs is going to Ukraine tomorrow in order to help push the high-level energy dialogue forward. This argumentation focuses on an aim imbedded in the action: to help push the high-level energy dialogue forward. Therefore, this argumentation is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation.

Both arguments lead to the claim that it is therefore legitimised that Piebalgs is going to Ukraine tomorrow. The *topos* of this argumentation is one of *cooperation*: both arguments focus on the EU and its cooperation with Ukraine.

Table 21 shows an overview of the legitimation categories found in relation to their specific *topoi*.

Table 21: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 1 of case study 1[584]

Topos	Legitimation category found in relation to topos	Frequency found in relation to *topos*
Cooperation	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
Cooperation	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1

5.4.1.1 – Summary Stage 1

This analysis of the first Stage of the first gas crisis shows us that in this first Stage, the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine was focused on cooperation with Ukraine. Both argumentation schemes show an explicit focus on *dialogue* and *cooperation*. Since security was not mentioned once in relation to the topic of "Energy", no securitisation of discourse occurred in this Stage of the gas crisis. The dominant *topos* across the whole discourse surrounding the first gas crisis is *energy security*, which suggests that at one point during this crisis a discursive shift towards securitisation of the discourse starts. The analysis of Stage 1 shows that in this Stage, at least, this was not the case yet. During this first Stage, the dominant legitimation employed in relation to the *topos* of *cooperation* was the instrumental

[584] Own elaboration.

rationalisation with the means orientation. Current policies (referring to those in the texts), like the making of preparations for high-level dialogue, were legitimised because they were done *in order to* facilitate cooperation.

5.4.2 Stage 2 – Negotiations: October 2005 – December 2005

Table 22: Stage 2: negotiations: October 2005 – December 2005[585]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topics
Reforms	26	1. Reforms
Energy	16	2. Energy
ENP	15	3. ENP
ENP Action Plan	11	
EU foreign policy	8	
Orange Revolution	5	
EU membership	5	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	4	
Visa	3	
Free Trade Area	2	
WTO	2	
PCA	1	

Table 22 shows that in the Stage 2, "Reforms" were the dominant topic found in the legitimation of the EU's discourse regarding Ukraine. We also see, however that the topic of "Energy" rose in frequency used compared to the first Stage. When we break down the *topoi* related to the topic of "Energy", we get Table 23.

Table 23: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 2[586]

Code	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Energy security	4	Integration
	Development	3	
	Integration	8	

[585] Own elaboration.
[586] Own elaboration.

	Cooperation	1	

Table 23 shows us that *integration* is the dominant *topos* employed when the topic of "Energy" is discussed. We also see that *energy security* is employed for the first time. Given the fact that *integration* is the dominant topic however, we can conclude that in Stage 2, no securitisation has taken place yet. The focus was on integration, and as Table 24 shows, instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation were employed most frequently in this regard. Regarding the *topos* of *energy security*, the instrumental rationalisation with the goal and means orientation were equally employed in frequency.

Table 24: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 2 of case study 1[587]

Topos	**Legitimation category found in relation to topos**	**Frequency found in relation to *topos***
Energy security	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	N/A (not found)
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	N/A (not found)
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	N/A (not found)
Integration	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	6
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1

[587] Own elaboration.

	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1
Development	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Cooperation	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1

Text 27 explains why the European Commission is spearheading the Energy Community Treaty, which was signed on October 25, 2005.[588] This text shows us several argumentation schemes related to the *topoi* displayed in Table 23 First, let us take a look at which argumentation schemes were employed in relation to the *topos* of *energy security*:

"*Why is the Commission spearheading this process and this treaty?*

Firstly, improving the balance between energy supply and demand is crucial to improve and sustain economic development in South Eastern Europe …

Secondly, the security of supply of the European Union is based on diversifying supply of gas and electricity and in being politically able to counter threats to energy disruption in the European Union …

[588] Memo on "An integrated market for electricity and gas across 34 European Countries", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_05_397.

Thirdly, the destruction of the energy infrastructure in the region during the wars of the 1990s and the economic fall-out following the break up of the East-West divide have had tremendous and bad effects on the security of private citizens in this region … The citizens of this part of Europe deserve a higher standard of energy infrastructure."[589]

The main action that is legitimised in the excerpt of text above is the Commission spearheading this process and this treaty. This action is legitimised by three arguments.

First, improving the balance between energy supply and demand is crucial to improve and sustain economic development in South Eastern Europe. This argumentation focuses on an aim imbedded in an action: the Commission is spearheading this process and this treaty *in order to* improve the balance between energy supply and demand, which in turn is crucial to improve and sustain economic development in South Eastern Europe. This argument is therefore an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation.

Second, the security of supply of the European Union is based on diversifying supply of gas and electricity and in being politically able to counter threats to energy disruption in the European Union. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation. The argumentation focuses on an aim imbedded in an action: the Commission is spearheading this process and this treaty *in order to* diversify the supply of gas and electricity and *in order to* become politically able to counter threats to energy disruption in the European Union.

Third, the destruction of the energy infrastructure in the region during the wars of the 1990s and the economic fall-out following the break up of the East-West divide have had tremendous and bad effects on the security of private citizens in this region … The citizens of this part of Europe deserve a higher standard of energy infrastructure. This last argument is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation. The focus here is in the last sentence: the citizens of this part of Europe deserve a higher standard of energy security: this means that the Commission is spearheading this process and this treaty with a goal in mind: the creation of a higher standard of security for the citizens of this part of Europe.

All three arguments lead to the claim that the Commission spearheading this process is therefore legitimised. The first argument focuses on the importance of improving the balance between energy supply and demand, and frames this as "crucial". Here we see a securitising aspect of the discourse for the first time. The second argument increases this tendency: we see words like "threats" and "disruption". The third argument finishes this up and talks about

[589] Memo on "An integrated market for electricity and gas across 34 European Countries", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_05_397.

"tremendous and bad effects on the security of private citizens" and the need to improve upon this. Therefore, the *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*.

Text 27 also contains examples of argumentation schemes that are employed around the dominant *topos* of *integration*:

"*Firstly, the treaty will extend the application of the energy, environmental, renewables, competition and other parts of the acquis communautaire (legislation and rules decided at EU level). This will create a level playing field, though there will have to be credible, effective and policed transition dates.*"

The action that is legitimised here is that the treaty will extend the application of the energy, environmental, renewables, competition and other parts of the acquis communautaire (legislation and rules decided at EU level). This is legitimised by the argument that this will create a level playing field, though there will have to be credible, effective and policed transition dates. The category that this legitimation belongs to is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the argumentation focuses on an aim embedded in an action: the treaty will extend the application of energy, environmental, renewables competition and other parts of the *acquis communautaire*, *in order to* create a level playing field. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that the treaty will extend the application of energy, environmental, renewables competition and other parts of the *acquis communautaire*. The *topos* of this argumentation focuses on extending the *acquis communautaire* and the creation of a level playing field in the fields of energy, environment, renewables and competition, which means that this *topos* is one of *integration*.

Text 30 shows another interesting example of an argumentation employed around the *topos* of *integration*:

"*The EU and Ukraine will be signing a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy. The memorandum foresees increased co-operation in all energy fields including electricity, oil, gas and coal, with the long term perspective of a future integration of EU and Ukraine energy markets.*"[590]

[590] Press release on "President Barroso to attend EU-Ukraine Summit in Kiev on 1 December", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_1506.

The action that is legitimised here is the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy between the EU and Ukraine. This is legitimised by the argument that the memorandum foresees increased co-operation in all energy fields including electricity, oil, gas and coal, with the long term perspective of a future integration of EU and Ukraine energy markets. This argumentation is an instrumental rationalisation with a goal orientation, as it clearly focuses on a future goal: the long-term perspective of a future integration of EU and Ukraine energy markets. This leads to the claim that the EU and Ukraine signing a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *integration*, as the core of the argumentation revolves around the long-term perspective of a future integration of EU and Ukraine energy markets.

5.4.2.1 – Summary Stage 2

The analysis of the second Stage of the first gas crisis shows us that regarding the topic of "Energy", no securitisation has taken place during Stage 2. The *topos* of *energy security* did emerge for the first time, and the argumentations related to this *topos* focused on the supply and demand of energy.

Despite the *topos* of *energy security* being employed for the first time in this Stage, the dominant *topos* employed was *integration*, with the instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation being dominant. The use of the means orientation shows that the EU was legitimising its actions in order to achieve a specific aim. The analysis above relates how the EU saw the Energy Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding as a means to achieve integration in the field of energy.

As the focus of Stage 2 was predominantly on *integration* and not on *cooperation*, as it was in Stage 1, a shift in discourse has occurred: from *cooperation* to *integration*. Whether this constitutes a discursive shift depends on the findings in later Stages.

5.4.3 Stage 3 – Peak crisis: January 2006

Table 25: Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2006[591]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topic
Energy	13	Energy

[591] Own elaboration.

Table 25 shows us that a significant shift in topics has taken place during the third Stage of the first gas crisis: the only topic employed was that of "Energy".

Table 26: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 3[592]

Code	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	EU effectiveness	5	1. EU effectiveness
	Danger	3	2&3. Energy security & danger
	Energy security	3	
	Problem solving	2	

Table 26 shows the legitimation categories found in relation to the specific *topos*. When we look at the *topoi* used in relation to this topic, we see in Table 26 that the dominant *topos* is that of *EU effectiveness*. This dominance means that in Stage 3, the EU was focused on legitimating its energy policy in order to show that it as an actor was efficient. We also see that the *topoi* of *energy security* and *danger* were frequently employed. Together, these *topoi* account for more frequent uses than the *topos* of *EU effectiveness*. Therefore, we can say that in Stage 3, the legitimation of energy policy started to become securitised. Table 27 shows the frequency of legitimation strategies employed per specific *topos*:

Table 27: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 3 of case study 1[593]

Topos	Legitimation category found in relation to *topos*	Frequency found in relation to *topos*
Energy security	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1

[592] Own elaboration.
[593] Own elaboration.

Danger	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
Problem solving	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
EU effectiveness	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	6
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1

We see that for the *topos* of *EU effectiveness*, the instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation is dominant. Regarding the *topoi* of *danger* and *energy security*, the dominant legitimations are, respectively, an impersonal authorisation legitimation and the goal orientation.

Text 33 shows several interesting examples regarding the *topos* of *EU effectiveness*:

"*The fact that we have coordinated our approach carefully between the Commission and the Member States through the Council, has enabled us to present a clear and effective European approach on this issue.*"[594]

The action that is legitimised here is the EU coordinating its approach carefully between the Commission and the Member States through the Council. The argument that is used to legitimise this action, is the fact that this has enabled the EU to present a clear and effective European approach on this issue. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the focus is clearly on the aim that was embedded in the action: the EU coordinated its approach, (as a means) *in order to* enable itself to present a clear and effective European approach on this issue. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that the EU has coordinated its approach carefully. The *topos* is *EU effectiveness*, as the main goal of this

[594] Speech by EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcoming the agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz (Jan. 4, 2006), accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_1.

argumentation is to show that the EU as an actor is effective, as opposed to all Member States employing their own policies.

Another example:

"*Although the meeting of the Gas co-ordination Group this morning was in fact rather short, I think it has been very useful, both in ensuring real transparency and providing a Community mechanism to deal with such issues.*"[595]

The action that is legitimised here is the meeting of the Gas co-ordination group. Two arguments are used to legitimise this action.

First, it ensures real transparency. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the meeting of the Gas co-ordination Group was employed as a means with an aim embedded in the action of employing it: ensuring real transparency.

Second, it provides a Community mechanism to deal with such issues. As with the first argument, this argument is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the meeting of the Gas co-ordination Group was employed as a means with an aim embedded in the action of employing it: providing a Community mechanism.

Both arguments lead to the claim that it the meeting of the Gas co-ordination Group is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is one of *EU effectiveness*, as the main goal of this argumentation is to show that the Community method is an effective method in dealing with this specific issue. In turn, this legitimises the EU as an effective actor has been effective actor.

In order to analyse the use of the *topos* of *danger*, we can look at the following excerpt:

"*We have been stressing that such a quick agreement was vital if Russia and the Ukraine were to retain their position as a reliable and secure gas and transit suppliers to Europe.*"[596]

[595] Speech by EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcoming the agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz (Jan. 4, 2006), accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_1.
[596] Speech by EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcoming the agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz (Jan. 4, 2006), accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_1.

The action that is legitimised here is that the EU has been stressing that that such a quick agreement was vital. This is legitimised by the argument that such a quick agreement was vital, if Russia and the Ukraine were to retain their position as a reliable and secure gas and transit suppliers to Europe. This argumentation is an impersonal authorisation legitimation, since the EU is referring to political agreements as the primary determinants of energy relations between the EU and Ukraine and Russia respectively. This argumentation leads to the claim that it is legitimised that the EU has been stressing that such a quick agreement was vital. The *topos* of this argumentation is *danger*, as the EU is suggesting that a "quick" agreement has to be reached, which is "vital". This indicates that the EU feels urgency and that danger is present.

Another example, this time regarding the *topos* of *energy security*:

"*We have worked carefully behind the scenes in the run up to the dispute to establish that a potential supply disruption would not cause a short term energy crisis in Europe.*"[597]

The action that is legitimised here is the EU having worked carefully behind the scenes in the run up to the dispute. This is legitimised by the argument that this was done *in order to* establish that a potential supply disruption would not cause a short term energy crisis in Europe. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the action of carefully working behind the scenes has been performed with an aim embedded in it: to establish that a potential supply disruption would not cause a short term energy crisis in Europe. This leads to the claim that the EU having worked carefully behind the scenes in the run up to the dispute is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the argumentation focuses on clauses such as "supply disruption" and "energy crisis".

Another example:

"*Thirdly, it is clear that Europe needs a clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security of energy supply. To date, the issue of security of energy supply is only really considered at national Member State level; but in reality we need a much greater European-wide approach on this issue. Indeed, the need for this was already identified at the Hampton*

[597] Speech by EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcoming the agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz (Jan. 4, 2006), accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_1.

Court Summit. I will issue a first Communication on a new European Energy Policy in spring, drawing final conclusions and proposals before the end of the year."[598]

The action that is legitimised here is Piebalgs issuing a first Communication on a new European Energy Policy in spring, drawing final conclusions and proposals before the end of the year. This is legitimised by the argument that it is clear that Europe needs a clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security of energy supply. This is a clearly stated goal, which makes this argumentation an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that Piebalgs will be issuing a first Communication on a new European Energy Policy in spring, drawing final conclusions and proposals before the end of the year. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as Piebalgs links a more collective and cohesive policy on energy supply specifically to the *security* of energy supply.

5.4.3.1 – Summary Stage 3

The analysis of Stage 3 has shown that a shift took place in *topoi*: from *topoi* of *cooperation* and *integration*, the focus shifted to a security-oriented *topoi* in this Stage. Taken together, the *topoi* of *energy security* and *danger* account for the most frequently employed *topoi* of Stage 3. In its legitimations, the EU frequently referred to words as "vital", "crisis", "disruption" and "security". Its *energy security* legitimations were accompanied most frequently by instrumental rationalisations with goal orientations, which shows that the EU linked its future goals to energy security, since these goals were focused on having a better policy regarding energy security. The contents of what this policy should look like remains vague.

The dominance of *EU effectiveness* as a *topos* also reveals much about the EU's legitimation during this Stage: its focus was on showing its member states that it is an effective actor in the field of energy. In addition, the EU tried to legitimise its actions by showing that the Community method was very effective in this crisis. This is confirmed by the fact that instrumental rationalisations with means orientations were dominant in relation to this *topos*. The EU kept referring to how the actions it took (meeting with the Gas co-ordination Group, coordinating its approach) were taken *in order to* achieve a specific goal. Therefore, we see the

[598] Speech by EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcoming the agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz (Jan. 4, 2006), accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_1.

EU trying to legitimise a Community policy in the field of energy, as opposed to each Member State having its own energy policy.

5.4.4 Stage 4 – Resolution & cooldown: January 2006 – March 2006

Table 28: Stage 4: resolution & cooldown (January 2006 – March 2006)[599]

Topic	Frequency	Dominant topics
Energy	44	Energy
ENP	12	
EU foreign policy	11	
EU membership	6	
Reforms	5	
ENP Action Plan	2	
Orange Revolution	1	

Table 28 shows us that in Stage 4, the topic of "Energy" was by far the most dominant. Compared to the first two Stages, where the focus was on topics like "Reforms" and the "ENP", in the fourth Stage the focus is still on energy, as it did in the third Stage.

Table 29: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 4[600]

Topic	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Energy security	16	1. Energy security
	Integration	14	2. Integration
	Cooperation	7	3. Cooperation
	Danger	3	
	Safety	2	
	EU effectiveness	1	
	Diversification	1	

Table 29 shows us that *energy security* is the dominant *topos* employed in Stage 4. This shows that after the third Stage, the legitimation of energy policy is still securitised. This might

[599] Own elaboration.
[600] Own elaboration.

indicate a pattern and this suggests that Stage 3 saw an enactment of a discursive shift, which started to be perpetuated in Stage 4. Table 30 shows which legitimations were used per *topos*. Regarding the *topos* of *energy security*, the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation was most frequently employed. Regarding *integration*, the means orientation was most frequently employed.

Table 30: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 4 of case study 1[601]

Topos	Legitimation category found in relation to topos	Frequency found in relation to *topos*
Energy security	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	5
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	10
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Moralisation: abstraction	1
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1
Danger	Authorisation: authority – expert authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Diversification	Authorisation: authority – expert authority	1

[601] Own elaboration.

EU effectiveness	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Cooperation	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	2
Integration	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	10
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	4
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
Safety	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1

Some examples related to the use of the *topos* of *energy security*, are the following:

"*The recent crisis and persistent high oil prices teach a lesson to those who normally resist and obstruct to provide an European dimension for the energy policy. Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability.*"[602]

The action that is legitimised here (Text 34) is the fact that Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability. This is legitimised by the argument that the recent crisis and persistent high oil prices teach a lesson to those who normally resist and obstruct to provide an European dimension for the energy policy. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, as the focus of the argumentation is on the effects of the outcome of the recent gas crisis. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability. The *topos* of this argumentation is one of *energy security*, as energy policy is clearly linked to the *security* of supply and sustainability. Furthermore, the argumentation itself refers to the recent gas *crisis* and refers to those opposing a Community method for energy policy as those who *obstruct*. The use of these words shows that the *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*.

Text 39 shows a remarkably similar argumentation:

"*The recent crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which had a serious knock-on effect in some EU Member States, and persistent high and volatile oil prices, have taught us a lesson: Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability.*"[603]

The action that is legitimised here is the fact that Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability. This is legitimised by the argument that the recent crisis between

[602] Speech by Barroso: Remarks on the programme of the Austrian Presidency of the European Union, accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_13.
[603] Speech by President of European Commission Barroso: "From Pittsburgh to Lisbon: reform in times of change", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_74.

Russia and Ukraine, which had a serious knock-on effect in some EU Member States, and persistent high and volatile oil prices, have taught the EU a lesson. This argumentation is almost the exact same as the one used in Text 34. The argumentation is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, as the focus of the argumentation is on the effects of the outcome of the recent gas crisis, which has taught the EU a lesson. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability. The *topos* of this argumentation is one of *energy security*, as energy policy is clearly linked to the recent gas *crisis*, which had a *serious* knock-on effect in some EU Member States.

Text 40 gives us another example:

"*This year we will be boosting our energy cooperation as part of a broader EU effort on energy supply. The events at the beginning of the year between Russia, Moldova and Ukraine provided a sharp reminder of the importance of energy security, and its susceptibility to political manipulation.*"[604]

The action that is legitimised here is the EU boosting its energy cooperation. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, this action is part of a broader EU effort on energy supply. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the EU boosting its energy cooperation is done *in order to* broaden its effort on energy supply. The EU boosting its energy cooperation has an aim embedded in it: the broadening of EU effort on energy supply.

Second, the events at the beginning of the year between Russia, Moldova and Ukraine provided a sharp reminder of the importance of energy security, and its susceptibility to political manipulation. This is a mythopoesis legitimation, with the Cautionary Tales orientation. The EU is reminding itself here what the (undesired) consequences are of not working on energy cooperation, energy supply and energy security.

Together, these arguments lead to the claim that the EU boosting its energy cooperation is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the argumentation links

[604] Speech by EU Commissioner for External Relations and ENP Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: "Managing Globalisation – the case for a European foreign policy", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_75.

energy policy to *energy security*. Political manipulation, which invokes feelings of danger, is also used in this argumentation, which adds to the securitisation of energy policy.
Text 43 gives us another good example:

"*Another important issue related to gas is security of transit through Ukraine, which is an important transit country for deliveries of gas to the European Union. The MoU addresses this issue and provides for the establishment of a joint EU-Ukraine technical support Group to develop and suggest concrete measures in this area.*"[605]

The action that is legitimised here is the MoU addressing the issue of security of transit of gas through Ukraine. This is legitimised by the argument that Ukraine is an important transit country for the deliveries of gas to the European Union. This is a theoretical rationalisation with the explanation orientation. The focus of this argumentation is on the fact that Ukraine is an important transit country. This is being presented as a matter of fact and as if it is the "nature" of Ukraine as a country. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that the MoU addresses the issue of security of transit of gas through Ukraine. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the transit of gas through Ukraine is explicitly referred to as a security issue.

The use of *integration* as a *topos* in Stage 4 is also interesting to analyse. These examples show us why:

"*National leaders, and citizens, see the sense of a common, coherent European policy. Now is the moment for the European institutions to play their role, with ambition and rigour. I look forward to working with you over the coming months to give shape to a European Energy Policy.*"[606]

The action that is legitimised here is Barroso looking forward to working with you over the coming months. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First is the argument that now is the moment for the European institutions to play their role, with ambition and rigour. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome

[605] Transcript of speech by Piebalgs: "EU-Ukraine: Common Energy Challenges" at Conference on "Electricity Sector of Ukraine – Status and Plans ahead", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_132.
[606] Speech by Barroso: Remarks on the programme of the Austrian Presidency of the European Union, accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_13.

orientation, as the focus of this argumentation is on the outcome of the gas crisis and its effects, as is shown by the word "now", which refers to the gas crisis.

The second argument is that Barroso is looking forward to working with you over the coming months *in order to* give shape to a European Energy Policy. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as Barroso's action has an aim embedded in it: to give shape to a European Energy Policy.

Both arguments lead to the claim that Barroso looking forward to working with you over the coming months is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *integration*, as Barroso is clearly aiming at a further integration of European energy policy.

Another example, this time from Text 39:

"*The Commission will come forward with ideas to make this a reality, and encourage the development of a real, pan-European energy market.*"[607]

The action that is legitimised here is the Commission coming forward with new ideas. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, the Commission is coming forward with new ideas *in order to* make this a reality and second, the Commission is coming forward with new ideas *in order to* encourage the development of a real, pan-European energy market. Both argumentations are instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the Commission coming forward with new ideas has two aims embedded in it: to make this a reality and to encourage the development of a real, pan-European energy market. The overarching focus of this argumentation is further integration of the European energy market, which makes the *topos* of this argumentation *integration*.

These two examples show that the *topos* of *integration* is employed by the EU as a means to counter the threat that the Union finds itself in regarding its energy security. As Table 30 shows, the means orientation legitimation supports this find.

[607] Speech by President of European Commission Barroso: "From Pittsburgh to Lisbon: reform in times of change", accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_74.

5.4.4.1 – Summary Stage 4

The analysis of Stage 4 shows that the securitisation of the legitimation of EU energy policy, which started in the third Stage, continued. *Energy security* continued to be the dominant *topos*. In its argumentations, the EU repeatedly linked its energy policy to security themes. Most specifically, the EU linked the transit of gas through Ukraine to energy security. This shows that the transit of gas through Ukraine is now seen by the EU as a security issue. The dominant legitimation category employed what the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. This is explained by the fact that in its legitimations, the EU used the recent gas crisis as the main legitimising factor for the securitisation of its policies.

The EU also employed *integration* as a *topos* quite frequently. The analysis above shows that the *topos* of *integration*, in combination with the instrumental rationalisation with their means orientations, was employed by the EU because the EU saw the integration of its energy policy as an answer to the threat to its energy security.

5.5 Discussion of results of first gas crisis

The analysis of the first case study reveals several aspects of EU energy policy legitimation.

While overall the topic of "ENP" is most frequently employed during this first gas crisis, we see a shift in topics occurring after Stage 2. The first two Stages showed a dominance of topics like the "European Neighbourhood Policy" and "Reforms", whereas from Stage 3 onward "Energy" became the dominant topic. This shift in topics was accompanied by a shift in *topoi*. From Stage 3 onward (this continued in Stage 4), *topoi* related to security turned out to be dominant *topoi*. For Stage 3 these were *energy security* and *danger*, for Stage 4 *energy security* was by far the dominant *topos*. The employment of *topoi* related to security went hand in hand with legitimations that linked energy policy to security issues. Therefore, this dissertation concludes that a discursive shift towards *security topoi* was enacted in Stage 3, which continued into Stage 4. The employment of the *topos* of *integration* in Stage 4 shows us that the EU saw the integration of its energy policy as an answer to the threat to its energy security. The conclusion about the enactment of the discursive shift in Stage 3 is reinforced by the types of legitimations that the EU employed in relation to their *topoi*. These will be discussed now.

Regarding the legitimations employed in relation to the *topoi*, we see that in Stage 1, when *cooperation* was the dominant *topos*, the instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation was dominant. Policies like the making of preparations for high-level dialogue, were

legitimised because they were done *in order to* facilitate cooperation. In Stage 2, *integration* was the dominant *topos*, with the means orientation being the dominant legitimation employed. The EU legitimised, for example, the Energy Treaty by stating how this was a means to achieve integration in the field of energy. In Stage 3, the first steps towards securitisation took place and *energy security* and *danger* together amounted for the dominant *topoi* employed. The instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation and the impersonal authorisation legitimation respectively were the dominant legitimations employed. With the instrumental rationalisations with the goal orientations, the EU linked its future goals to energy security. These goals were focused on having a better policy regarding energy security. The EU legitimising *future* energy policy in relation to energy security means that the EU not only started to prepare the grounds for additional securitisation of its energy policy, the EU effectively pre-legitimised normalisation by creating "future-related visions of the state of affairs".[608] While Krzyżanowski describes the process of normalisation to happen only in the last part of his three-step normalisation model, he also states that these stages are "necessarily overlapping and not drawn with rough edges"[609]. Therefore, in the first Stage of enactment, the grounds for the normalisation of discourse can already be prepared, which is what we see the EU doing here. Therefore, the EU's employment of its instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation in Stage 3 of the first gas crisis points to an enactment of a discursive shift towards securitisation. An enactment, since the two Stages before did not focus on security at all. Therefore, the introduction of the dominance of the security *topos* in Stage 3 can be considered to be a "recontextualisation into the public domain with "new" discursive elements, including themes and arguments, as well as various linguistic means which support their realisation."[610] In Stage 4, *energy security* was the dominant *topos* again. This time the outcome orientation was the dominant legitimation employed. Here, the EU used the recent gas crisis as the main legitimising factor for the securitisation of its policies. As pointed out by Krzyżanowski, the first stage of his normalisation model is where the key link is established between global level of discursive change (including transnational frames such as insecurity or threat) and the context- and actor- specific discourse at hand.[611] The EU employing the outcome rationalisation in this case fits a kind of transition between the enactment stage and the perpetuation stage of Krzyżanowski's model. On the one hand, the securitisation of the energy

[608] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 510.
[609] Ibid., 508.
[610] Ibid.
[611] Ibid.

discourse is reinforced, which would fit the perpetuation stage. On the other hand, by constantly referring to the recent crisis as a legitimation for energy policy being securitised, the EU also appears to be creating the link between security and energy over and over again. The constant creation of this link can be seen as a perpetuation of discourse, but also as establishing the key link "between the "global" level of discursive change (and transnational frames such as insecurity/threat …"[612] Therefore, the dominance of the *energy security topos* in Stage 4 of the first gas crisis has to be interpreted as being part of both the first and second stage of Krzyżanowski's normalisation model.

The analysis of the *topoi* and the accompanying legitimations employed by the EU in its energy discourse regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis therefore shows us that a discursive shift towards securitisation was enacted during the third Stage of the crisis. Whereas in the first two Stages the EU focused on cooperation and integration of its energy policies, from Stage 3 onwards the focus was on enhancing its energy security. This is a clear shift in discourse, both in terms of *topoi* employed and in terms of the content related to these *topoi* and their legitimations. The legitimations and their specific contents employed by the EU corroborate with Krzyżanowski's model of the three-step normalisation process.

Table 31: Summary first gas crisis[613]

Stage	Characteristics	Dominant topics	Dominant *topos* in relation to topic of "energy"	Dominant legitimation in relation to *topos* related to topic of "energy"	Three-step normalisation model
Stage 1	stable relations (January 2005 – July 2005)	ENP ENP Action Plan	*Cooperation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	N/A (no shift enacted)
Stage 2	negotiations on gas prices (October	Reforms Energy ENP	*Integration*	Instrumental rationalisation:	Possible shift towards *integration*

[612] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 508.
[613] Own elaboration.

	2005 – December 2005)			means orientation	
Stage 3	peak conflict (January 2006)	Energy	*EU effectiveness* *Energy security* + *danger* (together dominant in security)	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	Enactment of discursive shift towards securitisation
Stage 4	resolution and cooldown (January 2006 – March 2006)	Energy	*Energy security*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	Transition between enactment and gradation/perpetuation of discursive shift towards securitisation

Chapter VI – Analysis of the second gas crisis: 2008-2009

6.1 Overview of the second gas crisis

Just like for Chapter V, it is necessary to recall the division of the chronology of events of the second gas crisis before proceeding to the analysis of the discourse per Stage. This chronology of events can be found in Table 6.

Table 6: Second gas crisis: chronology of events[614]

Stage 1	Relatively stable relations: March 2008 – October 2008
Stage 2	Rising disputes: November 2008 – December 2008
Stage 3	Peak conflict: January 1, 2009 – 20 January, 2009
Stage 4	Resolution and cooldown: January 21, 2009 – March 2009

As the Oxford report rightly states, the second gas crisis was more significant than the 2006 crisis, as the events of the 2008-9 crisis were unprecedented.[615] Gas supplies to Europe had never been stopped since the creation of the transit system, which dates back to Soviet times. Furthermore, the shortfalls of supply that occurred during the 2006 crisis resulted from Ukraine being cut off and diverting a part of the volume destined to Europe for its own use. In the 2008-9 crisis, European supplies were halted completely.

Again, this chronology of events allows us to make predictions. Since in Stage 1 the relations were relatively stable, we can expect several things here. Compared to Stage 4 of the first gas crisis, in Stage 1 of the second gas crisis the discourse has: a). either taken a completely different turn due to events between the two gas crises; b). the discourse has stayed relatively similar to the last Stage of the first gas crisis; or c). the discourse of the last Stage of the first gas crisis has intensified. Stage 2 represents rising disputes, so here we would expect a shift in discourse again. As Stage 3 is the peak of the conflict, we can expect securitisation to return or intensify. Stage 4 will have to show whether the securitisation stays, or whether a de-securitisation of the discourse takes place.

[614] Own elaboration based on Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009," 1-66.
[615] Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009," 22.

6.2 Step 1: identifying specific contents or topics of a specific discourse – Overall data of the second gas crisis

This section will display the overall data found for the second gas crisis.

Table 32: Topics found in second gas crisis: March 2008 – March 2009[616]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topics
Energy	279	1. Energy 2. Eastern Partnership 3. ENP
Eastern Partnership	59	
ENP	49	
Reforms	24	
EU foreign policy	23	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	21	
Association Agreement	16	
Visa	14	
Free Trade Area	10	
Civil society	8	
EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement	7	
ENP Action Plan	6	
EU membership	3	
Environment	2	
Orange Revolution	2	
WTO	2	
Defence	2	
EU-Russia relations	1	
Transnistria	1	
EU internal market	1	
Crisis management	1	
Values	1	

Table 32 shows that overall, "Energy" was by far the dominant topic found in the second gas crisis. This is in stark contrast with the first gas crisis, where the "ENP" was the dominant topic

[616] Own elaboration.

found in the overall discourse. Given the fact that for both gas crises together "energy" is the dominant topic, we can assume that the shift towards the securitisation of energy in the discourse of the gas crises started that was enacted in Stage 3 of the first gas crisis, continued into the second gas crisis. This would mean that the discursive shift at least perpetuated.

Table 33 shows us that the *topos* of *energy security* was by far the dominant *topos* employed in the discourse of the second gas crisis. This suggests that a majority of the discourse of the second gas crisis focused on security. Again, this reinforces the points made above: that the discursive shift that was enacted during the first gas crisis was at least perpetuated and probably also normalised in the second gas crisis. Nevertheless, we do see that *cooperation* and *EU effectiveness* are frequently employed *topoi* as well. It therefore remains to be seen whether the assumptions made are justified.

Table 33: *Topoi* found in second gas crisis: March 2008 – March 2009, related to the topic of "Energy"[617]

Topos	Frequency	Dominant topos
Energy security	102	1. Energy security 2. Cooperation 3. EU effectiveness
Cooperation	36	
EU effectiveness	34	
Problem solving	24	
Integration	20	
Danger	20	
Evaluation	20	
Diversification	6	
Interdependence	6	
Solidarity	5	
Reforms	3	
Completion	2	
Safety	1	
Cost	1	
Solution	1	
Green energy	1	

[617] Own elaboration.

6.3: Step 2: identifying and investigating discursive shifts

Table 34 shows us that in the second gas crisis, the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation was most frequently employed.

Table 34: Legitimation strategies employed in second gas crisis: March 2008 – March 2009, related to the topic of "Energy"[618]

Legitimation strategy	Frequency	Dominant legitimation strategy
Authorisation: authority – personal authority	28	1. Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation 2. Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation 3. Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	26	
Authorisation: custom – tradition	5	
Authorisation: custom – conformity	1	
Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	74	
Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	89	
Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	138	
Theoretical rationalisation: definition	11	
Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	6	
Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	14	
Moralisation: abstraction	5	
Moralisation: analogy	5	
Moralisation: evaluation	3	
Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	3	

Table 35 breaks the use of legitimation strategies down per *topos*. This shows us that for the *topos* of *energy security*, the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome and means orientation were dominant. This suggests that the EU focused on legitimising its energy policy with certain objectives in mind.

[618] Own elaboration.

Table 35: Frequency of legitimation strategy employed regarding *topoi* related to the topic of "Energy"[619]

Topos	Legitimation strategy	Frequency
Energy security	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	10
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	14
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	2
	Authorisation: custom – conformity	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	42
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	23
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	49
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	4
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	4
	Moralisation: abstraction	3
	Moralisation: analogy	1
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
Cooperation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	4
	Authorisation: custom – conformity	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	3

[619] Own elaboration.

	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	14
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	17
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	2
Integration	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	7
Diversification	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3

	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
Danger	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	4
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	3
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	5
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	13
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	5
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
	Moralisation: abstraction	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1
EU effectiveness	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	6
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	11
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	28

	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	3
	Moralisation: analogy	1
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
Safety	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
Solidarity	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	2
	Moralisation: abstraction	1
Evaluation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	5
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	9
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	7
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	3
Reforms	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2

	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Problem solving	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	2
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	14
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	7
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Interdependence	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
	Moralisation: analogy	2
Completion	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	3
Solution	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Green energy	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
Cost	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1

The following sections will analyse the legitimation discourse of the second gas crisis by looking at individual stages, as indicated in the beginning of this Chapter.

6.4: Investigating the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations

6.4.1 Stage 1 – Stable relations: March 2008 – October 2008

Table 36: Stage 1: stable relations – March 2008 – October 2008[620]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topics
Energy	49	1. Energy
ENP	44	2. ENP
Reforms	24	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	15	
Association Agreement	10	
Free Trade Area	9	
Visa	9	
Civil society	8	
Eastern Partnership	8	
EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement	7	
EU foreign policy	7	
ENP Action Plan	6	
EU membership	3	
WTO	2	
Orange Revolution	2	
Defence	2	
Transnistria	1	
EU internal market	1	
Values	1	
Crisis management	1	
Environment	1	

Table 36 shows us that for Stage 1, "Energy" was the dominant topic, followed closely by the "European Neighbourhood Policy". Table 37 shows us that the *topos* of *energy security* was the dominant *topos* employed regarding the topic of "Energy". This clearly shows a

[620] Own elaboration.

continuation of the securitisation tendency started in Stage 3 of the first gas crisis. The *topos* of *cooperation* is frequently employed, but far less than *energy security*.

Table 37: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 1[621]

Code	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Energy security	25	1. Energy security 2. Cooperation
	Cooperation	10	
	Danger	3	
	EU effectiveness	3	
	Reforms	3	
	Evaluation	2	
	Integration	2	
	Solidarity	1	
	Safety	1	

Table 38: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 1 of case study 2[622]

Topos	Legitimation category found in relation to topos	Frequency found in relation to *topos*
Energy security	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	1
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1

[621] Own elaboration.
[622] Own elaboration.

	Authorisation: custom – conformity	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	9
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	11
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
Danger	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
Evaluation	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
EU effectiveness	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2

Cooperation	Authorisation: custom – conformity	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	5
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	4
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
Integration	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Safety	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
Reforms	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Solidarity	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1

Table 38 shows us that for the *topos* of *energy security*, the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation is dominant in Stage 1. Let us examine some legitimations with the *topos* of *energy security*:

"*I don't need to explain to this audience the importance of energy security – you have all seen the rise and rise of the price of oil and the annual disputes between Russia and some of its neighbours over gas supplies.*"[623]

The action that is legitimised here is Ferrero-Waldner not needing to explain to this audience the importance of energy security. This is legitimised by the argument that you have all seen the rise and rise of the price of oil and the annual disputes between Russia and some of its neighbours over gas supplies. This is a custom authorisation legitimation with the conformity orientation: Ferrero-Waldner assumes that this is something that the whole audience has witnessed and that this is no longer something special. In a way, Ferrero-Waldner normalises the situation. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that Ferrero Waldner does not need to explain to this audience the importance of energy security. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the dominant focus of this argumentation is energy security. Ferrero-Waldner links the gas disputes between Russia and some of its neighbours over gas supplies to the EU's energy security and by employing the custom authorisation legitimation with the conformity orientation, she normalises the situation.

Another example from Text 53:

"*"I am very pleased that EU Member States and like-minded neighbouring countries work closely together for global and regional energy security, and common projects of interest like the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline. I strongly believe that initiatives like the 'Krakow Initiative' can have an added value in the framework of a wider European co-operation", said Commissioner Piebalgs.*"[624]

The action legitimised here is Piebalgs stating that he is very pleased that EU Member States and like-minded neighbouring countries work closely together for global and regional energy security, and common projects of interest like the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline. This is legitimised by the argument that Piebalgs strongly believes that initiatives like the 'Krakow Initiative' can have an added value in the framework of a wider European co-operation.

[623] The European Union and its place in the world – the current agenda, accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_182.
[624] Commissioner Piebalgs participates in Kiev's Energy Security Summit, accessed September 26, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_788.

The cooperation between EU Member States and like-minded neighbouring countries therefore has an aim embedded in it: it can have an added value in the framework of a wider European co-operation. Therefore, this legitimation is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that Piebalgs states that he is very pleased that EU Member States and like-minded neighbouring countries work closely together for global and regional energy security, and common projects of interest like the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as cooperation between EU Member States and like-minded countries is linked to global and regional energy security.

Another example can be found in Text 56:

"*The Energy Community Treaty entered into force on 1 July 2006. The Energy Community extends the EU internal energy market to contracting parties from South-eastern Europe and beyond. It thereby provides a stable investment environment, based on the rule of law, and ties the contracting parties to the EU. Through its action, the Energy Community makes a large contribution to security of supply in the wider Europe.*"[625]

The action that is legitimised here is the Energy Community extending the EU internal energy market to contracting parties from South-eastern Europe and beyond. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, it thereby provides a stable investment environment, based on the rule of law, and ties the contracting parties to the EU. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the extending of the EU internal energy market to contracting parties has an aim embedded in it: the provision of a stable investment environment based on the rule of law, which ties the contracting parties to the EU.

Second, through this action, the Energy Community makes a large contribution to security of supply in the wider Europe. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the extending of the EU internal energy market to contracting parties has an aim embedded in it: it makes a large contribution to the security of supply in wider Europe.

Both of these arguments lead to the claim that it is legitimised that the Energy Community extends the EU internal energy market to contracting parties from South-eastern

[625] 2884th Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_08_200.

Europe and beyond. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since this argumentation legitimises the use of the Energy Community as a means for enhancing the security of supply in wider Europe, in other words, in order to enhance European energy security.

In Text 63, we see the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation being employed more frequently:

"*For Europe, the particular concern relates to gas imports. As gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines, supplies are vulnerable to disruption.*"[626]

The action that is legitimised here is Ferrero-Walder stating that the particular concern for Europe (regarding energy security) relates to gas imports. This framing is legitimised by the argument that gas supplies are vulnerable to disruption, as gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, as the argumentation focuses on the effect of the outcome that gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines. Ferrero-Waldner here of course makes an indirect reference to the first gas crisis, when gas supplies were disrupted through the pipeline that runs from Russia through Ukraine to Europe. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since the supply of gas is related to vulnerability and disruption. Ferrero-Waldner also frames Europe to have particular "concern" regarding as imports.

This specific argument is actually part of a broader argumentation.

"*For Europe, the particular concern relates to gas imports. As gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines, supplies are vulnerable to disruption.*

In oil, we also see growing resource nationalism and interference by the State in producer countries. In addition, with the rapidly growing demand from countries such as China and India, we see that the national oil companies are failing to match demand with investment in production capacity.

[626] Energy Security and Foreign Policy, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_458.

It clearly will be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels – including renewables to enhance Europe's energy security over the next decade.

All of this means that Energy Security will continue to top European Council agendas.

That energy should be at the heart of the European political agenda is of course not new. The creation of the Coal and Steel Community sowed the seeds of the Union as we know it today."[627]

The action that is legitimised here is the fact that it clearly will be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels – including renewables to enhance Europe's energy security over the next decade. This is legitimised by four arguments.

First, the argument we saw above: for Europe, the particular concern relates to gas imports. As gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines, supplies are vulnerable to disruption. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation.

Second, in oil, we also see growing resource nationalism and interference by the State in producer countries. This is also an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, as the focus is on the effects of the growing resource nationalism and interference by the State in producer countries. This had led to the fact that it will clearly be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels.

Third, in addition, with the rapidly growing demand from countries such as China and India, we see that the national oil companies are failing to match demand with investment in production capacity. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. Because of the fact that China and India have rapid growing demand, national oil companies are failing to match demand with investment in production capacity. This had led to the fact that it will clearly be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels.

Fourth, that energy should be at the heart of the European political agenda is of course not new. The creation of the Coal and Steel Community sowed the seeds of the Union as we know it today. This is custom authorisation with the tradition orientation, as Ferrero-Waldner places energy being at the heart of the European political agenda in a long-standing tradition and frames it to have always been the case.

Together, these four arguments lead to the claim that it is legitimised that it clearly will be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels – including renewables to enhance Europe's

[627] Energy Security and Foreign Policy, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_458.

energy security over the next decade. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as all these arguments are linked and employed in order to legitimise the diversification of fuels, in order to enhance Europe's energy security.

6.4.1.1 – Summary Stage 1

Stage 1 of the second gas crisis shows a continuation of the securitisation of EU energy policy legitimation discourse. The topic of "Energy" is the dominant topic found in this discourse and the *topos* of *energy security* is by far the dominant *topos* found. What we see is that the EU employed outcome legitimations most frequently. The analysis of the means orientations shows us that the EU viewed cooperation and integration through the Energy Community as a means that could be employed in order to enhance energy security. The analysis of the outcome legitimations shows that the EU is legitimising policies aimed to enhance its energy security by reacting to the first gas crisis and other energy challenges. The contents of the outcome legitimations point to the fact that the discursive shift is in the gradation/perpetuation stage. The previous gas crisis (2006) is used to justify the EU's current (2008) energy policy. Hence, the securitisation is reinforced. In addition to this, Krzyżanowski states that for a discursive shift to be gradated/perpetuated, it should be diffused and reinforced "across various social fields, spaces and genres."[628] The examples shown in the analysis show that this has been the case. Whereas in the first gas crisis the discourse has been uttered primarily through speeches, the first Stage of the second gas crisis shows that the enactment of the securitisation observed during the first gas has perpetuated to other genres, *inter alia* press releases and Council Meetings. The Council Meeting analysed here was on Agriculture and Fisheries,[629] which shows that the discourse has spread from the Commission to the Council. Hence, a gradation/perpetuation of the discourse is observed.

[628] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.
[629] 2884th Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, accessed December 12, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_08_200.

6.4.2 Stage 2 – Rising disputes: November 2008 – December 2008

Table 39: Stage 2 – rising disputes – November 2008 – December 2008[630]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topics
Eastern Partnership	37	1. Eastern Partnership 2. Energy
Energy	35	
EU foreign policy	7	
ENP	5	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	5	
Association Agreement	4	
Visa	4	
Reforms	1	

Table 39 shows an interesting development: in Stage 2 of the second gas crisis, the "Eastern Partnership" is the dominant topic found. This is in contradiction with expectations, since the overview at the beginning of the Chapter showed that the period of November – December 2008 showed a rise in disputes regarding gas. The dominance of the "Eastern Partnership" over "Energy" as a topic does not reveal anything about the type of energy discourse employed in this period. An explanation for the dominance of this topic can be found in the fact that in August 2008, the Russian-Georgian war occurred. The Eastern Partnership was presented as a direct reaction to this war, as can be seen in this example from Text 73:

"*The European Council of 19/20 June 2008 invited the Commission to prepare a proposal for an "Eastern Partnership" (EaP), emphasising the need for a differentiated approach respecting the character of the ENP as a single and coherent policy framework. The Extraordinary European Council of 1st September 2008 asked for this work to be accelerated, responding to the need for a clearer signal of EU commitment following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions.*"[631]

[630] Own elaboration.
[631] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Eastern Partnership {SEC(2008) 2974}, accessed September 29, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008DC0823&qid=1653306569543.

One of the actions legitimised here is the acceleration of the work that is the preparation of a proposal for an Eastern Partnership. This work being accelerated is legitimised by two arguments.

First, the Extraordinary European Council of 1st September 2008 asked for this work to be accelerated. This is personal authority authorisation legitimation, as an action is being performed because of a request of this body.

Second, this is a response to the need for a clearer signal of EU commitment following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation, since the action is framed as a need, thus, a goal: the EU needs to have a clearer signal of commitment following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions. By stating this, the EU links the introduction of the Eastern Partnership directly to the war in Georgia and its repercussions.

Both of these arguments lead to the claim that the acceleration of the work that is the preparation of a proposal for an Eastern Partnership is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *Eastern Partnership*, since this is the overarching topic and the policy that is being legitimised.

The dominance of the topic of the "Eastern Partnership" does not tell us anything about the securitisation of the energy discourse. For that, we have to turn to Table 40.

Table 40 shows that *energy security* was again the dominant *topos* employed by the EU in relation to the topic of "Energy". We also see that *integration* is also frequently used, almost as frequent as *energy security*. The trend of the securitisation of energy policy legitimation is therefore still continuing.

Table 40: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 2[632]

Code	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Energy security	14	1. Energy security 2. Integration
	Integration	12	
	EU effectiveness	5	
	Cooperation	4	
	Solidarity	1	
	Diversification	1	

[632] Own elaboration.

Table 41 shows that the instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation was most frequently employed regarding the *energy security topos*. For the *integration topos*, the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation was dominant.

Table 41: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 2 of case study 2[633]

Topos	Legitimation category found in relation to topos	Frequency found in relation to *topos*
Energy security	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	7
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
EU effectiveness	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
Cooperation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2

[633] Own elaboration.

Integration	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	4
Solidarity	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
Diversification	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1

First, let us analyse the *energy security topos*. Text 70 provides a good starting point:

"*In the short to medium term, Europe's dependence on imports means that effective provisions for preventing and dealing with supply crises must be in place. Europe can and must diminish its vulnerability to energy supply shocks, first and foremost by developing its own strengths, internally and externally.*"[634]

Two actions are legitimised here.

First is the fact that effective provisions for preventing and dealing with supply crises must be in place. This is legitimised by the argument that Europe is dependent on imports in the short to medium term. This is a theoretical rationalisation with the explanation orientation, as the nature of the EU is used as legitimation. The EU as an actor is dependent on imports, *therefore* the claim that effective provisions for preventing and dealing with supply crises must

[634] EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_08_703.

be in place, is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since the EU's energy import is directly linked with crises.

The second action that is legitimised here is the EU developing its own strengths, internally and externally. This is legitimised by the argument that Europe can and must diminish its vulnerability to energy supply shocks. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation, as the argument clearly portrays a goal: the diminishment by the EU of its vulnerability to energy supply shocks, which is something that the EU can and *must* do. This leads to the claim that it is legitimised that the EU would develop its own strengths, internally and externally. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since the supply side of energy is linked with "shocks" and the EU is framed to be "vulnerable".

Another example can be found in Text 70. This Text provides many examples of actions taken and legitimised by the EU, the following example is an excerpt:

"The 3rd internal energy market legislative package encourages investments in infrastructures, notably cross-border infrastructures. The Commission considers that a number of infrastructure developments should be recognised as energy security priorities of the Community:

…

Development of a Southern Gas Corridor for supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern sources and possibly other countries in the longer term, improving security of supply;

…"[635]

The action that is legitimised here is the EU Commission, as part of the EU energy and solidarity action plan, considering the development of a Southern Gas Corridor for supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern sources and possibly other countries in the longer term. This is legitimised by the argument that this would improve the security of supply. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the EU is considering the development of a Southern Gas Corridor *in order to* improve the security of (gas) supply. There is an aim

[635] EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_08_703.

embedded the action of considering this development. This leads to the claim that the consideration of the development of a Southern Gas Corridor is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the improvement of the security of energy supply is the overarching focus of this argumentation.

Text 71 shows another interesting example regarding the Energy Community:

"*The general objective of the Energy Community is to create a stable regulatory and market framework in order to:*

Create an integrated energy market allowing for cross-border energy trade and linked to the EU market ;

Enhance the security of supply;

Attract investment in power generation and networks in order to ensure stable and continuous electricity supply;

Improve the environmental situation in relation with energy supply."[636]

The action that is legitimised here is the Energy Community creating a stable regulatory and market framework. The argumentation that legitimises this is done *in order to*: create an integrated energy market allowing for cross-border energy trade and linked to the EU market; enhance the security of supply; attract investment in power generation and networks in order to ensure stable and continuous electricity supply and improve the environmental situation in relation with energy supply. Therefore, this is clearly an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation: the Energy Community is seen as a mechanism that can be used in order to enhance the EU's energy security. The *topos* of this argumentation is therefore *energy security.*

Text 73 shows another interesting example:

[636] Commission opens negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova upon accession to the Energy Community, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_1783.

"*Energy security of the EU and partners requires a strong diversification of supply and transit routes. This could be better achieved by closer involvement of third countries including Central Asia countries.*"[637]

The action that is legitimised here is the EU closer involving third countries, including Central Asian countries. This is legitimised by the argument that this could better achieve a strong diversification of supply and transit routes in order to achieve energy security of the EU and its partners. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, as the EU closer involving third countries would be done *in order to* achieve a strong diversification of supply and transit routes, *in order to* achieve energy security for the EU and its partners. It is clear that the action has an aim embedded in it. This leads to the claim that it the EU closer involving third countries is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since achieving energy security is the overall objective that is legitimised in this argumentation.

6.4.2.1 – Summary Stage 2

The dominant topic in Stage 2 is surprisingly not "Energy", but the "Eastern Partnership". This can be explained by the fact that in August 2008, the Russian-Georgian war was fought and the launch of the Eastern Partnership was accelerated in reaction to this war. "Energy" as a topic was frequently found, however, and the dominant *topos* related to this topic is again *energy security*. The instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation was the dominant legitimation employed in relation to the *topos* of *energy security*. The analysis above shows that these means orientations legitimised EU policy like the creation of a Southern Gas Corridor, the Energy Community and a closer involvement of third countries *in order to* enhance the EU's energy security. The trend of securitisation of energy legitimation therefore continued in Stage 2 of the second gas crisis. The content of the means legitimations shows that the discursive shift is still in the gradation/perpetuation stage of the three-step normalisation model. By advocating for new policies and legitimising them *in order to* enhance the EU's energy security, the discourse is actively being spread to new fields.

[637] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Eastern Partnership {SEC(2008) 2974}, accessed September 29, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008DC0823&qid=1653306569543.

6.4.3 Stage 3 – Peak crisis: January 2009

Table 42: Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2009[638]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topic
Energy	111	Energy

Table 42 shows us that "Energy" was the dominant and only topic found in Stage 3 of the second gas crisis. Given the fact that this Stage was the peak of the second gas crisis, when gas flows to Europe were cut off for about two weeks, this makes sense and fits expectations.

When looking at the specific *topoi* employed related to this topic, *energy security* is the dominant *topos* found. Furthermore, the topic of *danger* is also frequently employed, which shows that in total the number of *topoi* that deal with security issues has risen substantially compared to Stage 2. We can therefore conclude that an intensification of the securitisation of energy legitimation has occurred in Stage 3.

The other frequently employed *topoi* found, those of *problem solving* and *EU effectiveness*, are also worth mentioning. These show that during the crisis, the EU legitimised its policies in order to legitimise *itself* as an actor. This becomes clear when looking at examples from the texts.

Table 43: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 3[639]

Code	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Energy security	32	1. Energy security 2. Problem solving 3. Danger 4. EU effectiveness
	Problem solving	19	
	Danger	17	
	EU effectiveness	16	
	Evaluation	9	
	Cooperation	9	
	Solidarity	3	
	Completion	2	
	Green energy	1	
	Diversification	1	

[638] Own elaboration.
[639] Own elaboration.

	Solution	1	
	Integration	1	

Table 44 shows us that regarding the *topos* of *energy security*, the instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation is the dominant legitimation category employed. Regarding the *topos* of *danger*, the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation is dominant.

Table 44: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of "Energy" in phase 3 of case study 2[640]

Topos	**Legitimation category found in relation to topos**	**Frequency found in relation to *topos***
Energy security	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	5
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	8
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	18
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	8
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	13
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
	Moralisation: abstraction	2
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
Danger	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	3

[640] Own elaboration.

	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	12
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	5
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
	Moralisation: abstraction	1
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1
EU effectiveness	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	14
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
	Moralisation: evaluation	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1
Cooperation	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	3

	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1
Integration	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Solidarity	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation	1
	Moralisation: abstraction	1
Diversification	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Problem solving	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	2
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	12
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	6
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Evaluation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1

	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	2
Completion	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	3
Solution	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Green energy	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1

Text 82 provides an interesting starting point regarding *energy security*:

"*Security of energy supply is one of the three pillars of European Energy policy. Europe needs reliable partners.*"[641]

The action that is legitimised here is the fact that the security of energy supply is one of the three pillars of European Energy Policy. This is legitimised by the argument that Europe needs reliable partners. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation: the goal of Europe needing reliable partners legitimises the security of energy supply being one of the three pillars of European Energy policy. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since energy supply is given a central role (as a pillar), and it is linked with security explicitly.

Text 86 provides another interesting example:

"*The contribution of diversified transport routes and sources to the energy security of the EU and its Member States, including by LNG terminals suitably connected to the internal market to be of use to all Member States, must be a major criterion for selecting projects eligible for Community co-financing and other instruments such as those managed by the EIB. In this context the Council calls for mobilizing potential resources under the Community budget and other financing instruments to strengthen investment in vital energy infrastructure, and calls*

[641] Monitoring team starts work in Kiev and Gas Coordination Group urges Naftogaz and Gazprom to resume gas deliveries immediately, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_24.

also for urgent progress on the European Economic Recovery Plan as agreed by the European Council conclusions of December 2008."[642]

The action that is legitimised here is the Council calling for the mobilisation of potential resources under the Community budget and other financing instruments. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, this is called for *in order to* strengthen investment in vital energy infrastructure. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation. The calling for the mobilisation of potential resources and other financing instruments is done with an aim in mind: the strengthening of vital energy infrastructure.

Second, the contribution of diversified transport routes and sources to the energy security of the EU and its Member States, including by LNG terminals suitably connected to the internal market to be of use to all Member States, must be a major criterion for selecting projects eligible for Community co-financing and other instruments such as those managed by the EIB. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation, as this argumentation clearly states a goal: the need for the contribution of diversified transport routes and sources to the energy security of the EU and its Member States *must be* a major criterion for selecting projects eligible for Community co-financing and other instruments.

Both arguments lead to the claim that the Council calling for the mobilisation of potential resources under the Community budget and other financing instruments is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as energy security is an overarching focus throughout both arguments and the action.

Text 87 provides another interesting example:

"*Concerning energy and the current gas crisis, the minister described the Presidency's aim to "create long-term measures that will ensure more transparency in the gas flows, better energy infrastructure interconnections and a revision of the Security of Gas Supply Directive." Related to this, the Committee adopted an opinion on the "External Dimension of the EU's Energy Policy" by rapporteur Ulla Sirkeinen (Group I, Employers, Finland), in which the EESC*

[642] Extraordinary Council meeting Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_10.

proposes two pillars for an external energy policy of the EU: securing the EU's supply of energy, and an active and responsible energy and climate policy."[643]

The action that is legitimised here is the adoption an opinion on the "External Dimension of the EU's Energy Policy" by rapporteur Ulla Sirkeinen. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, there the current gas crisis. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, since the focus of this argumentation is on the effects of the current gas crisis.

Second, the adoption of the opinion is legitimised, since in it the EESC proposes two pillars for an external energy policy of the EU: securing the EU's supply of energy, and an active and responsible energy and climate policy. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation, since the adoption of the opinion has a goal in mind: the creation of two pillars for an external energy policy of the EU.

Together, these arguments lead to the claim that the adoption of the opinion is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the argumentation links the supply of the EU to security, and the overall context concerns the current gas crisis and the Security of Gas Supply Directive.

Text 90 provides an interesting last example regarding the *topos* of *energy security*:

"*Therefore we have to learn the lessons of this dispute. Indeed, I think that all sides have lessons to learn, but let me focus here on the key points from our side.*

…

Second, however, we must not allow ourselves to be placed in this position in future. New Year is for fireworks and celebration, not gas crises. This cannot become an annual event. We have to stop simply talking about energy security in Europe, and start doing something about it. The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly."[644]

[643] EESC debate with Czech Deputy Prime Minister Vondra: 'Europe without barriers', accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ces_09_7.
[644] Statement of President Barroso on the resolution of the Ukraine-Russia Gas Dispute, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_12.

The action that is legitimised here is Barroso stating that we have to stop simply talking about energy security in Europe, and start doing something about it. This is legitimised by three arguments.

First, Barroso states that we must not allow ourselves to be placed in this position in the future. This is clearly an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation: Barroso states a goal.

Second, the Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly. This is an impersonal authority authorisation legitimation, as Barroso refers to a policy document which forces the EU to take action.

Third, Barroso states that we have to learn the lessons of this dispute. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation: the goal is to learn the lessons of this gas crisis.

All three arguments lead to the claim that Barroso stating that we have to stop simply talking about energy security in Europe, and start doing something about it, is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since the core of the action revolves around energy security. Barroso also refers to the Commission's Strategic Energy Review, which links energy to strategy. Lastly, by stating that the EU cannot be *allow* itself to be placed in this position in the future, Barroso legitimises the use of policy in order to prevent that from happening.

Regarding the *topos* of *danger*, Text 80 provides a good starting point:

"*The present situation caused by interruptions of gas supplies from Russia via the Ukraine creates serious difficulties for a number of EU countries. Given the importance attached to solidarity within the EU, this is a problem for the EU as such. It is unacceptable for the EU to see its citizens and enterprises suffering from gas shortages due to the non respect by both partner countries of their contractual obligations.*"[645]

The action that is legitimised is that it is unacceptable for the EU to see its citizens and enterprises suffering from gas shortages due to the non respect by both partner countries of their contractual obligations. This is legitimised by the argument that this is a problem for the EU as

[645] EU Declaration on the Russia/Ukraine problem and energy security, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_04.

such. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, since the focus is on the effects of an established fact: because it is a problem for the EU as such, it is unacceptable for the EU to see its citizens and enterprises suffering from gas shortages. The *topos* of this argumentation is *danger*, as the current situation is framed as a dangerous situation: it creates difficulties for a number of EU countries.

Another example can be found in Text 82:

"*As the European market has lost about 30% of its gas imports, at a time of very low temperature, the Group underlined the importance and the necessity for both disputing parties to resume urgently supply and transit of gas towards the EU.*"[646]

The action that is legitimised is the Group underlining the importance and the necessity for both disputing parties to resume urgently supply and transit of gas towards the EU. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, the European market has lost about 30% of its gas imports. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, since the effects of an established outcome are used to legitimise this action.

Second, the temperature is very low. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, since the effects of an established situation are used for legitimation.

Both arguments lead to the claim that it is legitimised that the Group underlined the importance and the necessity for both disputing parties to resume urgently supply and transit of gas towards the EU. The *topos* of this argumentation is *danger*, since the arguments that the Group is using to legitimise its action are framing the situation as a dangerous one: the market has lost about 30% of its gas imports, and the temperatures are very low.

Regarding the *topos* of *EU effectiveness*, Text 81 provides a good starting point for analysis:

"*The present meeting had been planned long in advance, having in mind a possible problem of supply given the recurrent dispute between Ukraine and Russia at the turn of the year.*"[647]

[646] Monitoring team starts work in Kiev and Gas Coordination Group urges Naftogaz and Gazprom to resume gas deliveries immediately, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_24.
[647] The Gas Coordination Group evaluates the current gas crisis and confirms measures to assist countries in need, accessed September 29, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_30.

The action that is legitimised here is the fact that the present meeting (of the Gas Coordination Group) has been planned long in advance. This is legitimised by the argument that the Gas Coordination Group had in mind a possible problem of supply given the recurrent dispute between Ukraine and Russia at the turn of the year. This is a theoretical rationalisation with the prediction orientation, as the Gas Coordination Group shows that it predicted the current gas crisis. This leads to the claim that the present meeting having been planned long in advance is legitimised. This argumentation shows that the EU wants to portray itself as an effective actor: it has experience from a previous situation, which allowed it to act effectively in advance and in a timely manner. The *topos* of this argumentation is *EU effectiveness*, as this argumentation aims to portray the EU as an effective actor.

Text 86 provides another interesting example:

"*The Council welcomes the steps undertaken by the Presidency and the Commission with the aim to facilitate the dialogue between Russia and Ukraine in order immediately to restore gas deliveries and appreciates that the EU and its Member States coordinated their approach towards third parties.*"[648]

The action that is legitimised here is the Council welcoming the steps undertaken by the Presidency and the Commission. The argument that is used to legitimise this action is that these steps were undertaken with the aim to facilitate the dialogue between Russia and Ukraine in order immediately to restore gas deliveries and appreciates that the EU and its Member States coordinated their approach towards third parties. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the goal orientation, since the steps that the Presidency and the Commission took had a goal in mind: to facilitate dialogue. This leads to the claim that the Council welcoming the steps undertaken by the Presidency and the Commission is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *EU effectiveness*, since the EU portrays the Commission and the Presidency as effective actors who have done a good job. The EU legitimises its own actions by employing this argumentation.

[648] Extraordinary Council meeting Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, accessed September 29, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_10.

6.4.3.1 – Summary Stage 3

Stage 3 clearly saw an intensification of the securitisation of energy legitimation discourse. Regarding the *topos* of *energy security*, we saw a dominance of goal orientation legitimations. These were aimed at legitimising goals for policies that aimed to enhance energy security. It is interesting to note that the means orientation legitimations that were employed, were employed in a very manner similar, also to previous Stages of this gas crisis: these means legitimations also aimed at legitimising policy in order to enhance energy security. Both goal and means legitimations aiming at the goal of enhancing energy security indicates that the discursive shift has entered the normalisation stage of the three-step normalisation model. Indeed, the goal and means legitimations in this Stage legitimise the normalisation of the goal of the enhancement of EU energy security. Especially Barroso's comments about the necessity of not allowing gas crises to become an annual event[649] point in this direction. By pointing out that the EU does not want gas crises to become normal, Barroso actually justifies and thus normalise the EU's energy policy being aimed at enhancing its energy security. In addition, Krzyżanowski states that in order for a discursive shift to have entered the normalisation stage, a discourse should have "contributed to a deeper change of norms of public expression."[650] Barroso's speech about not allowing gas crises to become an annual event frames these situations of crises as something that could occur annually, i.e. become a new normal for the EU.

6.4.4 Stage 4 – Resolution & cooldown: January 2009 – March 2009

Table 45: Stage 4: resolution & cooldown – January 2009 – March 2009[651]

Code	Frequency	Dominant topic
Energy	84	Energy
Eastern Partnership	14	
EU foreign policy	9	
Association Agreement	2	
Reforms	2	
Free Trade Area	1	

[649] Statement of President Barroso on the resolution of the Ukraine-Russia Gas Dispute, accessed December 12, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_12.
[650] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.
[651] Own elaboration.

Visa	1	
EU-Ukraine harmonisation	1	
Environment	1	
EU-Russia relations	1	

Table 45 shows us that in Stage 4, "Energy" was by far the dominant topic. Table 46 shows us that *energy security* is by far the dominant *topos* related to this topic. Other employed *topoi*, like *cooperation* and *EU effectiveness*, lack behind in frequency. Therefore, we can say that the trend of securitisation is continued in this last Stage of the second gas crisis.

Table 46: *Topoi* employed related to the topic of "Energy" in Stage 4[652]

Code	*Topos*	Frequency	Dominant *topos*
Energy	Energy security	31	1. Energy security 2. Cooperation 3. EU effectiveness 4. Evaluation
	Cooperation	13	
	EU effectiveness	10	
	Evaluation	9	
	Interdependence	6	
	Problem solving	5	
	Integration	5	
	Diversification	4	
	Cost	1	

Table 47: Legitimation strategies employed regarding the topic of energy in phase 4 of case study 2[653]

Topos	Legitimation category found in relation to topos	Frequency found in relation to *topos*
Energy security	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	2
	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority	2

[652] Own elaboration.
[653] Own elaboration.

	Authorisation: custom – tradition	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	11
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	23
	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Moralisation: abstraction	1
	Moralisation: analogy	1
EU effectiveness	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	10
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Cooperation	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	8
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales	1

Integration	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Interdependence	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	3
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	2
	Moralisation: analogy	2
Diversification	Authorisation: authority – personal authority	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	1
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Problem solving	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	2
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1
Evaluation	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	4
	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	5
	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	5

	Theoretical rationalisation: definition	1
	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction	1
Cost	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	1

Table 47 shows us that the instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation was most frequently employed in relation to the *topos* of *energy security*. The following examples elaborate on this use:

"*The presidency briefed the Council on how it plans to handle the issue of energy security, following the crisis stemming from the recent interruption of gas supplies from Russia via Ukraine to the EU.*"[654]

The action that is legitimised here is the presidency briefing the Council on how it plans to handle the issue of energy security. The argument that is made is that this is one following the crisis stemming from the recent interruption of gas supplies from Russia via Ukraine to the EU. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, since the effects of the recent gas crisis are used to justify the briefing. Therefore, the claim is, the presidency briefing the Council is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is energy security, as the gas crisis is directly linked to the issue of energy security.

Text 93 shows a similar argumentation scheme:

"*"This commitment by EU's leading cities to cut CO2 emissions is indicative of the consensus that is emerging at the local level to reduce pollution and improve energy efficiency. The EU's Sustainable Energy Week is a timely opportunity to focus attention on these critical issues and to give European stakeholders the opportunity to showcase potential solutions. Europe needs to maintain its leading role in the battle against global warming and continue to reduce energy*

[654] 2920th Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations General Affairs, accessed September 30, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_15.

consumption and its dependence on energy imports," said Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs.

EUSEW 2009 takes place against the backdrop of the crisis in EU energy imports following the recent Ukraine-Russia gas dispute which highlights both the EU's over-dependence on imports and the urgent need for energy-saving solutions."[655]

Two actions are legitimised here, by the same argument: the taking place of the EUSEW 2009 and Piebalgs stating that Europe needs to maintain its leading role in the battle against global warming and continue to reduce energy consumption and its dependence on energy imports. This is legitimised by the argument that the EUSEW 2009 takes place against the backdrop of the crisis in EU energy imports following the recent Ukraine-Russia gas dispute which highlights both the EU's over-dependence on imports and the urgent need for energy-saving solutions. Again, the gas crisis is used as a legitimation, in this case for the organisation of the EU's Sustainable Energy Week and the policy of the EU maintaining its role in the battle against global warming and the EU reducing its energy consumption and its dependency on energy imports. This is therefore another instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the argument references the gas crisis and frames the EU's need for energy-saving solutions as "urgent".

This excerpt contains several other statements legitimised by the gas crisis in an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. First, there is the statement that the EU is over-dependent on imports, which is highlighted by the recent gas crisis. Second, there is the statement that the EU urgently needs energy-saving solutions. Again, this is highlighted by the recent gas crisis. Therefore, this excerpt is a good example of how the EU uses the recent gas crisis to legitimise future policy regarding energy security. This, in essence, is how the majority of the EU's discourse in relation to the *topos* of *energy security* is legitimised in this last Stage of the second gas crisis. Another example can be found in Text 97:

"*However, the weaknesses of EU energy security and the EU's energy situation were also identified. It confirmed that the EU urgently needs to continue the development of the internal*

[655] The Covenant of Mayors – the main highlight of an intense EU Sustainable Energy Week, accessed September 30, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_225.

market, to improve energy interconnections for security of supply, to reinforce its emergency mechanisms and to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis our major suppliers."[656]

Several actions are legitimised here.

First is the statement that the weaknesses of EU energy security and the EU's energy situation were also identified. This is legitimised by the argument that *it* confirmed that the EU urgently needs to continue the development of the internal market, to improve energy interconnections for security of supply, to reinforce its emergency mechanisms and to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis our major suppliers. The *it* in this argument refers to the gas crisis, which makes this another instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. This leads to the claim that the statement that the statement that the weaknesses of EU energy security and the EU's energy situation were also identified is legitimised. This argumentation therefore legitimises the frame that the EU has a weak energy security and energy situation. The dominance of the energy security theme is evident, which makes the *topos* of this argumentation *energy security*.

The second action that is legitimised is the EU urgently needing to continue the development of the internal market. This is legitimised by *it*, i.e. by the gas crisis. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. This leads to the claim that the EU urgently needing to continue the development of the internal market is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *integration*, since the development of the internal market is legitimised by this legitimation.

The third action that is legitimised is that the EU needs to improve energy interconnections for security of supply. This is legitimised by the argument that this is confirmed by *it*, i.e. the gas crisis. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. This leads to the claim that the EU needing to improve energy interconnections for security of supply is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as energy interconnections are explicitly linked with the security of supply.

The fourth action that is legitimised is that the EU needs to reinforce its emergency mechanisms. This is legitimised by the argument that this is confirmed by *it*, i.e. the gas crisis. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. This leads to the claim that the EU

[656] Energy Council, accessed September 30, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_09_72.

needing to reinforce its emergency mechanisms is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since *emergency* mechanisms are legitimised.

Fifth and last, the EU needs to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis its major suppliers. This is legitimised by the argument that this is confirmed by *it*, i.e. the gas crisis. Again, this is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation. This leads to the claim that the EU needing to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis its major suppliers is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, since what is legitimised is a *strengthening* of its negotiating position vis-à-vis its major suppliers. This suggests that the current position is weak, which would indicate a weakness for its energy security.

Text 101 provides another example:

"*On 7 January six EU Member States – and six non-EU members – found their gas supply from Russia via Ukraine either totally cut off or considerably reduced. It was an episode without precedent, termed by the Oxford institute for Energy Studies "the most serious security event in relation to gas that has ever happened in Europe". It called into question the reliability of Russia and Ukraine as supplier and transit countries and sparked reflection on how better to assure our external energy security, and manage our political relationships with our eastern neighbours.*"[657]

One of the actions legitimised here is reflection being sparked. This is legitimised by two arguments.

First, there is the argument that *it* sparked reflection. *It* here refers to the recent gas crisis. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, as the gas crisis is used to legitimise the reflection that is being sparked.

Second, there is the argument that the reflection has a certain means: on how better to assure our external energy security and manage our political relationships with our eastern neighbours. Therefore, the sparking of the reflection has a certain aim embedded in it. This is an instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation.

Both arguments lead to the claim that the reflection being sparked is legitimised. The *topos* of this argumentation is *energy security*, as the gas crisis and its repercussions for the

[657] Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what next? Accessed September 30, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_100.

EU's energy security being used to legitimise the spark in reflection. Furthermore, the embedded aim of the reflection is also linked to the EU's energy security.

6.4.4.1 – Summary Stage 4

The analysis of the fourth Stage of the second gas crisis has shown us that the trend in securitisation continued. "Energy" was by far the dominant topic found and *energy security* was the dominant *topos* found. The legitimations employed in relation to the *topos* of *energy security* were predominantly instrumental rationalisations with the outcome orientation. The analysis above has shown that this legitimation focused almost exclusively on the recent gas crisis. The recent gas crisis was then used to legitimise current and future policies, which were mostly related to enhancing the EU's energy security.

The contents of the instrumental rationalisations with the outcome orientation show that the discursive shift has normalised. For example, the meeting of the Energy Council states that the second gas crisis has *confirmed* the need for the EU to urgently *continue* to develop its internal market, to improve energy interconnections for security of supply, to reinforce its emergency mechanisms and to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis our major suppliers.[658] This shows the securitisation of the EU's energy policy already *was* normal, but that the recent gas crisis only confirms this and therefore normalises it even further. Therefore, these legitimations do not pre-legitimise normalisation, but they legitimise the status-quo, which means that the discursive shift has normalised.

6.5 Discussion of results of second gas crisis

The analysis of the data found for the second gas crisis reveals several interesting results.

Overall, the topic of "Energy" was dominant. This was true for every Stage of the second gas crisis, except for the second Stage. In Stage 2, the "Eastern Partnership" was the dominant topic employed. This divergence from the pattern can be explained by the fact that the launch of the Eastern Partnership was accelerated in response to the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. The analysis has shown that the Eastern Partnership was launched specifically in response to this war.

Regarding the *topoi* employed in relation to the topic of "Energy", overall, *energy security* was the dominant *topos* found, and this was true for every individual Stage. This means

[658] Energy Council, accessed December 12, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_09_72.

that the topic of "Energy" has been securitised across the whole second gas crisis. Regarding the three-step normalisation model, the analysis has found that during the first two Stages of the second gas crisis, the discursive shift has gradated/perpetuated, whereas in the last two Stages the discursive shift has normalised. This can be seen in the legitimations employed by the EU during these Stages.

Regarding the legitimations employed in relation to the *topos* of *energy security*, the analysis has shown that the instrumental rationalisations were dominant throughout all Stages. In the first Stage, the outcome orientation was dominant. The analysis has shown that the EU used this type of legitimation to refer to the first gas crisis and other energy challenges in order to legitimise policies that will enhance its energy security. Hence, the securitisation is reinforced. In addition to this, the first Stage of the second gas crisis shows that the enactment of the securitisation observed during the first gas has perpetuated to other genres, *inter alia* press releases and Council Meetings. Hence, a gradation/perpetuation of the discourse is observed.

In the second Stage the dominant type of legitimation was the means orientation. The means orientations legitimised the use of specific policies like the Southern Gas Corridor and the Energy Community, since these policies were used *in order to* enhance the EU's energy security. By advocating for new policies and legitimising them *in order to* enhance the EU's energy security, the discourse is actively being spread to new fields, which means that in the second Stage, the discursive shift was still in the gradation/perpetuation stage.

In the third Stage we see a dominance of the goal orientation legitimation. These legitimations were employed in order to legitimise goals for policies that aimed to enhance energy security. Both goal and means legitimations aimed at the goal of enhancing energy security, which in turn indicates that the discursive shift has entered the normalisation stage of the three-step normalisation model. Barroso's speech about not allowing gas crises to become an annual event shows how the discourse has "contributed to a deeper change of norms of public expression."[659]

Regarding the last Stage, the outcome orientation legitimations were dominant again. During the last Stage, the outcome orientation legitimations were used in a similar way as during the first Stage of the second gas crisis. However, during this last Stage they focused almost exclusively on the most recent gas crisis in order to legitimise current and future EU energy policies that were aimed at enhancing the EU's energy security. More specifically, the

[659] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.

content of the legitimations makes it clear that the EU enhancing its energy security is already seen as the new normal and that the recent gas crisis only *confirms* the need for the EU to enhance its energy security. Therefore, this last Stage shows that the discursive shift has been normalised.

Hence, it can be concluded that during the second gas crisis, the EU's energy policy discourse became normalised. In the analysis it has been observed that the last two stages of the three-step normalisation model have been met.

In addition, it can be noted that the legitimation categories employed in relation to the *topos* of *energy security* focused almost exclusively on legitimising policies aimed at enhancing the EU's energy security. The analysis of the different categories of legitimation (goal, means and outcome orientations) showed that the EU overall aimed at enhancing its energy security. The differences in legitimation show *how* the EU legitimised these aims in different circumstances. When the outcome orientations were dominant, the EU either focused on the previous or the current recent gas crisis to legitimise policies that would enhance its energy security. When the means orientation was dominant, the EU legitimised current policies that aimed at enhancing its energy security. When the goal orientation was dominant, we see that goals were legitimised that would enhance the EU's energy security. Therefore, we can also conclude that despite going through several phases, the EU's discourse legitimation was consistent in its overarching aim: enhancing its energy security.

Table 48: Summary second gas crisis[660]

Stage	Characteristics	Dominant topics	Dominant *topos* in relation to topic of "energy"	Dominant legitimation in relation to *topos* related to topic of "energy"	Three-step normalisation model
Stage 1	Relatively stable relations: March 2008 – October 2008	Energy	*Energy security*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	Gradation/perpetuation

[660] Own elaboration.

Stage 2	Rising disputes: November 2008 – December 2008	Eastern Partnership	*Energy security*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation	Gradation/perpetuation
Stage 3	Peak conflict: January 1, 2009 – 20 January, 2009	Energy	*Energy security*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation	Entering normalisation stage
Stage 4	Resolution and cooldown: January 21, 2009 – March 2009	Energy	*Energy security*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation	Normalised

Chapter VII – Visualising the discursive shift & summary of research

The previous two Chapters have completed the initial analysis by applying the three steps of the three-dimensional DHA approach. Specific topics and contents of the EU's discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine were identified, discursive strategies were investigated in detail and the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic relations were uncovered by relating the discursive strategies to the macro socio-political context. Now that this step has been completed, it is time to make sense of these findings. This will be the last part of the analysis.

This Chapter will analyse the data in several steps. First, the dominant topics of both case studies will be compared. In order to do so, the aggregate data displayed in Chapter IV will be utilised. Second, the dominant *topoi* of both case studies will be compared. This comparison will show that a discursive shift occurred in the timeframe of the two gas crises. The second section will then provide a visualisation of the discursive shift. Third, this Chapter will analyse what the data tells us about the evolution of the EU's conceptualisation of energy security and fourth, which type of discursive shift has occurred. The fifth section will explain to what extent a discursive change has occurred and the sixth section will outline how the evolution of the EU's understanding of energy security is could help in understanding the contemporary macro socio-political context of the gas crisis of 2022. The seventh section will discuss the implications of these results for future research and the last section will relate the results found in this doctoral dissertation to the hypotheses, research questions and objectives of this dissertation.

7.1 Comparing data on the dominant topics of both case studies

Chapter IV combines data found from the analysis of both gas crises and this aggregation shows us that the topic of "Energy" is dominant across the EU's discourse regarding Ukraine. The analysis of both gas crises in Chapters V and VI individually shows that for the first gas crisis, the dominant topic was the "ENP", whereas for the second gas crisis, the dominant topic was "Energy". This means the focus of the EU in its discourse definitely made a shift towards energy after the first gas crisis. However, the usefulness of such data on its own has to be criticised. On its own, data on the dominant topic does not tell us much about the legitimation of energy policy and possible shifts in the legitimation of energy policy. It tells us about the frequency of the EU discussing a certain topic.

The analyses of both gas crises show that the dominant topics fluctuated across both crises. These fluctuations help us to understand what discourse topic the EU put emphasis on during a specific period.

Table 49: Dominant topics in EU discourse regarding Ukraine per Stage per case study[661]

Period	Dominant topic
First gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006	
Stage 1: stable relations: January 2005 – July 2005	European Neighbourhood Policy
Stage 2: negotiations: October 2005 – December 2005	Reforms
Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2006	Energy
Stage 4: resolution & cooldown: January 2006 – March 2006	Energy
Second gas crisis: March 2008 – March 2009	
Stage 1: stable relations – March 2008 – October 2008	Energy
Stage 2 – rising disputes – November 2008 – December 2008	Eastern Partnership
Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2009	Energy
Stage 4: resolution & cooldown – January 2009 – March 2009	Energy

The dominance of a specific topic can be explained by looking at the broader socio-political context.

[661] Own elaboration.

In the first two Stages of the first gas crisis (January 2005 – July 2005 and October 2005 – December 2005), Ukraine was in a transition period in which the Orange Revolution was being processed. With no gas crisis on the horizon yet, the EU was focusing on integration with its "new" Ukrainian partner. The second Stage is interesting in this regard, as it became clear during this period that an energy crisis was looming, especially towards the last months of 2005. Nevertheless, the dominant topic discussed by the EU vis-à-vis Ukraine was "Reforms". When in January gas flows to Ukraine were cut off from Russia, "Energy" became the only discussed topic in Stage 3. In Stage 4 "Energy" remained the dominant topic by far and the frequency of the use of the topic of "Energy", especially when compared to the first two Stages of the first gas crisis, indicates a kind of shock reaction from the EU.

The distribution of found topics during the second gas crisis shows that "Energy" was a dominant topic throughout the crisis except during the second Stage, when the "Eastern Partnership" topic was dominant. This is explained by the socio-political context: in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and the accelerated introduction of the Eastern Partnership is presented by the EU as a response to that invasion.[662] As during the third Stage of the gas crisis many countries in Europe were left without gas, "Energy" naturally became the dominant topic. The fourth Stage shows again that the EU experienced a type of shock reaction, as "Energy" remained the dominant topic by far.

7.2 Visualising the discursive shift: comparing data on the dominant *topoi* of both case studies

Whereas the section above shows which topic was dominant in the EU's discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine during the gas crises, it does not tell us much about the actual legitimation of energy discourse. For this, we have to turn to an analysis of the employed *topoi* related to the topic of "Energy". These *topoi* were found by looking at argumentation schemes and the specific legitimations employed within those schemes. The data found on the dominant *topoi* per Stage show that a discursive shift occurred during the two gas crises.

[662] See page 196-197 of this research.

Table 50: Dominant *topoi* in EU discourse regarding Ukraine per Stage per case study[663]

Period	Dominant *topos*
First gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006	
Stage 1: stable relations: January 2005 – July 2005	*Cooperation*
Stage 2: negotiations: October 2005 – December 2005	*Integration*
Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2006	*EU effectiveness* (single *topos*) *Energy security & danger* (together dominant)
Stage 4: resolution & cooldown: January 2006 – March 2006	*Energy security*
Second gas crisis: March 2008 – March 2009	
Stage 1: stable relations – March 2008 – October 2008	*Energy security*
Stage 2 – rising disputes – November 2008 – December 2008	*Energy security*
Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2009	*Energy security*
Stage 4: resolution & cooldown – January 2009 – March 2009	*Energy security*

Table 50 shows the dominant *topos* per Stage per case study. This outline shows that during the first gas crisis, a shift in *topoi* employed occurred: from Stage 1 to Stage 2, there was a clear shift from *cooperation* to *integration*. From Stage 2 to Stage 3, there was a shift from *integration* to *EU effectiveness* and *energy security* and *danger*. *Energy security* and *danger* are both *topoi* that deal with security and given the fact that taken together, these two *topoi* are

[663] Own elaboration.

dominant in Stage 3, we can conclude that in Stage 3 a shift towards the securitisation of energy policy legitimation occurred. From Stage 3 onward, *energy security* remained the dominant *topos* employed by the EU regarding the topic of "Energy". This accounted for a "recontextualisation into the public domain with "new" discursive elements, including themes and arguments, as well as various linguistic means which support their realisation."[664] Hence, a discursive shift towards securitisation was enacted in Stage 3 of the first gas crisis. The fourth Stage of the first gas crisis represented a transition period between the enactment stage and the perpetuation stage of Krzyżanowski's model. On the one hand, the securitisation of the energy discourse is reinforced, which fits the perpetuation stage, but on the other hand the EU also appears to be creating the link between security and energy over and over again. Therefore, the dominance of the *energy security topos* in Stage 4 of the first gas crisis has to be interpreted as being part of both the first and second stage of Krzyżanowski's normalisation model. Figure 9 visualises the discursive shift.

Figure 9: The discursive shift visualised[665]



The securitisation of the topic of "Energy" continued throughout the second gas crisis. *Energy security* remained the dominant *topos* employed by the EU. Since *energy security*

[664] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 508.
[665] Own elaboration.

remained the dominant *topos*, no de-securitisation of EU energy policy legitimation has taken place since that moment. The analysis of Chapter VI shows that the intensity of the use of *energy security* as a *topos* fluctuated; however, as *topos* it remained dominant. Had de-securitisation occurred, we would have seen *cooperation* or *integration* or some other *topos* not related to security emerge as the dominant *topoi* in some Stage. Since in the first Stage of the second gas crisis the discourse has spread to different genres, it is clear that the discursive shift was in its gradation/perpetuation phase. This was also the case for the second Stage of the second gas crisis. Only in the third Stage of the second gas crisis did the discursive shift enter the normalisation phase. In the fourth Stage, the discursive shift was completely normalised, as evidenced by the fact that the EU's legitimations show that the second gas crisis confirmed an already-established fact: that the EU needs to enhance its energy security. Indeed, this shows that the discursive shift has contributed to a deeper change of norms of public expression.[666] Here, it is important to mention that there are several types of discursive shifts. As Krzyżanowski showed us, discursive shifts can either constitute discursive continuity or discursive discontinuity.[667] Before we categorise which particular type of discursive shift has been observed, it is important to look at the evolution of the EU's definition of energy security. After this has been done, the type of discursive shift can be determined.

7.3 The evolution of the EU's definition of energy security

The main objective of this doctoral dissertation is to identify how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security evolved during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. The application of Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model has been able to trace a discursive shift of the securitisation of the EU's energy policy. However, this does not yet explain how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security has changed. Nevertheless, the application of Krzyżanowski's model in the form of the formal-content related analysis of argumentation schemes did allow for the observation that *energy security* has become the dominant *topos* in the EU's energy policy legitimation since the third Stage of the first gas crisis. The formal-content related analysis has also allowed for a linking of the found *topoi* to their specific context. This linkage has given an insight in how the EU has determined energy security. This can be seen in Table 51.

[666] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.
[667] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 106.

Table 51 shows how the EU has defined energy security throughout the different Stages of the gas crises. Chronologically ordering the EU's definitions of energy security elicits a significant difference in how the EU has defined energy security *after* the discursive shift has been enacted, compared to *before* that: except for during Stage 3 of the second gas crisis, the EU has included sustainability and the environment in its discourse about energy security. Therefore, based on these observations in the corpus of data, we can conclude that the discursive shift has led to an expansion of the EU's definition of energy security.

Table 51: Evolution of the EU defining energy security throughout the discursive shift[668]

Period	EU definition of energy security	Texts
First gas crisis: January 2005 – March 2006		
Stage 1: stable relations: January 2005 – July 2005	N/A (energy security not found in corpus of data)	N/A (energy security not found in corpus of data)
Stage 2: negotiations: October 2005 – December 2005	Security of supply	Text 27, see p. 161-164
Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2006	Security of supply	Text 33, see p. 166-169
Stage 4: resolution & cooldown: January 2006 – March 2006	Security of supply; sustainability and diversification	Text 34 and 39, see p. 173-174
Second gas crisis: March 2008 – March 2009		
Stage 1: stable relations – March 2008 – October 2008	Security of supply; diversification; renewables	Text 56 and 63, see p. 195-198
Stage 2 – rising disputes – November 2008 – December 2008	Security of supply; environment; diversification	Text 70, see p. 202-204

[668] Own elaboration.

Stage 3: peak crisis – January 2009	Security of supply	Text 82, see p. 210 and 214
Stage 4: resolution & cooldown – January 2009 – March 2009	Security of supply; import-dependence	Text 93 and 97, see p. 220-223

Indeed, this dissertation speaks of an *expansion* of the EU's definition of energy security, since it is clear that the security of supply remains dominant in the EU's conception of the term. Nevertheless, the inclusion of sustainability and the environment is a significant change compared to the sole focus on the security of supply that was present before the enactment of the discursive shift.

These findings are salient, since they show that our main hypothesis was not entirely correct. The hypothesis of this dissertation was that the EU's understanding of energy security evolved through a securitisation of its energy policy. This was based on the findings of the literature review. It was clear from the literature that the first gas crisis had a tremendous influence on the EU's energy policy.[669] Most scholars argued that the EU's definition of energy security was focused on the security of supply, even when sustainability was mentioned.[670] Therefore, given the presumed impact of the gas crisis on the EU's energy policy and the fact that most scholars assume that the EU's conception of energy security was focused on the security of supply, the main hypothesis of this dissertation was that as a result of the two gas crises, the EU's understanding of energy security would evolve in the form of a securitisation of its energy policy. What the findings of this research show, is that that is only partly the case. Indeed, the results of this analysis show that besides a securitisation of the EU's understanding of energy security, aspects like sustainably and the environment were included in the EU's definition of the concept. Hence, the main hypothesis of this dissertation was only partly correct. These findings also contest Knodt's findings. Knodt argued that a security frame emerged after the first gas crisis that led to a rivalry afterwards with the sustainability frame.[671] This dissertation argues that the gas crises led to an understanding by the EU of energy security that consisted of a nexus between both security and sustainability. The gas crises did not *only* lead to a securitisation of energy security; rather, the EU's understanding of the concept became more comprehensive to include sustainability and environmental aspects.

[669] Tekin and Williams, "Turkey and EU Energy Security," 419.
[670] See, for example: Haghighi, "Security of Energy Supply in Europe," in: *Energy Security*, 16; Luciani, "Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets," 2; *International Energy Agency Policies Review: the European Union*: 79; Biresselioglu, "Geopolitics and Energy Security," 9; Knodt, "EU energy policy," 231.
[671] Knodt, "EU energy policy," 233.

7.4 What type of discursive shift was observed?

The observation of the expansion of the definition of energy security in the discursive shift allows us to elaborate on the *type* of discursive shift that has taken place. According to Krzyżanowski, discursive shifts can either constitute discursive continuity or discursive discontinuity.[672] "Overt discursive continuity allows social actors to produce discourses which remain seemingly unchanged while in-fact already effectively recontextualizing elements of other discursive practices across spatial and temporal scales."[673] Covert discursive continuity shows discourse as changing, while in fact retaining many of its former features. This can also be seen as overt discontinuity.

The discursive shift observed during the gas crises is an example of overt discontinuity. First, the discourse profoundly changed from one moment to the other. The EU shifted from legitimating its discourse with a focus on cooperation and integration to a focus on security that stayed dominant throughout the period observed and this constituted a clear break with the past. While the types of legitimation employed to justify EU policy were diverse (instrumental rationalisations with different orientations: means, outcome and goal), they served one overall goal: the tendency to securitise the EU's energy policy. Second, the data has shown that the EU has expanded its understanding of the concept of energy security. Before the discursive shift was enacted, the EU defined energy security solely by focusing on the security of supply. This changed after the enaction of the shift to include sustainability and environmental aspects. Therefore, while the security of supply was still a core part of the EU's definition of energy security (i.e. many of the features of the EU's discourse were retained), the discourse expanded. Therefore, this discursive shift can be categorised as an example of overt discontinuity.

7.5 To what extent has a discursive change been observed?

Fairclough has pointed out how a discursive change leaves traces in texts and how a process of naturalisation of those changes can establish a new hegemonic discourse.[674] Krzyżanowski coined the term discursive shifts, which would allow the observation of a discursive change on the micro-level,[675] i.e. in texts. By creating the three-step normalisation model, Krzyżanowski allowed for tracing the enactment, gradation/perpetuation and the

[672] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 106.
[673] Ibid.
[674] Fairclough, "A Social Theory of Discourse," 97.
[675] Krzyżanowski, "Policy, policy communication and discursive shifts," 105.

normalisation of a discursive shift. This model allows for an observation of how a discourse can become naturalised or, in Krzyżanowski's words, normalised. Applying this model therefore allows one to observe to what extent a discursive shift and *therefore* to what extent a discursive change has taken place.

Applying this three-step normalisation to the corpus of data has provided several results. Most importantly, the enactment of a discursive shift towards the securitisation of the EU's energy policy discourse has been observed. This shift has been enacted in Stage 3 of the first gas crisis. Applying the model furthermore showed that this discursive shift has subsequently been gradated/perpetuated, i.e. it has spread across different genres. This occurred during the last Stage of the first gas crisis and the first two Stages of the second gas crisis. The last two Stages of the second gas crisis have shown that this discursive shift has become normalised. The analysis of the legitimations employed by the EU in these periods has shown that the securitisation of the EU's energy policy is regarded as something normal. In other words, the discourse has "contributed to a deeper change of norms of public expression."[676]

Therefore, applying Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model leads to the conclusion that a discursive shift has taken place. From enactment to gradation/perpetuation, the securitisation of the EU's energy policy has become normalised. The analysis of the EU's legitimations shows that this securitisation involves an expansion of the concept of energy security to include sustainability and environmental aspects. The normalisation that has been observed through the analysis of legitimations can be linked back to Fairclough's concept of naturalisation: once a change in a text has been naturalised, a new hegemonic discourse has been established. The analysis has shown that this is indeed the case for the period of the two gas crises. Therefore, this dissertation concludes that a discursive change has taken place during the period of the two gas crises, in the form of a securitisation of EU energy policy discourse which includes sustainability and environmental aspects. The discursive change is visualised in Figure 10 below.

[676] Krzyżanowski, "Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism," 509.

Figure 10: The observed discursive change[677]



7.6 The importance of the EU's evolution of its conceptualisation of energy security – socio-diagnostic critique

The main conclusion of this dissertation, the fact that a discursive change has taken place during the period of the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009 in the form of a securitisation of EU energy policy discourse which includes sustainability and environmental aspects, is especially important when related to the contemporary macro socio-political context. As has been shown in Chapter III, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has caused a "sea change"[678] in the EU's energy policy. This "sea change" came in the form of the EU's REPowerEU plan and the shrinking in Russian gas exports to the EU.[679] Indeed, after the renewed invasion of 2022 the EU decided to become less dependent on Russian fossil fuels. REPowerEU aims to end "the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels, which are used as an economic and political weapon and cost European taxpayers nearly €100 billion per year, and tackling the climate crisis."[680] REPowerEU aims to do so through energy savings, the diversification of energy supplies and an accelerated roll-out of renewable energy to replace fossil fuels in homes, industry and power generation. These plans sound rather familiar to the discourse produced by the EU after the second gas crisis. See for example Text 93:

"*"This commitment by EU's leading cities to cut CO2 emissions is indicative of the consensus that is emerging at the local level to reduce pollution and improve energy efficiency. The EU's Sustainable Energy Week is a timely opportunity to focus attention on these critical issues and*

[677] Own elaboration.
[678] Pepe, "Russia's Geopolitical Shock," 9.
[679] Ibid., 9.
[680] "REPowerEU: A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition*," *European Commission* (website), accessed February 28, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131. * stands for updated May 18, 2022, 16:50.

to give European stakeholders the opportunity to showcase potential solutions. Europe needs to maintain its leading role in the battle against global warming and continue to reduce energy consumption and its dependence on energy imports," said Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs.

EUSEW 2009 takes place against the backdrop of the crisis in EU energy imports following the recent Ukraine-Russia gas dispute which highlights both the EU's over-dependence on imports and the urgent need for energy-saving solutions."[681]

Especially the second paragraph, which highlights the fact that the EU is over-dependent on energy imports and that the EU needs to focus on energy saving, sounds very familiar to REPowerEU.

See also, for example, Text 97:

"*However, the weaknesses of EU energy security and the EU's energy situation were also identified. It confirmed that the EU urgently needs to continue the development of the internal market, to improve energy interconnections for security of supply, to reinforce its emergency mechanisms and to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis our major suppliers.*"[682]

This Text states that the EU needs to improve the interconnections in order to increase its security of supply. This is very similar to the aim of REPowerEU to diversify the EU's energy supplies.

Therefore, we see that the discourse of REPowerEU repeats the discourse that was created after the second gas crisis of 2009. This, together with the effects of the 2022 gas crisis,[683] suggests that not enough action has been taken by the EU to actually ensure its energy security. It is therefore worth analysing what action the EU took in relation to its dependency on Russian fossil fuels after the gas crises of 2006 and 2009.

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[681] The Covenant of Mayors – the main highlight of an intense EU Sustainable Energy Week, accessed February 28, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_225.
[682] Energy Council, accessed February 28, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_09_72.
[683] See "Timeline - EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine," *European Council* (website), accessed February 28, 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/timeline-eu-response-ukraine-invasion/ for a timeline of events that happened after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2009 gas crisis, the EU and Russia agreed upon new forms of crisis management and later that year both countries signed a memorandum on the creation of an early warning mechanism, which would provide for an early evaluation of potential risks and problems related to the supply and demand of natural gas, oil and electricity.[684] Also, both countries agreed on preventing or rapidly reacting to the threat of emergency situations.[685] Tekin and Williams state that "Given its – and possibly others' – perspectives on the aforementioned hydrocarbon transit 'crises', Russia has attempted to route more of its energy exports around its most 'problematic' transit partners."[686] This effort to bypass transit countries altogether has been joined by major European energy firms.[687] Tekin and Williams state that this policy of diverting Russian gas around 'problematic' transit countries was one "opposed to a genuine policy of diversifying not only transit routes but also suppliers".[688] This policy seems to have been strongly motivated by a desire for some reciprocal share of Russia's rich upstream sector.

Korkmaz shows how EU domestic production of gas has been steadily declining over the years, while imports have been steadily increasing.[689] EU gas imports from Russia did decline from 41% in 2000 to 32% in 2012, but in 2017 Russia's share had risen again to 38%.[690] It is clear that since the gas crisis of 2009, EU dependency on Russian gas has only increased. EU policy after the gas crisis has indeed been to diversify only supply routes, not supplying-countries, as can be seen by the fact that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was in the making,[691] another direct pipeline connecting Russia to Europe directly and circumventing Ukraine and the Baltic states.

The main conclusions that can be drawn from these observations are threefold and serve as the basis for the socio-diagnostic critique that this dissertation will deliver. The socio-diagnostic critique is an important part of conducting research that is part of CDA. Specifically, the socio-diagnostic critique aims at exposing manipulation in and by discourse and it focuses

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[684] Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams, "External Dimension of European Energy Policy," in: *Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus – The European Union, Russia and Turkey* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2011): 56.
[685] Tekin and Williams, "External Dimension of European Energy Policy," 56-57.
[686] Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams, "EU Dependence on Russian Energy," in: *Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus – The European Union, Russia and Turkey* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2011): 92.
[687] Tekin and Williams, "EU Dependence on Russian Energy," 93.
[688] Ibid., 93.
[689] Dicle Korkmaz, "European Energy Security and Turkey," in: *Turkey and the EU in an Energy Security Society – The Case of Natural Gas* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2021): 67.
[690] Korkmaz, "European Energy Security and Turkey," 68.
[691] Jordan Stevens, "Nord Stream 2 explained: What it is and why it's proving controversial," *CNBC* (website), accessed March 1, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/21/nord-stream-2-explained-what-it-is-and-why-its-proving-controversial.html.

on revealing ethically problematic aspects of discursive practices.[692] It focuses on discrepancies between discursive and other social practices and functions as a form of social control.

First, it is clear that the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 have not been taken seriously enough by the EU. After the 2009 crisis, in its discourse the EU called for energy saving and the diversification of its energy supply. What we have seen is that instead of saving energy, EU demand for natural gas only increased year by year. Instead of actually diversifying its energy imports, the EU diversified its supply routes from one supplier to divert "Russian gas around 'problematic' transit countries"[693]. Therefore, this research has shown that there is a clear discrepancy between discursive and social practice. This is the first part of the socio-diagnostic critique.

Second, this policy of circumventing 'problematic' transit countries shows an acceptance of the Russian framing of the transit countries being problematic. This acceptance to circumvent countries like Ukraine is highly problematic since it has been very clear for years now that Russia uses energy as a weapon to achieve its aims in what it considers to be its sphere of influence.[694] Now that the EU has increased its dependence on Russia via direct pipelines, Ukrainian geopolitical leverage is decreased.[695] Whether this has contributed to the Russian decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 is speculation, nevertheless, creating direct pipelines like Nord Stream 1 and 2 did take out the middle-man and increased Ukraine's isolation.[696] This observation elicits the ethical issues that are related to the EU accepting this Russian framing. Therefore, this is the second part of the socio-diagnostic critique: it is clear that there are ethical issues in the EU's social practices vis-à-vis transit countries.

Third, we can conclude that based on this context and history, EU action after REPowerEU should be scrutinised carefully. EU discourse in REPowerEU repeats the discourse of 2009 and it remains to be seen whether any actual action towards decreasing dependency on Russia will be taken. Whereas the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009 should have served as a wake-up call for the European Union in terms of energy security, subsequent policies pursued by the EU in the field of energy security show that the opposite has been

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[692] Reisigl, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 50-51.
[693] Tekin and Williams, "EU Dependence on Russian Energy," 93.
[694] In his book, Goldman shows how Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have been subject to pressure from Gazprom. See: Marshall I. Goldman, "Natural Gas – Russia's New Secret Weapon," in: *Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia* (Oxford University Press USA: 2008): 150.
[695] Jordan Stevens, "Nord Stream 2 explained: What it is and why it's proving controversial," *CNBC* (website), accessed March 1, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/21/nord-stream-2-explained-what-it-is-and-why-its-proving-controversial.html.
[696] Stevens, "Nord Stream 2 explained," *CNBC* (website), accessed March 1, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/21/nord-stream-2-explained-what-it-is-and-why-its-proving-controversial.html.

achieved. This last observation can therefore be seen as a form of social control: based on the previous observations and criticisms of the EU's discursive and social practices and the discrepancies between the two, this dissertation suggests close scrutiny to the EU's actions in order to determine whether this discrepancy between discourse and social practice is continued. This is the third part of the socio-diagnostic critique.

To summarise, by linking the results of the analysis of this dissertation to the macro socio-political context of the 2022 gas crisis, this section has provided a socio-diagnostic critique based on the EU's discourse and practices.

7.7 Implications for future research & policy recommendations

This research has applied the three-step normalisation model to a completely new field of literature. Whereas previously this model had only been applied to right-wing and racist discourse by Krzyżanowski, it has now been applied to the field of International Relations proper. This research has therefore made a significant contribution to the field of IR. In addition, it has to be made clear that this dissertation has applied Krzyżanowski's model in a novel manner. Krzyżanowski took discursive change as a starting point to look for discursive shifts, while this research has taken discursive shifts as a starting point to see to what extent a discursive change has taken place. The success of this novel application shows that this model is versatile and that discourse can be approached from two ways: from a bottom-up and from a top-down approach. The following recommendations for future research should be read with that in mind: each topic can be approached from both a top-down and a bottom-up approach.

7.7.1 Additional research on the gas crises & the EU's discursive and social discrepancies

First, additional research should be done on the gas crises. The main focus of this research has been the energy discourse of the European Union vis-à-vis Ukraine during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. While the socio-diagnostic critique has made it clear that the EU has failed in preventing the 2022 energy crisis, the reasons behind this failure have not been sufficiently researched yet. An application of the three-step normalisation model to the 2022 gas crisis could potentially elicit intentions and legitimations behind the policy choices that led to the 2022 crisis. This would also shed light on the question how the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security has evolved after the 2022 energy crisis. This could possibly elicit another discursive change.

Additional research that employs securitisation theory could uncover the reasons behind the EU's discursive and social discrepancies. While this dissertation has focused solely on identifying the securitising act in the EU's energy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine, an analysis of the audience's perception did not fit the scope of this research. Floyd states that "For the Copenhagen School a securitisation is successful when (1) there is an existential threat justification, (2) there are emergency measures, and (3) there is an alteration to interunit relations by breaking free of rules."[697] In addition, for the Copenhagen School audience acceptance of the external threat justification is important as well.[698] If these criteria are not met, securitisation has failed according to the Copenhagen School. This dissertation has adhered to Floyd's conception of securitisation, which states that securitisation is successful simply when it is brought into existence.[699] This focus has allowed the application of Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model and the observation of the discursive shift towards securitisation. Nevertheless, in order to build upon these results, future research should apply the criteria of the Copenhagen School to the EU's securitised discourse and the responses to that discourse. Analysing the responses of EU member states to the EU's securitised discourse could elicit to what extent the securitisation act has been successful. The discrepancy between the action taken by the EU between the 2009 and 2022 gas crises suggests that the securitisation act has not been successful, but to what extent this is the case has to be determined. An application of the criteria of the Copenhagen School would also be useful in order to determine to which effects the EU's securitising energy discourse has produced in Russia or Ukraine.

7.7.2 New avenues for applying the three-step normalisation model: Ukrainian agency

This dissertation has expanded the use of the three-step normalisation model from right-wing and extremist discourse to the EU, which is an institutional setting. Now that this has been accomplished, the model should be tested on state actors like Russia or Ukraine. This makes sense especially in the context of the current research.

An application of the model to Ukrainian discourse would give Ukraine the agency it is missing currently. The macro socio-political context has shown that Ukraine has made it clear since the end of the 1990s Ukraine has explicitly advocated for integration with the European

[697] Floyd, "A revised securitisation theory," 54.
[698] Ibid.
[699] Ibid.

Union.[700] Exactly how this European vocation came into being and how it was legitimised could be determined by applying the three-step normalisation model to Ukrainian discourse in the early 1990s. Another interesting venue for future research would be the tracing of a discursive shift in Ukrainian public opinion on joining NATO. In its twentieth national poll on foreign policy mood, Ukrainian research group Рейтинг shows how after 2014 (the year that Russia illegally annexed Crimea and started its war in eastern Ukraine) Ukrainian support for joining the EU and NATO has increased drastically.[701] Answers to polls like these could be analysed using Krzyżanowski's three-step normalization model in order to determine the discursive legitimations behind these changes.

7.7.3 New avenues for applying the three-step normalisation model: Russian justifications of its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine

In addition, an analysis of a discursive change that includes the application of the three-step normalisation model to Russian discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine would be a valuable contribution: it could shed light on when exactly a belligerent discourse towards Ukraine has been started. Furthermore, the model could be used to trace the enactment of specific discourse. One of the Russian justifications for its brutal war of aggression has been the denazification of Ukraine.[702] While it is clear that this justification is not grounded in any reality whatsoever, it is nevertheless necessary to analyse where this discourse comes from and how it is legitimised. An application of the three-step normalisation could do just that: it could analyse how this type of discourse has been enacted and how it evolved.

7.7.4 New avenues for applying the three-step normalisation model: non-Western discourse

The successful application of this model should not be limited to Western state actors. The applicability of the model to Western discourse shows that it is also applicable to non-Western discourse and languages. An interesting venue for future research would be to analyse Chinese discourse.

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[700] Semeniy, "Ukraine's European Policy Choice," 126.
[701] Рейтинг, "TWENTIETH NATIONAL POLL. FOREIGN POLICY MOODS (JANUARY 14-16, 2023)," accessed March 2, 2023, https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/dvadcyate_zagalnonac_onalne_opituvannya_zovn_shnopol_tichn_nastro_naselennya_14-16_s_chnya_2023.html.
[702] Worth Talley and Max Kampelman, "Debunking Denazification," *CSCE* (website), accessed March 2, 2023, https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/debunking-denazification.

A recent change in Chinese diplomacy is its shift towards so-called "Wolf Warrior diplomacy". As Martin shows, this style of diplomacy is in contrast with Deng Xiaoping's strategy of keeping a low profile.[703] The wolf warrior style of conducting diplomacy is much more assertive. While to the West this may seem aggressive (as foreign leaders have been insulted through this style of diplomacy), Martin states that for many Chinese diplomats wolf warrior diplomacy is defensive in nature.[704] Applying three-step normalisation model could uncover intentions behind this sudden shift in discourse.

Additionally, Chinese discourse vis-à-vis Taiwan deserves analysis. Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated openly that China will never renounce the right to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue.[705] With tensions rising around Taiwan, Xi's statements can be seen as contradictory: Xi also stated that "We insist on striving for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and best efforts, but we will never promise to give up the use of force and reserve the option to take all necessary measures."[706] An application of the three-step normalisation model could trace when this discourse has become belligerent and which intentions are behind this.

7.7.5 The three-step normalisation model and Artificial Intelligence (AI)

2022 and 2023 have seen an incredible growth in applications of AI, causing debates on the usefulness of these tools.[707] Indeed, the situation has developed to such an extent that entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak have called for a pause in the development of AI systems in order to put guardrails in place, that should benefit humanity.[708] ChatGPT is one of these AI tools and it has already caused academia headaches: students can use the tool

[703] Interview with Peter Martin by Joanna Nawrotkiewicz, "Understanding Chinese "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy"," *NBR* (website), accessed March 2, 2023, https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-chinese-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/.
[704] Interview with Peter Martin by Joanna Nawrotkiewicz, "Understanding Chinese "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy"," *NBR* (website), accessed March 2, 2023, https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-chinese-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/.
[705] Yew Lun Tian and Ben Blanchard, "China will never renounce right to use force over Taiwan, Xi says," *Reuters* (website), accessed March 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-use-force-over-taiwan-2022-10-16/.
[706] Tian and Blanchard, "China will never renounce right to use force over Taiwan, Xi says," *Reuters* (website), accessed March 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-use-force-over-taiwan-2022-10-16/.
[707] Evgeny Morozov, "The problem with artificial intelligence? It's neither artificial nor intelligent," *The Guardian* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/30/artificial-intelligence-chatgpt-human-mind.
[708] Evgeny Morozov, "The problem with artificial intelligence? It's neither artificial nor intelligent," *The Guardian* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/30/artificial-intelligence-chatgpt-human-mind.

to write for universities, while it is difficult to recognise the use of ChatGPT.[709] Therefore, it is more difficult to detect plagiarism.

Nevertheless, while AI certainly poses dangers to academia, it can also useful. Ortega-Martín et al. analyse how well ChatGPT can analyse linguistic ambiguity.[710] They conclude that ChatGPT did fairly well, despite some failures.[711] For example, ChatGPT did well in correcting negative examples of polysemy, but it failed to detect positive ones. In addition, the researchers state that their experiments have been carried out for the English language, which is a high-resource language. The results may be different for other languages.

This research shows that while AI models still have to improve, they can already be useful in linguistic research, meaning that AI brings massive promises to this field. While the research in this dissertation has been conducted manually, future research employing the three-step normalisation model should determine the extent to which the use of AI models can be useful. If AI does improve, it could aid analyses like the one conducted in this dissertation significantly. Therefore, it is imperative that the development of AI is considered in future research in linguistics.

7.7.6 Policy recommendations

Section 7.6 has shown how this research delivers an elaborate socio-diagnostic critique on the EU's energy policy. It is important to highlight that this socio-diagnostic critique can be used for policy recommendations. The main points of the socio-diagnostic critique are that 1) the EU did not take the 2006 and 2009 gas crises seriously enough; 2) the EU has accepted the Russian framing of transit countries as problematic; and 3) EU policy action based on REPowerEU should be scrutinised carefully. Each of these three points has to be taken into account when formulating energy policy, on both the member state and the EU level of policy making. For example, regarding the second point, it is clear that many Western analysts are reconsidering their perspectives and the extent of Russian framing that is present in them, but this is not yet done on the political level. The example of Hungary accusing the EU of prolonging Russia's war in Ukraine is an example that shows how Russian framing is still

[709] Anna Fazackerley, "AI makes plagiarism harder to detect, argue academics – in paper written by chatbot," *The Guardian* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/mar/19/ai-makes-plagiarism-harder-to-detect-argue-academics-in-paper-written-by-chatbot.
[710] Miguel Ortega-Martín, Óscar García-Sierra, Alfonso Ardoiz, Jorge Álvarez, Juan Carlos Armenteros and Adrián Alonso, "Linguistic Ambiguity analysis in ChatGPT," https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.06426.
[711] Ortega-Martín et al., "Linguistic Ambiguity analysis in ChatGPT," https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2302.06426.

accepted by an EU member state.[712] German hesitancy to deliver weapons to Ukraine at the beginning of the war could be seen as another example of this problem. Therefore, the socio-diagnostic critique could be used to highlight and counter these issues in policy recommendations.

7.7.7 Summary of implications for future research

These examples show how the three-step normalisation model is applicable to more than just right-wing, extremist and energy policy discourse. By applying the model to energy discourse, this dissertation has shown the usability the model to all fields of discourse analysis. As such, the analytical potential of this model has been proven. This section has shown that the application and usefulness of the model are limited only to the extent that a researcher has to limit themselves in their goals and aims. In addition, it is important to mention that the development of AI models could play an important role in the future of linguistic analyses. It is a prerequisite to keep track of this development and to determine to what extent these AI models could be useful for future research.

This section has also shown how the results of this research could be used for policy recommendations on both the EU and individual member state level.

7.8 The results of the analysis in relation to the hypotheses, research questions and objectives of this doctoral dissertation

This section will relate the results of the analysis of this dissertation to the hypotheses, research questions and objectives that have been formulated at the beginning of this research.

7.8.1 Hypotheses

First, these results are important for the hypotheses formulated for this research. As shown above, the results show that our main hypothesis was only partly correct. Rather than a full securitisation of EU energy policy, the discursive change observed shows us that the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security included sustainability and environmental aspects besides the security of supply.

[712] "Hunagary: Viktor Orban pledges to keep relations with Russia," *DW* (website), accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-viktor-orban-pledges-to-keep-relations-with-russia/a-64754014.

Building forth upon this, the second hypothesis has also been found to be partially correct. The discursive change has been a securitisation of EU energy policy, but it has also been an expansion of EU energy policy to include sustainability and environmental aspects.

Concerning the third hypothesis, Table 31 shows that the EU predominantly used instrumental rationalisations to legitimise its energy policy before the peak of the third gas crisis. This hypothesis has thus been proven incorrect.

The fourth hypothesis has been proven correct. It was after the third Stage of the first gas crisis that the discursive shift was enacted.

The fifth hypothesis has been proven correct: during the second gas crisis, the EU predominantly used rationalisation legitimations to legitimise its energy policy.

The visualisation of the discursive shift shows that the sixth hypothesis is also correct: it was in the second gas crisis that the discursive shift was both perpetuated and normalised.

The seventh hypothesis is again partially correct, since the discursive shift has indeed led to a discursive change in the form of a securitisation of energy discourse, but the expansion of the energy discourse to include sustainability and environmental aspects has not been foreseen in this hypothesis.

The last hypothesis has been found to be correct. The results show that the security of supply is indeed the core determinant of the EU's conceptualisation of energy security. While sustainability and environmental aspects form an important addition to the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security, Table 51 shows that the security of supply remains present as the core aspect.

7.8.2 Research questions

Second, these results have been able to answer all research questions. The main research question is: "To what extent is it possible to identify a discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine by applying the three-step normalisation model on discursive shifts during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009?" The answer to the main research question, based on the results of the analysis, is the following: the application of the three-step normalisation model on discursive shifts during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 has shown that a discursive change consisting of a securitisation of EU energy policy discourse that expanded the EU's understanding of energy security to include sustainability and environmental aspects has taken place during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009.

The second research question, "How did the EU legitimise its energy policy regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis of 2005-2006?" can be answered as follows. During the first

gas crisis, the EU legitimised its energy policy predominantly with instrumental rationalisations. During the third Stage of the first gas crisis, the discursive shift towards securitisation was enacted.

The third research question was: "To what extent are discursive shifts visible in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis of 2005-2006?" This can be answered as follows: one possible shift is visible during the first gas crisis, and one definite shift is visible. The first possible shift is from Stage 1 to Stage 2 of the first crisis, when the dominant *topos* shifted from *cooperation* to *integration*. The second definite shift is the one towards securitisation that was enacted in the third Stage.

The fourth research question was: "How did the EU legitimise its energy policy actions regarding Ukraine during the second gas crisis of 2008-2009?" This can be answered by stating that the EU legitimised its policy actions during the second gas crisis by predominantly using instrumental rationalisations. These legitimations have been used to gradate/perpetuate and normalise the discursive shift.

This already answers the fifth research question: "To what extent are discursive shifts visible in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during second gas crisis of 2008-2009?" The second gas crisis did not show a new discursive shift, but it showed the last two stages of the discursive shift that was enacted in the third Stage of the first gas crisis.

The sixth research question, "How do the legitimation strategies employed by the EU during the first gas crisis compare to those employed during the second gas crisis?" is less straightforward to answer. Both gas crises saw a dominance in the use of the instrumental rationalisation. The first gas crisis sees a dominance in the instrumental rationalisation with the means orientation, whereas such a dominance is not present in the second gas crisis. We do see that the use of the instrumental rationalisation legitimations is always tailored to the specific socio-political contexts. When in the first Stage of the second gas crisis the EU uses an instrumental rationalisation with the outcome orientation, it does so in relation to the current context of relatively stable relations and in order to gradate the shift towards securitisation. The same is true for the fourth Stage: the outcome orientation is used predominantly to justify the normalisation of the shift in discourse. This also applies to the first gas crisis. The means orientation is employed in the first two Stages in order to justify EU-Ukraine integration through the ENP and reforms.

The seventh, eighth and ninth research questions are relatively simple to answer. The possible discursive shift was enacted in the third Stage of the first gas crisis, and the possible

discursive shift was gradated during the first two Stages of the second gas crisis. The discursive shift was completely normalised during the last two Stages of the second gas crisis.

The tenth research question, "To what extent is a discursive change visible in EU legitimation strategies after comparing both gas crises?" can be answered by stating that a discursive change is visible in the form of a securitisation of EU energy policy discourse that expanded the EU's understanding of energy security to include sustainability and environmental aspects.

The eleventh research question, "How did the EU define energy security during the two gas crises?" can be answered by referring to Table 51: the EU's definition of energy security evolved during the two gas crises. While a focus on the security of supply remained the core aspect of the EU's conceptualisation of energy security, the discursive shift towards securitisation also meant that the EU's definition of energy security evolved to now include sustainability and environmental aspects.

The twelfth research question, "What are possible ventures for future research in this field?" can be answered as follows: the application of the three-step normalisation model to the field of energy discourse has proven the analytical potential of the model. Future research venues should focus on applying the model to states actors (like Ukraine and Russia) and non-Western discourse and non-Western state actors.

The thirteenth and last research question "To what extent can the outcome of this research help in explaining the 2022 gas crisis?" requires an elaborate answer. This research has formulated a socio-diagnostic critique, the main point of which has been that there has been a discrepancy between the EU's discursive and social practices. While the EU advocated for action in the sphere of energy policy after the 2009 gas crisis, the 2022 gas crisis and its accompanying EU discourse have shown that not much action has actually been taken. Therefore, based on this critique, this research has suggested future research grounded in securitisation theory. This research should determine to what extent the EU's securitisation act after the 2006 and 2009 gas crises has been successful and whether a failure of this securitisation is to blame for the 2022 gas crisis.

7.8.3 Objectives

Lastly, the answers of the research questions and the relation of the results of the analysis to the hypotheses shows that all objectives of this research have been met.

The main objective of this research was to identify how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security evolved during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. As we have seen, this has been

successful. The discursive change observed shows us that the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security evolved to include sustainability and environmental aspects besides the security of supply.

The second objective has been to identify to what extent a discursive change in the EU's energy discourse regarding Ukraine has occurred by identifying to what extent a discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation vis-à-vis Ukraine during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009. This research has determined that a discursive change consisting of a securitisation of EU energy policy discourse that expanded the EU's understanding of energy security to include sustainability and environmental aspects has taken place during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009.

The third objective has been to determine to what extent a discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first (2006) and second (2009) gas crisis. It has been determined that a discursive shift towards securitisation that included sustainability and environmental aspects has taken place. This shift has been enacted in the third Stage of the first gas crisis, it has been perpetuated in the first two Stages of the second gas crisis and it has normalised in the last two Stages of the second gas crisis.

The fourth objective has been to apply the three-step normalisation model to the corpus of data in order to find out to what extent a discursive shift has occurred in the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first (2006) and second (2009) gas crisis. As the previous sections show, this has been successful.

The fifth objective has been to determine the legitimation strategies employed by the EU regarding Ukraine during the first gas crisis. Tables 13, 14, 17, 18, and 31 shows that this objective has been achieved.

The sixth objective has been to determine the legitimation strategies employed by the EU regarding Ukraine during the second gas crisis. Tables 13, 14, 34, 35 and 48 show that this objective has been achieved.

The seventh objective has been to compare the legitimation strategies of the EU regarding Ukraine employed during the first and second gas crisis. Table 51 shows that this objective has been achieved as well.

The eighth objective has been to determine what type of possible discursive shift has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation. Section 7.4 has shown that the type of discursive shift observed has been one of overt discontinuity.

The ninth objective has been to determine the significance of a possible discursive shift for EU energy policy legitimation. As we have seen, the significance of the observed discursive

shift is that a securitisation has taken place that has expanded the EU's understanding of energy security to include sustainability and environmental aspects.

The tenth objective has been to determine what type of possible discursive change has taken place in the EU's energy policy legitimation. As the previous sections show, this has been achieved. The discursive change observed shows us that the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security evolved to include sustainability and environmental aspects besides the security of supply.

The eleventh objective has to determine the significance of a possible discursive change for EU energy policy legitimation. By relating the discourse uttered by the EU after the 2009 gas crisis to the contemporary macro socio-political of the 2022 gas crisis, the significance of the discursive change observed has been determined.

The twelfth objective has been to determine how the EU has defined energy security during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009. Table 51 shows the evolution of the EU's conceptualisation of the concept of energy security throughout the two gas crises.

The thirteenth objective has been to fill the literature gap in International Relations (IR) by applying the three-step normalisation model to the EU's energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine during the first (2006) and second (2009) gas crisis. This has been achieved, as this dissertation has opened up several new venues of research.

The fourteenth objective has been to determine recommendations for future research. As section 7.7 has shown, this objective has been achieved.

The fifteenth objective has been to determine how this research is useful in understanding the 2022 gas crisis. Again, by relating the discourse uttered by the EU after the 2009 gas crisis to the contemporary macro socio-political of the 2022 gas crisis, this dissertation has been able to provide a socio-diagnostic critique that has subsequently led to suggestions for further research that could help to understand the 2022 gas crisis. Therefore, this objective has also been achieved.

Conclusion

The main objective of this doctoral dissertation has been to identify how the EU's conceptualisation of energy security evolved during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009. By applying Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model to the EU's energy discourse vis-à-vis Ukraine during the two gas crises of 2006 and 2009, this objective has been completed. The application of Krzyżanowski's model has allowed for a tracing of discourse that shows us that during the first gas crisis, the EU enacted a discursive shift towards securitisation. This discursive shift has gradated/perpetuated during these crises until it normalised towards the end of the second gas crisis. The normalisation of the discursive shift indicates that a discursive change occurred in the EU's energy policy legitimation. By engaging in a formal-content related argumentation analysis, this research has observed that during this discursive change, the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security evolved into an expanded conceptualisation that includes sustainability and environmental aspects besides a core focus on the security of supply. By achieving its main objective, the main research question, "To what extent is it possible to identify a discursive change in EU energy policy legitimation regarding Ukraine by applying the three-step normalisation model on discursive shifts during the two gas crises of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009?" has been answered as well.

Regarding the hypotheses, the analysis has shown that not all of them were correct. The main hypothesis was partially correct. Rather than a full securitisation of EU energy policy, the discursive change observed shows us that the EU's understanding of the concept of energy security included sustainability and environmental aspects besides the security of supply.

The methodology that was employed to reach these conclusions was the Discourse-Historical Approach of Critical Discourse Analysis. The main guiding lines of this methodology were the four levels of context of the DHA. These were, respectively: the immediate, language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse; the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses; the language external social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific situational context, and the broader socio-political and historical context. The first level of context consisted of the actual texts analysed and their specific genres (press releases, speeches). The second level consisted of the enactment of the discursive shift: the insertion of security into the EU's discourse and its subsequent gradation/perpetuation and normalisation. The third level of context, the immediate context of the analysed discourse, consisted of the chronology of events of the gas crises. The fourth level of context, the broader macro socio-political context, consisted of two parts: the broader macro

socio-political context in which the dissertation as a whole is situated, and the immediate socio-political context in which the analysis of the gas crises is situated. Regarding the first part, the analysis of this dissertation has been able to provide an understanding to the 2022 gas crisis in the form of the socio-diagnostic critique. Regarding the second part, the contextual chapter on the EU-Ukraine relations has contextualised the application of Krzyżanowski's model to the EU's energy discourse during the two gas crises.

By using these four levels of context as a guideline, this dissertation has adhered to the triangulatory approach to research that the DHA stipulates. At each level of context, the theoretical background of discourse analysis (discursive shifts and the three-step normalisation model and discursive change), the methodology of the DHA and the empirical observations made in the corpus of data have been taken into account. The DHA has been applied successfully in this dissertation and the results that have been produced by applying the DHA are a valuable contribution in many aspects.

First, these results have made a significant contribution to the field of International Relations literature. Previously, Krzyżanowski's model had only been applied to right-wing and racist discourse. This dissertation has applied it to the field of International Relations proper, effectively creating a new field of literature, opening up many venues for future research.

Second, the analysis of this dissertation has applied Krzyżanowski's model in a novel manner. Whereas Krzyżanowski took discursive change as a starting point to look for discursive shifts, this research has taken discursive shifts as a starting point to see to what extent a discursive change has taken place. Therefore, by showing that this model can be applied in a different way, this dissertation has made a theoretical contribution to the theory of discursive shifts and discursive changes.

Third, the socio-diagnostic critique has exposed a discrepancy between the EU's discursive and social practice. It is clear that despite the rhetoric after the 2009 gas crisis, no significant changes in EU policy have been made, which had implications for the EU's policy regarding the 2022 gas crisis. In addition, the socio-diagnostic critique has uncovered ethical issues in the EU's discourse: it has shown an acceptance of the Russian framing of transit countries, which is highly problematic given the Russian practice of using energy as a means to exert influence in those transit countries. Furthermore, the socio-diagnostic critique has functioned as a form of social control. Based on the aforementioned criticisms, this dissertation states that the EU's actions in the form of REPowerEU should be carefully scrutinised. Therefore, this dissertation has made significant contributions to both the literature of

International Relations and discourse analysis. In addition, the analysis of this dissertation has provided a major contribution to understanding the 2022 gas crisis. In doing so, the circle has been completed: the main inspiration for conducting this research has been addressed.

It is clear that the discrepancies between the EU's discourse and social practice require more attention. Research focusing on securitisation and its reception should shed light on that. In addition, now that it has been ascertained that it is possible to apply the model to an actor like the European Union, it should be applied to state actors like Ukraine, Russia and individual EU member states. Keeping that in mind, the model should also be tested to non-Western discourse.

All in all, this dissertation has shown the versatility and usability of Krzyżanowski's three-step normalisation model. A significant contribution has been made to the scholarly field by providing new venues for research, which promises exciting contributions to the fields of discourse and IR in the near future. More importantly however, by providing a socio-diagnostic critique to the discrepancy between the EU's discursive and social practice, this dissertation has addressed the faults of the EU's energy policies. It is the hope of this dissertation that lessons can be learned so that the EU can truly ensure energy security for its citizens, while providing the necessary support to its neighbouring countries, most importantly Ukraine.

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Appendix I – Corpus of data: first gas crisis

Table 52: Overview Stage 1 of the first gas crisis

Stage 1	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	24	Press release	10	41,7%	194
		Speech	10	41,7%	
		Press conference	1	4,2%	
		Memo	1	4,2%	
		Interview	1	4,2%	
		Cover note	1	4,2%	

Table 53: Texts collected for Stage 1 of the first gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
1: Press release on European Parliament vote on statement on Ukrainian elections https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/dn_05_44	January 12, 2005	Press release
2: Press release on Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner at the inauguration of new Ukrainian president Yushchenko https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_81	January 21, 2005	Press release
3: Speech by High Representative Javier Solana at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (pdf file)	January 24, 2005	Speech
4: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: „Europa als globaler Akteur – Aktuelle Schwerpunkte Europäischer Außen- und Nachbarschaftspolitik“ – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_30	January 24, 2005	Speech
5: Speech by Ferrro-Waldner: Remarks to Foreign Affairs Committee – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_41	January 25, 2005	Speech
6: Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner at the Conference of the Graz Process https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_74	January 28, 2005	Speech
7: Press release on the 2637th meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations of the Council of the European Union https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_05_15	January 31, 2005	Press release
8: Q&A session of Condoleezza Rice, Ferrero-Waldner and Barroso with journalists https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_84	February 9, 2005	Press conference
9: Cover note from Co-secretary of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council sent to the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council containing the text of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (pdf file)	February 14, 2005	Cover note
10: Press release on Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's visit to Ukraine https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_186	February 16, 2005	Press release

11: Transcript of EU press release after eight meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (6428/05) (pdf file)	February 21, 2005	Press release
12: 2641st Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_05_34	February 21, 2005	Press release
13: EU-Ukraine – Strengthening the Strategic Partnership – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_05_57	23 February 2005	Memo
14: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Eine Partnerschaft der Erneuerung – Europas strategische Prioritäten für das 21. Jahrhundert – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_139	7 March, 2005	Speech
15: EU-Ukraine Ministerial Troika – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_362	29 March 2005	Press release
16: Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner: "Europe's Neighbours – Towards Closer Integration" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_253	April 22, 2005	Speech
17: Speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner: "The EU and Ukraine – What Lies Beyond the Horizon?" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_257	April 26, 2005	Speech
18: Press release on the EU and Ukraine strengthening energy cooperation https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_504	April 28, 2005	Press release
19: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Europas Herausforderungen im 20. Jahrhundert: Innovation, Integration und Internationalität – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_264	1 May, 2005	Speech
20: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union - Herausforderungen und Perspektiven – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_281	13 May, 2005	Speech
21: Speech by Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy Margot Wallström: "Transnational Democracy – the Road Ahead for Europe?" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_342	June 10, 2005	Speech
22: Transcript of EU press release after the ninth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (10047/05, Presse 146) (pdf file)	June 13, 2005	Press release
23: Interview of High Representative Javier Solana with newspaper День: https://m.day.kyiv.ua/en/article/day-after-day/javier-solana-ball-ukraines-court	June 14, 2005	Interview
24: EESC supports Ukrainian civil society in the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ces_05_76	June 28, 2005	Press release EESC

Table 54: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 1 of the first gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
1	MEPs congratulating the Ukrainian people	The Ukrainian people have resolved a political crisis	Therefore, MEPs congratulating the Ukrainian people is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		and have set their country firmly on the path towards democracy in a non-violent and mature way			Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation Moralisation: abstraction
1	MEPs stating that it is now time to consider other forms of association with Ukraine besides the Neighbourhood Policy	The Ukrainian people set their country on the path towards democracy in a non-violent and mature way. The MEPs state that this is the case.	Therefore, MEPs stating this is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: abstraction (reference to value systems) Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		giving the country a clear European perspective, possibly leading to EU membership			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
1	MEPs stating that the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine should be revised	In order to help Ukraine in its political and economic reforms	Therefore, the MEPs stating this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
1	MEPs stating that financial assistance to Ukraine should be increased considerably	In order to support economic and administrative reforms	Therefore, the MEPs stating this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
1	EU *urging* Ukraine to consolidate the espousal of common European values by taking further steps to promote democracy	because MEPs are concerned about the deep divisions within Ukraine	Therefore, the EU urging Ukraine to consolidate … is legitimised	*Reforms*	Moralisation: abstraction
		Threats of separatism were deemed unacceptable			Moralisation: evaluation
1	The MEPs called on all political leaders to make efforts to heal those rifts	because MEPs are concerned about the deep divisions within Ukraine	Therefore, the MEPs calling on political leaders to do so is legitimised	*Reforms*	Moralisation: abstraction
		Threats of separatism were deemed unacceptable			Moralisation: evaluation

2	The European Commission is fully committed to working with the new Ukrainian President	In order to significantly deepen the relationship between the EU and Ukraine both politically and economically, under the European Neighbourhood Policy	Therefore, the Commission being fully committed to working with the new Ukrainian president is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
2	Implementation of EU Ukraine Action Plan	Now, democratic elections have taken place	Therefore, the implementation of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: evaluation Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		as soon as the final procedural steps have been taken			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
2	The new beginning of the EU-Ukraine relationship	The presidential elections and the Orange Revolution have taken place in Ukraine	Therefore, a new beginning of EU-Ukraine relations is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Moralisation: evaluation Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		Ukraine is a country of strategic importance to the EU			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
2	EU working out how to take full advantage of the Action Plan	In order to move our relations with Ukraine up a gear	Therefore, the EU working out how to take full advantage of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		In order to ensure swift results to the benefit of the Ukrainian people			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
2	The EU giving financial assistance to Ukraine	Depends on Ukraine making progress in specific priorities	Therefore, the EU giving financial assistance to Ukraine is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
2	The EU-Ukraine relationship becoming stronger	Depends on the implementation of common values	Therefore, the relationship becoming stronger is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority Moralisation: abstraction
2	The European Council Summit asking the Commission to come forward with proposals to further "strengthen	In view of the new political circumstances	Therefore, the asking for proposals is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

	cooperation with Ukraine, making full use of the Action Plan"				
2	The Action Plan has all the scope needed to allow a significant intensification of EU-Ukraine ties	It includes important elements to strengthen democracy	Therefore, the statement that the AP has all the scope to allow for a signifncaatnt intensification of EU-Ukraine ties is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		it prepares Ukraine for membership of the WTO			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
2	The creation of a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine	Depends on Ukraine becoming be a member of the WTO	Therefore, the creation of a free trade area is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
3	Solana stating that the idea of common European standards and values is not an empty slogan but a reality	The momentous changes that have taken place in Ukraine offer proof of that	Therefore, Solana's statement is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The idea that there are key European standards for the running of elections, and the magnetic power of the EU, played a hugely important role in the peaceful and democratic outcome of the crisis			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation Moralisation: abstraction
3	The EU and Ukraine having an opportunity for a deeper and more intense EU-Ukraine relationship	There is a new political leadership in Ukraine	Therefore, the opportunity is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
4	haben wir die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik konzipiert	Um die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Vorteile der Erweiterung mit unseren neuen Nachbarn zu teilen	Therefore, the creation of the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Mit dieser Politik etablieren wir einen „Ring von Freunden" entlang der Grenzen der erweiterten EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
4	etablieren wir einen „Ring von Freunden" entlang der Grenzen der erweiterten EU	Das ist ein geostrategisches Schlüsselprojekt für Europa	Therefore, the creation of a ring of friends is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

4	Diese Zone der Stabilität und des Wohlstandes soll von Osteuropa über den Kaukasus und den Nahen Osten quer durch den gesamten Mittelmeerraum reichen	Unser Angebot gilt für all jene Staaten in Europas Umfeld, für die die Erweiterungsperspektive nicht auf der Tagesordnung steht	Therefore, this zone stretching from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus and the Middle East is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
4	Es wird eines meiner politischen Hauptanliegen als Kommissarin sein, diese Nachbarschaftspolitik umzusetzen und zu vertiefen	Das ist eine entscheidende sicherheitspolitische Weichenstellung für die Union	Therefore, the implementation and the deepening of this policy is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
4	The drawing up of Action Plans	Die Umsetzung der Nachbarschaftspolitik erfolgt mit Hilfe substantieller Aktionspläne	Therefore, the drawing up of Action Plans is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		die wir gemeinsam mit unseren Partnern entwerfen			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Damit werden wir unseren neuen Grenzen weitgehend das Trennende nehmen und die EU eng mit den Nachbarstaaten verflechten			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Durch diese facettenreiche Kooperation binden wir Schlüsselregionen dauerhaft an die EU.			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Wir schaffen damit auch Anreize für demokratische Reformen in unseren Partnerstaaten			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
4	Wir schaffen damit auch Anreize für demokratische Reformen in unseren Partnerstaaten	Die politische Lösung der Krise im Zusammenhang mit der Präsidentenwahl in der Ukraine hat das gezeigt: Das friedliche Bekenntnis der ukrainischen Bürger zur	Therefore, the Action Plans are creating incentives for democratic reforms in partner states	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		Demokratie und zu europäischen Werten war beeindruckend			
4	Aber auch die deutliche und einstimmige Haltung der EU war ein ganz wesentlicher Beitrag zur Beilegung der Krise	Wir haben sanften Druck in Richtung einer friedlichen und demokratischen Lösung ausgeübt und waren vermittelnd tätig	Therefore, the statement that the position of the EU was an important contribution to resolving the Orange Revolution is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Wir haben auch den Ablauf der Wahlwiederholung mit der Entsendung hunderter Beobachter unterstützt			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Vor allem aber haben wir eine Zukunftsperspektive für die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Ukraine vermittelt			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
4	Dies beweist, dass das Instrumentarium der Nachbarschaftspolitik stabilisierend wirken kann	Vor allem aber haben wir eine Zukunftsperspektive für die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Ukraine vermittelt	Therefore, the statements that the instruments of the ENP can work the ENP stabilising is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
4	Es zeigt auch, was Europa tun muss, um außenpolitisch erfolgreich zu sein: Rasch und einstimmig reagieren, aktives Krisenmanagement betreiben, politische Ziele vorgeben und eine längerfristige, realistische Perspektive bieten	Vor allem aber haben wir eine Zukunftsperspektive für die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Ukraine vermittelt	Therefore, the EU acting quickly and unanimously, engaging in active crisis management, setting political goals and offering a longer-term realistic perspective is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
4	Javier Solana und ich haben einen intensivierten Aktionsplan ausgearbeitet, den wir den Mitgliedstaaten am 31. Januar vorlegen werden	Jetzt ist es wichtig, auf dieser positiven Dynamik in der Ukraine aufzubauen, die Reformen zu vertiefen und die Möglichkeiten unseres umfassenden, flexiblen und mit der	Therefore, the creation of an intensified Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalization: goal orientation

		Ukraine abgestimmten Aktionsplans voll auszuschöpfen			
		Darin anerkennen wir die Bedeutung der neuen Ausrichtung in der Ukraine und hoffen, damit der Ukraine eine „Avantgarde Stellung“ in der Nachbarschaftspolitik einzuräumen			Instrumental rationalization: means orientation
4	Die Nachbarschaftspolitik kann so zu einer substantiellen Vertiefung unserer Beziehungen führen	Javier Solana und ich haben einen intensivierten Aktionsplan ausgearbeitet, den wir den Mitgliedstaaten am 31. Januar vorlegen werden	Therefore, the statement that the ENP can lead to a substantial deepening of relations is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalization: goal orientation
4	Lassen Sie mich an dieser Stelle unterstreichen, dass die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik in keiner Weise der Auftakt zu einem geopolitisches Nullsummenspiel ist	Es geht hier nicht um die Ausdehnung von „Einflusszonen“. Ganz im Gegenteil, es geht uns um die Stärkung von Sicherheit, Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft rund um die EU und die Lösung von bestehenden regionalen Konflikten	Therefore, the statement that the ENP is not a geopolitical zero-sum game is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: analogy
		Das ist im gemeinsamen Interesse Russlands und der EU			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		Wir wollen daher in Zukunft noch produktiver als bisher zusammenarbeiten			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
5	Ferrero-Waldner stating that the ENP is an ambitious policy	designed to substantively upgrade our relationship with partners, through both deeper political cooperation and a significant degree of economic integration	Therefore the statement that the ENP is an ambitious policy is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
5	The EU neighbours being able to develop a closer relationship with the EU	If they have respect for the Action Plans	Therefore, the EU neighbours being able to develop a closer	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: abstraction
		combined with political and economic reforms			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

			relationship with the EU is legitimised		
5	Action Plans for Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine will now be presented to the relevant Association and Cooperation Councils	They were were adopted by Council last December	Therefore, the Action Plans being presented to the relevant Councils is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		for endorsement			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		thus paving the way for implementation			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
5	The challenge now for the countries, and for the EU, is to turn the commitments and aspirations contained in these Plans into reality, into measurable reforms which benefit the partner countries and especially their populations	Action Plans for Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine will now be presented to the relevant Association and Cooperation Councils for endorsement	Therefore, the stating of the challenge is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
5	I would like to lay particular emphasis on Ukraine	where the EU played a very positive role in assisting the country to overcome the crisis late last year	Therefore, the emphasis put on Ukraine by Ferrero-Waldner is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
5	the EU played a very positive role in assisting the country to overcome the crisis late last year	Last December, the Council endorsed the draft Action Plan and indicated that it would transmit it to the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council for approval "as soon as developments in Ukraine permit	Therefore, the statement that the EU played a very positive role in assisting the country to overcome the crisis late last year is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The holding of free and fair elections opened the way towards strengthened cooperation			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and we are now in a position to move ahead			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

5	Now is the moment to take steps to reinforce our relationship	President Yushchenko is inaugurated	Therefore, the statement that now is the moment to take steps to reinforce our relationship is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
5	we hope that the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, which has been scheduled for 21 February 2005, will endorse this document	Now is the moment to take steps to reinforce our relationship	Therefore, this hope is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		so as to prepare the ground for its implementation			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
5	Javier Solana and I have written a joint letter to the Council	in recognition of the new political reality in Ukraine	Therefore, writing of this joint letter is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		which contains a number of proposals to maximise the Action Plan's benefits for Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
6	EU exporting stability and helping democratic values to take root	The recent political crisis in Ukraine (Orange Revolution) was solved peacefully	Therefore, the EU exporting stability and helping democratic values to take root is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	-Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation Moralisation: evaluation
6	The EU must act globally	The recent Ukrainian crisis was solved by EU action	Therefore, the EU acting globally is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
7	EU Council stating that Ukraine's European aspirations are based on common values shared by both European States and citizens	Recent events in Ukraine demonstrate clearly that the Ukrainian people have chosen the democratic path for their country, based on respect for basic freedoms and on peace	Therefore, the Council's statement is legitimized	*Orange Revolution*	Moralisation: evaluation Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
7	The way to strengthening EU-Ukraine relations is open	There is now a new, democratic government committed to reform in Ukraine	Therefore, the strengthening of EU-Ukraine relations is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Moralisation: evaluation Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
7	The Council stressing the EU's full support for President	Ukraine is going through a far-reaching process of	Therefore, the Council's	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

	Yushchenko and the Ukrainian people and emphasising that the EU is ready to strengthen its relations with Ukraine	democratisation and reform	actions are legitimised		
7	The Council being able to launch the Action Plan	the re-run of the second round of the presidential elections brought Ukraine more closely into line with international standards	Therefore, the launching of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: evaluation -Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
8	EU support for Ukraine	Ukraine is democratic	Therefore, the EU is supporting Ukraine	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
8	Barroso stating that Ukraine's journey now is not for membership	We have the ENP	Therefore, Ukraine's journey for now is not for membership	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
8	The EU giving Ukraine ENP status	So, I believe that it's the best way to ensure stabilization and consolidation of democratic institutions of Ukraine	Therefore, the EU giving Ukraine ENP status is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
8	we adopted an action plan proposed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner	But we made the implementation of the action plan conditional to a true democracy in Ukraine	Therefore, the adoption of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
8	EU creating the Action Plan for Ukraine	Let me add that our decision to make the action plan was not to have Ukraine far away, but, on the contrary, to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union	Therefore, the EU creating the Action Plan for Ukraine is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: analogy
9	The enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004 has brought a historical shift for the Union and Ukraine in political, geographic and economic terms	The EU and Ukraine now share a border	Therefore, statement that the enlargement has brought a historical shift is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and, as direct neighbours, will reinforce their political and economic interdependence			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

9	The EU and Ukraine have the opportunity to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation, to gradual economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation	Enlargement offers this opportunity for the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, this opportunity is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
9	The EU's and Ukraine's approach is founded on shared values, joint ownership and differentiation	It will contribute to the further stepping up of our strategic partnership	Therefore, their approach being founded on shared values, joint ownership and differentiation is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
9	The European Union and Ukraine are determined to work together	through the implementation of this European Neighbourhood Action Plan	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine working together is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation Moralisation: abstraction
		to help ensure that no new dividing lines are drawn in Europe			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
9	The implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action plan	will help fulfil the provisions in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) as a valid basis for EU-Ukraine cooperation	Therefore, the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and will encourage and support Ukraine's objective of further integration into European economic and social structures			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		will significantly advance the approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards to those of the European Union			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It will also build solid foundations for further economic integration,			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		including through joint efforts towards an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area following Ukraine's			
		accession to the WTO, on the basis of the adoption and implementation of economic and trade-related rules and regulations with the potential to enhance trade, investment and growth			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		help to devise and implement policies and measures to promote economic growth and social cohesion, to raise living standards and to protect the environment, thereby contributing to the long-term objective of sustainable development			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
9	The European Union acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's European choice	This is confirmed in the EU's Common Strategy on Ukraine	Therefore, the EU acknowledges and welcomes Ukraine's European choice	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
10	Ferrero-Waldner visiting Ukraine	The visit is an opportunity to underline the EU's commitment to deepening political cooperation and economic integration with Ukraine, reflecting the changed political reality in the country	Therefore, the visit is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
10	The EU designed an Action Plan	We have heard Ukraine's calls for closer relations with the EU, and we are ready to answer	Therefore, the EU designed an Action Plan	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		designed to bring Ukraine and the EU much closer together			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

10	EU willingness to enhance Action Plan (beyond what was on offer)	Elections were held on December 26th (*the* elections; implication here about them being democratic)	Therefore, the EU is ready to go beyond what was originally on offer	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		It is a powerful signal: it shows that the EU will respond, if Ukraine is willing to move closer to the EU and it will implement the necessary actions to do so			Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
		I am confident that for the immediate future, many of Ukraine's aspirations can be addressed in this framework			Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
10	The Commission will speed up work to prepare the ground to launch negotiations for a free Trade Area	Efforts will be needed on both sides	Therefore, the Commission doing this is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		once Ukraine has joined the WTO			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
10	The Commission will speed up work to start negotiations on trade in steel products	Efforts will be needed on both sides	Therefore, the Commission doing this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
10	The Commission will speed up work to finalise negotiations on trade in textiles	Efforts will be needed on both sides	Therefore, the Commission doing this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
10	The Commission will further step up its efforts to help Ukraine ensure that its goods meet the standards required to enter the Single Market, and help the Ukrainian government resolve the remaining questions that need to be addressed in order to qualify for Market Economy Status	Efforts will be needed on both sides	Therefore, the Commission doing this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
10	Close cooperation between the EU and Ukraine will be needed	to prepare for negotiations for a simplified visa regime, including progress on an	Therefore, close cooperation will be needed	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		EC-Ukraine readmission agreement			
10	Ferrero-Waldner looking for first-hand information on the government's priorities	to ensure that work with the EU builds Ukraine's own reform programme	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner looking for first-hand priorities is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
10	The EU offering ENP status to a country	The country borders the EU	Therefore, the EU granting ENP status to a country is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: Explanation
		The country shares EU fundamental values			Moralisation: evaluation
11	The EU opening new prospects for both Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations	Ukraine made a new commitment to democracy and reforms	Therefore, the EU opened up prospects for both Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations	*Reforms*	Moralisation: evaluation Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
11	The EU underlining its commitment to support Ukraine	This moment is crucial	Therefore, the EU underlining its commitment to support Ukraine is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
11	The Union stressed that work on the EU-Ukraine Action Plan endorsed by the Co-operation Council should begin immediately	This moment is crucial	Therefore, the EU stressing this is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
11	EU presenting additional aspects to the Action Plan	In order to strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the additional aspects are legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
11	The EU strengthening and enrichment the Action Plan	In support of a democratic and reform-oriented Ukraine	Therefore, the strengthening and enrichment of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: evaluation -Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
16	The EU paying particular attention to its surroundings	It is natural	Therefore, the EU pays attention to our immediate surroundings	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: Explanation

16	Our neighbours are not just citizens of "third countries", they are our close partners and friends	We share practical interests, ideals, and aspirations, and we face common challenges to our security	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: Explanation
16	The EU's first priority is sharing its enlarged peace, stability and prosperity with its neighbours	The EU's neighbours are close partners and friends	Thus the EU's first priority is to share the EU's enlarged peace, stability and prosperity with our neighbours	*ENP*	Moralisation: evaluation
		The EU's neighbours share practical interests, ideals and aspirations and they face common challenges to security			Theoretical rationalisation: Explanation
16	The EU offering this "ring of friends" a new, special relationship	The EU's first priority is to share the EU's enlarged peace, stability and prosperity with our neighbours	Therefore, the EU offering the ENP to this 'ring of friends' is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
		Through the ENP			Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
		The idea is not to replace our existing relationships, but to give them an added dimension			Moralisation: analogy
16	The idea is not to replace our existing relationships, but to give them an added dimension	The European Neighbourhood Policy will bring into sharper focus the established Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and Association Agreements (AAs)	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
		The Barcelona Process will continue to provide an essential regional forum			Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
16	The European Neighbourhood Policy is an opportunity for us, and our partners	to share the benefits which we have derived from half a century of peaceful integration	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: Means orientation
16	The ENP offering deeper political and economic integration to its partners	In return for concrete steps being taken towards economic reform, and our shared values - good governance, human	Therefore, the EU offering deeper political and economic integration to its partners	*ENP*	Moralisation: evaluation Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

		rights, democracy, and the rule of law	through the ENP is legitimised		
16	The EU giving partner countries through the ENP a stake in the EU's internal market	If partner countries approximate legislation and gradually integrate transport, energy and telecommunication networks	Therefore, the EU giving ENP countries a stake in the EU's internal market is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
16	The EU requiring its partners to implement far-reaching reforms	But the benefits will be considerable – structural reforms will lead to increased growth rates; a better macroeconomic environment and trade liberalisation to increased foreign direct investment; and public administration reform to increased institutional capacity. In sum, increased efficiency and welfare gains for all citizens	Therefore, the EU requiring reforms is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
16	The EU and partner countries agreeing on reforms being guided by ENP Action Plans	These are jointly-drawn up political documents committing both sides to respect common values and norms of international conduct and undertake political and economic reforms	Therefore, the reforms being guided by ENP Action Plans is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		This combination will allow us to develop a closer relationship			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
16	From 2007 the TACIS and MEDA being replaced by a single new instrument - the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)	as part of a general reform of our external assistance	Therefore, this replacement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		We will tailor our assistance to meet priority needs and support the implementation of the ENP Action Plans with improved and streamlined procedures			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		We will use tried and tested methodology such as twinning and support			

		for institution and capacity-building			
16	The EU proposing a substantial increase in funding for the ENP region to nearly €15 billion for the period 2007-2013, nearly doubling the amount available for 2000-2006	This ambitious policy needs adequate financial means	Therefore, the substantial increase is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Even before the ENPI comes into effect in 2007, we have enhanced the assistance provided under TACIS and MEDA e.g. by strengthening cross-border aspects			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
16	The EU should be proud of its achievements	in the two short years since this policy was first conceived, and less than a year since our Strategy Paper spelled out the details, ENP has taken concrete shape	Therefore, the statement that the EU should be proud of its achievements is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
17	The EU has for potential for democracy, freedom and justice throughout the world, and particularly in our neighbourhood	Ferrero-Waldner is a firm believer in the European Dream	Therefore, the EU promoting democracy etc. is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: evaluation Moralisation: abstraction
17	The EU promoting the values at the core of the European Dream in Ukraine	It is the task	Therefore, the EU promoting its values in Ukraine is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – role model authority
17	Relations between the EU and Ukraine stagnated over the past decade	Rather than talking to each other, we talked past each other	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Frustration set in			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
17	Today, the difference is striking	We find ourselves developing a qualitatively superior relationship, and anticipating Ukraine being one of the EU's key partners		*Orange Revolution*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		In marked contrast to the past, when I go to Kiev now, I have stimulating and encouraging discussions			Moralisation: analogy

17	EU-Ukraine relations have experienced a fundamental shift	Ukraine experienced a recent change of government	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The new government prioritises the rule of law, freedom and justice			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Now, when we talk about the importance of reform, our arguments no longer fall on deaf ears			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The people sitting at the table with us genuinely agree that reform is essential for Ukraine's future success			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Under President Yushchenko Ukraine has a real chance for a more democratic and more prosperous future			Moralisation: abstraction
17	But we should never forget that the real heroes of the "Orange Revolution" were the Ukrainian people	Hundreds of thousands of ordinary people from across Ukraine took to the streets in defence of democracy, in scenes reminiscent of their western neighbours in the 1980s	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
17	I pay tribute to their steely determination and resilience in the face of sub-zero temperatures and rumours of soldiers and tanks	But we should never forget that the real heroes of the "Orange Revolution" were the Ukrainian people	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
17	The European Union and its new initiative, the European Neighbourhood Policy, played an important factor in the Orange Revolution	However, we practitioners of international politics know that major changes in the political cosmos are invariably due to a coincidence of factors	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – expert authority
17	The EU sought to play a greater political role on the global stage	That greater global role was fair because the EU is the world's largest integrated market and biggest economy	Therefore, the EU seeking to play a greater political role on	*EU foreign policy*	-Theoretical rationalisation: Explanation

		We know that we need new ideas and creative responses to deal with the challenges of today's globalised world	the global stage is legitimised		Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
17	The EU created the ENP	The need for a more creative foreign policy approach	Therefore, the creation of the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The EU enlarged			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
17	If the EU's principal foreign policy objective is to promote stability, security, and prosperity globally, that is all the more true in our immediate neighbourhood	We want to create a space where our fundamental values hold sway	Therefore, the EU promoting stability, security, and prosperity globally in its immediate neighbourhood is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
17	We want to create a space where our fundamental values hold sway	The EU believes that these are inherently valuable and universally desirable	Therefore, the EU respecting these values is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		But we also believe that respect for those principles is essential for sustainable human and economic development, and thus for security and political stability			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
17	The EU offering its eastern and southern neighbours a mutually beneficial deal	If those countries share the EU's vision	Therefore, the EU offering this deal is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: abstraction
17	The EU offering new opportunities to share in the EU's Single Market, closer co-operation on energy and transport links, and a chance to participate in EU programmes	If neighbours take meaningful steps to strengthen the rule of law, good governance, human rights, democracy, economic reform	Therefore, the EU offering new opportunities is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority Moralisation: evaluation
17	The ENP aims to encourage the spirit of democracy	by providing our partners with incentives to reform	Therefore, the ENP aiming to do this is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		just as we leveraged the EU's magnetic power to			Moralisation: analogy

		promote reforms in the enlargement countries			
17	Ferrero-Waldner claiming that the EU's Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) played a significant role in the outcome of the Orange Revolution	Throughout the crisis, the EU showed exemplary coordination and coherence	Therefore, the claim that the ENP played a significant role in the outcome of the Orange Revolution is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and our message was clear – we wanted to offer Ukraine a closer relationship, but we could only do that if Ukraine shared our fundamental values			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		EU adopted draft ENP Action Plan but put it on hold until the political situation was satisfactory resolved			Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		EU kept telling Ukraine about the incentives on offer to Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
		EU kept telling Ukraine that it was ready to begin implementation as soon as possible			Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
17	and our message was clear – we wanted to offer Ukraine a closer relationship, but we could only do that if Ukraine shared our fundamental values	We needed Ukraine to demonstrate its respect for the rule of law and democratic principles	Therefore, this message is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
17	ENP passed the test as the EU's new political tool	EU's ENP action helped to resolve Ukraine's Orange Revolution satisfactorily	Therefore, the ENP passed the test as the EU's new political tool	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
17	The EU made good on its promises	Had we not made good on our promises, the success would have been short lived	Therefore, the statement that the EU made good on its promises is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		we immediately drew up a 10 point plan, offering to push the Action Plan to the limit			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
17	The ENP is a highly effective foreign policy tool that supports the EU's	The ENP succeeded in Ukraine	Therefore, the ENP proved itself as a highly effective	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation

	long-term goal of greater assertiveness and effectiveness on the global stage	I do not believe that "the EU contributed to the revolution simply by its attractiveness as a club that so many want to join", as Mr Timothy Garton Ash has recently claimed. That would relegate us to a purely passive role and my point is that those days are gone.	foreign policy tool that supports the EU's long-term goal of greater assertiveness and effectiveness on the global stage		Moralisation: analogy
17	The EU has been hard at work	we know that the ENP will only continue to work as an incentive for reform if we keep our side of the bargain	Therefore, the EU having been hard at work is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
17	Visa facilitation is a key priority	I believe that it will send a strong signal to Ukraine's people	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Visa*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		I want to see an end to the frustrating, time-consuming, and expensive processes that make it so difficult for Ukrainians to visit us			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
17	We have already held several meetings with Ukraine	to prepare the mandate for negotiating visa facilitation	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
17	I hope the member states will also act quickly	This way we show that we really do see Ukrainians as our close partners and friends	Therefore, the EU acting quickly on visa facilitation is legitimised	*Visa*	Moralisation: abstraction Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
17	The EU giving the government a precise list of our outstanding issues regarding Market Economy Status, and the actions required to address them	We also know the importance Ukraine attaches to Market Economy Status	Therefore, the EU giving this list is legitimised	*Reforms*	Moralisation: abstraction
		Once these are fulfilled Market Economy Status will follow			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
17	We have made progress on other issues, for example the EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area	where we are launching the promised feasibility study	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
17	Commissioner Piebalgs is going to Ukraine tomorrow	We are also pushing forward our cooperation in the energy sector	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		to help push the high-level energy dialogue forward			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
17	The EU very much welcomes Ukraine's commitment to facilitate a solution	This is a perfect illustration of how, through intensifying our cooperation, we can make our common region more secure and more stable	Therefore, the EU welcoming this is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		I hope it will be a prototype for using the Neighbourhood Policy to tackle the region's remaining conflicts			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		thus creating a more secure neighbourhood for us all			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
17	The ENP does not create membership opportunity for Ukraine	ENP is not designed to judge on the question of EU membership	Therefore, the ENP not creating membership opportunity for Ukraine is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
17	EU membership for Ukraine is ruled out for the moment	It is irresponsible for the EU and Ukraine to pretend that democratic and economic transitions take place overnight	Therefore, the EU ruling out membership for Ukraine for the moment is legitimised	*EU membership*	Moralisation: abstraction
		Yushchenko himself acknowledges that Ukraine has a great deal of work to do to consolidate its democratic and economic transitions, both of which are necessary before EU membership becomes an option			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Discussions on EU membership for Ukraine distracts from the real issue			Moralisation: abstraction
		Ukrainian people agree that energy should be spent on supporting the reform process and not on idle speculation			Authorisation: authority – personal authority

		There are wounds to heal in Ukraine and that will take time and effort			Moralisation: abstraction
17	Discussions on EU membership for Ukraine distracts from the real issue	Reform in Ukraine is now an urgent matter	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*EU membership*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		Reform is necessary for membership, yes, but above all necessary for the welfare of Ukrainians			Moralisation: analogy
17	I believe we should expend our energies on supporting the reform process, not on idle speculation	and I believe the Ukrainian people agree	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		There are wounds to heal in Ukraine, and that will take time and effort			Moralisation: abstraction
17	we want closer cooperation with Ukraine	For now, even if our final destination has not been spelt out, the door is not shut and the general direction is clear	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: abstraction
17	Ferrero-Waldner being confident that there will be progress to report by the time of the Summit in October	I know the Ukrainian government is sincere in its commitment to us	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner being confident is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Moralisation: abstraction
17	I am confident that Ukraine's government and people will rise to the challenge	The courage displayed by President Yushchenko, which moved me deeply when I met him last Autumn when he was in Vienna for treatment, and by the Ukrainian people as they stood up for their democratic rights, was deeply impressive	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner being confident is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation Moralisation: abstraction
		A people which finds the resources of energy necessary for such a show of determination is surely a people with the requisite resilience and perseverance to succeed in this task			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

12	The Council welcomed the appointment of the new Government in Ukraine and expressed support to the new government for its ambitious programme of political and economic reforms	A new commitment to democracy and reforms opens new prospects for Ukraine and for EU-Ukraine relations	Therefore, the Council welcoming and expressing support is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	The EU welcomes Ukraine's European choice	The EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirations	Therefore, the EU welcoming Ukraine's European choice is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
12	The Council underlined the EU's commitment to support Ukraine	at this crucial moment	Therefore, the Council underlining the EU's commitment is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
12	the EU is strongly committed to responding in a timely manner on its side	Even though the pace of progress in the ENP Action Plan will depend on the quality of efforts undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities	Therefore, the EU is strongly committed	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
12	The Council agreed to consider a first review of the implementation of the Action Plan already in the beginning of 2006	provided that significant progress has been made	Therefore, the Council agreeing to consider a frist review in the beginning of 2006 is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
12	the Council agreed on the following measures in support of a democratic and reform-oriented Ukraine	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the Council agreeing on these measures is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To initiate early consultations on an enhanced agreement between EU and Ukraine	to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement at the end of its initial ten-year period	Therefore, the initiation of early consultations is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		as soon as the political priorities of the ENP			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

		Action Plan have been addressed			
		In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To explore possibilities for closer cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, including European Security and Defence Policy, and to address in particular issues of regional stability and enhanced cooperation in both crisis management and non-proliferation	The EU is ready to intensify cooperation with Ukraine on the settlement process to solve the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Ukraine should be invited, on a case by case basis, to align itself with EU positions on regional and international issues			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To deepen trade and economic relations between EU and Ukraine	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	Work on agreements for steel and textile products for 2005 will be intensified	To deepen trade and economic relations between EU and Ukraine	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	The review of the existing feasibility study on establishing a Free Trade Area between Ukraine and the EU will be accelerated	To deepen trade and economic relations between EU and Ukraine	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		with a view to enable an early start of negotiations			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		once Ukraine has joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO)			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
12	To lend further support to Ukraine's WTO accession and to offer Ukraine continued assistance in meeting the necessary requirements	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To grant 'Market Economy Status' to Ukraine	as soon as the limited remaining issues have been satisfactorily resolved	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

		In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	The EU will intensify contacts with Ukraine	in order to resolve these issues	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To study options concerning the question of how, and in what framework, the granting of visas could be facilitated whilst complying rigorously with security requirements	with a view to the negotiations to be held between the EU and Ukraine before the next EU-Ukraine Summit	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To enhance cooperation in key sectors, including energy, transport, environment and health as well as in private sector development	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	Preparations will be made for a high-level dialogue on energy and related issues and the environmental dialogue will be upgraded	to enhance cooperation in key sectors	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To step up support to the process of legislative approximation, including technical assistance and twinning to meet EU norms and standards and targeted advice and support legislative approximation through a mechanism such as TAIEX	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	To welcome and increase people-to-people contacts, including in the key areas of youth and	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	education, through measures such as priority access to the Erasmus Mundus programme, reinforced participation in the Tempus programme, support to Ukraine's efforts to work towards convergence in higher education by participating in the Bologna process, considering the possibility of offering internships for young professionals, and continued support to independent media				
12	To maximise access to funding from the European Investment Bank (EIB)	In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	up to € 250 million of EIB lending could be made available to Ukraine	After final endorsement of the ENP Action Plan	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
12	To provide increased assistance to Ukraine through the relevant instruments	in order to help Ukraine to pursue the reform process	Therefore, the EU wanting to do this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
12	the Action Plan is an essential tool	Ukraine should have a result-oriented approach	Therefore, the framing of the Action Plan as an essential tool is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
12	relations between the EU and Ukraine will become deeper and stronger	As Ukraine makes genuine progress in carrying out internal reforms and adopting European standards	Therefore, the relations becoming deeper and stronger is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
13	The EU taking concrete steps to strengthen the EU-Ukraine relationship	The European Union (EU) is responding to the changed political reality	Therefore, the EU taking concrete steps is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

13	The EU will support the new leadership's own ambitious programme of political and economic reform with a substantive and realistic package	designed to answer Ukraine's wish for increased integration with Europe	Therefore, this package is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
13	On Monday 21 February the EU-Ukraine Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was formally endorsed by the EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council	signalling a significant intensification of the EU-Ukraine relationship	Therefore, the endorsement is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
13	On the same day, the General Affairs External Relations Council (GAERC) approved ten additional points proposed by the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner and High Representative Javier Solana	This additional offer is a powerful signal that if Ukraine wishes to move closer to the EU, and is willing to implement the necessary actions to do so, then the EU will respond	Therefore, the approvement is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
13	The EU will respond	if Ukraine wishes to move closer to the EU, and is willing to implement the necessary actions to do so	Therefore the EU responding is legitimatised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
13	The EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan offers all the scope needed to allow a significant intensification of EU-Ukraine ties	It supports Ukraine's political and economic reforms, but success will require considerable effort from both sides	Therefore, the statement that the Action Plan offers all the scope needed to allow a significant intensification of EU-Ukraine ties is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: analogy

14	The ENP is important and efficient	Die Wichtigkeit und Effizienz der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik hat sich nicht zuletzt bei der politischen Lösung der jüngsten Krise in der Ukraine gezeigt	Therefore, the framing of the ENP as important and efficient is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
14	Wir schaffen damit auch Anreize für demokratische Reformen in unseren Partnerstaaten	Die Wichtigkeit und Effizienz der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik hat sich nicht zuletzt bei der politischen Lösung der jüngsten Krise in der Ukraine gezeigt	Therefore, the EU creating incentives for democratic reforms in partner states is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
14	Die deutliche Haltung der EU war sehr wichtig für Lösung dieser Krise	auch weil wir der Ukraine eine konstruktive, realistische Zukunftsperspektive vermittelt haben	Therefore, the statement that the clear position of the EU important was in solving the crisis is legitimized	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
14	Wir müssen jetzt auf dieser Dynamik aufbauen	durch unseren Nachbarschafts-Aktionsplan und einen weiteren 10 Punkte-Plan den ich jüngst dem EU-Ministerrat vorgelegt habe	Therefore, the building on this momentum is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
15	On 30 March, an EU Troika will meet Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk	for discussions on the development of EU-Ukraine relations	Therefore, the Troika meeting this minister is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The meeting will take stock of the efforts made to take forward the Action Plan since its launch on 21 February 2005			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and both sides will share views on further steps in its implementation			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The meeting will also cover developments in the region including Transnistria, as well as key foreign policy issues			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		This troika meeting will help us to keep the momentum going regarding the implementation of the Action Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
15	The EU and Ukraine already made progress towards the implementation of the Action Plan	As soon as it was endorsed we lost no time in getting down to work	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine already having made progress is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
15	Ferrero-Waldner stating I am also looking forward to discussing with our Ukrainian partners how to work together more effectively to resolve the long-standing conflict over Transnistria	Finding a peaceful solution is in the interests of Moldova, Ukraine and the EU	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner look-in forward to this is legitimised	*Transnistria*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
15	The EU-Ukraine Ministerial meeting will review the internal situation of Ukraine	following the formation of the new government and the presentation of its ambitious reform agenda	Therefore, the meeting reviewing this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
15	The EU and Ukraine will also review possibilities for enhanced cooperation on regional and international issues, including on the Transnistria conflict in Moldova	following the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Moldova	Therefore, reviewing this is legitimised	*Transnistria*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
15	relations between the EU and Ukraine will become deeper and stronger	as Ukraine makes genuine progress in carrying out internal reforms and adopting European standards	Therefore, relations becoming stronger is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
18	Piebalgs visiting Kiev and meeting with Ukrainian ministers	The talks aimed at providing the political guidance for achieving in the coming months progress on issues of common interest such as Ukrainian energy market liberalisation, energy efficiency, renewable	Therefore, Piebalgs visiting Kiev and meeting the ministers is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		energies, nuclear safety and cooperation on broader infrastructure projects			
		the two parties signed an Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Piebalgs visit reflects the EU's clear commitment to continue and to intensify energy cooperation with Ukraine			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
18	Piebalgs stating that he is pleased that both the EU and Ukraine strongly agree to strengthen cooperation on energy issues	Ukraine and the EU can only benefit from closer co-operation on key energy issues	Therefore, Piebalgs statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
18	The EU being committed to continue and to intensify energy cooperation with Ukraine	Energy is considered among the priority cooperation areas in the EU – Ukraine Action Plan which was endorsed at the EU – Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting on 21 February 2005	Therefore, the EU's commitment is legitimized	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
18	The EU and Ukraine engaging in enhanced cooperation in key sectors including energy	The priority is recognised by both sides	Therefore, the engagement in energy is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
18	The Commission and Ukraine from now on meeting annually at ministerial level	to review progress and if appropriate to establish additional energy cooperation activities	Therefore, meeting annually is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
19	The EU creating clear incentives for reform with the ENP	Das Beispiel der Ukraine zeigt, wie erfolgreich diese Politik sein kann	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Das Bekenntnis der Ukrainer zur Demokratie war beeindruckend			Moralisation: abstraction
19	Die EU hat in dieser heiklen Situation rasch agiert und einen wichtigen Beitrag zur	auch dadurch, dass wir der Ukraine ein attraktives Angebot im Rahmen der	Therefore, the EU acting quickly and making an	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	Lösung der Krise geliefert	Nachbarschaftspolitik gemacht haben	important contribution is legitimised		
		dass wir jetzt im Detail umsetzen			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
19	Rasch und einstimmig agieren, aktives Krisenmanagement betreiben, politische Ziele vorgeben und eine langfristige, realistische Perspektive bieten	Dieses Beispiel zeigt auch, was Europa tun muss, um außenpolitisch erfolgreich zu sein	Therefore, the EU acting quick and unanimous is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
19	die Ideen Europas, das heißt unser Modell von Demokratie, sozialer Marktwirtschaft und transnationaler Zusammenarbeit, eine weltweite Ausstrahlung hat, die wir noch besser nützen können	Dieses Beispiel zeigt es	Therefore, the statement that the European ideas have a world wide resonance is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
20	Ferrero-Waldner being sure that Yushchenko and his government will continues to make progress with the EU's help	All dies ist eine Strategie der Heranführung an Europa – nicht des Fernhaltens (i.e. the ENP Action Plans are)	Therefore, Ferero-Waldner being sure is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Moralisation: analogy
		Ferrero-Waldner knows Yushchenko for a long time already			Authorisation: authority – expert authority
20	Eine mögliche EU-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine steht dabei nicht auf der Tagesordnung	Die Tür zur EU ist weder offen noch verschlossen	Therefore, EU membership is not on the agenda for Ukraine	*EU membership*	Moralisation: analogy
		Ich denke, wir sollen der Zukunft hier nicht vorgreifen			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Entscheidend ist, dass wir an den Reformen arbeiten – zum Wohle der Menschen in der Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
20	Entscheidend ist, dass wir an den Reformen arbeiten	zum Wohle der Menschen in der Ukraine	Therefore, it is crucial to work on the reforms	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

20	Insofern waren die letzten Monate auch ein wichtiger „Test“ für Europas Außenpolitik	Das Beispiel der Ukraine zeigt übrigens auch, was Europa tun muss, um außenpolitisch erfolgreich zu sein: Rasch und einstimmig agieren, aktives Krisenmanagement betreiben, politische Kriterien vorgeben und eine langfristige, realistische Perspektive mit all unseren Instrumenten bieten	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner stating that the crisis in Ukraine was a test for the EU's foreign policy is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
21	The EU is a transformative power	The worst thing that Europe can do is not to engage with a country but, on the contrary, to turn its back on it	Therefore, the EU being a transformative power is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: abstraction
		Its gravitational attraction helps these countries strengthen their own democratic systems			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
21	So, the EU is not – and has no wish to become – 'fortress Europe'	Our borders must not become a kind of castle wall separating a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe from a surrounding world of instability and poverty	Therefore, this is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
21	Our borders must not become a kind of castle wall separating a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe from a surrounding world of instability and poverty	That would be in no-one's interests	Therefore, this goal is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
21	Instead, we want to share the benefits of EU enlargement with our neighbours to the east and south (i.e. acting as a transformative power)	So, the EU is not – and has no wish to become – 'fortress Europe'	Therefore, this goal is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		Our borders must not become a kind of castle wall separating a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe from a surrounding world of instability and poverty			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

21	The EU offering benefits to ENP partner countries	These partner countries commit themselves to political and economic reforms	Therefore, the EU offering benefits is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
21	The EU improving its offer of benefits to Ukraine	The political reality changed in Ukraine	Therefore, the EU improving its offer of benefits to Ukraine is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: Outcome orientation
21	The EU promoting democracy	The EU believes that democracy, as well as being fundamentally fair and right, is the best guarantor of peace, stability and prosperity in any country and any region	Therefore, the EU promoting democracy is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Democratic societies, where the rule of law operates and human rights are respected, are stabler and more secure societies			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		Democratic societies are also more open to international cooperation			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		Stability, security and openness are essential for the trade and inward investment that bring economic development and prosperity. In a globalized world, this is crucial to us all			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		So, for the European Union, promoting democracy is not just a matter of solidarity with our friends abroad: it is also in our enlightened self-interest			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
22	The ninth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council taking place	The meeting allowed both sides to review the progress achieved in the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan since the endorsement of this Plan by the	Therefore, the meeting is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		"Special" EU Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting of 21 February			
22	Both the EU and Ukraine expressing satisfaction	EU-Ukraine relations are strengthened resulting from progress made to date by Ukraine in its reform efforts	Therefore, the expression of satisfaction is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
22	Both the EU and Ukraine looking forward to deeper and stronger relations	As further genuine progress is made in carrying out internal reforms and adopting European standards	Therefore, both sides looking forward to deeper and stronger relations is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
23	The EU and Ukraine proceeding with forging an even deeper partnership	After the Action Plan is implemented	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine forging an even deeper partnership is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Based on an evaluation of progress			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
23	Solana stating that now the EU-Ukraine relationship truly has the possibility to go forward quickly	The Action Plan will be implemented in the short term	Therefore, Solana stating that now the EU-Ukraine relationship truly has the possibility to go forward quickly is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
23	The substance of EU-Ukrainian cooperation in the future	Depends primarily on Ukraine and its commitment to and success in implementing reforms	Therefore, the substance of EU-Ukrainian cooperation in the future is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
23	The bulk of the work needs to be done by Ukraine	as the Plan is a powerful tool in supporting Ukraine's reforms	Therefore, Ukraine doing the bulk of the work is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
23	I am particularly pleased that the intensified political dialogue foreseen in the Action Plan is moving forward	Ukraine and the EU are forging a powerful foreign policy partnership	Therefore, Solana being pleased is legitimised	*ENP ActionPplan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

23	Ukraine and the EU are forging a powerful foreign policy partnership	Ukraine's decisive support in April of the EU's line at the UN Commission on Human Rights is convincing proof of this	Therefore, Ukraine and the EU are forging a powerful foreign policy partnership	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
23	The EU and Ukraine have a good foundation for the future	We have already increased contacts with Ukraine, and we are talking frankly and openly with each other on all levels, both officially and informally	Therefore, Ukraine and the EU have a good foundation for the future	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
23	The EU has also initiated a procedure to invite Ukraine to align itself with common EU positions on international affairs	which is a clear signal of our wish to develop our partnership and to work together on the international scene	Therefore, the EU initiating this is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
23	In the short term, we must not lose focus of what needs to be done now in order to strengthen our relationship	This partnership is a work-in-progress and we have a lot of work to do	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
24	The EESC having as its goal to help civil society of Ukraine to play its role in the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan	Its not just the task of the Government to implement the EU-UA Action Plan, - said Ms Anne-Marie Sigmund, President of the EESC, - but the responsibility of society as a whole	Therefore, the EESC having this as its goal is legitimised	*ENP Action plan*	Moralisation: analogy
		Without the involvement of all actors, the government can not succeed			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
24	The EESC wanting to come back to Ukraine	in order to hold a civil society seminar with our Ukrainian counterparts to discuss how best to go about this task	Therefore, the EESC wanting to come back to Ukraine is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
24	The EESC wanting to hold a civil society seminar with Ukrainian counterparts	to discuss how best to go about this task	Therefore, the EESC wanting to do this is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

24	we want to build up networks of regular dialogue with Ukrainian counterparts	Without prejudging the results of this conference	Therefore, the EESC wanting to do this is legitimised	*Civil society*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		in order to channel the experience we have gained to Ukrainian Civil Society, of how to effectively interact with government and in particular create a platform to reflect and monitor the progress in the EU-Ukraine partnership			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

Table 55: Overview Stage 2 of the first gas crisis

Stage 2	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	8	Speech	5	62,5%	99
		Press release	2	25%	
		Memo	1	12,5%	

Table 56: Texts collected for Stage 2 of the first gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
25: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Remarks to the joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the European Parliament and of National Parliaments – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_575	5 October 2005	Speech
26: Speech by Kallas: On the road to reforms Panel discussion "Policy of reforms in Ukraine – basis for stability and prosperity of the society" – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_582	6 October 2005	Speech
27: Memo on "An integrated market for electricity and gas across 34 European Countries" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_05_397	25 October 2005	Memo
28: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: The European Neighbourhood Policy: helping ourselves through helping our neighbours – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_658	3 November 2005	Speech
29: Speech by Hübner: "How Structural Funds reinforce competitiveness and help enlargement to succeed" – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_672	10 November 2005	Speech
30: Press release on "President Barroso to attend EU-Ukraine Summit in Kiev on 1 December" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_1506	30 November 2005	Press release
31: Joint statement of the EU and Ukraine after the EU-Ukraine Summit, pdf)	1 December 2005	Press release
32: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: "Quo Vadis Europa?" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_05_797	14 December 2005	Speech

Table 57: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 2 of the first gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
25	The ENP is proving its worth	To our east we used it successfully to support the negotiations during Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" last year	Therefore, the statement that the ENP is proving its worth is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		As part of the ENP Action Plan agreed with Ukraine we are discussing visa facilitation and readmission			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
25	The EU discussing visa facilitation and readmission with Ukraine as part of the ENP Action Plan	We want Ukrainian businessmen, officials, students and tourists to travel to the EU more easily	Therefore, the EU discussing this with Ukraine is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
26	There having been long limits in the efforts to strengthen relations between the EU and Ukraine since Ukraine became independent in 1991	mainly related to the lack of political reform in Ukraine itself	Therefore, the long pauses have been legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	The EU and Ukraine moving to a higher gear	Last year's Orange Revolution has created the conditions for Ukraine and the EU to move to a much higher gear	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine moving to a higher gear is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	At the beginning stood EU efforts to help the country in a very pragmatic way	We promoted political and economic reform by means of our assistance, which covers a broad range of areas, including support to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund	Therefore, the EU helping Ukraine in a pragmatic way is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	By concluding the Partnership and Cooperation which entered into force in	This agreement paved the way for a significant broadening of our cooperation to include in particular regular political dialogue at various levels and	Therefore, the framing of the PCA being a milestone is legitimised	*PCA*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	1998 we reached a milestone	an expanding cooperation in a broad range of sectors			
		The detailed history of the implementation of the PCA still needs to be written. But already today we can confirm that this agreement very significantly strengthened the European dimension of our relationship			Moralisation: analogy
		Since 1998 we have been continuously strengthening our interaction at the EU level proper			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	But already today we can confirm that this agreement very significantly strengthened the European dimension of our relationship	Since 1998 we have been continuously strengthening our interaction at the EU level proper	Therefore, this statement is legitimised		Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	We ask our partners to create clear structures which are transparent and accountable	One of the main aims of EU policy is to increase transparency	Therefore, the EU asking this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
26	The EU also should do this itself	One of the main aims of EU policy is to increase transparency	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
26	Kallas launching the Transparency Initiative	I have been working on transparency for some time	Therefore, Kallas launching this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		which will make the EU more transparent and accountable			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	Another important field of co-operation	Ukraine borders the EU	Therefore, this framing as it being important is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

	is the fight against fraud	and organized crime will try to create wholes which will enable smuggling and contraband			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
26	The cooperation with Ukrainian authorities is working well	OLAF is satisfied of the existing cooperation in tackling customs fraud and the evasion of customs and excise duties	Therefore, this framing is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	The EU wanting to intensify this efficient cooperation	OLAF is satisfied of the existing cooperation in tackling customs fraud and the evasion of customs and excise duties	Therefore, the EU wanting this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	The European Neighbourhood Policy has opened further opportunities for cooperation	This policy provides for a very comprehensive relationship	Therefore, the statement that the ENP has opened further opportunities for cooperation is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	This policy provides for a very comprehensive relationship	It covers the broad range of aspects of political and economic relations in addition to cooperation on more specific issues such as environment, education, health and also assistance	Therefore, the statement that this policy provides for a very comprehensive relationship is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		As a long-term perspective a stake in the internal market is on offer			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
26	In this sense this policy represents the most serious effort undertaken so far fully to exploit the very significant potential of the existing cooperation agreements	As a long-term perspective a stake in the internal market is on offer	Therefore, the ENP represents the most serious effort undertaken so far to fully exploit the potential of the existing cooperation agreements	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
26	We should all welcome this policy	In this sense this policy represents the most serious effort undertaken so far fully to exploit the very significant potential of the existing cooperation agreements	Therefore, we should all welcome this	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

26	The EU and Ukraine have made a lot of progress	Ukraine has had a genuine political will to take the twin objectives of political and economic reforms seriously	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	It is therefore primarily the vision of a prosperous and democratic state that should motivate the political leaders of our partners in their reform efforts	Ultimately, the main benefits for our partners lie in the results of internal reforms	Therefore, this vision should motivate the political leaders	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
26	the EU stands ready to provide support	But it has been a challenge and at the same time reassuring for our partners to recognise that the future depends primarily on themselves – on determination to make their country work	Therefore, the EU standing ready to provide support is legitimised	*Reforms*	Moralisation: analogy
26	For Ukraine as for other partners the insight that the future depends primarily on themselves – on determination to make their country work provides a sound basis for the future	it has been a challenge and at the same time reassuring for our partners	Therefore, this insight provides a sound basis for the future	*Reforms*	Moralisation: analogy
26	Ukraine realising its European aspirations and transforming itself in a modern democratic country	The Orange Revolution has created a unique opportunity for Ukraine to do so	Therefore, Ukraine doing this is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	Clearly, one of the key challenges of the present Ukrainian leadership is to	Both at home and among friends abroad, expectations are extraordinarily high	Therefore, the framing that one of the key challenges is Ukraine managing	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	"manage expectations" that is to say to demonstrate that Ukraine does follow the path which the Orange revolution opened		expectations is legitimised		
26	The issue of Ukraine's economic reforms is, ultimately, highly political	"Political reforms" is a heading under which ultimately all efforts fall which aim at promoting the further transformation of Ukraine in a modern, democratic state	Therefore, the statement that the issue of Ukraine's economic reforms is highly political is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	We strongly hope that Ukraine will realise its ambition and join WTO before the end of this year	since this will have a huge repercussion on Ukraine's economy and further integration into the processes of globalisation	Therefore, the EU hoping this is legitimised	*WTO*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
26	the EU Ukraine Action Plan which the EU and Ukraine jointly endorsed in February	Only the Orange Revolution made it possible for the EU to move to the implementation phase	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine jointly endorsing the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		we have a key tool at our disposal to promote the necessary political and also economic reforms in Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	the EU has made a significant effort to provide additional support to Ukraine's reform efforts	in recognition of the very positive developments in Ukraine	Therefore, the EU making this effort and this statement are legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The General Affairs Council, on the basis of proposals made jointly by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and HRSG Solana, agreed on what I am tempted to call a "Plus", i.e. a range of additional measures, including the enhancing of energy relations, closer cooperation on CFSP issues and the launching of visa facilitation negotiations			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

26	The EU-Ukraine Summit taking place on December 1	It will provide an important opportunity to acknowledge these and other first achievements	Therefore, the Summit is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		the Summit will allow us to identify key challenges ahead			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	a clear separation between business and politics is important	recent events have in particular confirmed this	Therefore, Ukraine having a separation between business and politics is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This separation should foster the implementation of the rule of law in Ukraine more generally and thereby also enhance the security of domestic and international investment			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	corruption continues to be seen as a major challenge in Ukraine itself	Recent events have also confirmed that	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	Clearly, the new government will need to take energetic and credible steps to ensure progress in this very important matter	if not addressed properly, seriously risks derailing Ukraine's reform policy	Therefore, the Ukrainian government needing to take steps is legitimised	*Reforms*	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales
		Recent events have also confirmed that corruption continues to be seen as a major challenge in Ukraine itself			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	Ukraine pursuing administrative reform	This is key for promoting change to the better, in an institution like the Commission and also in the overall process of the modernisation of a country	Therefore, Ukraine pursuing this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	In Ukraine as in other countries, strong rule of law is therefore a key condition for sustainable economic development	Clearly, democracy will not work without a fully functioning legal system	Therefore, the statement that strong rule of law in Ukraine is a key condition for sustainable economic development is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		I am sure Ukrainians wish to see judges appointed in a transparent way, laws not only adopted but also enforced, police being checked by internal controls			Authorisation: authority – personal authority

		Similarly, domestic and foreign investors alike want to know that transparent, simple and predictable rules shape the business environment, not arbitrary decisions			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
26	The preparations for and the conduct of the parliamentary elections in March next year will be the litmus test for the credibility of the leaders of Ukraine's Orange revolution	Ukrainians who fought so hard to make their voices heard democratically, will wish to know that the Orange Revolution fully respects its commitments as regards the process of democratic elections	Therefore, the framing that the parliamentary election in March next year will be a credibility test for the Orange Revolution is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Free and fair elections are rightly mentioned as a priority in the Action Plan			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
26	The EU will follow these elections very carefully	to see whether Ukraine respects the commitments it has taken towards the EU, the Council of Europe and OSCE in this important domain for the future of the country	Therefore, the EU following these elections very closely is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Free and fair elections are rightly mentioned as a priority in the Action Plan			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
26	Ukraine making progress in the areas mentioned by Kallas	This progress alone will provide the basis for a further strengthening of the relations between the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, Ukraine making progress in these areas is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Ukrainians and the EU will wish to see this progress			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
26	we cannot tell today where exactly Ukraine and the EU will stand in ten or 15 years from now	Looking at what happened to my own country, Estonia, I am profoundly convinced that History is open	Therefore, Kallas stating that he cannot exactly tell today where Ukraine and the EU will stand in 10 of 15 years from now	*EU membership*	Moralisation: analogy
26	the EU has launched a policy	which will bring Ukraine much closer to the EU	Therefore, the EU launching this policy is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		if the necessary reforms in Ukraine are carried through			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		the EU has clearly recognised the importance of Ukraine as a key partner of the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
26	Ukraine carrying through the necessary reforms	as we all wish	Therefore, Ukraine carrying through the necessary reforms is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		This will bring Ukraine much closer to the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
26	relations between the EU and Ukraine will become deeper and stronger	As Ukraine makes genuine progress in carrying out internal reforms and adopting European standards	Therefore, relations between the EU and Ukraine becoming deeper and stronger is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority Moralisation: evaluation
26	The European Commission looks forward to close cooperation with the new government	in taking this process forward	Therefore, the Commission looking forward to this is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
27	The Commission spearheading this process and the Energy Treaty	Improving the balance between energy supply and demand is crucial to improve and sustain economic development in South Eastern Europe	Therefore, the Commission spearheading this process and the Energy Treaty is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The security of supply of the European Union is based on diversifying supply of gas and electricity and in being politically able to counter threats to energy disruption in the European Union			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		A higher standard of infrastructure is needed for the citizens of South Eastern Europe following the wars of			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		the 1990s and the breakup of the East-West divide			
27	Requires a strong legal commitment by the countries of the region towards market oriented reforms, regional integration and sustainable development, and investment security	Improving the balance between energy supply and demand is crucial to improve and sustain economic development in South Eastern Europe	Therefore, the strong legal commitment required is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		This will offer significant advantages both in terms of improved utilisation of existing supply and production capacities, but also in fostering more cooperation and integration in the region			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		which would result in economic growth, stability and investment			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
27	The EU connecting the strategic area of supply with the internal energy market	we assist in assuring both the European Union's security of supply and that of the region	Therefore, the EU connecting this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
27	The citizens of this part of Europe deserve a higher standard of energy infrastructure	the destruction of the energy infrastructure in the region during the wars of the 1990s and the economic fall-out following the break up of the East-West divide have had tremendous and bad effects on the security of private citizens in this region	Therefore, the citizens deserving a higher standard of energy infrastructure is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
27	The EU Energy Community Treaty is an effective pre-accession tool	it aims to extend the benefits of the Internal Energy market before the partners of the region may become members of the European Union	Therefore, the framing of the EU Energy Community Treaty being an effective pre-accession tool is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
27	The EU Energy Community Treaty asks not for commitments to do things in the future, but for each of the	it aims to extend the benefits of the Internal Energy market before the partners of the region may become members of the European Union	Therefore, the EU Energy Community Treaty asking for the partners to do things now is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	partners to do things now				
27	The EU engaging in the active creation of a real integrated market, free of any barriers	There are strong arguments for extending the internal electricity and gas markets outside the borders of the European Union, but the creation of a level playing field and equivalent environmental and safety standards is a central element for a wider European electricity and gas market to function effectively	Therefore, the EU engaging in this is legitimised	*Energy*	Moralisation: analogy
		The process of inclusion of such countries goes considerably beyond simple questions of open trade between the European Union and its neighbours under more general international trade obligations			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
27	in South East Europe that means creating a local regional market and designing it	So that it seamlessly will fit into the general framework of the European Union's Internal Energy Market	Therefore, the EU creating and designing a local regional market is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The EU is engaging in the active creation of a real integrated market, free of any barriers			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
27	the treaty will extend the application of the energy, environmental, renewables, competition and other parts of the acquis communautaire (legislation and rules decided at EU level)	This will create a level playing field, though there will have to be credible, effective and policed transition dates	Therefore, the Energy Treaty extending the application of the energy etc. acquis is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
27	the treaty will create regional mechanisms that extend into the European Union	to allow for deeper integration of local energy markets	Therefore, the Treaty creating regional mechanisms is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
27	The EU enabling regulation in the	the treaty will create regional mechanisms that extend into	Therefore, the EU enabling this	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	future allowing for accelerated infrastructure development, in particular for gas pipelines	the European Union to allow for deeper integration of local energy markets	in the future is legitimised		means orientation
27	there is agreement to work toward common policies for external trade, mutual assistance and the removal of internal energy market barriers	Given that the idea of a common energy market is central to the Energy Community	Therefore, the fact that there is agreement to work towards common policies is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
27	The EU creating the Gas Forum	With respect to issues of the Regional Gas Market in South East Europe, these will be dealt under the Gas Forum	Therefore, the creation of the Gas Forum is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It will create a regional plan for the creation of a gas market			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
28	ENP is also making a major contribution to economic growth and increased prosperity	By helping the countries move their legislation closer to ours, harmonise standards and increase cooperation on transport and energy, we facilitate their access to our internal market and opportunities for trade	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
28	The EU setting out 10 priority actions	In response to the peaceful resolution to Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" last year	Therefore, the EU setting out these 10 actions is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		to support and facilitate Ukraine's reforms			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
28	Progress in implementing those actions	has been guided by the pace of Ukraine's reforms	Therefore, progress in the implementation of those actions is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		and the conduct of next year's parliamentary elections will also be key			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

28	the EU has been keeping its commitments	We hope we will be able to respond to Ukraine's economic reforms by announcing Market Economy Status at the 1 December EU-Ukraine Summit	Therefore, the EU has been keeping its commitment	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
28	we have responded quickly to their steps towards this	We know how important this is to Ukraine	Therefore, the EU responding quickly is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
28	The EU and Ukraine wanting to endorse a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation	The Summit will also be the occasion for us	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine wanting to do this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		which the Commission has been working on throughout this year			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
29	The Union has devised its European Neighbourhood Policy	as a way of helping the other countries in the region to integrate with the Union	Therefore, the EU devising the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
29	it is of course Ukraine which has grabbed most of the headlines	since the Orange Revolution	Therefore, Ukraine grabbing the headlines is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
29	I think our role in the Union has to be to support Ukraine in the reforms	which it has undertaken since the beginning of this year and is continuing to take	Therefore, the EU supporting Ukraine in the reforms is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: custom – tradition
29	The EU underpinning the implementation of the Action Plan with technical assistance and financial aid	I think our role in the Union has to be to support Ukraine in the reforms	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
29	The Union and Ukraine will then together decide on the next steps to be taken in our relationship	Implementing the Action Plan will already mean that Ukraine has begun to fulfill some of the conditions for deeper integration with the Union	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine deciding this together will be legitimised if Ukraine has implemented the Action Plan	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

29	the Union must push on with the job of integrating the European continent	This spreads our values and our standards	Therefore, the EU pushing on its job of integrating the European continent is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		leading to more security and a better standard of life for all			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
29	Policies will have to change	to allow this (the EU integrating the European continent)	Therefore, policies having to change is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
29	at some time we will have to come back to some of those institutional proposals	to allow this (the EU integrating the European continent)	Therefore, coming back to those institutional proposals is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
29	working on the Union's absorption capacity is essential	to allow this (the EU integrating the European continent)	Therefore, working on the EU's absorption capacity is legitimised	*EU membership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
30	The EU and Ukraine holding their first Summit since the Orange Revolution	The Summit will demonstrate how much has already been achieved under Ukraine's new leadership and it will also show the progress made in implementing the Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine are holding their first summit since the Orange Revolution	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Summit will provide the backdrop for the signing of three agreements between the EU and Ukraine: a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation, and agreements on Galileo and Aviation			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Summit is expected to announce that Ukraine has now met the technical criteria for the granting of Market Economy Status			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
30	The implementation of the ENP	through which the EU is supporting Ukraine's reform efforts	Therefore, the implementation of the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

30	The European Union remains committed to help Ukraine integrate more closely with the EU through its Neighbourhood Policy	We have kept our promise to launch visa facilitation negotiations in 2005	Therefore, the statement that the EU remains committed to help Ukraine through the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and tomorrow I look forward to informing President Yushchenko of our intention to grant Market Economy Status to Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
30	The EU granting MES to Ukraine	MES will be granted as soon as the remaining procedures have been completed	Therefore, the EU granting MES to Ukraine is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
30	The EU encouraging the Ukrainian government to address the last remaining issues in this regard (WTO accession)	so that work can start on deepening economic integration between the EU and Ukraine through the creation of a Free Trade Area	Therefore, the EU encouraging the Ukrainian government is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
30	The EU and Ukraine will be signing a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy	The memorandum foresees increased co-operation in all energy fields (including electricity, oil, gas and coal) with the long-term perspective of a future integration of EU and Ukraine energy markets	Therefore, the Memorandum will be signed	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
30	the launch of negotiations on visa facilitation	which should simplify procedures for Ukrainians seeking visas to travel to Europe	Therefore, the launch of negotiations on visa facilitation is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
31	The leaders of the European Union and Ukraine met in Kiev today	for the EU-Ukraine Summit	Therefore, the meeting of the leaders is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
31	New prospects had opened up for Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations	Ukraine committed to democracy and reforms	Therefore, the new prospects opening up is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
31	EU-Ukraine relations were now deeper and stronger	as a result of the significant progress achieved in implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

31	EU leaders confirmed their commitment to initiate early consultations on a new enhanced agreement between EU and Ukraine	to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement	Therefore, the initiation of early consultations on a new enhanced agreement is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		as soon as the political priorities of the Action Plan have been addressed			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
31	EU leaders welcomed the decision by the Ukrainian government to continue visa-free travel for EU citizens	thereby contributing to the promotion of closer ties	Therefore, the EU leaders welcoming this is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
31	Ukraine underlined the importance of the introduction of a visa free regime between the EU and Ukraine as a long-term goal	Ukraine and the EU stressed the importance of strengthening people-to-people contacts	Therefore, Ukraine underlining this is legitimised	*Visa*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
31	EU leaders looked forward to an early start of negotiations of a Free Trade Area	in order to achieve the goal of promoting deep economic integration between the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, EU leaders looking forward to this is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		once Ukraine has joined the WTO			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
31	EU leaders stressing their commitment to continue to offer assistance in meeting the necessary requirements	EU leaders underlined strong support for Ukraine's early accession to the WTO	Therefore, the EU leaders stressing their commitment is legitimised	*WTO*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
31	Leaders of the EU and Ukraine stress the importance of the rapid implementation of the Memorandum of	The Memorandum is aiming at a progressive integration of the Ukrainian energy market to the EU	Therefore, the importance of the rapid implementation of the Memorandum is stressed	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The Memorandum is aiming at enhancing energy security			

	Understanding on co-operation in the field of energy				Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Leaders signed agreements on this			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
31	EU leaders welcomed Ukraine's European choice	Ukraine's commitment to democracy and reforms opens new prospects for a considerable enhancement of the level and quality of EU-Ukraine relations	Therefore, EU leaders welcomed Ukraine's European choice	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Ukraine reiterated its strategic goal to be fully integrated into the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation (because of this statement, this outcome, the EU leaders welcomed their European choice)
32	The EU pursuing a more effective foreign policy	There is a strong public demand	Therefore, the EU is pursuing a more effective foreign policy	*EU foreign policy*	Authority: personal (public wants it)
		A more effective EU foreign policy meets global challenges like terrorism, poverty and political instability			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation (foreign policy is a means)
		External action gives Europe democratic legitimacy			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
32	The EU finetuning its foreign policy	The EU foreign policy is essentially about the management of globalisation	Therefore, the EU should fine-tune its foreign policy	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
32	The EU having an active foreign policy in its neighbourhood	If the Union does not spread stability prosperity in its neighbourhood, it will import instability in the long run / it is in the enlightened self-interest of the EU to engage with its neighbours	Therefore, the EU should have an active foreign policy in its neighbourhood	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation (goal is to prevent the

					import of instability)
32	EU-enlargement	Has been a key tool to project stability	Therefore, EU-enlargement is legitimised	*EU membership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Resulted in the reunification of Europe			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
32	The EU slowing down its enlargement	Every political Union has borders	Therefore, the EU is slowing down its enlargement	*EU membership*	Authority: custom – conformity (acceptability of what most people do)
		We must honour our present basic commitments in the enlargement process, while insisting strictly on all criteria			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Enlargement is not a one-way street (conditionality is involved; shared values should be adhered to)			Moralisation: abstraction
		The EU must consolidate itself			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The EU should communicate the advantages of enlargement to its citizens more actively and take the pessimism that prevails in some quarters more seriously			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation (when this is done better enlargement could become possible again)
32	The EU must be crystal-clear about EU conditionality	Enlargement is not a one-way street	Therefore, the EU being crystal clear about conditionality is legitimised	*EU membership*	Moralisation: abstraction
		To use our gravitational pull efficiently as a lever for reforms			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Our shared values are the fundament of our common European home			Moralisation: evaluation
32	The EU consolidating itself	Overstretching it would be highly detrimental, for us and our partners	Therefore, the EU consolidating	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction

			itself is legitimised		
32	The EU should communicate the advantages of enlargement to its citizens more actively and take the pessimism that prevails in some quarters more seriously	Politics is about leading people, not about running out of sight	Therefore, the EU communicating is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: analogy
		We cannot allow ourselves to get ahead of our public opinion			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
32	The EU legitimises the ENP becoming even more important	The EU has inherent limits of enlargement	Therefore, the ENP is becoming even more important	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		The ENP is the EU's way of ensuring that Europe's borders are connecting people rather than separating them			Moralisation: analogy
32	The ENP is a key priority for EU external relations	It is a virtuous cycle: by helping our neighbours, we help ourselves (by investing in our neighbours, creating stable conditions around us, we extend prosperity and security of our citizens)	Therefore, the ENP is a key priority for EU external relations	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The ENP is a win-win policy based on shared interest and values			Moralisation: abstraction
32	The Action Plans are tailor-made for each country's needs	Ukraine has an "avant-garde" status within the ENP with much deeper cooperation	Therefore, the Action Plans are tailor-made for each country's needs	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation (because Ukraine has such needs they have avant-garde status)
32	The ENP is not just a "second-best" option for the EU's partners	It is a very substantial policy with palpable incentives	Therefore, the ENP is not just a "second-best" option for the EU's partners	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		It is a policy that works and delivers to our partners abroad and to Europe's citizens			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It responds to our neighbours' desire for closer relations with the EU, *without* offering a perspective of membership			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation (the

					ENP is "responsive" to the desires of the EU's neighbours
32	EU accession is not on the ENP agenda	First things first	Therefore, EU accession is not on the ENP agenda	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation (*realistic* goals should be kept in mind)
		The "journey to Brussels" is more important than its final destination			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation (the means of integration are framed as being more important than the goal of membership)

Table 58: Overview of Stage 3 of the first gas crisis

Stage 3	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	1	Speech	1	100%	13

Table 59: Texts collected for Stage 3 of the first gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
33: Speech by EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcoming the agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz (Jan. 4, 2006) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_1	4 January 2006	Speech

Table 60: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 3 of the first gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
33	The EU (Commission) working hard	to make it clear to both sides of this dispute that Europe considers it vital to reach a rapid solution	Therefore, the EU worked hard	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
33	The EU stressing that such a quick agreement was vital	if Russia and the Ukraine were to retain their position as a reliable and secure gas and transit suppliers to Europe	Therefore, the EU stressed that such a quick agreement was vital	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
33	Indeed, I believe that we can say that, with this action, both Gazprom and Naftogaz have proved their determination to remain wholly reliable suppliers of gas and transit respectively to the EU	such a quick agreement was vital if Russia and the Ukraine were to retain their position as a reliable and secure gas and transit suppliers to Europe	Therefore, Gazprom and Naftogaz have proved their determination	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
33	Commissioner Piebalgs having	Have clearly played a role in providing the necessary impetus for reaching this deal	Therefore, the Commissioner having those	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	many contacts with representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian governments and their gas companies		contacts is legitimised		outcome orientation
33	The Gas Coordination Group meeting today	Has clearly played a role in providing the necessary impetus for reaching this deal	Therefore, the meeting of the Gas Coordination Group today has been legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
33	The EU having coordinated its approach carefully between the Commission and the Member States	This enabled the EU to present a clear and effective European approach on this issue	Therefore, the EU coordinating its approach is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
33	The Gas co-ordination group meeting today	It ensures real transparency It provides a Community method to deal with issues such as these	Therefore, the Gas co-ordination group meeting today is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
33	The Commission proposing the Gas Security of Supply Directive	Does provide at least the basis of an appropriate mechanism to deal with such situations	Therefore, the Gas Security of Supply Directive is legitimised (even though watered down)	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
33	the manner that the Commission and Council have dealt	has been shown to have been both measured and successful	Therefore, the manner that the Commission and Council have dealt with	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	with the issue		the issue is legitimised		
33	We have worked carefully behind the scenes in the run up to the dispute	to establish that a potential supply disruption would not cause a short term energy crisis in Europe	Therefore, the Commission and the Council working behind the scenes is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
33	The creation of the Energy Dialogues between the Community and both Ukraine and Russia	These Energy Dialogues have provided the EU with the necessary framework to get its views across effectively and established the relationship of trust between us to enable this to be done in the clearest possible terms.	Therefore, the creation of the Energy Dialogues has been legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		This crisis has shown the benefits			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
33	it is clear that Europe needs a clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security of energy supply	To date, the issue of security of energy supply is only really considered at national Member State level; but in reality we need a much greater European-wide approach on this issue	Therefore, a more collective and cohesive policy on the security of energy supply is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation Moralisation: analogy
		Indeed, the need for this was already identified at the Hampton Court Summit			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
33	Piebalgs issuing a first Communication on a new European Energy Policy in spring, drawing final conclusions and proposals before the	it is clear that Europe needs a clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security of energy supply	Therefore, Piebalgs doing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	end of the year				

Table 61: overview Stage 4 of the first gas crisis

Stage 4	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	10	Speech	9	90%	81
		Press release	1	10%	

Table 62: Texts collected for Stage 4 of the first gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
34: Speech by Barroso: Remarks on the programme of the Austrian Presidency of the European Union – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_13	18 January 2006	Speech
35: Speech / Public lecture by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn: "Enlargement in the evolution of the European Union" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_22	20 January 2006	Speech
36: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner on "European Strategies for Promoting Democracy in Post- Communist Countries" (Vienna) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_35	20 January 2006	Speech
37: Speech by EU Commissioner for External Relations and ENP Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: "Quo vadis Europa?" in German, updated part on Ukraine and the gas crisis and the EU's role in this https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_43	26 January 2006	Speech
38: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Europas Verfassung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_42	26 January 2006	Speech
39: Speech by President of European Commission Barroso: "From Pittsburgh to Lisbon: reform in times of change" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_74	10 Februar y 2006	Speech
40: Speech by EU Commissioner for External Relations and ENP Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: "Managing Globalisation – the case for a European foreign policy" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_75	10 Februar y 2006	Speech
41: Die EU muss, so der Vizepräsident des Österreichischen Gemeindebundes, die Energiequellen diversifizieren und die Effizienz steigern –	17 Februar y 2006	Press release by Commit

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/cor_06_16		tee of the Regions
42: Speech by Dimas: Closing Speech at the Solar Solidarity Exhibition – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_118	23 February 2006	Speech
43: Transcript of speech by Piebalgs: "EU-Ukraine: Common Energy Challenges" at Conference on "Electricity Sector of Ukraine – Status and Plans ahead" https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_06_132	Speech at 28 Feb. 2006, transcript published on 1 March, 2006	Speech

Table 63: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 4 of the first gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
34	I want to thank the Austrian Presidency	for its excellent cooperation in dealing with the recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, Barroso thanking the Austrian Presidency is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
34	Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability	The recent crisis and persistent high oil prices teach a lesson to those who normally resist and obstruct to provide an European dimension for the energy policy	Therefore, Europe having this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
34	the Commission announced a Green Paper on secure, competitive and	Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability	Therefore, the Commission announcing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	sustainable energy policy				
34	We are also preparing a series of new initiatives on energy efficiency and clean technologies	Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability	Therefore, the EU preparing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
34	We will take up the debate initiated with the bio-mass action plan and complement it with a Communication on bio-fuels	Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability	Therefore, the EU will take up this debate	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
34	we will put forward ideas for developing a real pan-European energy market	Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversification of sources, security of supply and sustainability	Therefore, the EU putting forward these ideas is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		enhancing cooperation with our neighbouring countries			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Here is an example of common sense driving a common approach where no option should be excluded			Moralisation: abstraction
34	Now is the moment for the European institutions to play their role, with ambition and rigour	National leaders, and citizens, see the sense of a common, coherent European policy	Therefore, the statement that now is the moment is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
34	Barroso looking forward to working with	Now is the moment for the European institutions to play their role, with ambition and rigour	Therefore, Barroso looking	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	you over the coming months	to give shape to a European Energy Policy	forward is legitimised		Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
35	Rehn stating that a theoretical discussion about whether Ukraine should eventually join the EU would benefit neither the Union nor the Ukrainians at this point in time	We now have a consolidated enlargement agenda	Therefore, Rehn stating this is legitimised	*EU membership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Enlargement policy should not be held hostage to a theological debate about the ideal shape of the perfect Union, or the final borders of Europe			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
35	Let's respect the principle of Article 49 of the EU's Treaties, which states that any European country that respects and applies European values, especially democracy, Human Rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, may apply for EU membership	That does not mean that every European country must apply, or that the EU has to accept every one. But it does mean that we should remain open to changes on our continent.	Therefore, Barroso stating that the EU should respect Article 49 is legitimised	*EU membership*	Moralisation: analogy
		To close the door forever, by drawing a line across the map to define Europe once and for all, would not be good for us or for any of our neighbours			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		Sometimes, the art of politics requires the art of ambiguity			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
36	The EU believes democracy is inherently valuable and	as an organisation founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law	Therefore, the EU believing this is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

	universally desirable				
36	The EU fostering values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its partners	The EU believes democracy is inherently valuable and universally desirable The EU feels morally obliged to do so	Therefore, the EU fostering values is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
					Theoretical rationalisation: explanation Moralisation: evaluation
		But it is not just a question of high-minded principle, the EU's Security Strategy makes clear "the best protection of our security is a world of well-governed states"			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
36	the EU's Security Strategy makes clear "the best protection of our security is a world of well-governed states"	Democracies are, on the whole, more prosperous and more stable and therefore make better partners. And better governments for their people	Therefore, the EU's Security Strategy making clear that the best protection of our security is a world of well-governed states is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
36	EU focusing on democracy promotion in the post-communist world today	The post-communist world is a region that is even more important to the EU (compared to the Middle East and North Africa)	Therefore, the EU focusing on this region today is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		The challenges of democratic transition remain in the post-communist world			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
36	The post-communist world is a region that is even more	given its co-habitation with the EU	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

	important to the EU (compared to the Middle East and North Africa)				
36	The EU placing particular importance on our immediate neighbourhood	It is only natural for us	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
36	it is no surprise that this region has been in the vanguard of the EU's democratisation efforts	It is only natural that the EU is placing particular importance on our immediate neighbourhood	Therefore, this region being in the vanguard of the EU's democratisation efforts is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
36	The EU continuing to use Europe's power to attract, stabilise and transform	Following our tremendous success with enlargement	Therefore, the EU continuing to do so is legitimised	*EU membership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
36	The EU continuing to use Europe's power to attract, stabilise and transform as the guiding principle of the latest addition to our democratization toolbox, the European Neighbourhood Policy	Following our tremendous success with enlargement	Therefore, the EU continuing to do so through the ENP legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
36	The EU having the ENP	The Neighbourhood Policy gives us a framework for promoting democracy and economic development in the countries	Therefore, the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		around the borders of an expanded EU			
36	The ENP providing our partners with incentives to reform	It aims to encourage the spirit of democracy	Therefore, the ENP providing these incentives is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		In this way the EU fosters and encourages democratic reform, but does not impose it: the impetus must always come from within			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
36	The EU offering a share in the EU's single market; closer cooperation on energy and transport links; and a chance to participate in the EU's internal programmes	In return for progress to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, and to promote market-oriented economic reforms	Therefore, the EU offering this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
36	Ukraine was in the avant garde of our policy of conditionality	as we used the incentives offered by the Neighbourhood Policy to help resolve the 2004 crisis	Therefore, Ukraine being in the avant garde of the policy of conditionality is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
36	We put the Action Plan on ice	until the crisis was resolved	Therefore, the putting on ice of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
36	and then drew up a 10 point plan going even beyond its scope	until the crisis was resolved	Therefore, this is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
36	Since then we have worked hard with the government	We have responded to every move the government has made	Therefore, the statement that the EU has worked hard	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	to help keep Ukraine on the path of democracy	and significant progress has been achieved	with the government to help keep Ukraine on the path of democracy is legitimised		Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
36	But this road is not easy, nor is it always predictable	as recent events have shown (i.e. gas crisis!)	Therefore, the statement that this road is not easy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
36	We are of course concerned that Ukraine's democratic gains be preserved	But this road is not easy, nor is it always predictable, as recent events have shown	Therefore, the EU being concerned is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
36	The EU being confident that the Ukrainian people will find the necessary resilience and determination to see this process through to the end	who showed such commitment to democratic values in the freezing temperatures last winter	Therefore, the EU being confident is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
37	The EU connecting its talks behind closed doors during the gas crisis with its energy politics	This is a perfect example of European "added value"	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
38	Die EU-Außenpolitik ist für dieses „Globalisierungsmanagement" unabdingbar	An die Frage der Energiesicherheit, wie sie sich im Gasstreit zwischen Russland und der Ukraine manifestiert hat …	Therefore, EU foreign policy is indispensible in globalisation-management	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Europa hätte keine Chance, seine Interessen durchzusetzen, wenn es nicht mit einer Stimme spräche			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

39	Europe must have an improved, more coordinated energy policy, based on the principles of diversificatio n of sources, security of supply and sustainability	The recent crisis between Russia and Ukraine has taught us a lesson	Therefore, Europe needing an improved energy policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
39	The Commission will come forward with ideas	to make this a reality	Therefore, the Commission coming forward with ideas is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and encourage the development of a real, pan-European energy market			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
39	The EU adhering to a new dynamic of integration: political dynamics are driving institutional consensus	National leaders and citizens in Europe can all now see the sense in creating a common, coherent European energy policy (i.e. as a result of the gas crisis)	Therefore, the EU adhering to this new dynamic of integration is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		It is this virtuous circle of cause and effect that will help Europe to keep reinventing itself, just as Pittsburgh reinvented itself			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It is this virtuous circle that will keep Europe at the forefront of global developments			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It is this virtuous circle that will keep Europe in control of its own destiny			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It is this virtuous circle that will keep Europe as a strong and reliable partner for the United States and its other friends in the world.			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
40	The EU boosting its energy cooperation	as part of a broader EU effort on energy supply	Therefore, the EU boosting its energy	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		The events at the beginning of the year between Russia, Moldova and Ukraine provided a sharp reminder of the importance of energy security, and its susceptibility to political manipulation	cooperation is legitimised		Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales
40	The EU building a stronger foreign policy	is the only sensible response to globalisation	Therefore, the EU legitimises building a stronger foreign policy	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The stronger we are, the more we can achieve			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		And by achieving concrete results we will re-establish confidence in the EU and demonstrate to our citizens the benefits of European Union in the 21st century			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
40	The EU debating its foreign policy	The debate is not new / The EU has been moving in that direction for some time	Therefore, the EU debating a stronger foreign policy is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Authorisation: Custom – Tradition
40	The EU taking next steps in building a stronger foreign policy	Our task is to translate all this into equivalent political weight on the world stage	Therefore, the EU legitimises building a stronger foreign policy	*EU foreign policy*	Authorisation: authority – role model
40	Already our "transformati ve" power has had a momentous impact on the European continent	EU enlargement has made an extraordinary contribution to peace and prosperity thanks to our strategic use of the incentives on offer	Therefore, the statement that the EU's "transformativ e" power has had a momentous impact is legitimised	*EU membership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
40	The EU continuing enlargement	The EU's member states have made commitments to continue enlargement	Therefore, the EU will deliver on these commitments	*EU membership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
40	The EU slowing down enlargement	Yet it is clear that in some member states the pace and scale of the process is approaching the limit of what public opinion can bear.	Therefore, the EU will slow down its enlargement	*EU membership*	Authorisation: authority – expert authority

		We also have to consider our absorption capacity - the EU cannot enlarge ad infinitum			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
40	The EU using the ENP instead of enlargement	Yet it is clear that in some member states the pace and scale of the process is approaching the limit of what public opinion can bear. We also have to consider our absorption capacity - the EU cannot enlarge ad infinitum	Therefore, the use of the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – expert authority
		in order to pursue our geo-strategic interest in expanding the zone of stability, security and prosperity beyond our borders			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
40	The EU offering our eastern and southern neighbours many of the benefits previously associated only with membership through the ENP	ENP builds on the wealth of experience we have accumulated in helping states transition to democracy and market economy	Therefore, the ENP offers many of the benefits previously associated only with membership	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – expert authority
40	The EU offering the ENP	It is designed to offer a privileged form of partnership *now*, irrespective of the exact nature of the *future* relationship with the EU	Therefore, the EU offering the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: analogy
		By increasing our neighbours' stability, security and prosperity we increase the stability, security and prosperity of the EU. ENP is a policy of enlightened self interest – by helping our neighbours we help ourselves			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
40	ENP is based on the kind of conditionality underpinning the enlargement process	Only as our partners fulfil *their* commitments to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights; promote market-oriented economic reforms; and cooperate on key foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, will *we* offer an even deeper relationship.	Therefore, the statement that the ENP is based on the kind of conditionality underpinning the enlargement process is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

40	The EU having the ENP	ENP also enables us to tackle some of our citizens' most pressing concerns, like migration, energy supplies, security, and terrorism	Therefore, the EU having the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
40	The EU using the ENP as a tool for promoting good governance and open societies	It increases the EU's security	Therefore, using the ENP as a tool for promoting good governance and open societies is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
40	The EU having the ENP	It is early days for ENP, but it illustrates how we are already actively addressing the public's concerns	Therefore, the ENP is already legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation (ENP is the means to address the public's concerns)
40	The EU finding the will for a strong foreign policy capable of delivering results	The European Union can only strengthen its credibility by producing results	Therefore, the EU finding the will for a strong foreign policy is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		We must respond to the needs of the moment			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		That will answer our publics' questions about the purpose of the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		That will give Europe new momentum			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		And it will position us to manage the challenges we will face in the future			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
41	Die von Bernd Vögerle, Vizepräsident des Österreichisc hen	Die Wichtigkeit dieses Themas wurde zuletzt durch die in einigen Mitgliedstaaten als Folge der Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem russischen Gasmonopolisten Gazprom und der benachbarten Ukraine	Therefore, Vögerle underlining this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	Gemeindebundes, vorgelegte Stellungnahme unterstreicht außerdem die Notwendigkeit, die Energiequellen der EU zu diversifizieren	entstandene Brennstoffknappheit verdeutlicht			
41	"Wir müssen sicher sein, dass unsere Energieversorgung gewährleistet bleibt," sagte SPE-Mitglied Vögerle	Die Wichtigkeit dieses Themas wurde zuletzt durch die in einigen Mitgliedstaaten als Folge der Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem russischen Gasmonopolisten Gazprom und der benachbarten Ukraine entstandene Brennstoffknappheit verdeutlicht	Therefore, Vögerle stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
42	The EU supporting renewable energies and increased in the energy mix of the European Union	First of all, Europe's own oil, gas and coal reserves are running out	Therefore, the EU supporting renewable energies is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Secondly, oil and gas prices have recently risen to heights not seen for many years			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Thirdly, an estimated 1.7 billion people worldwide lack electricity			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
42	Europe's own oil, gas and coal reserves are running out	Today we import 50% of our energy needs, in two decades it will be 70% if nothing changes	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
42	Renewables offer a way out of our dependency on imported fossil fuels	The recent gas price dispute between Russia and Ukraine and the continued instability in the Middle East illustrate the precariousness of our situation and the uncertainty in which the European Union could be easily put	Therefore, renewables offer a way out of our dependency on imported fossil fuels	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
42	oil and gas prices have recently risen	Many experts say that because of continuously growing demand from the booming economies of	Therefore, oil and gas prices have recently	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority –

	to heights not seen for many years	China and India the era of cheap oil is over	risen to heights not seen for many years		expert authority
42	The EU developing other energy sources to fuel our economies	these experts recommend this	Therefore, the EU developing other energy sources is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – expert authority
42	Thirdly, an estimated 1.7 billion people worldwide lack electricity	Only 8% of the population in certain African countries have direct access to electricity	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
43	EU supporting Ukraine organising the conference "Electricity Sector of Ukraine – Status and Plans ahead"	I am sure this event will be an excellent opportunity to take stock of the current situation with respect to developments in the electricity sector in Ukraine	Therefore, the EU supports organising this conference	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		in view of our common objective of bringing our markets closer together			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
43	The Commission outlining its views on how energy policy in the EU should be shaped for the future	The EU needs a response to the challenge of increasing energy demand and declining oil and gas reserves	Therefore, the Commission outlining a view is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
43	The EU promoting a Wider-Europe Energy Market, based on common principles, values and regulatory approaches	This will be an important element of a future policy	Therefore, the EU promoting this is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
43	The EU reinforcing co-operation	Re-enforced co-operation with Ukraine is a key element of our considerations in this respect (of	Therefore, the EU reinforcing cooperation	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

	with Ukraine in energy	energy demand and oil and gas reserves)	with Ukraine is legitimised		
43	The EU and Ukraine signing the Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of energy which was signed on 1 December 2005	It constitutes a good basis for working together	Therefore, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It recognises that the EU and Ukraine face common energy challenges			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		Indeed, issues such as … are key concerns for both parties			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		The Memorandum establishes a joint strategy towards the progressive integration of the Ukrainian and the EU energy market			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Memorandum also foresees the development of a roadmap on energy efficiency, renewables and measures to tackle climate change			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
43	Piebalgs stating that this roadmap should thus be developed rapidly	demand management has now become a key priority for Ukraine	Therefore, Piebalgs stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
43	EU stating that Ukraine must meet internationally recognised nuclear safety standards	In order to strengthen public confidence in the benefits of enabling trade in electricity between the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, the EU stating that Ukraine must meet internationally recognised nuclear safety standards is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	EU and Ukraine underlining in the Memorandum that safety of nuclear installations is a primary objective for both parties	In order to strengthen public confidence in the benefits of enabling trade in electricity between the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine underlining that safety of nuclear installations is a priority is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	Piebalgs stating that	Ukraine and the EU underline in the Memorandum that safety of	Therefore, Piebalgs	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority –

	rapid progress is necessary in this area	nuclear installations is a primary objective for both parties	stating this is legitimised		personal authority
43	Piebalgs stating that the integration of electricity markets requires the implementation of key elements of Community rules on electricity	A level playing field with respect to the rules prevailing in all parts of the wider market will facilitate the development of substantial trade between the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, Piebalgs stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	The EU promoting Ukrainian membership in the Energy Community	As regards the framework for a future participation of Ukraine in the internal electricity market, both sides consider membership of Ukraine in the Energy Community as the appropriate solution	Therefore, the EU promoting Ukrainian membership in the Energy Community is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		The Treaty establishing the South-East Europe Energy Community was signed on 25 October 2005			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		I expect its entry into force this summer			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
43	The EU and Ukraine signing the MoU	Against this background (of the Energy Community), the MoU provides for Ukraine to align its legislation with the relevant Community rules as envisaged under the Energy Community	Therefore, the signing of the MoU is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	Piebalgs being confident that this ambitious objective can be met	provided both the Ukrainian government and industry are strongly committed to this process	Therefore, Piebalgs being confident is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Already under previous governments important first steps towards market reform have been taken, such as the creation of a regulatory authority			Authorisation: custom – authority of conformity
43	Piebalgs encouraging the Ukrainian government	Already under previous governments important first steps towards market reform have been	Therefore, Piebalgs encouragement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Authorisation: custom – authority of conformity

	to further pursue market reform	taken, such as the creation of a regulatory authority			
		Only when both the Ukrainian government and industry are strongly committed to this process can the ambitious objective be met			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	The EU promoting the establishment of an interconnecti on between the system operated by the Union for the Co-ordination of the Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) and the Ukrainian grid system	Apart from equivalent market rules, trade in electricity requires a reliable physical interconnection. At the moment only a minor part of the Ukrainian electricity system is connected to the EU system	Therefore, the establishment of an interconnectio n between the system ooperated by the Union and the Ukrainian grid system is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
43	A comprehensi ve study, co-financed by the Commission, is currently ongoing to look at possible options of linking the synchronousl y interconnecte d CIS electricity system with the UCTE system	The establishment of an interconnection between the system operated by the Union for the Co-ordination of the Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) and the Ukrainian grid system will thus be necessary	Therefore, the Commission undertaking this comprehensive study is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
43	The EU stating that Ukraine should significantly upgrade its	I know that the objective of Ukraine is to become a full member of UCTE	Therefore, the EU stating that Ukraine should significantly update its	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	system to meet UCTE standards		system is legitimised		
43	Piebalgs making a statement about gas	The MoU and indeed the Energy Community cover both, electricity and gas market reform and integration	Therefore, Piebalgs making a statement about gas is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
43	Progress in reforming gas markets is necessary for the development of a competitive electricity sector	Gas is becoming increasingly important as input fuel for electricity production and a real market of electricity requires fair and equal access to all input fuels	Therefore, the statement that progress in reforming gas markets is necessary is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
43	The EU advocating for the creation of an open gas market	Progress in reforming gas markets is necessary for the development of a competitive electricity sector	Therefore, the EU advocates for the creation of an open gas market	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	The MoU addressing the security of transit of gas through Ukraine to the EU	Another important issue related to gas is security of transit through Ukraine, which is an important transit country for deliveries of gas to the European Union	Therefore, the MoU addresses the security of transit of gas through Ukraine to the EU	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation (Ukraine is an important transit country *therefore* we address this)
43	The establishment of a joint EU-Ukraine technical support Group	The MoU addresses this issue	Therefore, the establishment of a joint EU-Ukraine technical support Group is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		to develop and suggest concrete measures in this area			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
43	The creation of a wider-Europe Energy Market is the objective of the European Commission	Such a market must be based on common principles, values and regulatory approaches	Only then can such a market be created	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
					Moralisation: evaluation

43	The EU requiring strong commitment of the Ukrainian government to the process of reforming its electricity and gas sector	Ukraine should be a part of such a wider-Europe Energy Market	Therefore, the EU requiring this from Ukraine is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		I can tell you from our own experience within the EU that this is not an easy task			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

Appendix II – Corpus of data: second gas crisis

Table 64: Overview Stage 1 of the second gas crisis

Stage 1	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	26	Speech	12	46,2%	211
		Press release	11	42,3%	
		Memo	2	7,7%	
		Communication from Commission	1	3,8%	

Table 65: Texts collected for Stage 1 of the second gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
44: Statement of Commissioner Piebalgs and Minister Vizjak on resolving Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_383	4 March 2008	Press release
45: Gas Coordination Group evaluates the recent dispute between Russia and Ukraine – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_432	11 March 2008	Press release
46: Twelfth Meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_08_71	11 March 2008	Press release
47: EU deepens ties with its neighbours and supports their reforms – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_509	3 April 2008	Press release
48: European Neighbourhood Policy – UKRAINE – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_08_215	3 April 2008	Memo
49: Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council - Implementation of the European neighbourhood policy in 2007 – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008DC0164&qid=1653306569543	3 April 2008	Communication from Commission t
50: A stronger Europe through deepening and widening – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_184	8 April 2008	Speech
51: The European Union and its place in the world – the current agenda – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_182	8 April 2008	Speech

52: Europe's smart power in its region and the world – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_222	1 May 2008	Speech
53: Commissioner Piebalgs participates in Kiev's Energy Security Summit – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_788	23 May 2008	Press release
54: The European Neighbourhood Policy – making Europe more secure – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_285	28 May 2008	Speech
55: Perspectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_306	5 June 2008	Speech
56: 2884th Council meeting Agriculture and Fisheries – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_08_200	15 July 2008	Press release
57 The EU – from civilian power to premier league security policy player? – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_399	27 August 2008	Speech
58: Speech by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner in the European Parliament after the extraordinary European Council – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_401	1 September 2008	Speech
59: Leaders look forward to a new phase in EU-Ukraine relations – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_1302	9 September 2008	Press release
60: EU - Ukraine Relations – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_08_556	9 September 2008	Memo
61: EU-Ukraine Summit – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_08_247	9 September 2008	Press release
62: A Letter from Brussels to the Next President of the United States of America – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_455	24 September 2008	Speech
63: Energy Security and Foreign Policy – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_458	24 September 2008	Speech
64: The EESC takes forward the cooperation among civil society in Ukraine and the EU – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ces_08_81	29 September 2008	Press release

65: "Regions are new actors of economic development" – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_483	2 October 2008	Speech
66: Figel' on official visit to Ukraine – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_1454	3 October 2008	Press release
67: CONSEIL EUROPEEN – BRUXELLES; CONCLUSIONS DE LA PRÉSIDENCE – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/doc_08_4	17 October 2008	Press release
68: 2009: Year of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Europe Partnership – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_556	23 October 2008	Speech
69: The European integration: future challenges – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_558	24 October 2008	Speech

Table 66: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for stage 1 of the second gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
44	Commissioner Piebalgs together with Vizjak calling on the parties to make all efforts to find a rapid solution to the outstanding issues of disagreement between them	The Commission has received information that Gazprom made a first supply cut to the Ukraine on 3 March and that it has announced its intention to further reduce its supplies of gas to Ukraine this evening, but has stated that supplies to the EU will be unaffected	Therefore, Piebalgs and Vizjak stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation (they are making this call because they have received certain information)
44	The EU expecting Gazprom and Ukraine to make every effort to find a rapid and durable solution to their disagreement	The European Union considers that in the past Gazprom has demonstrated its commitment	Therefore, the EU expecting both parties to solve the disagreement is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: custom – tradition

		to be a reliable supplier of gas to the European Union, as has Ukraine played a similar role as a transit partner of the EU			
		The EU places enormous importance on this			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation (the EU finds this important by nature)
44	Piebalgs convening a meeting of the EU's gas coordination group	that will ensure a fully coordinated EU response to the situation	Therefore, Piebalgs convening this meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
45	The EU gas coordination group meeting in extraordinary session today	It was at the request of Piebalgs	Therefore, the meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		In order to evaluate the reliability of gas supplies through Ukraine following the dispute which arose last week and the launch of new negotiations between the two parties			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
45	The gas coordination group underlining the importance and the necessity of urgent clarification of relations between Gazprom and Ukraine as far as domestic Ukrainian gas consumption and	The gas coordination group ascertained that the European market supply was not affected by the supply restrictions imposed on Ukraine	Therefore, the gas coordination group underlining this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	gas transit towards the EU is concerned	Piebalgs stating: Security of energy supply is one of the key elements of European Energy policy as defined by the European Council of March 2007. A reliable source of energy is essential for the European economy and for the well being of European citizens			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
45	The gas coordination group reviewing the measures taken by the MS who would have been most concerned by a momentary gas supply cut	The gas coordination group evaluated the situation caused by the supply restrictions imposed by Gazprom on Ukraine on 4 and 5 March this year	Therefore, the coordination group reviewing measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		These MS would have been most concerned by a momentary gas supply cut			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
45	No particular measures having been taken by EU MS or the gas coordination group	The gas supply was not negatively affected	Therefore, not taking particular measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
45	Close cooperation between MS shown by effective solidarity is necessary	The repetition of these incidents has clearly highlighted the	Therefore, close cooperation is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		necessity of this			
45	The EU must necessarily speak with one voice on questions linked to external energy policy	Nearly 80% of gas imported from Russia by the EU transits via Ukraine and supplies a dozen EU Member States	Therefore, the EU speaking with one voice regarding energy policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The repetition of these incidents has clearly highlighted the necessity of this			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
45	The gas coordination group being created	It was created by a Directive relating to measures that guarantee security of natural gas supply	Therefore, the group being created is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		The object of the Group is to exchange information and to develop both short and long term concrete measures which reinforce the security of gas supply to the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
46	The EU calling on the Ukrainian leadership to stabilise the country's political situation	This will allow the country to continue the path of ambitious political and economic reforms	Therefore, the EU calling on the Ukrainian leadership to stabilise the political situation is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
					Moralisation: evaluation
46	The EU commending the conduct of the parliamentary	These elections were characterised by a lively	Therefore, the EU commending the elections is legitimised	*Reforms*	Mythopoesis: Moral Tales

	elections of 30 September 2007 and the establishment of a new government in the end of 2007	campaign and genuine political competition			
46	The EU recalling the key importance of constitutional reform	It is a necessary basis for political stability	Therefore, the EU recalling this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
46	The EU encouraging Ukraine to make use of the advice of the Venice Commission	This will help in in its efforts to obtain a sustainable and well balanced Constitution	Therefore, the EU encouraging Ukraine is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
46	The Cooperation Council confirmed the extension of the Action Plan for a period of maximum one year	It is a key tool for Ukraine's reform process	Therefore, the affirmation of the extension of the Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
46	The Cooperation Council also welcoming the start of negotiations on a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area on February 18	These negotiations are a core element of the New Enhanced Agreement	Therefore, the welcoming f the start of these negotiations is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
46	The EU congratulating Ukraine	Ukraine finished the finalisation of the WTO accession process in Geneva	Therefore, the EU congratulating Ukraine is legitimised	*WTO*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
46	The EU expressing its appreciation towards Ukraine	Ukraine cooperated in the Transnistria settlement	Therefore, the EU expressing its appreciation is legitimised	*Transnistria*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Ukraine continues to align itself with most EU declarations			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
47	The Commission encouraging a	If those partners have	Therefore, the Commission	*ENP*	Moralisation: evaluation

	targeted and differentiated deepening of relations through the ENP with select partners	shown particular capacity and ambition	encouraging a targeted and differentiated deepening of relations with select partners is legitimised		
47	The Commission having started the targeted and differentiated deepening of relations with Ukraine	Implied that Ukraine has shown particular capacity and ambition	Therefore, the statement that this process has started with Ukraine is legitimised	*Reforms*	Mythopoesis: Moral Tales
47	Ferrero-Waldner stating that the neighbourhood policy is a success story	We work closely with our partners to help them advance their structural reforms and bring them closer to our Union	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Progress on the ground over the last year has been remarkable in many countries and our relations with our neighbours to the South and to the East are becoming more intense and fruitful by the day			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
47	The EU now considering to specifically deepen our ties with four countries that have shown particular progress and ambition	Each country shapes its relationship with us individually	Therefore, the EU now considering specifically deepening its ties with particular countries is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
47	The EU stating that economic integration is	Negotiations were launched with Ukraine on a New	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	progressing since the end of 2006	Enhanced Agreement including on a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area			
47	The EU stating that mobility with certain countries has been facilitated	Readmission and visa facilitation agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are now in force	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
47	The EU stating that cooperation on justice and fight against organised crime has increased	Ukraine started a reform of its legal and judicial system including reform of company law and elimination of inconsistencies between different legislative acts in order to ensure a more predictable and transparent business climate	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
47	The EU stating that energy cooperation contributes to more energy security	The EU has signed Memoranda of Understanding on energy cooperation with energy producer Azerbaijan and transit country Ukraine and expects to conclude soon similar ones with key producers	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		Algeria and Egypt			
47	The EU stating that transport links are strengthened	Negotiations on a similar agreement (as with Morocco were launched with Ukraine in January 2008	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
47	Ukraine regularly aligning its positions with the EU's CFSP positions	The ENP partners have the possibility to align their positions with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) positions	Therefore, Ukraine doing this is legitimised by the EU	*EU foreign policy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
48	The EU identifying an extra 10-point list of reform priorities in addition to the Action Plan	to maximise its potential	Therefore, the identification of this extra 10-point list is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
48	Seven sub-Committees meeting on a regular basis	to monitor and guide the implementation of the broad range of areas covered by the PCA	Therefore, the sub-committees meeting is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
48	Ukraine framed as a key energy partner of the EU	because some 80% of EU imports of Russian gas pass through Ukrainian pipeline infrastructure	Therefore, the framing of Ukraine as a key energy partner is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
48	Five Joint Working Groups meeting on a regular basis under the Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation	to monitor and guide efforts aiming at the various energy-related objectives of the Action Plan	Therefore, the meetings are legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

48	The EU framing Ukraine to have a democratic vocation	Early parliamentary elections in September 2007 confirm this	Therefore, this framing is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		In the area of human rights, the freedom of the media has been further consolidated			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
48	Visa facilitation and readmission agreements entered into force in January 2008	They are a major contribution to people-to-people contacts and in the fight against illegal migration	Therefore, these agreements entering into force is legitimised	*Visa*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
48	EU stating that Ukraine plays a leading role in the Black Sea Synergy regional cooperation launched in spring 2007	A successful ministerial conference was held in Kyiv in February 2008	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
48	The EU framing the EU and Ukraine as coopering closely on energy issues	The establishment of the Gas Metrology Centre in Boyarka, a major achievement in this context, is a result of joint efforts of the EU and Ukraine in order to ensure transparency and reliability of gas supplies	Therefore, the EU framing the EU and Ukraine as cooperating closely on energy issues is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
48	The EU and Ukraine establishing the Gas Metrology Centre in Boyarka	in order to ensure transparency and reliability of gas supplies	Therefore, establishment is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

48	Ukraine was awarded additional EU financial support under the Governance Facility (€22 million)	In recognition of good progress made in reforms in 2006	Therefore, the additional financial EU support is legitimised	*Reforms*	Mythopoesis: Moral Tales
48	The EU stating that Ukraine's progress stalling somewhat compared to previous years	due to the political instability which characterised most of 2007	Therefore, Ukraine's progress stalling is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
48	The EU providing assistance and training in the area of democratisation, human rights and the rule of law	In order to support Ukraine to build upon and further strengthen the achievements of the Orange Revolution (democratic elections, freedom of the media etc.).	Therefore, the EU providing assistance is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation Moralisation: evaluation
48	The EU developing a special Action Plan	In order to bring Ukrainian products in line with EU technical standards and norms and to enable them to enter the EU market	Therefore, the development of this special Action Plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
48	The European Commission committed €35million in 2007 for projects in the area of readmission and the implementation of the EC-Ukraine readmission agreement	to improve Ukraine's capacity to deal with irregular migration and ensure compliance with European best practice and humanitarian standards	Therefore, the allocation of money by the Commission is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

48	The Commission allocated €87 million in 2007	for the reform of the Ukrainian energy sector	Therefore, the allocation of money is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		A list of priority projects in the electricity, gas and oil sectors has been prepared and agreed			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		significant funding from international financial institutions has been secured for their implementation			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
48	Increased use of the Community's twinning instrument and TAIEX assistance; they bring dozens of civil servants from all over the EU to work on a daily basis with Ukrainian counterparts	to help advance reforms and to share EU know-how and best practices in various area	Therefore, the increased use of the twinning instrument and TAIEX is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
49	The EU having the ENP over the last few years	has enabled the EU and its partners to make clear progress in deepening their cooperation and in targeting it better at the needs and ambitions of partners	Therefore, the EU having the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The ENP is gradually establishing itself as a mutually beneficial			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		partnership for reform and development, helping our neighbours to come closer to the EU, bringing new benefits to their and our citizens and promoting regional integration beyond the borders of the Union			
49	The EU and Ukraine opening negotiations on a new Enhanced Agreement (NEA) in March 2007	building on the strong progress achieved previously	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine opening new negotiations on the NEA is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		aiming to draw Ukraine significantly closer by supporting further internal reforms			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		integrating the Ukrainian economy progressively in the internal market			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and going beyond the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the EU-Ukraine Action Plan wherever possible			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
49	The EU and Ukraine launching negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade area as a core element of the NEA	Following the finalisation of Ukraine's WTO accession process in February 2008	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine starting these negotiations is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

49	The EU continuing cooperation with Ukraine on the basis of the Action Plan	for pragmatic reasons	Therefore, continuing the cooperation on the basis of the Action plan is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		EU-Ukraine relations are currently under review			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
49	The political reform processes under the ENP being different for each country	This reflects the commitments that these countries have made in this respect	Therefore, the reform processes being different is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
49	In Ukraine, despite the controversy surrounding the calling of pre-term parliamentary elections, a consolidation of the democratic process was achieved in 2007	The elections were assessed to have taken place mostly in line with international standards for democratic elections	Therefore, the statement that a consolidation of the democratic process was achieved in Ukraine in 2007 is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
49	A particular way of deepening of EU-Ukraine relations is warranted	joint work on implementing the Action Plans has intensified in such a way that this is necessary	Therefore, the particular way of deepening of EU-Ukraine relations is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
49	The EU and Ukraine negotiating on a new Enhanced Agreement	This is laying the ambitious new framework for the particular deepening of EU-Ukraine relations	Therefore, these negotiations are legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
50	Olli Rehn supporting Ferrero-Waldner's work to further develop and strengthen the ENP	enlargement is not the EU's only policy for dealing with its neighbours	Therefore, Rehn supports Ferrero-Waldner's work with the ENP	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		It guides reforms in our neighbours and brings them closer to			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		European markets, institutions and values			
		The tailor-made approach of the ENP benefits the EU and its partners alike			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		It allows the EU to take a strategic perspective and look at how strengthen our outreach in terms of external economic policy			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It helps us to respond better to economic globalisation by widening the European economic and regulatory space			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		For our partners, it provides the immense opportunity to integrate into the EU's internal market of 500 million consumers			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
50	The EU and Ukraine launching negotiations on a New Enhanced Agreement including on a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area	This is an example of the opportunity to integrate into the EU's internal market	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine launching these negotiations is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

50	The EU developing the eastern dimension of the ENP	This contributes to the consolidation of the enlargement Agenda	Therefore, the EU developing the eastern dimension of the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
50	Therefore, while approaching the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean, the EU should also look for ways to further develop and strengthen the relations with our Eastern neighbours	Both the ENP and enlargement form part of the wider European security strategy	Therefore, the EU looking for ways to further develop and strengthen relations with its eastern neighbours is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
50	The EU anchoring countries such as Ukraine more firmly on the European track	is important for the security and stability of the entire Europe	Therefore, the EU anchoring Ukraine is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: evaluation
51	Ferrero-Waldner not needing to explain to this audience the importance of energy security	you have all seen the rise and rise of the price of oil and the annual disputes between Russia and some of its neighbours over gas supplies	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner not needing to explain this is legitimized	*Energy*	Authorisation: custom – conformity (focus on audience)
51	The EU clearly needs to pay energy security more importance in the future, adjusting to the new "World Energy Equation"	you have all seen the rise and rise of the price of oil and the annual disputes between Russia and some of its neighbours over gas supplies	Therefore, the EU needing to pay energy security more importance in the future is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation (focus on policy argumentation)
		We are facing more competition from other			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		consumer countries (China)			
		The EU is facing and re-nationalisation of resources by producers			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
51	That means diversifying our sources of supply, our transit routes and our internal energy mix	The EU clearly needs to pay energy security more importance in the future, adjusting to the new "World Energy Equation"	Therefore, the EU diversifying its sources of supply etc. is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
51	For that the EU needs a more proactive and coherent energy security diplomacy	We clearly need to pay energy security more importance in the future, adjusting to the new "World Energy Equation". That means diversifying our sources of supply, our transit routes and our internal energy mix	Therefore, the EU needs a more proactive and coherent energy security diplomacy	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
51	The EU needs to address energy security in our political dialogue with all external partners	the EU needs a more proactive and coherent energy security diplomacy	Therefore, the EU addressing energy security in its political dialogue with all external partners is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
51	The EU discussing and taking action to protect critical infrastructure and diversify supply routes	the EU needs a more proactive and coherent energy security diplomacy	Therefore, the EU addressing and taking action is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
51	building on the memoranda of understanding we	the EU needs a more proactive and coherent	Therefore, the EU building on the memoranda of	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	have already signed with countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Egypt, and also Turkmenistan and Jordan	energy security diplomacy	understanding is legitimised		
51	The EU improving its internal market	gives us more flexibility and solidarity	Therefore, the EU improving its internal market is legitimised	*EU internal market*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
51	The EU accepting the need for more coordination and transparency	to enable us to speak with one voice towards our external partners	Therefore, the EU accepting the need is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
51	The new Treaty provision on "energy solidarity" is so important	An important part of our approach must also be internal	Therefore, the new Treaty prevision being important is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
51	ENP continues to prove its worth	showing that our policy of encouraging and rewarding reform does have an impact on our neighbours and is bringing them closer to us	Therefore, the ENP is continuing to prove its worth	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
51	ENP will remain an important priority in the months ahead	Our goal of promoting stability, security and prosperity for our neighbours, and thus also for ourselves, is more relevant than ever	Therefore, the statement that the ENP will remain an important priority is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		In particular, I plan to move ahead with four "avant-garde" countries (Ukraine, Israel, Morocco and Moldova), with whom we			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		want to deepen relations specifically			
52	The tension between the competing models of the European way of life and authoritarian capitalism can also be seen in Ukraine	Since the Orange Revolution in 2004, the country has moved on in democratic transformation, but there are still major challenges in the reforms	Therefore, the statement that the tension between the European way of life and authoritarian capitalism can also be seen in Ukraine is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
52	The EU is committed to closer ties with Ukraine	We want to reinforce the European neighbourhood policy	Therefore, the EU is committed to closer ties with Ukraine	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
52	We want to reinforce the European neighbourhood policy	in order to build closer economic relations through a deep free trade area	Therefore, the EU wanting to reinforce the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		to strengthen political dialogue			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		to improve contacts between people			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and to support reforms in Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
52	The EU not prejudging the future regarding EU-Ukraine relations	The European neighbourhood policy is the foundation of our current work with Ukraine	Therefore, the EU does not prejudge the future of EU-Ukraine relations	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
52	The EU maintaining credible policies in enlargement and the neighbourhood	the European way of life can only have influence outside our borders if we maintain credible	Therefore, the EU maintaining credible policies is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		policies in enlargement and the neighbourhood			
		These two policies are complementary and form the hard core of our soft power of attraction and democratic transformation			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		These policies are also central to European security			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
52	The policies of enlargement and neighbourhood are central to European security	they provide our most powerful means of creating an arc of stability around the EU	Therefore, the statement that these policies are central to European security is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
53	Piebalgs stating that he is very pleased that EU Member States and like-minded neighbouring countries work closely together for global and regional energy security, and common projects of interest like the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline	I strongly believe that initiatives like the 'Krakow Initiative' can have an added value in the framework of a wider European co-operation	Therefore, the statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
53	One of the main topics of the Summit was the practical implementation of the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk oil pipeline project	The pipeline is planned to be prolonged to Plock in Poland, where it can link with the Druzhba Pipeline as far as the port city	Therefore, one of the main topics of the Summit was the practical implementation of the pipeline	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		of Gdansk in the Baltic Sea			
		The project has been labelled of Pan-European Interest under the INOGATE programme and it has benefited from EU funding of € 2 million			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
54	the ENP is rooted in the analysis set out in the European Security Strategy	It is a key EU policy	Therefore, the ENP being rooted in the analysis set out in the EU security strategy is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
54	The EU working with its neighbours on their reform agendas, by helping them to build open societies and offering them our experience and assistance	By doing this the EU is reinforcing not only their prosperity and security, but also our own. The ENP creates a clear win-win situation	Therefore, the EU working with its neighbours is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
54	The ENP uses the great potential of the Union as a "soft and smart power" and builds a unique, privileged relationship with our neighbours, anchored in shared interests and values	As Konrad Adenauer used to say, "We all live under the same sky, even if we don't all have the same horizon"	Therefore, the ENP using the Union's potential and building a unique relationship with our neighbours is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: abstraction
54	Democracy and human rights, the rule of law and good governance, market economy and sustainable development – these principles are and must remain the cornerstone of	despite the undeniable cultural, political or social differences throughout the neighbourhood	Therefore, these principles are and must remain the cornerstone of the Union's engagement with its neighbours	*ENP*	Moralisation: analogy

	the Union's engagement with our neighbours				
54	The EU and its neighbours respecting these values	That creates trust	Therefore, respecting these values is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation Moralisation: abstraction
54	Creating trust between the EU and its neighbours is essential	Only neighbours that trust each other can become good friends	Therefore, creating trust is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
54	The ENP is in the EU's own interest	We cannot and will not feel secure in a "fortress Europe"	Therefore, the ENP is in the EU's own interest	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		We cannot dig trenches and build walls around us. That has never worked, nor will it work in today's globalized, interconnected world			Authorisation: custom – tradition
54	The EU engaging with its partners, bringing them gradually closer to the EU and sharing with them its achievements and prosperity	Only by doing that can the EU be confident that under the same sky the horizon will get brighter for all of us	Therefore, the EU engaging with its partners is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation Moralisation: abstraction
54	On that note, I was very pleased	the second round of so-called ENP Progress Reports that I presented in April allowed us – on the basis of the good progress made - to propose	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner being pleased is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		substantially upgrading our relationship with four neighbours: Ukraine, Morocco, Israel and Moldova			
54	The EU was allowed to propose substantially upgrading our relationship with four neighbours: Ukraine, Morocco, Israel and Moldova	on the basis of the good progress made	Therefore, the EU proposing to substantially upgrade the relationship is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
55	the ENP is a central priority of the EU	it is a strategic policy, which aims at the stability, security and prosperity of the common neighbourhood to which we all belong	Therefore, the ENP is a central priority for the EU	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		It is based on a privileged relationship through which we draw our partners closer and closer, building upon common commitments and shared values			Moralisation: evaluation
55	The ENP is a reform partnership	We do not seek to impose anything but want to support our partners' own reform efforts	Therefore, the ENP is a reform partnership	*ENP*	Moralisation: analogy
55	The ENP is not a uniform "straight-jacket"	It is a framework policy, tailored to each	Therefore, the ENP is not a uniform "straight-jacket"	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation (focus on natural

		partner's needs, capacities and performance			needs of the partners)
55	The progress-based "individualization" of the ENP is particularly visible in our relations with our Eastern partners	For instance, we are pursuing an ambitious enhanced agreement with the Ukraine which will substantially intensify our relationship and draw Kiev significantly closer	Therefore, the progress-based "individualisation" of the ENP is particularly visible with the EU's Eastern partners	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
55	we are pursuing an ambitious enhanced agreement with the Ukraine	which will substantially intensify our relationship and draw Kiev significantly closer	Therefore, the EU pursuing an ambitious enhanced agreement with Ukraine is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
55	Ferrero-Waldner being happy	to say that negotiations are progressing well	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner being happy is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		and have progressed well in the past even in difficult phases			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
55	the Commission granting the ENPI Governance Facility this year grant to Ukraine, Moldova and Morocco	The EU thus recognises good progress	Therefore, the Commission granting the ENPI Governance Facility is legitimised	*ENP*	Mythopoesis: Moral Tales
		So we are always ready to give 'more for more'			Mythopoesis: Moral Tales
55	The EU building a multilateral, regional dimension to the ENP in addition to the bilateral track	Not because we believe that our Eastern Neighbourhood … is one uniform "entity"… But very simply because it is evident that there are issues	Therefore, the EU building a multilateral regional dimension to the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: analogy

		of mutual concern, which cannot be tackled effectively on a purely bilateral basis …			
		because it is evident that there are issues of mutual concern, which cannot be tackled effectively on a purely bilateral basis: From organized crime to environmental threats, from transport issues to energy connections			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
55	the strong bilateral strand of the European Neighbourhood Policy remains the driving force to bring our Eastern neighbours closer to the EU (in context of the Eastern Partnership that was just then being proposed)	This is what our neighbours want	Therefore, the strong bilateral strand of the ENP remaining the driving force is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		also where the bulk of our assistance lies			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
55	The EU wanting to set up a Parliamentary Assembly with our Eastern neighbours, similar to the one existing in with its Southern partners	Parliamentary cooperation can help us share 'democratic know-how' both between EU and our partners, and between our partners themselves,	Therefore, the setting up of a Parliamentary Assembly is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		which is of crucial importance for the promotion of democracy and the rule of law in the region			
55	Ferrero-Waldner believing that parliamentary exchanges on a regional basis have a very important role to play in relations with our Eastern neighbours	Parliamentary cooperation can help us share 'democratic know-how' both between EU and our partners, and between our partners themselves, which is of crucial importance for the promotion of democracy and the rule of law in the region	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner believing that parliamentary exchanges on a regional basis have a very important role to play is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
55	Democracy has already made a promising start in our Eastern neighbourhood	In particular, we have recently seen another round of free elections in Ukraine, and local government elections have taken place in Moldova according to democratic standards	Therefore, the statement that democracy has already made a promising start in the EUs Eastern neighbourhood is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
55	We therefore need to continue nurturing democracy, for instance with constitutional reform in Ukraine,	But these positive developments cannot be taken for granted	Therefore, the EU continuing to nurture democracy is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

	and we need to support further efforts throughout the Caucasus and work for help a political opening in Belarus				
55	But these positive developments cannot be taken for granted	Young open societies are obviously fragile	Therefore, these positive developments cannot be taken for granted	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
55	All this makes parliamentary cooperation and contacts between our neighbours and the European Parliament all the more important	these positive developments cannot be taken for granted	Therefore, parliamentary cooperation is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
56	The Energy Community extends the EU internal energy market to contracting parties from South-eastern Europe and beyond (Ukraine is added to the Energy Community in this decision, but this decision is not legitimised)	It thereby provides a stable investment environment, based on the rule of law, and ties the contracting parties to the EU	Therefore, the Energy Community extending its internal energy market to contracting partners from South-eastern Europe and beyond is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Through its action, the Energy Community makes a large contribution to security of supply in the wider Europe			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
57	In the EU's neighbours to the east and south-east there are growing tensions between the European way of life on the one hand and the authoritarian type of government on the other … I	Since the Orange Revolution in 2004 Ukraine has implemented a number of democratic reforms, but much remains to be done	Therefore, the statement that there are growing tensions between the European way of life and the authoritarian type in the EU's neigbours to the east and south-east is legitimised	*Orange Revolution*	Moralisation: analogy

	would like to give a few examples of this				
57	It is important that Ukraine should anchor itself permanently to European values	By achieving this, Ukraine can also give a signal to other countries in the region that change is possible	Therefore, Ukraine anchoring itself permanently to European values is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
57	Discussion about Ukraine's candidate status is not on the agenda at the moment	Our cooperation with Ukraine is based on the European Neighbourhood Policy	Therefore, discussion about Ukraine's candidate status is not on the agenda at the moment	*EU membership*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
57	That said, we should not say "never" to Ukraine	this unnecessary move would amount to both parties' shooting themselves in the foot, weakening the EU's influence and slowing down the pace of reform in Ukraine	Therefore, the EU should not say "never" to Ukraine when it comes to candidate status	*EU membership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
57	the EU should deliver a clear political signal that Ukraine's rapprochement towards the EU is possible, provided that Ukraine continues its determined work for reforms promoting European values	Ukraine may be the next focus of political pressure for Russia, whose doctrine of "the near abroad" harks back to the sphere of interest policy of the past	Therefore, the EU should deliver a clear political signal that Ukraine's political rapprochement towards the EU is possible	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		For the sake of stability			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
57	This calls for the unity of Ukraine's government and	Ukraine continuing its determined work for	Therefore, the call for the unity of Ukraine's government and continuous joint	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

	continuous joint endeavours	reforms promoting European values	endeavours is legitimized		
57	Talks on a new EU-Ukraine agreement began in February	A new agreement will give greater breadth and depth to EU-Ukraine relations through increased dialogue on foreign and security policy and enhanced cooperation in areas such as justice and home affairs, energy, transport and the environment	Therefore, the talks on a new EU-Ukraine agreement are legitimised	*EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		For Ukraine this will be a further step towards the European way of life			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
58	A new importance will be given to some areas of policy, including the EaP and the ENP, and energy	Recent events, i.e. the Russian-Georgian War	Therefore, new importance given to some areas of policy is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
58	The EU committing in June to develop the Eastern partnership and the EU having the European Neighbourhood Policy	These policies demonstrate the EU's legitimate interests in the region	Therefore, the actions of the EU of committing to develop the EaP and the EU having the ENP are legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		These policies underline that we will not accept new dividing lines in Europe, and that partners			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		like Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova can count on our support for their territorial integrity and sovereignty			
58	The EU being ready to accelerate and deepen our work on the new Eastern partnership	in order to submit our proposal as soon as possible	Therefore, the EU being ready to accelerate and deepen its work on the new EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
59	The EU and Ukraine holding the 12th annual EU-Ukraine Summit	The summit will be an opportunity to mark the considerable progress made in the course of the year in negotiations on this agreement.	Therefore, the holding of the summit is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Furthermore, the summit will see the launching of a visa dialogue with the long term perspective of establishing a mutual visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
59	The EU and Ukraine finalizing an Association Agreement	At the present time, the EU and Ukraine must deliver on their very strong and shared commitment to deepen their relations and to strengthen their ties	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine finalising an AA is legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		This agreement, which will require serious efforts from both sides, will bring real benefits for all our citizens			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
59	The launching of a visa dialogue with the long term perspective of establishing a mutual visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine	is another clear sign of the EU's genuine and practical commitment to furthering our relationship with Ukraine	Therefore, the launching of a visa dialogue is legitimised	*Visa*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
59	Ferrero-Waldner stating that political stability in the Ukraine is paramount	for this deepened cooperation to fully succeed and to be of maximum benefit to the citizen	Therefore, her statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
59	The EU and Ukraine completing a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement	is at the heart of the accord that the EU and Ukraine are striving for	Therefore, completing a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		This is not just about accelerating our trade and investment flows. It is a mark of Ukraine's continuing political and economic integration into the global economy, and deep partnership with the EU			Moralisation: analogy

59	international issues will also feature highly on the Summit's agenda	Naturally	Therefore, international issues being featured on the Summit's agenda is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		in the light of the conflict in Georgia and the visit to Moscow and Tbilisi of President Sarkozy, President Barroso and the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the 8th of September			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
60	Talks on a Free Trade Area will continue into 2009	as negotiations only began once a decision had been taken for Ukraine to join the World Trade Organisation	Therefore, talks on a free trade area continuing into 2009 is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
60	The EU is Ukraine's largest trading partner	EU-Ukraine trade reached over €34 billion in 2007	Therefore, the statement that the EU is Ukraine's largest trading partner is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and has been growing by two-digit rates steadily in the recent years			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
60	The EU is also by far the largest foreign investor in Ukraine	According to Ukraine's State Statistics Committee, in 2007 the total stock of FDI into Ukraine was USD 29.5 billion or USD 636.5 per capita	Therefore, the statement that the EU is Ukraine's largest foreign investor is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
60		Assistance provided by the	Therefore, the statement that the EU	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	The EU is the largest donor to Ukraine	European Community alone has amounted to approximately € 2.8 billion since 1991	is the largest donor to Ukraine is legitimised		outcome orientation
		and national assistance budgets (ENPI) to Ukraine have tripled over the last years (€40 million in 2002 to €138.6 million in 2008, Governance Facility allocation included)			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
60	In the area of nuclear safety, the EC has provided extensive support since the early nineties to Energoatom, the operator of nuclear power plants in Ukraine	to upgrade its plants' operation to internationally recognized safety standards	Therefore, the EC providing extensive support is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
60	the Annual Action Programme 2007, has been increased by a € 22 million allocation from the Governance facility	To top up the ENPI allocation	Therefore, the increase of the Annual Action Programme 2007 is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	The joint declaration being issued	Presidents Yushchenko, Sarkozy and Barroso have met today and agreed on the following joint declaration	Therefore, the joint declaration is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	The EU and Ukraine stating that Ukraine made progress in	The successful holding of parliamentary elections in	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	implementing its democratic reforms	September 2007 bears witness to Ukraine's progress			
61	Ukraine accessing to the World Trade Organisation in 2008	This accession rewarded Ukraine's economic reforms	Therefore, Ukraine accessing the WTO in 2008 is legitimised	*WTO*	Mythopoesis: Moral Tales
61	the Presidents emphasised that political stabilisation in Ukraine, constitutional reform, the consolidation of the state of law, also in relation to investment, and full implementation of the undertakings given in the framework of the WTO are indispensable conditions for pursuing reforms and deepening the EU-Ukraine relationship based on our common values, notably democratic principles, good governance and human rights	In this connection	Therefore, the presidents emphasising all this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
61	The negotiation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, which will be an integral part of the new agreement, began in February 2008	as a result of Ukraine's accession to the WTO	Therefore, the start of the negotiation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

61	The presidents decided at the Paris summit to provide a decisive impetus for the development of our relations	aware of the strategic importance of the relationship between the European Union and Ukraine	Therefore, they decided to provide a decisive impetus	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
61	The presidents recognising that Ukraine shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European Union	as a European country	Therefore, the presidents recognising this is legitimised	*Values*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
61	The presidents being pleased that the new agreement between the European Union and Ukraine will be an association agreement	This leaves open the way for further progressive developments in EU-Ukraine relations	Therefore, the presidents being pleased that it is an association agreement is legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	The EU welcomes Ukraine's European choice	The EU acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine	Therefore, the EU welcoming Ukraine's European choice is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
61	gradual convergence of Ukraine with the EU in political, economic and legal areas	This will contribute to further progress in EU-Ukraine relations	Therefore, gradual convergence is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	The Association Agreement will renew our common institutional framework, facilitate the deepening of our relations in all areas, strengthen political association and economic integration between Ukraine	by means of reciprocal rights and obligations	Therefore, the AA renewing the common institutional framework is legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	and the European Union				
61	The EU and Ukraine shall address the challenges to these principles at all appropriate levels of the political dialogue, including ministerial level	in a timely manner	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine addressing this is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	The establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area with large-scale regulatory approximation of Ukraine to EU standards	This will contribute to the gradual integration of Ukraine to the EU Internal Market	Therefore, the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	the presidents underlined the importance of developing a new practical instrument to replace the Action Plan in March 2009 with a view to preparing the implementation of the Association Agreement	Taking into account the substantial progress in the negotiating process	Therefore, the presidents underlining this is legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
61	The presidents also decided to launch a visa dialogue, developing the relevant conditions	with the long-term perspective of establishing a visa free regime between the EU and Ukraine	Therefore, the presidents' decision is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
61	the Presidents hope that the Association Agreement, which will be as ambitious as possible, will be finalised rapidly	Based on the discussions between the European Union and Ukraine	Therefore, the presidents' hope is legitimized	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	and can be signed as soon as possible				
61	The EU and Ukraine implementing the Action Plan, including the additional measures agreed at the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council in March 2008	The presidents confirm their commitment	therefore, the implementation is legitimised	*ENP Action Plan*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	The presidents expressed their satisfaction	The EU and Ukraine are developing cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy which leads to ever closer political convergence	Therefore, the satisfaction is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
61	The Parties recognized a new horizon for practical cooperation in the given field	which has been opened by entrance into force of the Framework Agreement on Ukraine's participation in EU led operations on crisis management	Therefore, the recognition of the new horizon is legitimised	*Crisis management*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
61	The EU and Ukraine wanting to explore the potential for developing military and technical cooperation	The Parties expressed their intention	Therefore, the parties wanting to explore this is legitimised	*Defence*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
61	Ukraine and the European Defense Agency will establish close contacts	to discuss military capability issues	Therefore, establishing close contacts is legitimised	*Defence*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

61	The EU and Ukraine having joint strategic interest in energy co-operation	The Parties reaffirmed this	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	The EU and Ukraine having intrinsically linked energy security needs	The Parties reconfirmed this	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	Ukraine being committed to progress in the reforms of the gas sector and to establish efficient financial mechanisms	for the modernisation of the gas transit system of Ukraine	Therefore, Ukraine wanting to reform the gas sector and establishing financial mechanism is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	the Parties welcome the forthcoming conference on the gas transportation system of Ukraine	Ukraine is committed to progress in the reforms of the gas sector and to establish efficient financial mechanisms	Therefore, the conference is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
61	The EU and Ukraine continuing co-operation with the aim of advancing Ukrainian energy sector reform and of ensuring safe, reliable and transparent energy transit through Ukraine	They agreed to do so	Therefore, continuing this cooperation is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	The leaders welcomed progress made on Ukraine's integration into the EU's energy system	in particular the imminent start of negotiations regarding Ukraine's accession to the Energy Community Treaty and the preparatory studies	Therefore, welcoming the progress is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		concerning the synchronous interconnection of the Ukrainian electricity network with that of the Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity			
61	The leaders underlined the need for full and effective implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements by the authorities of EU Member States and Ukraine	acknowledging that Ukraine has exempted EU citizens from the visa obligation	Therefore, the underlining is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
61	The presidents underlined the benefits of agreements on local border traffic and encouraged intensified co-operation aimed at the prompt entry into force of the relevant agreements of Ukraine with EU neighbouring countries, in full respect of the EC Local Border Traffic Regulation	in order to foster people-to-people contacts and economic development in the local border areas.	Therefore, the underlining and encouragement are legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	the leaders encouraged the experts to start this dialogue as soon as possible this year	With a view to launching a dialogue on the establishment of a visa-free regime for short stay travel between the EU	Therefore, the encouragement is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		and Ukraine as a long-term perspective			
61	EU and Ukraine having intentions to deepen further their co-operation on environment protection, including through high-level meetings, in particular concerning the development and implementation of Ukraine's national environment strategy	The Parties confirmed this	Therefore, these intentions are legitimised	*Environment*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	Ukraine upgrading an administrative arrangement on civil protection	in particular to ensure that its coverage extends to assessment of the environmental impact of disasters	Therefore, Ukraine upgrading this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
61	The EU and Ukraine wanting to complete negotiations on a global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement by 2009	The leaders stressed it	Therefore, wanting this is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	The EU and Ukraine committing to regulatory approximation in this area in the context of the Free Trade Area, which will form an integral part of the Association Agreement, on the basis of clear objectives,	Considering the importance of the financial sector as an engine for growth	Therefore, this commitment is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		they agreed that it is crucial to do so			Authorisation: authority – personal authority

	priorities and timeframes				
61	The EU and Ukraine cooperating more closely on the upgrading of Ukraine's land transport infrastructure, with reference to the High Level Group's Report on extension of the Trans-European Transport Networks and with particular regard to ensuring that Ukraine has the best possible transportation system in place by the time of the 2012 UEFA European Football Championships	They resolved to do so	Therefore, this cooperation is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
61	The EU and Ukraine using where appropriate existing forms of cooperation	to facilitate the Ukrainian side's preparations for co-hosting the 2012 European football championships	Therefore, the usage of appropriate existing forms of cooperation is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		They agreed to it			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
62	EU has established and is developing further a policy mix of regional and bilateral cooperation in Eastern Europe	that will help countries such as Ukraine, to pursue deep political and economic reforms that will help bring them closer to Europe and to a	Therefore, the establishment of this policy is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		future of peace and prosperity			
63	Ferrero-Waldner stating that the main energy security concern relates to gas imports	As gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines, supplies are vulnerable to disruption	Therefore, the gas imports being the main energy concern is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
63	Energy Security will continue to top European Council agendas	It clearly will be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels – including renewables to enhance Europe's energy security over the next decade	Therefore, Energy security dominating the European Council agendas is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
63	It clearly will be important to ensure a diversified range of fuels – including renewables to enhance Europe's energy security over the next decade	For Europe, the particular concern relates to gas imports. As gas is mainly transported in long-distance pipelines, supplies are vulnerable to disruption	Therefore, the future importance of ensuring a diversified range of fuels is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		In oil, we also see growing resource nationalism and interference by the State in producer countries			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		In addition, with the rapidly growing demand from countries such as China and India, we see			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		that the national oil companies are failing to match demand with investment in production capacity			
		That energy should be at the heart of the European political agenda is of course not new. The creation of the Coal and Steel Community sowed the seeds of the Union as we know it today			Authorisation: custom – tradition
63	The Commission will shortly be presenting its Second Strategic Energy Review	It is clear that we need to ensure that our internal market is fully integrated	Therefore, the Energy Review is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Without this, we won't have the bargaining power we need			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
63	The progress the EU can make (in relation to energy) is first and foremost a matter of political will	As so often in the history of European construction	Therefore, the progress is dependent on political will	*Energy*	Authorisation: custom – tradition
63	there is a direct link between the level of ambition of the EU's internal agenda and our credibility and effectiveness externally	as in many other areas	Therefore, the direct links is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Authorisation: custom – conformity
63	the European Council enjoined the Commission to	The events in the Caucasus have brought	Therefore, the review of all energy security	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	review all energy security initiatives, in particular on diversification of sources and supply routes	home that the so-called "frozen conflicts" can directly affect our energy security	initiatives is legitimised		outcome orientation
63	Over the past couple of years we have signed MOUs on energy with four key energy partners, namely Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan	At present energy features as a key element in all our agreements with third countries, suppliers, consumers and transit countries	Therefore, the signing of the MOUs is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		We are working hard to enhance our bilateral energy relations with key partners in the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
64	The workshop "Involving civil society in the EU – Ukraine relations" taking place in Kyiv	It will provide a new opportunity for the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the Ukrainian National Tripartite Social and Economic Council (NTSEC) and the Ukrainian civil society to exchange views on how to involve civil	Therefore, the workshop is legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		society in the current negotiation of a new EU-Ukraine Association Agreement			
		A concrete objective of this meeting will be to elaborate proposals to create an EU-Ukraine civil society Joint Body that would become part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The workshop would also clearly voice the interests and aspirations of Ukrainian and European civil society in the European Neighbourhood Policy			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
64	The EU wishing to have a deeper relationship with Ukraine	is not only about activities for governments and institutions, it is about people	Therefore, the EU wishing a deeper relationship with Ukraine is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Moralisation: analogy
64	The EU caring about people regarding EU-Ukraine relations	It is essential to bring our communities, our youth, our students, and civil society closer together	Therefore, the EU caring about people is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
65	The last EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris marked an	We made considerable progress in	Therefore, the last summit being an important	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	important development in our relationship	negotiations on a new Association Agreement, which will go significantly beyond the previous agreement	development is legitimised		outcome orientation
65	The EU and Ukraine negotiation a new Association Agreement	The intention is to achieve economic integration and political association: that also implies increased co-operation in areas as diverse as foreign and security policy, justice freedom and security, transport, energy and environment	Therefore, these negotiations are legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
65	The decision to launch a visa dialogue aiming at establishing a mutual visa-free regime in the long term	This is further evidence of the profound commitment to substantially strengthening the relationship	Therefore, the launch of a visa dialogue is legitimised	*Visa*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
65	New opportunities will be available through the Eastern Europe Partnership Initiative	It will offer the prospect of promoting greater economic integration, improved mobility of people and intensified political dialogue	Therefore, new opportunities being available through the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It will promote co-operation between our partners and			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		ourselves in the field of best practice in democracy and human rights, energy, environmental protection and, possibly, security			
65	We are now preparing our proposals for the operational mechanisms for the partnership	as requested by the European Council	Therefore, the preparations are legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
65	These proposals will involve stepping up our efforts to stabilise and modernise the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood	This is an urgent investment in our joint future	Therefore, these proposals involving stepping up efforts is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
65	our cooperation should be bottom-up and focussed on concrete needs	This is the condition for the new Association Agreement taken together with the Eastern Partnership producing practical and tangible results	Therefore, the cooperation should be bottom-up and focused on concrete needs	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
65	The EU being already involved in the preparation of a new Ukrainian strategy and draft law on regional development	It is the vital part of the ENP to strengthen regional management structures and promote better governance	Therefore, the EU being involved is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
65	this joint work can be further developed and involve new, regional and local partners	The co-operation which is limited to that between states has its limits	Therefore, this joint work being further developed and involving new and regional and local partners is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition

65	The co-operation which is limited to that between states has its limits	It can establish structures to help boost economic growth, but without regional and local authorities it is impossible to achieve concrete results	Therefore, the statement that co-operation limited to that between states is limited is legitimised	*ENP*	Moralisation: analogy
65	Ukraine and the EU signing a Memorandum of Understanding	such as we already have with China, with Russia and with Brazil	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine signing a MoU is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: custom – conformity
		The Memorandum would provide a platform for concrete, result oriented co-operation in areas which are of most interest to our Ukrainian friends - such as energy conservation, the transformation of derelict land and sustainable urban renovation programmes			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		And, last but not least, for building the most important bridges – those linking our people			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
66	Ján Figel', presented themes for future cooperation between the EU	On the occasion of his official visit to Ukraine	Therefore, Figel presenting themes is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	and Ukraine in the areas of education, culture, youth and sport				
66	Figel making an official visit to Ukraine	during which he will be meeting Vice Prime Minister for European and International Integration, Gregory Nemyria, the Minister of Education, Ivan Vakarchuk, the Minister of Culture and Tourism, Vasyl Vovkun, and the Minister for Sport, Youth and Family, Mr Yurii Pavlenko	Therefore, Figel's visit is legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The discussions follow the recent EU-Ukraine Summit on 9 September			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The discussions take place in the context of the future EU-Ukraine Association Agreement			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
66	Figel being pleased to hold these talks with our Ukrainian partners	The EU has a lot to offer in terms of promoting exchanges and opportunities for collaboration among our youth	Therefore, Figel being pleased is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		The enthusiasm of the young people I have met here, and their dedication to exploring and building on these opportunities, are an inspiration, and I wish them every success in their future activities, both in the EU and in Ukraine			Moralisation: abstraction
66	Mr Figel' also congratulated Ukraine	on its progress in introducing the 'Bologna process' reforms in the higher education sector	Therefore, the congratulations are legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
66	Figel invited Ukraine to ratify and implement the Convention	At his meeting with Mr Vasyl Vovkun, the Minister of Culture, Commissioner Figel' stressed the importance of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions for the EU	Therefore, the invitation is legitimised	*Civil society*	Authorisation: authority – role model authority
66	The Commissioner also met with youth leaders at YES (Yalta European Strategy) 2nd University	discussed with them their role and responsibilities in active participation for shaping the future societies	Therefore, the meeting is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		He also presented the EU's funding programmes, in particular the Youth in Action programme			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
66	Figel presenting the Youth in Action funding programme	This programme offers a variety of opportunities to support the mobility of, and cooperation between, young people from around Europe, and encourages their civic participation in, and sense of belonging to, the society of which they are a part.	Therefore, the presentation of the funding programme is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		In 2007 alone, over 600 young Ukrainians and youth workers took part in Youth in Action			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
66	On sport, Commissioner Figel' emphasised the important role in the area of the EU's external relations	Sport should be an element of European external assistance programmes and should also feature in the EU's dialogue with partner countries	Therefore, the emphasis is legitimised	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
66	Sport should be an element of European external assistance	Through concrete actions, sport has	Therefore, the statement that sport should be an element of European external	*Civil society*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	programmes and should also feature in the EU's dialogue with partner countries	considerable potential as a tool to promote education, health, inter-cultural dialogue, development and peace	assistance is legitimised		
67	The EU supporting its eastern neighbours in their efforts to achieve economic modernisation and democratisation	The European Union is resolved to do so	Therefore, the EU supporting its eastern neighbours is legitimised	*ENP*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		in particular through its neighbourhood policy			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
67	The European Council stresses in this respect the importance of the outcome of the EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris	The European Union is resolved, in particular through its neighbourhood policy, to continue supporting its eastern neighbours in their efforts to achieve economic modernisation and democratisation	Therefore, the European Council stressing this is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
67	The European Council instructing the Council to conduct an initial examination of the proposals for a future "Eastern Partnership" of the European Union	The European Council stresses the importance of the outcome of the EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris and calls for relations between the Union and the Republic of Moldova and Georgia to be	Therefore, the European Council instructing the Council is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		strengthened in accordance with the Council conclusions of 13 October			
		which the Commission intends to submit in November			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
67	The European Council requesting the Commission to submit proposals to develop the Union's energy relations with producer and transit countries	with a view to securing stability of supply and diversifying its energy sources and supply routes	Therefore, the request is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
67	the European Council welcomes the energy security initiatives taken by several Member States and, in particular, the meeting with the Caspian Sea countries and transit countries which will be organised by the Czech Presidency in the spring of 2009	Because the European Council wants to secure stability of supply and diversifying its energy sources and supply routes	Therefore, the welcoming of the initiatives is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
68	The EU should develop a sustainable medium-term strategy to ensure stability and security in the Eastern dimension of our continent	The EU's role in defusing the crisis in Georgia was significant. But we need more than just crisis management	Therefore, the EU developing this strategy is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: analogy
		This is vital for those countries, and also is crucial to the EU's own well-being			Theoretical rationalisation: definition

68	The Commission is negotiating on behalf of the Union with Ukraine on a new Association Agreement	that will bring closer collaboration in the political, economic and legal spheres	Therefore, the negotiations for the AA are legitimised	*Association Agreement*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
68	The EU and Ukraine engaging in deeper cooperation	It will improve the business environment, open market access for goods, increase border traffic and transport, as well as promote justice and the fight against corruption	Therefore, deeper cooperation is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		Moreover, the visa dialogue aims at establishing, in the longer run, a mutual visa-free regime between the EU and the Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
68	The EU and Ukraine engaging in visa dialogue	It aims at establishing a mutual visa-free regime in the long run	Therefore, the visa dialogue is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
68	Discussion about Ukraine's EU membership perspective is not on the agenda for the moment	The new Association Agreement will leave open the question of the future development of EU-Ukrainian relations	Therefore, discussion about Ukraine's EU membership is not on the agenda for the moment	*EU membership*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		There is no need to decide on this issue at this point in time			Moralisation: abstraction

		and a renewed debate would not help either the EU or Ukraine			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
68	We need to deepen our ties with Ukraine at every level	through business ties, culture and people-to-people contacts, as well as political ties	Therefore, the need to deepen ties with Ukraine is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		regardless of how the future status of the relationship might evolve			Moralisation: abstraction
68	Poland's deep historical relationship with Ukraine is a great asset for the whole Union	he rapprochement between Ukraine and Poland over the past 20 years, driven by courageous leadership in both countries, has been the anchor for Central and Eastern Europe's stability during turbulent times	Therefore, the statement that Poland's historical relationship with Ukraine being a great asset for the whole EU is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This strong bilateral relationship remains central to keeping Ukraine oriented towards the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
69	the Union should also pursue its interest through bilateral negotiations	with the aim of projecting the Union's acquis communautaire throughout the EU's neighbourhood	Therefore, the Union should also pursue its interest through bilateral negotiations	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

69	The EU having as a key objective in the negotiation of free trade agreements the projection of its acquis communautaire throughout the EU's neighbourhood	the Union should also pursue its interest through bilateral negotiations, with the aim of projecting the Union's acquis communautaire throughout the EU's neighbourhood	Therefore, projecting the acquis being a key objective in the negotiation of free trade agreements is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Short of EU membership, such an approach is essential to enhance stability South and East of the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
69	Energy policy within the Union will of course remain extremely important in the coming years	in the context of climate change, security of supply and energy prices	Therefore, energy policy will remain extremely important	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
69	At the EU level both increased storage capacity for energy and the sharing of energy resources around the Union will remain crucial topics for EU policy	especially when one or more countries are threatened by an external supplier	Therefore, the topics remaining crucial is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
69	But most of all, we need a more unified external energy policy	to improve energy security	Therefore, needing a more unified external energy policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
69	This means in particular a common approach to essential infrastructure, to the diversification of supplies (like	But most of all, we need a more unified external energy policy	Therefore, having a common approach to these issues is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	the Nabucco pipeline or LNG terminals), and to the negotiation of long-term supply contracts				

Table 67: Overview Stage 2 of the second gas crisis

Stage 2	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	8	Press release	3	37,5%	102
		Speech	2	25%	
		Memo	2	25%	
		Communication from Commission to the EP and the Council	1	12,5%	

Table 68: Texts collected for Stage 2 of the second gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
70: EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_08_703	13 November 2008	Memo
71: Commission opens negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova upon accession to the Energy Community – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_1783	26 November 2008	Press release
72: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Ambitious New Partnership for the East – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_672	27 November 2008	Speech
73: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Eastern Partnership {SEC(2008) 2974} – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008DC0823&qid=1653306569543	3 December 2008	Communication from Commission to the EP and the Council
74: The Eastern Partnership –an ambitious new chapter in the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_1858	3 December 2008	Press release
75: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Energiesicherheit als strategische Herausforderung für die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union im 21.	4 December 2008	Speech

Jahrhundert – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_08_677		
76: Energy Council 8 December 2008 – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_08_770	5 December 2008	Memo
77: Let's act now for a better Europe: Danuta Hübner addresses Polish Senate – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_08_2042	19 December 2008	Press release

Table 69: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 2 of the second gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
70	Effective provisions for preventing and dealing with supply crises must be in place	Europe is dependent on imports	Therefore, the EU should have effective provisions for preventing and dealing with supply crises in place	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
70	The EU developing its own strengths, internally and externally	Europe can and must diminish its vulnerability to energy supply shocks	Therefore, the EU should develop its own strengths, internally and externally	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
70	The EU Commission, as part of the EU energy and solidarity action plan, considering the development of a Southern Gas Corridor for supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern sources and possibly other countries in the longer term	improving security of supply	Therefore, the EU Commission wanting this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

70	The EU Commission, as part of the EU energy and solidarity action plan considers the need for an LNG action plan	particularly important for the Member States which are currently overwhelmingly dependent on a single gas supplier	Therefore, the Commission wanting an LNG action plan is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
70	The EU needs to intensify its efforts in developing an effective external energy policy; speaking with one voice, identifying infrastructure of major importance to its energy security and then ensuring its construction, and acting coherently	to deepen its partnerships with key energy suppliers, transit countries and consumers	Therefore, the EU speaking with one voice regarding external energy policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
70	The Commission will identify the concrete mechanisms necessary for ensuring transparency between Member States and the EU	so that a common message can be constructed	Therefore, the Commission identifying these mechanisms is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
70	International frameworks are needed which are capable of sustaining the major investments and innovations	with energy interdependence of countries growing	Therefore, the need for international frameworks is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	needed in the coming years				
70	The EU having the European Economic Area and the Energy Community with our neighbours	These provide a very good basis for the needed international frameworks	Therefore, the EU having these is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
70	A framework for cooperation is also provided by the Energy Community	which is building an integrated energy market in South-East Europe anchored to the EU	Therefore, the Energy Community providing a framework for cooperation is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
70	The EU negotiating with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Turkey on their access to the Energy Community	Their accession would catalyse their energy sector reforms and create a mutually beneficial enlarged energy market based on common rules	Therefore, the EU negotiating with these countries is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
70	Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Turkey accessing the Energy Community	Depends on whether the negotiations are successful or not	Therefore, the accession of these countries would be legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
70	The Commission concludes that greater harmonisation of security of supply standards and predefined emergency measures at regional and EU levels are needed	after its evaluation of the Directive on Security of Gas Supply	Therefore, the Commission concluding this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

70	The threshold for triggering EU action should be reconsidered and compensation arrangements should be clarified	The Commission concludes this after its evaluation of the Directive on Security of Gas Supply	Therefore, the Commission concluding this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
70	The Commission considers that there is insufficient evidence at this stage for making strategic gas stocks obligatory	after its evaluation of the Directive on Security of Gas Supply	Therefore, the Commission concluding this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
71	First negotiation rounds (on Ukraine and Moldova accessing the Energy Community) were successfully held	Both countries demonstrated their strong willingness to join the Energy Community, to prepare for the implementation of the related EU legislation and to pursue the necessary reforms of their energy markets	Therefore, the framing of the negotiations being successful is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
71	Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova presented their initial assessment and timetable for the implementation of the Energy Community Treaty	in relation with their energy policy strategy and planned reforms of the energy sector (these countries plan to reform their energy sector)	Therefore, these countries presenting their initial assessment and timetable is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
71	Ukraine and Moldova meeting with the EU negotiation team in Vienna	The meeting allowed for a comprehensive review of the requirements to be met	Therefore, the meeting is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

71	In both cases, the discussion was very constructive	did not reveal major obstacles to a swift negotiating process	Therefore, the framing of the meeting being constructive is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
71	Commissioner Piebalgs welcomed the positive outcome of the first negotiations	"This first meeting confirmed that it is possible to progress quickly and to conclude the negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova possibly in 2009"	Therefore, Piebalgs welcoming the positive outcome of the first negotiations is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
71	Piebalgs stating: We hope to open negotiation with Turkey as well in the coming weeks	Because the first meeting with Ukraine and Moldova confirmed that it is possible to progress quickly	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
71	The Ministerial Council of the Energy Community taking a decision on Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey joining the Energy Community	Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey introduced a request to become Parties to the Energy Community Treaty	Therefore, the Ministerial Council taking a decision is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
71	The Council of the European Union mandated the European Commission to carry out negotiations with these three countries	The Ministerial Council of the Energy Community took a decision	Therefore, the Council mandating the Commission is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
71	The EU Commission carrying out negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey on their accession to	In its Second Strategic Energy Review adopted on 12 November (IP/08/1696), the European Commission indicated that "the accession of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Turkey to the Energy Community would catalyse their energy sector	Therefore, the Commission negotiating with these countries is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	the Energy Community	reforms and result in a mutually beneficial enlarged energy market based on common rules".			
71	The EU having the Energy Community	In order to create a stable regulatory and market framework in order to pursue several objectives: -Create an integrated energy market allowing for cross-border energy trade and linked to the EU market ; -Enhance the security of supply; -Attract investment in power generation and networks in order to ensure stable and continuous electricity supply; -Improve the environmental situation in relation with energy supply.	Therefore, the Energy Community is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
71	the main instrument of the Energy Community Treaty is the implementation of key parts of the EU acquis	In order to pursue the objectives of the Energy Community	Therefore, the main instrument being the implementation of key parts of the EU acquis is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
71	Contracting parties have the obligation to implement these instruments within specific timeframes	the main instrument of the Energy Community Treaty is the implementation of key parts of the EU acquis	Therefore, the contracting parties having this obligation is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		In order to pursue the objectives of the Energy Community			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
72	The countries we today refer to as our "Eastern Partners" – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine – and depending on its own	as a result of successive – and successful - enlargements	Therefore, these countries have become the EU's neighbours	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	choices Belarus - have become our neighbours				
72	But they are not only geographically closer. Their political systems and economies are also closer	as a result of reforms fostered by the European Neighbourhood Policy	Therefore, their political systems and economies being closer to the EU is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
72	The EU has a vital strategic interest in seeing stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern borders	These changes, Honourable Members, bring new opportunities, but also new responsibilities, not least in the light of this summer's conflict in Georgia	Therefore, the EU having a vital strategic interests in seeing its Eastern border stable is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
72	We intend to pursue that interest and support our partners even more strongly	These changes, Honourable Members, bring new opportunities, but also new responsibilities, not least in the light of this summer's conflict in Georgia	Therefore, the EU intending to pursue that interest and support its partners even more strongly is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
72	The EU intending to support those aspirations of these countries seeking to intensify their relations with the EU, this "choice for Europe"	For their part, our Eastern Partners all seek to intensify their relations with the EU	Therefore, the EU intending to support these countries is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
72	Ladies and Gentlemen, we want to build a new, ambitious partnership, going well beyond the achievements of the	It should bring a lasting political message of solidarity, with additional, tangible support for democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation of partners' statehood and territorial integrity	Therefore, the EU wanting to build a new partnership that goes beyond the ENP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	European Neighbourhood Policy				
72	The EU wanting to conclude AA's with its partners as a key element of the EaP	With those partners that are ready and willing to take on far-reaching commitments	Therefore, the EU wanting to conclude AA's with its partners is legitimised	*Association Agreements*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Superseding current Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, these "Associations" will formalise the step change in our engagement and the bond between us			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		They will be the firm basis for a strong and ambitious relationship.			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		They will also promote further convergence with EU legislation and standards - key for business and investors - and advance cooperation on the global stage through cooperation on both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
72	The EU wanting to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP	In short: We want to use the power of attraction of our internal market – the world's largest – to stabilize our partners and create prosperity	Therefore, the EU wanting to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
72	The EU providing sectoral support	to provide immediate gains for business	Therefore, the EU providing sectoral support is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The EU wants to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	The EU concluding AA's with	the Association Agreements will provide for better mutual market access and the creation of Deep and Comprehensive	Therefore, the EU concluding AA's is legitimised *Association Agreements*		Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	partner countries	Free Trade Areas, once partner countries join the WTO			
		This will enable the free movement of goods, capital and services much as our own market does			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The EU wants to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	the Association Agreements will provide for better mutual market access and the creation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas	Once partner countries join the WTO	Therefore, only then can de AA's provide for better mutual market access and the created of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas	*Association Agreements*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
72	In parallel, we'd like to encourage partners to develop a free trade network between themselves	which could, in the longer term, join up into a Neighbourhood Economic Community	Therefore, the EU encouraging the partners to develop a free trade network between themselves is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		The EU wants to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	But we can help the partners that are not ready yet reach the necessary state of readiness for this	Of course, not all partners are yet ready to undertake negotiations or implement a Free Trade Area with the EU	Therefore, the EU helping these partners is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		The EU wants to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	This is just one reason why the Eastern Partnership will introduce innovative Comprehensive Institution	Of course, not all partners are yet ready to undertake negotiations or implement a Free Trade Area with the EU	Therefore, the EaP introducing these programmes is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
		to help them develop the capacity to undertake the challenging reforms needed to bring them closer to Europe			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	Building programmes with each partner	The EU wants to promote free trade with its partners through the EaP			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	we want to encourage the free movement of people	This is clearly a litmus test for the credibility of our enhanced European offer - and for the Neighbourhood Policy as a whole	Therefore, the EU wanting to encourage the free movement of people is legitimised	*ENP*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		Our Union must gradually open our borders - but of course in a smart, secure, controlled way			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	Our Union must gradually open our borders	but of course in a smart, secure, controlled way	Therefore, the opening of the EU's border is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: evaluation
72	The EU will therefore offer the Eastern Partners "Mobility and Security Pacts"	to promote legal movement of people	Therefore, the EU offering the Mobility and Security Pacts is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Poland and other Member States had a visa-free regime with their eastern neighbours until recently, and they have understandable reasons for wanting to return to this situation			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	We recommend the EU to initiate talks on visa facilitation with partners who do not yet benefit from it;	The EU wants to encourage the free movement of people	Therefore, the EU recommending this is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	We recommend the EU to provide additional facilitation including the waiving of fees to partners who do benefit from it already	The EU wants to encourage the free movement of people	Therefore, the EU recommending this is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

72	We recommend the EU to improve Member State consular coverage through Common Visa Application centres	The EU wants to encourage the free movement of people	Therefore, the EU recommending this is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	We recommend the EU to open dialogues on visa-free travel with all partners in the long term	The EU wants to encourage the free movement of people	Therefore, the EU recommending this is legitimised	*Visa*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	The EU proposing to include "Energy interdependence chapters in the Association Agreements	we want to guarantee our mutual energy security	Therefore, the EU proposing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	The EU proposing the swift completion of negotiations on Ukraine's and Moldova's membership in the Energy Community	we want to guarantee our mutual energy security	Therefore, the EU proposing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
72	we will help partners address economic and social disparities, and improve conditions in their less developed regions	we will aim to promote partners' sustainable development	Therefore, the EU helping its partners is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Drawing on the experience of EU regional development policies			Authorisation: authority – expert authority
		thereby laying the foundations for prosperity – in their interest and ours			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

72	The list of points related to the EaP being long	which illustrates the seriousness of our intent	Therefore, the list being long is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Eastern Partnership represents a substantial upgrade in the level of our engagement			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
72	We will also create a New Multilateral Framework for the relationship to be launched at a Summit meeting next spring	This will enable us to support partners' individual ambitions, in a forum where common challenges can be addressed, experience shared, and joint activities undertaken	Therefore, the creation of this New Multilateral Framework is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Above all it will give us a new way to accompany partners' own reform efforts by explaining EU legislation and standards			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
72	The EU introducing the EaP	I believe that now is the time to act	Therefore, the EU introducing the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		I believe that now is the time to act and to make an ambitious political investment			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		I believe that now is the time to act and to make an ambitious political investment, not only in the interests of our partners to the East, but also those of our own citizens			Moralisation: analogy
		I believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the Eastern partnership will yield stability and prosperity "dividends" for years to come.			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
72	The EaP being based on frank dialogue about reform	as in all of the EU's partnerships	Therefore, the EaP being based on frank dialogue about reform is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: custom – tradition
72	I think we can all be satisfied with the outcome of	which led to the granting to Ukraine of an "Association Agreement"	Therefore, being satisfied about the outcome of the	*Association Agreements*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	deliberations earlier in the year between the EU and Ukraine	which can now become the model for others in the Eastern Partnership. .	EU-Ukraine deliberations is legitimised		Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
72	Ferrero-Waldner being happy to report	negotiations are progressing well, including now on the trade track	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner being happy to report is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and that a visa dialogue was launched at the end of October			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
72	The EU urging the political forces in Ukraine to focus on the serious challenges facing their country in terms of economic and political reform: constitutional reform, reform of the judiciary and the implementation of measures to strengthen the business and investment climate	the continuing political instability is a matter of concern	Therefore, the EU urging this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		we all have a part to play in urging this			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	The EU wanting to see stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern borders	The European Union has a vital interest in this	Therefore, the EU wanting stability etc. is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
73	The Union's policy towards its partners in the East and South	The European Union has a vital interest in seeing stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern borders	Therefore, the EU's policy towards its partners must be proactive	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

	Caucasus must be proactive and unequivocal	At the same time, our partners in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus all seek to intensify their relations with the EU	and unequivocal		Authorisation: authority – personal authority
73	the EU will give strong support to these partners in their efforts to come closer to the EU, and will give all necessary assistance with the reforms this entails, through a specific Eastern dimension within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)	The Union's policy towards them must be proactive and unequivocal	Therefore, the EU giving strong support through an Eastern dimension within the ENP is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
73	the EU will give strong support to these partners in their efforts to come closer to the EU, and will give all necessary assistance with the reforms this entails	The EU will do this through a specific Eastern dimension within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)	Therefore, the EU giving strong support to these partners and giving all necessary assistance is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	The past 15 years have brought sweeping changes on the EU's eastern flank	Since the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the European Union and Eastern Partners, successive enlargements have brought greater geographic proximity, while reforms supported by the ENP have brought these countries politically and economically closer to the EU.	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*ENP*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

		The EU has a growing responsibility to the partners			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
73	The EU should help its partners address the political and economic challenges that they face and to support their aspirations for closer ties	The EU has a growing responsibility to the partners	Therefore, the EU helping its partners is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
73	The time has come to make a step change in relations with these partners, without prejudice to individual countries' aspirations for their future relationship with the EU	The past 15 years have brought sweeping changes on the EU's eastern flank	Therefore, the time has come is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The EU has a growing responsibility to the partners			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
73	The Commission preparing a proposal for an "Eastern Partnership" (EaP)	The European Council of 19/20 June 2008 invited the Commission to prepare a proposal	Therefore, the Commission preparing this proposal is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		This proposal emphasises the need for a differentiated approach respecting the character of the ENP as a single and coherent policy framework			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
73	This work being accelerated	The Extraordinary European Council of 1st September 2008 asked for this work to be accelerated	Therefore, this work being accelerated is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		This is a response to the need for a clearer signal of EU commitment following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

73	The EU proposing the EaP	The EaP should bring a lasting political message of EU solidarity, alongside additional, tangible support for their democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation of their statehood and territorial integrity	Therefore, the EU proposing the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		It would serve the stability, security and prosperity of the EU, partners and indeed the entire continent			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		The ENP has already been successful in forging closer relations between the EU and its neighbours. The EaP should go further.			Moralisation: analogy
73	The EaP should bring a lasting political message of EU solidarity, alongside additional, tangible support for their democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation of their statehood and territorial integrity	It would serve the stability, security and prosperity of the EU, partners and indeed the entire continent	Therefore, the EaP should bring a lasting political message of solidarity	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
73	The EaP should go further than the ENP	The ENP has been successful	Therefore, the EaP going further than the ENP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The guiding principle should be to offer the maximum possible			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
73	The guiding principle of the EaP should be to offer the	At the same time it will take into account political and economic realities and the state of reforms of the partner concerned	Therefore, the guiding principle is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	maximum possible	This will bring visible benefits for the citizens of each country			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	this partnership should be pursued with the full political engagement of EU Member States	It is important	Therefore, this partnership should be pursued with the full political engagement of EU MS	*Eastern Partnership*	Moralisation: abstraction
73	The EU's level of ambition of the relationship with the Eastern Partners	Depends on the extent to which these values are reflected in national practices and policy implementation	Therefore, the EU's level of ambition of its relationship with its Eastern Partners is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority Moralisation: abstraction
73	the EaP achieving its objective of political association and economic integration	Depends on both sides having strong political will	Therefore, the EaP achieving its objective is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
73	The EaP will aim to strengthen the energy security of the EU and of the partners with regard to long-term energy supply and transit	The closeness of main hydrocarbon transit pipelines to zones of conflict remains of concern	Therefore, the EaP aiming to strengthen the energy security of the EU and the partners is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Instability in the Southern Caucasus can also threaten the region's energy security			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		The main gas pipeline from the Russian Federation to the Balkans passes through the Transnistrian region of Moldova			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		These factors impact on investor confidence, on the prospects of sustainable energy transit through the Caucasus and on the EU's strategy for securing new suppliers in Central Asia			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

73	The Commission proposing enhanced support for the full integration of Ukraine's energy market with that of the EU	Which will recognise the importance of a satisfactory assessment of the level of nuclear safety in all Ukraine's operating nuclear power plants	Therefore, the EU proposing enhanced support for the full integration of Ukraine's energy market with that of the EU is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Rehabilitation of the Ukrainian gas and oil transit network is a priority, including through improvement of the monitoring of gas and oil flows into Ukraine			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		A pledging and investment conference aiming to assist Ukraine in the rehabilitation and development of its gas transit network will be held in 2009			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
73	the EaP Energy Security platform should concentrate on measures of mutual interest	The energy security of the EU and partners is closely linked	Therefore, the EaP Energy Security platform concentrating on measures of mutual interest is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
73	The EaP will aim to develop and implement mutual energy support and security mechanisms, including early warning mechanisms and joint security actions	One of the objectives will be to strengthen contacts on energy security and to enhance energy crisis preparedness	Therefore, the EaP aiming to develop and implement this is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
73	An energy security panel will be established	In order to support the objective of strengthening contacts on energy security and to enhance energy crisis preparedness	Therefore, the establishment of an energy security panel is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		One of the objectives will be to strengthen contacts on energy security and to enhance energy crisis preparedness			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
73	The EU developing an Energy Infrastructure	The creation in the medium term of a mutually beneficial interconnected and diversified energy market between the EU	Therefore, the EU developing an Energy Infrastructure Action Plan for	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	Action Plan for the EaP	and partners will also be pursued	the EaP is legitimised		
73	The EU and its partners having energy security	requires a strong diversification of supply and transit routes	Therefore, energy security could be achieved	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
73	The EU closer involving third countries including Central Asia countries	This could better achieve a strong diversification of supply and transit routes in order to achieve energy security for the EU and its partners	Therefore, the EU involving third countries is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	the EaP should contribute towards the ongoing strengthening of the Baku Process as a genuine energy partnership, with a full participation of countries of Central Asia as a key energy producing region, and including through the development of the Southern corridor including the Transcaspian	This could better achieve a strong diversification of supply and transit routes in order to achieve energy security for the EU and its partners	Therefore, the EaP should contribute towards the ongoing strengthening of the Baku Process	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	Deepening our relations with the partners through the Eastern Partnership	The rationale of the ENP – that the Union has a vital interest in promoting better governance and economic development through a determined engagement in its neighbourhood – is more valid than ever	Therefore, deepening the EU's relations with its partners through the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Moralisation: abstraction
		is thus both a strategic imperative and a political investment for the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		which will pay dividends to Europe's citizens			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	The Commission calls on the Council and European Parliament to provide strong political and financial support to the EaP	The EaP will contribute to energizing reforms, integrating markets and societies, projecting stability and counteracting the risk of the emergence of new borderlines across our continent	Therefore, the Commission calling on the Council and the Parliament is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
73	The Commission proposes that the Eastern Partnership be launched at a Summit Meeting in the spring of 2009, involving the Heads of State or Government of all EU Member States and partners	This "Eastern Partnership Summit" will adopt a Political Declaration establishing the Partnership, spelling out its main goals and principles and determining the general features of the ensuing cooperation process	Therefore, the Commission proposing to launch the EaP during a Summit in the spring of 2009 is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
74	The Commission's proposal for a new Eastern Partnership represents a step change in the EU's relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine	This ambitious Partnership foresees a substantial upgrading of the level of political engagement, including the prospect of a new generation of Association Agreements, far-reaching integration into the EU economy, easier travel to the EU for citizens providing that security requirements are met, enhanced energy security arrangements benefitting all concerned, and increased financial assistance	Therefore, the statement that this proposal represents a step change is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The EU proposes much more intensive day to day support for partners' reform efforts through a new Comprehensive Institution Building programme, and a new			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		multilateral dimension which will bring partners together to address common challenges			
		The new Partnership includes new measures to support the social and economic development of the 6 countries, and five flagship initiatives that will give very concrete evidence of the EU's support			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
74	the Eastern Partnership achieving its objective of political association and economic integration	Only with strong political will and commitment on both sides will the Eastern Partnership achieve its objective of political association and economic integration	Therefore, the EaP achieving its objectives is dependent on the political will and commitment on both sides	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
74	We need to make an even greater investment in mutual stability and prosperity	Only with strong political will and commitment on both sides will the Eastern Partnership achieve its objective of political association and economic integration	Therefore, the statement that we need to make an even greater investment is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		This will be quickly compensated by important political and economic benefits			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		and will lead to more stability and security both for the EU and for our Eastern partners			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
74	we have prepared an ambitious and at the same time well-balanced offer	The time is ripe to open a new chapter in relations with our Eastern neighbours	Therefore, the EU having prepared this offer is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Building on the progress of the last years			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The security and stability of the EU is affected by events taking place in Eastern Europe and in the Southern Caucasus			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Our policy towards these countries should be strong, proactive and unequivocal			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		The EU will continue with the successful approach of tailor-made programmes on a new scale and add a strong multilateral dimension			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It remains our principle though that progress must go hand in hand with reform efforts by our partners, but this new package also offers more intensive assistance to help them meet their goals			Moralisation: analogy
74	The EU proposing the EaP	The EaP responds to the desire of the EU's Eastern neighbours to move closer to the European Union	Therefore, the EU proposing the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Yet, it is also in the EU's vital interest to contribute to the development of stability, better governance and economic development at its Eastern borders			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
74	The EU has a growing responsibility to the partners to help them address the political and economic challenges they face and support their aspirations for closer ties	Successive enlargements have brought greater geographic proximity with our Eastern neighbours	Therefore, the EU has a growing responsibility to its partners	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		reforms supported by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have brought these countries politically and economically closer to the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		not least in the light of the conflict in Georgia last summer			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
74	the European Council of the 1st September requested the Commission to present its proposal earlier than previously foreseen	Following the conflict in the Caucasus	Therefore, the request is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
74	the Commission proposes to engage more deeply bilateral relations with	Following consultations with the Eastern Partners	Therefore, the proposal of the Commission is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority

	the Eastern Partners and to launch a new multilateral framework for cooperation				
75	Ich engagiere mich seit langem in der Kommission für eine koordinierte europäische Energieaußenpolitik	um eine sichere und nachhaltige Energieversorgung zu gewährleisten	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner engaging herself for a coordinated EU energy-foreign policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
75	Gerade heute habe ich eine Absichtserklärung mit Ägypten unterzeichnet	Im Mittelpunkt steht die Diversifizierung der Energieversorgung und die Diversifizierung und Verbesserung der Energietransportrouten. Dabei ist es wichtig, dass wir unsere Blicke sowohl Richtung Osten als auch Richtung Süden richten. Und zwar direkt in unsere unmittelbare Nachbarschaft und auch in weiter entfernte Länder Amerikas, Asiens oder Schwarzafrikas	Therefore, the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Egypt is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Sie fügt sich nahtlos in die Reihe der bereits bestehenden Energie-Abkommen ein. Sie umfassen mittlerweile die Ukraine, Aserbaidschan, Kasachstan und Turkmenistan			Authorisation: custom – tradition
76	The focus of the Second Strategic Energy Review being mainly on energy security	It is clearly presented as matter of common EU concern	Therefore, the focus of the Review being on energy security is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
76	The Commission has intensified energy cooperation with third countries	in line with the Member States' call for strengthening dialogues and partnerships with producer, transit and consumer countries	Therefore, the Commission intensifying energy cooperation with third	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority

			countries is legitimised		
76	Major developments have occurred over this semester on the state of implementation of the external priorities outlined in the Energy Policy for Europe Action Plan 2007-2009	The opening of negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova upon accession to the Energy Community	Therefore, the statement that major developments have occurred is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
76	The next Ministerial Council will take place in Tirana on 11 December 2008	Because negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova on the accession to the Energy Community have been opened up	Therefore, the next Ministerial Council taking place is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
76	Preparations are under way for the Investment Conference on the rehabilitation and modernisation of Ukraine's gas transit system, currently planned for 23 March 2009	We have also progressed in the implementation of the MOU on strategic energy partnerships with the Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan	Therefore, preparations being under way is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
77	The EU Commission creating a programme for 2009	The dramatic events witnessed in 2008 have made citizens realise that action at Community level is efficient and necessary – for economic and social welfare, for a better environment, for more solidarity and for more security	Therefore, the Commission creating the 2009 programme	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation Moralisation: evaluation

		It has a dual objective: to continue on the path we have taken in response to existing challenges and to be ready to tackle the ones we will face in future			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
77	The EU Commission proposing the EaP	It is framed as a part of the Commission's programme for 2009 (fourth pillar)	Therefore, the Commission proposing the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		This partnership foresees stronger political engagement, including the prospect of a new generation of Association Agreements, better integration into the EU economy, easier travel to the EU for citizens, providing security requirements are met, enhanced energy security arrangements and increased financial assistance			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

Table 70: Overview Stage 3 of the second gas crisis

Stage 3	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	13	Press release	8	61,5%	111
		Speech	2	15,4%	
		Declaration of the Council of the European Union	2	15,4%	
		EESC debate	1	7,7%	

Table 71: Texts collected for Stage 3 of the second gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
78: Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on interruption of Russian gas supply through Ukraine – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pesc_09_1	2 January 2009	Declaration of the Council of the European Union
79: What moves Europe? Global crisis and the euro – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_2	8 January 2009	Speech
80: EU Declaration on the Russia/Ukraine problem and energy security – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_04	8 January 2009	Declaration of the Council of the European Union
81: The Gas Coordination Group evaluates the current gas crisis and confirms measures to assist countries in need – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_30	9 January 2009	Press release
82: Monitoring team starts work in Kiev and Gas Coordination Group urges Naftogaz and Gazprom to resume gas deliveries immediately – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_24	9 January 2009	Press release
83: ENERGY: Update on the deployment of EU monitor team in Ukraine – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_32	10 January 2009	Press release
84: Statement from the President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs on the agreement for the gas monitoring – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_33	11 January 2009	Press release
85: The EU gas observation mission, already deployed on the ground and the terms of reference of the mission signed. Once again, there is no reason to further delay gas supplies – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_34	11 January 2009	Press release
86: Extraordinary Council meeting Transport, Telecommunications and Energy – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_10	12 January 2009	Press release

87: EESC debate with Czech Deputy Prime Minister Vondra: 'Europe without barriers' – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ces_09_7	15 January 2009	EESC Debate
88: Van den Brande urges local and regional authorities in Russia and the Ukraine to intervene as gas crisis starts to have dramatic impact within the EU – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/cor_09_2	16 January 2009	Committee of the Regions press release
89: Gas Coordination Group: Solidarity works and the EU's gas market adapts to challenges of gas crisis – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_75	19 January 2009	Press release
90: Statement of President Barroso on the resolution of the Ukraine-Russia Gas Dispute – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_12	20 January 2009	Speech

Table 72: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 3 of the second gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Code	Category of legitimation
78	The European Union calls for an urgent solution to the commercial dispute on gas supplies from the Russian Federation to Ukraine, and for an immediate resumption of full deliveries of gas to the EU member states	Energy relations between the EU and its neighbours should be based on reliability and predictability	Therefore, the EU calling for an urgent solution is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Existing commitments to supply and transit have to be honoured under all circumstances			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
78	The EU continuing to monitor the situation closely	The European Union regrets the fact that assurances of the reliability of energy supply have not been met	Therefore, the EU continuing to monitor the situation closely is legitimised	*Energy*	Moralisation: abstraction
79	The EU galvanising action in other areas, particularly towards our long term objective of fighting climate change and	The EU should look at the financial crisis as a chance	Therefore, the EU galvanising action in other areas is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	using cleaner energies				
79	energy efficiency, together with sources diversification, is certainly one of the main elements for a stable solution in the future	in the context of the current dispute on gas provision between Russia and Ukraine and its consequences on gas delivery to Central Europe	Therefore, the statement that energy efficiency is one of the main elements for a stable solution in the future is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The EU should look on the financial crisis as a chance to galvanise action in other areas, particularly towards our long term objective of fighting climate change and using cleaner energies			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
80	The present situation caused by interruptions of gas supplies from Russia via the Ukraine creates serious difficulties for a number of EU countries which is a problem for the EU as a whole / as such	Given the importance attached to solidarity within the EU	Therefore, the statement that this situation is a problem for the EU as a whole is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
80	It is unacceptable for the EU to see its citizens and enterprises suffering from gas shortages due to the non respect by both partner countries of their contractual obligations	this is a problem for the EU as such	Therefore, it is unacceptable for the EU to see its citizens and enterprises suffering	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
80	the EU has undertaken concerted efforts to facilitate the dialogue between Russia and the Ukraine	With the first evidence of gas supply reductions in early January 2009	Therefore, the EU undertaking efforts to facilitate dialogue between Russia and Ukraine is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

80	The credibility of Russia and Ukraine is damaged	Both sides have to date shown insufficient determination to solve the problem	Therefore, the statement that their credibility is damaged is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
80	The EU urges Russia and the Ukraine to honour their obligations as supplier respectively transit country and to immediately resume normal deliveries to the European market	The EU expects that the current negotiations will bring a quick solution	Therefore, the EU urging is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
80	A special Energy Council will take place on 12 January	in order to look at the situation on the energy market, including monitoring, and to discuss the concrete measures to be taken	Therefore, the special Energy Council is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
80	The EU also insists on the necessity to create the conditions for a long term solution, based on internationally recognized principles	This puts an end to regularly occurring crises in the midst of winter	Therefore, the EU insisting this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
80	Security of energy supply is a priority for the EU	It involves the responsibility and solidarity of all the Member States	Therefore, the security of energy supply being a priority for the EU is legitimised	*Energy*	Moralisation: abstraction
80	The EU will speed up work on the various energy security initiatives mentioned under paragraph 17 of the October EC conclusions	Security of energy supply is a priority for the EU. It involves the responsibility and solidarity of all the Member States	Therefore, the EU speeding up work is legitimised	*Energy*	Moralisation: abstraction
		Particular emphasis will be put on priority interconnections both within the EU and with supplier and			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		transit countries, increased transparency, and the developing of crisis mechanisms to tackle temporary supply disruptions			
80	Energy security will be on the agenda of the upcoming General Affairs Councils	with a view to reaching decisions at the Spring European Council	Therefore, energy security being on the agenda is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
81	In the afternoon session of the meeting of the Gas Coordination Group members, together with countries of the Energy Community in South-East Europe, discussed the impact of the current gas crisis, evaluating each country's situation	with a particular view to identify further measures of assisting countries in need	Therefore, discussing the impact and evaluating each country's situation is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		in the spirit of solidarity			Moralisation: abstraction
81	The implementation of the gas security supply directive	has shown how Member States though heavily struck are able to cope with the crisis	Therefore, the implementation of the gas security supply directive is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Some Member States, although severely affected, have been able to assist neighbours in difficulty showing real solidarity			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
81	The EU needs a coordinated European response and emergency plan	This is demonstrated by the current crisis	Therefore, the EU needing a coordinated European response and emergency plan is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		as already highlighted by the Commission in its Second Strategic Energy Review advocating an EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, as it was published in November 2008			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

81	The Group identified the possible measures which could further help in relieving the countries most affected	in view of the discussion of the Energy Ministers on Monday 12 January 2009	Therefore, the Group identifying possible measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
81	The Gas Coordination Group was created in 2006	according to Directive 2004/67 relating to measures that guarantee security of natural gas supply	Therefore, the creation of the Gas Coordination group is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
81	The Group meets regularly (at least four times per year)	to exchange information and to develop both short and long term concrete measures which reinforce the security of gas supply to the EU	Therefore, the gas group meeting regularly is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
81	The present meeting had been planned long in advance	having in mind a possible problem of supply given the recurrent dispute between Ukraine and Russia at the turn of the year	Therefore, the meeting having been planned long in advance is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
81	the Energy Community contracting parties were invited to the meeting of the Gas Coordination Group	Due to the exceptional circumstances	Therefore, the Energy Community contracting parties being invited is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
81	The Gas Coordination Group being convened	Directive 2004/67 provides for this in its three-step approach	Therefore, the Gas Coordination Group being convened is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
81	the Commission proposes the revision of the directive and the elaboration of regional and EU emergency plans to be activated automatically in case of the occurrence of	The recent Communication of the Commission, adopted on 13 November 2008 together with the Strategic Energy Review, points out that the current Community mechanism might not be timely and adequate to deal with a supply crisis that national measures cannot mitigate	Therefore, the Commission proposing the revision of the directive is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	supply disruption of a certain importance				
81	The Energy Council will hold an extraordinary meeting on Monday 12 January	to consider the results and recommendations of the meeting of the Gas Coordination Group of today	Therefore, the Energy Council holding an extraordinary meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
82	The Gas Coordination Group met today together with experts from Gazprom, Naftogaz and Ukrainian administration in Brussels	to discuss the current gas crisis	Therefore, the Gas Coordination Group meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and to reach a common understanding between experts of the main elements of the dispute			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		in order to facilitate an immediate resumption of gas supply to the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
82	the Group underlined the importance and the necessity for both disputing parties to resume urgently supply and transit of gas towards the EU	As the European market has lost about 30% of its gas imports	Therefore, the Gas Group underlining this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		at a time of very low temperature			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
82	Security of energy supply is one of the three pillars of European Energy policy	Europe needs reliable partners	Therefore, security of energy supply is one of the three pillars of European Energy Policy	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
82	Suppliers must respect their contractual obligations towards European industry and transit countries must live up to their	A commercial dispute cannot have such disproportionate consequences	Therefore, suppliers must respect their contractual obligations	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	international transit obligation				
82	Both parties have to show their goodwill	in order not to compromise further their reputation as reliable partners to the EU	Therefore, both parties having to show their goodwill is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
82	The Commission has called the two parties to find a stable and long-term solution for their divergences	These divergences continue to arise regularly during the past two years	Therefore, the Commission calling on the two parties to find a stable and long-term solution is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
82	the Group offered technical advice	if they so wish	Therefore, the Group offering technical advice is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
82	The recent Communication of the Commission, adopted on 13 November 2008 together with the Strategic Energy Review	to strengthen the measures to have a more effective action in case of gas crisis	Therefore, the adoption of the recent Communication is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
83	The monitoring team has held a technical meeting this morning with the Ukrainian Gas Transmission System Operator UkrTransGaz (UTG) and with Naftogas	on the modalities for the deployment of the monitoring mission	Therefore, the monitoring team holding a technical meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
84	Barroso warmly welcoming the agreement to the document setting out terms of reference for the monitoring mission that has been signed by	Following the intensive efforts of both the Czech Presidency and the Commission	Therefore, Barroso warmly welcoming the agreement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This should now finally allow the resumption of gas supplies from Russia to the EU			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction

	Russia, Ukraine and the European Commission				
84	Barroso particularly thanking the Presidency of the Council, Prime Minister Topolanek	for his final efforts to facilitate the deal in Kiev and Moscow	Therefore, Barroso particularly thanking Topolanek is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
84	We now need the gas to flow immediately to the EU	There are many EU citizens at risk without gas supply	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and this situation has gone on for far too long			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
84	the monitoring teams will start to do their work as soon as possible	Now that the terms of reference are agreed	Therefore, the monitoring teams starting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
84	hopefully there will soon be gas flowing for them to monitor	European citizens need the gas so badly	Therefore, the statement that Barroso hopes that soon there will be gas flowing that the monitoring teams can monitor is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
84	the European Commission, together with the Czech Presidency, has undertaken an intense activity	Since the cut of supplies from Russia through Ukraine	Therefore, the Commission together with the Czech Presidency, have undertaken an immense activity	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		to achieve the restoration of gas supplies to the EU			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and to mitigate the dramatic consequences that this crisis has had in many EU Member States			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

84	The day after, President Barroso spoke to Prime Ministers Putin and Timoshenko on the phone	urged them to restore full gas supplies to the EU immediately	Therefore, Barroso speaking to Putin and Timoshenko in the phone is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
84	Barroso urging Putin and Timoshenko to restore full gas supplies to the EU immediately	President Barroso made it clear that it was unacceptable that the EU's gas supply security was taken hostage to negotiations between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, Barroso urging them to restore full gas supplies to the EU immediately is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		He warned that reputation as reliable partners of Russia and Ukraine was at stake			Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales
84	President Barroso insisted that Ukraine and Russia had to find a stable and long-term solution to guarantee reliable gas supplies to the EU	He warned that reputation as reliable partners of Russia and Ukraine was at stake	Therefore, Barroso insisting this is legitimised	*Energy*	Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales
84	the flows of gas would be fully restored	if an international monitoring mission was deployed	Therefore, the flows of gas would be fully restored	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs got assurances from both sides			Authorisation: authority – personal authority
84	The European Commission services in cooperation with the European Gas Industry and the European Gas Transmission Operators built up a team of experts to undertake the	In a new series of telephone conversations in the last couple of days, President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs got assurances from both sides that if an international monitoring mission was deployed to control the flows of gas would be fully restored	Therefore, the building of a team of experts is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	monitoring mission				
85	there is no reason to further delay gas supplies	The EU gas observation mission, already deployed on the ground	Therefore, the statement that there is no reason to further delay gas supplies is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		and the terms of reference of the mission signed			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
85	The Commission considering that there is no reason to delay the restoration of gas supplies any further	The Commission considers that all conditions expressed by the two parties have been met	Therefore, the Commission considering that there is no reason to delay the restoration of gas supplies any longer is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
86	The Ministers meeting in an Extraordinary Council meeting at a critical moment	caused by the current unprecedented interruption of gas supplies from Russia via Ukraine to the EU	Therefore, the Ministers meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
86	The Council urged both parties to resume gas deliveries to the EU immediately	in order to rebuild the credibility of both parties	Therefore, the Council urging this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		and avoid further economical harms and suffering to the citizens of the EU and of neighbouring countries			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
86	The Council appreciates domestic and solidarity measures already undertaken	The Council evaluated the situation of gas supplies in relevant Member States	Therefore, the Council appreciating the domestic and solidarity measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		which – despite the limited possibilities in the short run - have helped to mitigate the impact on European citizens and national economies			Moralisation: analogy
86	The Council encouraging the MS to sustain and deepen	until the supplies are restored	Therefore, the Council encouraging the MS to do this is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

	solidarity measures				
86	The Council welcomes the steps undertaken by the Presidency and the Commission	with the aim to facilitate the dialogue between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, the Council welcoming the steps undertaken by the Presidency and the Commission is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
86	The Presidency and the Commission undertaking steps with the aim to facilitate the dialogue between Russia and Ukraine	in order immediately to restore gas deliveries	Therefore, the Presidency and the Commission taking these steps is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
86	The Council appreciates the steps taken towards the establishment of the technical monitoring mission	The Council expects all parties to facilitate prompt results from its work	Therefore, the Council appreciating the establishment of the monitoring mission is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
86	the Council calls on both parties to develop lasting solutions	that would prevent the recurrence of such dispute	Therefore, the Council calling this on both parties is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
86	the Council calls on both parties to ensure they will honour their obligations	To guarantee the continuity of gas supply to the EU	Therefore, the Council calling this on both parties is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
86	the Council agrees on the necessity urgently to develop and strengthen medium and long-term measures along the following priority axes	The present crisis has documented the importance of urgently reinforcing the energy policy in Member States and at EU level	Therefore, the Council agreeing on the necessity to urgently develop and strengthen medium and long-term measures along several priority	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		in order to be able to prevent possible future major supply disruptions or cope with their consequences			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

			axes is legitimised		
86	Transparency regarding physical gas flows, demand and storage volumes must be enhanced in both Member States and their industry, and in supply and transit countries, including by installing reliable metering systems where appropriate	the Council agrees on the necessity urgently to develop and strengthen medium and long-term measures along the following priority axes	Therefore, the Council stating that this must be enhanced is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
86	The Commission presenting a report on this issue in time for the March European Council	The Council invited the Commission to do so	Therefore, this action is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
86	The Council inviting the Commission to suggest possible forms of bilateral or regional agreements	Regional or bilateral solidarity arrangements, including on a commercial basis, addressing disruption of supplies must be enhanced	Therefore, the Council inviting the Commission is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
86	The Commission speeding up the revision of the Security of Gas Supply Directive 2004/67/EC by the end of 2009, notably with respect to the definition of the "major supply disruption"	The Commission is invited by the Council to do so	Therefore, the Commission speeding up this process is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		Access to and investment in gas storage must be improved and strategic gas stocks could also be considered by Member States as well as other means to improve security including the capacity of each Member State to free up security margins			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	indicator and the related Community and national mitigating measures in crisis situations				
86	The Commission carrying out a thorough assessment of network interconnection, identify gaps, suggest action and to speed up the revision of the TEN-E framework	The Commission is invited by the Council to do so	Therefore, the Commission carrying out a thorough assessment is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		In order to identify missing interconnections and accelerate the relevant work			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		with a view to considering the development of a comprehensive EU Energy Security and Infrastructure Instrument as suggested in the 2nd Strategic Energy Review			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
86	EU MS speeding up the implementation of network planning provisions foreseen in the 3 rd internal energy market package and inform the Commission of the planning and realization of their most urgent projects	The Council urges them to do so	Therefore, the MS speeding up their implementation and informing the Commission is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
86	The Council calling for mobilising potential resources under the Community budget and other financing instruments	to strengthen investment in vital energy infrastructure	Therefore, the Council calling for mobilising potential resources under the Community budget is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The contribution of diversified transport routes and sources to the energy security of the EU and its Member States, including by LNG terminals suitably connected to the internal market to be of use to all Member States, must be a			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		major criterion for selecting projects eligible for Community co-financing and other instruments such as those managed by the EIB			
86	The Council calling for urgent progress on the European Economic Recovery Plan	as agreed by the European Council conclusions of December 2008	Therefore, the Council calling for progress is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		The contribution of diversified transport routes and sources to the energy security of the EU and its Member States, including by LNG terminals suitably connected to the internal market to be of use to all Member States, must be a major criterion for selecting projects eligible for Community co-financing and other instruments such as those managed by the EIB			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
86	The Commission identifying with the Member States affected, the economic and social consequences resulting from the crisis and to map out the relevant measures, including State aid rules where necessary	The Council invited the Commission to do so	Therefore, the Commission doing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		in assisting those Member States			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
86	The Council deciding on further concrete medium and long-term measures envisaged in the	The Council will review the situation and progress made	Therefore, the Council deciding on further measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction

	2 nd Strategic Energy Review as well as in these Council Conclusions				
86	The Commission reporting on the progress reached at the 19 February Energy Council	The Council invites the Commission to report	Therefore, the Commission reporting on the progress reached is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		in order for the Spring European Council to agree on the necessary responses on energy security			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
87	EESC President stating that the Czech presidency has come at a crucial moment for Europe	Since the Czech presidency has to deal with the financial crisis, the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute and the attacks on Gaza	Therefore, the statement that the Czech presidency has come at a crucial moment for Europe is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
87	This situation should be reason enough to ratify the Lisbon Treaty as soon as possible	The Czech presidency has to deal with the financial crisis, the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute and the attacks on Gaza	Therefore, ratifying the Lisbon Treaty as soon as possible is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
87	The Czech presidency aiming to create long-term measures that will ensure more transparency in the gas flows, better energy infrastructure interconnections and a revision of the Security of Gas Supply Directive	Because of the current gas crisis going on	Therefore, the Czech presidency's aim is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
87	the Committee adopted an opinion on the "External	Because of the current gas crisis going on	Therefore, the Committee adopting this	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	Dimension of the EU's Energy Policy" by rapporteur Ulla Sirkeinen	in which the EESC proposes two pillars for an external energy policy of the EU: securing the EU's supply of energy, and an active and responsible energy and climate policy	opinion is legitimised		Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
87	Marius Opran stressing the importance of avoiding bilateral agreements	the citizens are the first victims of the current gas situation	Therefore, Opran stressing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		in order to create an integrated European strategy			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
88	Van den Brande urges local and regional authorities in Russia and the Ukraine to intervene	as gas crisis starts to have dramatic impact within the EU	Therefore, Van den Brande urging this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation Moralisation: evaluation
88	President Luc Van den Brande voiced his grave concern about the situation in several EU member states including Slovakia and Bulgaria	Speaking on behalf of the Committee of the Regions	Therefore, Van den Brande voicing his grave concern is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		The gas crisis is starting to hit the citizens of several EU member states hard			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		It is unacceptable that European citizens are taken hostage in a Russian-Ukrainian dispute and have to live in fear and uncertainty			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
88	Van den Brande appealing to the representatives of local and regional authorities in Russia and the Ukraine	to put pressure on their national governments in order to reach a swift solution to the crisis	Therefore, Van den Brande appealing is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		It is unacceptable that European citizens are taken hostage in a Russian-Ukrainian dispute and have to live in fear and uncertainty			Theoretical rationalisation: definition

88	Thus, we, the local representatives of the citizens, call upon the European Union to step up efforts to solve this crisis	Increasing numbers of households, hospitals, schools and small and medium sized enterprises are suffering from the effects of the gas dispute	Therefore, the local representatives calling upon the EU is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		More and more public infrastructures are unable to operate effectively			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		In their despair, citizens are turning to their local and regional representatives for help			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		EU Member States must be united in solidarity and work harder to send a strong common political message to our external partners			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
89	The mitigation measures undertaken by EU companies and Member States	have allowed most countries to successfully manage the situation in a way which is the least disruptive for their consumers	Therefore, the EU companies and MS undertaking mitigation measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
89	The gas coordination group meeting in Brussels	to evaluate the situation in the affected Member States as a consequence of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis	Therefore, the gas coordination group meeting is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
89	The Commission will call for a meeting of the Directors General for Energy of the 27 Member States next Wednesday	to study the situation from a broader energy point of view	Therefore, the Commission calling for this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
89	Commissioner Pieblags has decided to send Energy Deputy Director, Dominique Ristori to Bulgaria and Slovakia tonight	to evaluate the situation on the ground and identify possible solutions	Therefore, Piebalgs deciding this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

89	Commissioner Pieblags sending Energy Deputy Director Fabrizio Barbaso to visit the most affected countries in the Energy Community Members in the Balkans	Barbaso will start his mission in Croatia tomorrow morning	Therefore, Piebalgs sending Barbaso is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
89	The Commission demanding that the supply of gas from Russia, through Ukraine, is resumed as quickly as possible	The situation remains tight	Therefore, the Commission demanding this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		lower temperatures in the coming days could render the situation more critical			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		lower temperatures in the coming days could render the situation more critical, especially if the short-term contracts agreed at industry level could not be prolonged			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
89	The European Commission would like to thank the EU partner countries Norway, Algeria and Libya	who are providing the EU in this time of crisis with a steady and even increasing supply of natural gas	Therefore, the Commission thanking these countries is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
89	The Gas Coordination Group being ready to come back to Brussels, next week	if the situation calls for it	Therefore, the Gas Coordination Group being ready is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
90	Barroso stating that today we can – finally – welcome the resumption of gas supplies to Europe	The Russian side opened the valves this morning and the Ukrainian side has allowed the gas to flow	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Our monitors on the ground report that gas is flowing normally, pressure is building up in the system and gas is crossing the Ukrainian border into Slovakia			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

90	So we can now tell our citizens: the gas is finally on its way	Our monitors on the ground report that gas is flowing normally, pressure is building up in the system and gas is crossing the Ukrainian border into Slovakia	Therefore, the EU can tell its citizens that gas is finally on its way	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	We have worked night and day for three weeks to get to this point	In particular I have spoken in considerable detail and with great regularity to President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin on the Russian side and to President Yushenko and Prime Minister Tymoschenko on the Ukrainian side	Therefore, the statement that we have worked day and night for three weeks is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		I have made it very clear throughout that we insisted on the immediate resumption of gas supplies			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	Barroso speaking in detail and with great regularity to Medvedev, Putin, Yushchenko and Timoshenko	I have made it very clear throughout that we insisted on the immediate resumption of gas supplies	Therefore, Barroso speaking in detail with these persons is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	Barroso thanking Piebalgs and his services	who have worked tirelessly to restore gas supplies	Therefore, Barroso thanking Piebalgs is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	Barroso thanking Prime Minister Topolanek and the Czech Presidency	They worked closely together	Therefore, Barroso thanking Topolanek and the Czech Presidency is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	Barroso thanking both Piebalgs and Topolanek and the Czech Presidency	This has been a team effort and an effective unified voice	Therefore, Barroso thanking them is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation Moralisation: evaluation
90	The Commission setting up a monitoring team	which was vital for confidence building	Therefore, the Commission setting up a monitoring team is legitimized	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	on the spot over a week ago				
90	the Commission then sponsored the agreement on the Terms of Reference for the monitoring mission	When it became clear that setting up a monitoring team was not enough	Therefore, the Commission sponsoring the agreement on the ToR is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	Andris Piebalgs and Barroso pushing hard for direct, substantial talks between the parties at a high political level	when it was clear that agreement on the whole contract was going to be necessary in order for gas transit to be resumed	Therefore, them pushing hard for direct talks is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		That has now led directly to settlement of the dispute			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
90	Barroso stating that it is difficult to welcome something that should not have happened in the first place	It was utterly unacceptable that European gas consumers were held hostage to this dispute between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
90	Barroso stating that we have to learn the lessons of this dispute	It was utterly unacceptable that European gas consumers were held hostage to this dispute between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
90	Barroso stating that solidarity worked inside the EU and with our near neighbours	Mitigation measures taken by EU companies and the Member States allowed most countries to manage the situation successfully	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		we have to learn the lessons of this dispute			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
90	Barroso stating that we must not allow ourselves to be placed in this position in future	New Year is for fireworks and celebration, not gas crises	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Moralisation: analogy
		This cannot become an annual event			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		we have to learn the lessons of this dispute			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
90	Barroso stating that we have to stop simply talking about energy security in Europe, and start doing something about it	we must not allow ourselves to be placed in this position in future	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
		we have to learn the lessons of this dispute			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
90	The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly	we have to stop simply talking about energy security in Europe, and start doing something about it	Therefore, the EU trying to move forward rapidly is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		we have to learn the lessons of this dispute			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
90	Barroso stating that we must now promote the rapid development of infrastructure for the EU's energy needs	to encourage both diversity of energy sources and supply routes	Therefore, Barroso stating that we must now promote the rapid development of infrastructure for the EU's energy needs is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
90	Barroso stating we want to see rapid agreement in the Council to the proposal from the Commission for 5 bn euros of unspent money to go on infrastructure	we must now promote the rapid development of infrastructure for the EU's energy needs	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	spending, notably in the energy area				
90	Barroso stating we have to complete the Third Single Energy Market package which is currently in its final stages	This will mean more transparency for networks, storage and demand	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
		The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
90	Barroso stating we have to prepare better for the next crisis	Member States must prepare for next winter	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
90	Barroso stating that there needs to be rapid agreement to changes in the Security of Gas Supply Directive	Member States must prepare for next winter	Therefore, Barroso stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
90	the Commission will bring forward detailed proposals as soon as possible	there needs to be rapid agreement to changes in the Security of Gas Supply Directive	Therefore, the Commission bringing forward details proposals as soon as possible is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		Member States must prepare for next winter			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The Commission's Strategic Energy Review published last November makes a number of recommendations which we will now try to move forward rapidly			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

90	the EU needs to take energy security seriously	But let's not forget the big picture	Therefore, the EU needing to take energy security seriously is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		This painful episode is a sharp reminder			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation Moralisation: evaluation
90	Energy security begins at home	we have also shown that Europe will do whatever it takes to ensure that our citizens are not left in the cold	Therefore, Barroso stating that energy security begins at home is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
90	Measures to develop energy security and measures to tackle climate change are mutually reinforcing	energy efficiency, renewables, all means of cutting back on carbon emissions, will become ever more important in the future	Therefore, Barroso stating that measures to develop energy security and measures to tackle climate change are mutually reinforcing is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
90	Barroso taking the message to the March European Council that we have to be serious about diversifying and investing in Europe's energy security future	Now (i.e. now that the crisis happened, we have to be serious about it)	Therefore, Barroso taking this message to the European Council is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

Table 73: Overview Stage 4 of the second gas crisis

Stage 4	Total number of texts	Genre	Frequency	Percentage	Argumentation schemes found and analysed
	11	Speech	5	45,5%	116
		Press release	4	36,4%	
		Transcript	1	9,1%	
		Memo	1	9,1%	

Table 74: Texts collected for Stage 4 of the second gas crisis

Text	Date	Genre
91: 2920th Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations General Affairs – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_15	26 January 2009	Press release
92: EU-Ukraine Foreign Minister Troika meeting to confirm ambitious agenda for future relationship – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_207	4 February 2009	Press release
93: The Covenant of Mayors – the main highlight of an intense EU Sustainable Energy Week – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_09_225	6 February 2009	Press release
94: Beginning of the Meeting with the European Commission Delegation – http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48376	6 February 2009	Transcript
95: Olli Rehn Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement European elections and the challenges ahead – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_52	10 February 2009	Speech
96: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: "The Mediterranean Solar Plan – a necessity, not an option" – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_60	13 February 2009	Speech
97: Energy Council – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_09_72	18 February 2009	Memo
98: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Mit Schwung für Europa – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_72	20 February 2009	Speech
99: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: Ein globales Europa – aktuelle Herausforderungen in der Außenpolitik – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_74	20 February 2009	Speech
100: 2926th Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations External relations – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_09_48	23 February 2009 February 2009	Press release
101: Speech by Ferrero-Waldner: After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what next? – https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_09_100	9 March 2009	Speech

Table 75: Argumentation schemes and legitimations found for Stage 4 of the second gas crisis

Text	Action legitimised	Argument made	Claim made	Topos	Category of legitimation
91	The presidency briefing the Council on how it plans to handle the issue of energy security	following the crisis stemming from the recent interruption of gas supplies from Russia via Ukraine to the EU	Therefore, the presidency briefing the Council is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
91	The Council held an exchange of views	emphasising urgency in seeking solutions to problems that were highlighted during the gas crisis	Therefore, the Council holding an exchange of views is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
91	The EU wanting to reach an agreement by the end of March on a proposed package regarding the internal energy market, including on market transparency	The presidency identified four areas on which it intends to focus	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
91	The EU wanting to reach an early agreement on the Commission's proposals regarding interconnection and infrastructure projects	The presidency identified four areas on which it intends to focus	Therefore, the EU wanting to reach an early agreement is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
91	The EU wanting supply crisis	The presidency identified four areas on which it intends to focus	Therefore, the EU wanting this is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority –

	response mechanisms: adjustments to directives on the security of supply of oil and gas, and measures to improve access to and investment in gas storage				personal authority
91	The EU wanting to develop policy so as to reduce the EU's vulnerability and avoid new disruptions of supply (regarding external energy policy)	The presidency identified four areas on which it intends to focus	Therefore, the EU wanting to develop policy in such a way is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
92	A Troika taking place in Prague between the EU and Ukraine	The Troika will cover a range of bilateral issues and issues of common concern including developments in the region, the Eastern Partnership, the state of play on negotiations towards an Association Agreement as well as energy	Therefore, the Troika taking place is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		This is a valuable opportunity to discuss foreign policy matters and review EU-Ukraine relations in the light of recent developments such as the global financial crisis, the gas dispute as well as progress achieved in negotiations on an EU-Ukraine Association Agreement			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		At the same time I am looking forward to providing our Ukrainian partners with more			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

		information on the planned Eastern Partnership			
92	Ukraine needs to increase its efforts on political and economic reforms	too much time has been lost due to internal problems	Therefore, Ukraine needing to increase its efforts is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
92	The EU and Ukraine engaging through the EaP	which will allow for further deepening of our bilateral relationship and increased exchange between the countries in our Eastern neighbourhood on a wide range of topics	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine engaging through the EaP is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		I hope that Ukraine will profit from the opportunities offered by this initiative and become an active partner in the Eastern Partnership once it is launched			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
92	The organisation of the upcoming international investment conference on the rehabilitation and modernization of Ukraine's gas transit system which will be co-chaired by Ukraine and the Commission	It is proof of our commitment to assisting Ukraine in being a reliable partner in the field of transit of energy resources	Therefore, the organisation of this conference is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
92	The European Union carries out regular consultations with Ukrainian counterparts	in accordance with the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from 1998	Therefore, the carrying out of regular consultations is legitimised	*EU-Ukraine harmonisation*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
92	The EU and Ukraine are currently negotiating	which will replace the above mentioned Partnership and Cooperation Agreement	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine negotiation the	*Association Agreements*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	an Association Agreement	The new Agreement aims to enhance Ukraine's political association and economic integration with the EU	AA is legitimised		Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		This ambitious agreement will cover all areas of political, economic and sectoral cooperation, including the establishment of a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
92	The Ukrainian gas transit network is currently in need of refurbishment and modernisation	An EU-funded study has identified that some €2.5 billion is necessary between now and 2013 to maintain the current transit capacity	Therefore, the statement that the Ukrainian gas network is in need of modernisation is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
92	The Commission will be co-hosting an international investment conference together with the Ukrainian Government on 23 March in Brussels	The conference aims to attract international investment in the system with the overall aim of securing the efficiency, reliability and transparency of the Ukrainian gas transit infrastructure both for Ukrainian domestic supply and international transit	Therefore, the Commission co-hosting this conference with the Ukrainian government is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
92	The conference aims to attract international investment in the system	with the overall aim of securing the efficiency, reliability and transparency of the Ukrainian gas transit infrastructure both for Ukrainian domestic supply and international transit	Therefore, the conference aiming to attract international investment is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
93	Piebalgs stating that Europe needs to maintain its leading role in the battle against global warming and continue to reduce energy consumption and its	EUSEW 2009 takes place against the backdrop of the crisis in EU energy imports following the recent Ukraine-Russia gas dispute which highlights both the EU's over-dependence on imports and the urgent need for energy-saving solutions	Therefore, Piebalgs statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	dependence on energy imports				
93	The EU Sustainable Energy Week 2009 (EUSEW 2009) taking place	EUSEW 2009 takes place against the backdrop of the crisis in EU energy imports following the recent Ukraine-Russia gas dispute which highlights both the EU's over-dependence on imports and the urgent need for energy-saving solutions	Therefore, the EUSEW 2009 is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
93	The EU is over-dependent on imports	This is highlighted by the recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
93	The EU urgently needing energy-saving solutions	This is highlighted by the recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine	Therefore, the EU urgently needing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
94	Barroso and Medvedev speaking on the phone	we tried to resolve the crisis which really should not have occurred	Therefore, Medvedev and Barroso speaking is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
94	I appreciated your personal participation	in the resolution of this problem	Therefore, Barroso stating this to Medvedev is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
94	it is very important to create the conditions necessary	Now	Therefore, the creation of these conditions is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		so that such crises are, in future, not repeated			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		We think that energy security is an extremely important question for Russia and the European Union			Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		We think, and we have spoken about this on more than one occasion, that it is vital we enhance our relationship and strengthen positive			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

		interdependence in the energy sector			
		This positive interdependence is very important now, as you said, when we are confronted by a global crisis			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		We all have an interest in this, Russia, the European Commission, and major partners			Authorisation: custom – conformity
94	Barroso advocating for vigorous global coordination	And we think that we cannot overcome the negative consequences of the crisis, of the financial crisis, which was the first of such magnitude in the history of globalisation	Therefore, this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
95	The EU mediating in the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine	was crucial to reach a compromise	Therefore, EU mediation in the gas crisis is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		Without the EU, people might still be waiting for the gas to flow today!			Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
95	Energy has moved to the top of the EU's agenda	EU mediation in the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine was crucial to reach a compromise	Therefore, energy moving to the top of the EU's agenda is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
95	completing the single market, investing in interconnecti ons and ensuring a broad energy mix	we need decisions to increase our energy security	Therefore, these actions are legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
96	Ferrero-Waldner stating that enhancing energy security in Europe is an increasingly pressing concern, and one that needs a European, rather than	When Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006, European supplies were not seriously affected. When it did so this year, European households suffered	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Moralisation: analogy

	national, response				
96	The EU seeking to diversify its energy imports in terms of energy mix, origin and transportation routes	Last month's events underscored the importance of doing so	Therefore, the EU seeking to do this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
96	it is clear that this energy diversificatio n strategy must include a significant shift to renewable energies and in particular solar	If we are to meet our 20/20/20 targets	Therefore, energy diversification must include a significant shift to renewable energies and in particular solar	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	On 19th February, starting at 10.00 there will be an Energy Council	It is the first regular Council since the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January	Therefore, the Energy Council taking place is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: definition
		The main objectives of the Council are to have an exchange of views on the gas crisis, to adopt conclusions on the Strategic Energy Review and to have an orientation debate on the proposal on the revision of the Directive on oil stocks and the Commission Communication on the security of supply for natural gas			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		The lunch will be focused on the technical elements of the energy projects of the Recovery Plan			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Commission and presidency will inform the ministers on the development of the recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine and the lessons learn from this crisis			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
97	During the crisis, the EU demonstrated	for instance, when sending monitors to remote locations in Ukraine and Russia	Therefore, the statement that the EU	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	that it could speak with one voice, and was be able to act quickly and resolutely		demonstrated that it could speak with one voice is legitimised		means orientation
		Mitigation measures taken by EU companies and the Member States allowed most countries to manage the situation successfully			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Solidarity measures as supply of gas to EU countries more severely affected by the gas cut were swiftly implemented			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	Discussions are ongoing with the Russian authorities	on how to continue the monitoring mission	Therefore, the ongoing discussions are legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
97	The EU MS and companies taking mitigation measures	allowed most countries to manage the situation successfully	Therefore, taking these mitigation measures is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	However, the weaknesses of EU energy security and the EU's energy situation were also identified	The crisis confirmed that the EU urgently needs to continue the development of the internal market, to improve energy interconnections for security of supply, to reinforce its emergency mechanisms and to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis our major suppliers	Therefore, the statement that the crisis also identified the weaknesses of the EU is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	the EU urgently needs to continue the development of the internal market	The crisis confirmed this	Therefore, the EU urgently needs to continue the development of the internal market	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The EU needs to improve energy interconnections for security of supply	The crisis confirmed this	Therefore, the EU needs to improve energy interconnections for security of supply	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The EU needs to reinforce its emergency mechanisms	The crisis confirmed this	Therefore, the EU needs to reinforce its	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

			emergency mechanisms		
97	The EU needs to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis our major suppliers	The crisis confirmed this	Therefore, the EU needs to strengthen its negotiating position	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The rapid development of infrastructure for the EU's energy needs is paramount	to encourage diversity of both energy sources and supply routes	Therefore, the rapid development of infrastructure for the EU's energy needs is paramount	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		under the 2nd Strategic Energy Review			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
97	The Commission considers that the proposed regulation on financial assistance to energy projects should be quickly adopted	with a view to financing energy infrastructure projects under the Recovery Plan,	Therefore, the quick adoption of this proposed regulation is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	negotiations on new agreements with both Russia and Ukraine should make real progress over the coming months	the Presidency has confirmed its aim	Therefore, negotiations should make real progress	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
97	The Commission is also pursuing negotiations for Ukraine to accede to the Energy	which is the shortest way to help Ukraine restructuring its energy sector and creating transparency on the transit	Therefore, the Commission pursuing these negotiations is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	Community Treaty				
97	The Ministers are expected to adopt highly supportive Council Conclusions on the Strategic Energy Review which will pass to the GAERC and subsequently to the European Council on 19-20 March 2009	These conclusions would form the basis of a European Council endorsement of the SER	Therefore, the adoption of these conclusions is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
97	the need for an EU energy security and solidarity plan is more urgent than ever	The gas crisis has confirmed this	Therefore, the need for an EU energy security and solidarity plan is more urgent than ever	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	while the EU is definitely the best level at which to tackle energy security crises, the current framework is not strong enough to prevent these happening	The Russia-Ukraine gas crisis confirmed the arguments of the Strategic Energy Review	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The support of the council to the second Strategic Energy Review is also very strong	Mrs Laperrouze's (ALDE, FR) report on the second Strategic Energy Review was adopted by a large majority at the Plenary on 3 February	Therefore, the statement that the support to the SER was very strong is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

97	The EU has positive developments in its common energy policy (response with one voice, solidarity examples between Member States, the fact that the market reacted reasonably well, etc)	This is highlighted by the gas crisis	Therefore, the statement that the EU has positive developments in its energy policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The EU has weaknesses in its energy policy such as an insufficiently interconnected gas network and the need for more transparency and stronger mechanisms for crisis coordination	This is highlighted by the gas crisis	Therefore, the statement that the EU has weaknesses in its energy policy is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The EU needs more transparency and stronger mechanisms for crisis coordination	This is highlighted by the gas crisis	Therefore, the EU needing this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The EU needs to revisit the Council directive 2004/67 on security of gas supply	This is one of the main consequences of the gas crisis	Therefore, the EU needing to revisit the Council directive 2004/67 is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This is recognised by the Energy Council of 12 January and by the European Parliament in its resolution on the Strategic Review on 3 February			Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority

		This revision had already been announced in November 2008 in the SER and a Communication on the implementation by the Member States of this directive had highlighted the main shortcomings of the directive			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		The shortcomings of the directive have been verified in January 2009			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	Commission would like to integrate fully the concept of responsibility and solidarity: each one has to take the necessary measures and these measures may also be useful to implement solidarity mechanisms	The EU needs to revisit the Council directive 2004/67 on security of gas supply	Therefore, the Commission wanting to integrate fully this concept is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	A detailed questionnaire on the crisis consequences and lessons has been sent to the Member States	Their replies will help assessing fully the consequences and the measures most needed to prevent and address future crises	Therefore, the sending of the questionnaire is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		The Commission will use these contributions to prepare revision of the directive in the coming months			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
97	The MS providing lessons to be learned for the future	Member States provided their first ideas on what is needed in term of preventing and dealing with gas crises at the extraordinary Energy Council on 12 January and at the meeting of Directors General for Energy on 21 January 2009. Some ideas have come out of these discussions	Therefore, the MS providing lessons to be learned for the future is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

97	the means to alleviate a gas crisis should be looked also in the diversification of the energy-mix, energy efficiency improvements, identification of missing interconnectors and diversification of routes and suppliers	The concerns were not focussed on security of gas supply, but on energy security as a whole	Therefore, the means to alleviate a gas crisis should be looked also in the diversification of the energy mix	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	Transparency was a crucial point	To this purpose, the Gas Coordination Group worked effectively, but data availability remained an issue, as some players were not allowed to disclose important information to help managing the crisis	Therefore, transparency being a crucial point is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	…but the actions identified in the Review should be speed up, in particular concerning transport capacity (links, interconnectors, storages, reverse flows) and the diversification of routes and suppliers (including the Southern Gas	The drivers of the Second Strategic Energy Review have been corroborated	Therefore, the actions identified in the Review should speed up	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	Corridor, LNG action plan)				
97	The internal market "package" brings very important elements to strengthen the security of supply in case of crisis, not least on transparency	This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	other measures than strategic stocks may be implemented with more cost effectiveness	Such stocks are very costly	Therefore, other measures needing to be implemented is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future			Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	The issue remained controversial	Such stocks are very costly	Therefore, the issue remaining controversial is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
97	The EU highlighting in the future that the EU was able to speak with a single voice in this crisis	This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future	Therefore, this highlighting in the future is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
97	EP is supporting the promised earlier revision of the security of gas supply directive	This is one of the lessons to be learned for the future	Therefore, this statement is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
98	Gerade in Krisenzeiten zeigt sich, wie unglaublich wichtig die EU in unserer	Auch in der jüngsten Gaskrise zwischen der Ukraine und Russland konnten wir als Europäische Union erfolgreich vermitteln und die Energieversorgung unserer Bürgerinnen und Bürger und	Therefore, the statement that it is precisely in crisis times that the EU can show how important it is in our	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	vernetzten Welt geworden ist	Unternehmen letztlich sichern - gerade weil wir als Union der 27 mit einer Stimme gesprochen haben	connected world is legitimised		
		Ich war in den letzten zehn Tagen zweimal in Moskau und kann Ihnen versichern, dass ein selbstbewusstes Europa bei der russischen Führung durchaus Gehör findet			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
98	The EU speaking with one voice	Auch in der jüngsten Gaskrise zwischen der Ukraine und Russland konnten wir als Europäische Union erfolgreich vermitteln und die Energieversorgung unserer Bürgerinnen und Bürger und Unternehmen letztlich sichern	Therefore, the EU speaking with one voice is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Ich war in den letzten zehn Tagen zweimal in Moskau und kann Ihnen versichern, dass ein selbstbewusstes Europa bei der russischen Führung durchaus Gehör findet			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
98	Auch in der jüngsten Gaskrise zwischen der Ukraine und Russland konnten wir als Europäische Union erfolgreich vermitteln und die Energieversorgung unserer Bürgerinnen und Bürger und Unternehmen letztlich sichern	gerade weil wir als Union der 27 mit einer Stimme gesprochen haben	Therefore, the EU being able to successfully mediate and secure energy for its citizens and companies is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
99	eine einheitliche europäische Energiediplomatie	Auch die Gaskrise zwischen der Ukraine und Russland Anfang des Jahres – die wir Europäer zum Glück entschärfen konnten - hat gezeigt	Therefore, the statement that a uniform EU energy diplomacy is	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

	unverzichtbar ist		necessary is legitimised		
100	The ministers noting that there were a number of issues, such as visa liberalisation, the articulation between the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy, the participation of third countries and financing, which will require further discussion (in the EaP context)	as part of the process of developing and implementing the Eastern Partnership	Therefore, these issues requiring further discussion is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
100	The relevant Council bodies will now start work on preparations for the Spring European Council	which is expected to establish the Eastern Partnership	Therefore the relevant bodies starting work is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
100	The Eastern Partnership is a multinational forum formed by the EU member states and six eastern European and southern Caucasus states: Armenia,	It is intended to facilitate the negotiation of free trade zones for services and agricultural products, as well as partnership agreements and visa agreements	Therefore, the EaP being formed is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation

	Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine				
101	reliability of Russia and Ukraine as supplier and transit countries being questioned	As a result of the gas crisis	Therefore, the reliability of Russia and Ukraine being questioned is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	reflection being sparked	As a result of the gas crisis	Therefore, reflection being sparked is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		on how better to assure our external energy security, and manage our political relationships with our eastern neighbours			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU reacting with a concerted push to strengthen our position	The first Ukraine gas crisis in 2006 had already alerted us to weaknesses in the EU's energy security	Therefore, the EU reacting with a concerted push is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Many of us played a part: President Barroso spearheaded the so-called 20-20-20 package that puts the EU in the lead in reducing emissions and boosting renewables by 20%, all by 2020. My colleague Andris Piebalgs has fought hard for the 3rd energy package to better integrate our market and so increase our energy security			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		And I, as External Relations Commissioner, have made my priority diversifying energy sources and supply routes, by developing the Commission's energy diplomacy with supplier, transit and consumer countries around the world			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	President Barroso spearheaded the so-called	that puts the EU in the lead in reducing emissions and boosting renewables by 20%, all by 2020	Therefore, Barroso spearheading	*Environment*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	20-20-20 package		this package is legitimised		
101	My colleague Andris Piebalgs has fought hard for the 3rd energy package	to better integrate our market and so increase our energy security	Therefore, Piebalgs fighting hard is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	Ferrero-Waldner made her priority diversifying energy sources and supply routes	And I, as External Relations Commissioner	Therefore, Ferrero-Waldner making this her priority is legitimised	*Energy*	Authorisation: authority – personal authority
		by developing the Commission's energy diplomacy with supplier, transit and consumer countries around the world			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU having stepped up our energy cooperation with partners around the world	signing new agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Ukraine to the east, and Egypt, Jordan and Morocco to the south. Further agreements are on track with Algeria, Libya and Iraq	Therefore, the EU having stepped up its energy cooperation with partners around the world is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	And we are focusing on priority infrastructure projects for gas and electricity, such as the Baltic Interconnection Plan, the North-South interconnections within Central and South-East Europe, and LNG terminals	to receive liquefied natural gas	Therefore, the EU focusing on priority infrastructure projects for gas and electricity is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU's resolve to continue this work being strengthened	January's events (i.e. the gas crisis) strengthened this resolve	Therefore, the EU's resolve being strengthened is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

101	The EU not wanting to supplant Russia	which will remain a prime supplier for the medium and probably long term	Therefore, the EU not wanting to supplant Russia is legitimised	*Energy*	Theoretical rationalisation: prediction
101	we need to be clear-headed about the situation	January's events (i.e. the gas crisis) strengthened the EU's resolve	Therefore, the EU needing to be clear-headed about the situation is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		There's much talk about our energy dependence on Russia, but it's more accurate to talk of energy interdependence			Moralisation: analogy
101	There's much talk about our energy dependence on Russia, but it's more accurate to talk of energy interdependence	The EU may depend on Russia for 25% of our gas and oil supplies, but 70% of Gazprom's revenue comes from us	Therefore, it is more accurate to talk of energy interdependence	*Energy*	Moralisation: analogy
101	Both the EU and Russia having incentives to put our energy relations on a firm and predictable basis	it's more accurate to talk of energy interdependence	Therefore, both sides having incentives to put energy relations on a firm and predictable basis is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	We want to strengthen our energy dialogue with Russia, bringing it to accept binding arrangements based on these principles, including in the new EU-Russia Agreement	Because both sides have incentives to put their energy relations on a firm and predictable basis	Therefore, the EU wanting to strengthen its energy dialogue with Russia is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	we are negotiating				
101	Russia too has come up with new ideas	Because both sides have incentives to put their energy relations on a firm and predictable basis	Therefore, the statement that Russia too has to come up with new ideas is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	We are willing to discuss new ideas and look forward to hearing more details	Because both sides have incentives to put their energy relations on a firm and predictable basis	Therefore, the EU willing to discuss new ideas is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU having more-robust early warning mechanisms and dispute resolution arrangements	In the short term we should look for workable, practical ways to ensure that there is no repetition of this winter's events	Therefore, the EU having this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
101	When problems arise the gas must still flow, even as solutions are sought	In the short term we should look for workable, practical ways to ensure that there is no repetition of this winter's events	Therefore, the statement that gas must still flow is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
101	The EU holding jointly with Ukraine an "International Investment Conference on the Ukrainian gas transit system" later this month	We also have to look at the long-term reliability, transparency and predictability of the key transit routes to the EU	Therefore, the EU and Ukraine holding this conference is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		to help upgrade its gas transit system and reform the gas sector			Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU must react with solidarity, and with the weight appropriate to our value as a consumer	There are other lessons to be learnt from January's crisis	Therefore, the EU reacting with solidarity is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
		whether or not the EU is ready to pool sovereignty in the delicate area of energy security			Moralisation: abstraction

101	We need to develop the reflexes and mechanisms	that enable us to exercise a coherent external energy policy, supported by a strategic energy security diplomacy	Therefore, the EU developing these reflexes and mechanisms is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU feeling how important it is to have stable and predictable relationships with its neighbours	The impact of the gas crisis was felt not only on energy supplies	Therefore, the EU feeling this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	We need partners whose governance respects contracts and manages key sectors transparently	The gas crisis brought home how important it is for the EU to have stable and predictable relationships with its neighbours	Therefore, the EU needing those partners is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	Next week, Member States will approve the Commission's proposals for an ambitious new "Eastern Partnership" with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine	This Partnership sets out proposals for an ambitious programme of institution building: reinforcing the European Neighbourhood Policy and offering more intensive help than we have ever offered before for reforms essential to peace, prosperity and security	Therefore, the MS approving this is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EaP offering tailor-made bilateral support	to boost each country's own energy security	Therefore, the EaP offering tailor-made bilateral support is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
		in full recognition that the needs of countries dependent on Russian gas like Armenia and Moldova, transit countries like Ukraine and Georgia, and			Theoretical rationalisation: explanation

		suppliers such as Azerbaijan – will differ			
101	The EaP offering multilateral cooperation	to improve early warning and crisis preparedness	Therefore, the EaP offering multilateral cooperation is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EaP offering flagship initiatives	to help diversify the EU's sources of energy supply and transit and promote green energy	Therefore, the EaP offering flagship initiatives is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	Deepening bilateral relations between the EU and its Eastern partners	will depend on progress towards democracy, rule of law and human rights	Therefore, bilateral relations between the Eu and its Eastern partners could deepen	*Eastern Partnership*	Moralisation: abstraction
101	The EU offering an AA	Those who make progress in these areas will qualify for a closer political relationship with the EU	Therefore, the EU offering an AA is legitimised	*Association Agreements*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority
101	The EU building relationships with the Eastern Partners	has to be a two way street	Therefore, the EU building relationships with its Eastern partners is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Moralisation: abstraction
101	We can make real progress on Free Trade Agreements	Only with economies that are genuinely ready to open up to competition	Therefore, making progress on FTA's is legitimised	*Free Trade Area*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
101	The EU offering visa facilitation	Only to countries which have secure travel documents, properly run borders and arrangements for readmission of returnees	Therefore, the EU offering visa facilitation is legitimised	*Visa*	Authorisation: authority – impersonal authority Moralisation: evaluation
101	The EU needing to be willing to move on neighbours' key desires	if we want to protect our security	Therefore, the EU needing to be willing to move on neighbours' key desires is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: goal orientation
101	The EU opening our markets to	In order to move on neighbours' key desires	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation:

	goods from new competitors				means orientation
101	The EU allowing - in controlled mobility partnerships - greater access for workers from these countries when they bring skills we lack in our job markets	In order to move on neighbours' key desires	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU devoting EU taxpayers' money to the initiative	In order to move on neighbours' key desires	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU has to be willing to give in return	We are asking a lot	Therefore, the EU has to be willing to give in return is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		This is not philanthropy. It is 21st century European foreign policy			Moralisation: analogy
101	The EU seeking to achieve a new, innovative style of partnership with countries which are still emerging from a communist past	Drawing on the EU's unique range of instruments	Therefore, the EU seeking to achieve a new innovative style of partnership is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	the Eastern Partnership will bring dividends of stability and prosperity to European citizens for	If we remain ambitious both in what we offer and what we seek	Therefore, the EaP could bring dividends of stability and prosperity	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation

	generations to come				
101	Ukraine is a member of the Eastern Partnership that has traditionally been ahead of the rest	both in what it has achieved, and in what it has been offered by the EU	Therefore, the statement that Ukraine has traditionally been ahead of the rest is legitimised	*Eastern Partnership*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	There being a growing perception of confusion and drift in Ukraine's leadership	the recent crisis contributed to this	Therefore, the framing of a growing perception of confusion and drift in Ukraine's leadership is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		conflicting messages coming from Kyiv			Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	The EU stating that it is essential that the Ukrainian government is able to take, and stick to, unified positions	Since the crisis, this pattern has persisted	Therefore, the EU stating this is legitimised	*Energy*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
		Ukraine is well placed to take advantage of the Eastern Partnership both under its bilateral track and through the different platforms within the multilateral track. But it requires commitment, consistency and determination at all levels.			Mythopoesis: Cautionary Tales
101	The EU stating that renewed efforts are needed from Ukraine	particularly in the context of the current global financial and economic crisis which is hitting Ukraine hard	Therefore, the EU stating this is legitimised	*Reforms*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation
101	The EU standing at a cross-roads regarding its relations with Russia	The war in Georgia and the gas crisis seriously undermined the level of trust between us	Therefore, the EU standing at a cross-roads with Russia is legitimised	*EU-Russia relations*	Instrumental rationalisation: outcome orientation

101	Our challenge is to remain true to our principles and interests, whilst being flexible and responsive to developments on the ground	This is a fast-changing situation, not least against the background of the global economic crisis besieging us all	Therefore, the EU's challenge is to remain true to its principles and interests whilst being flexible	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: abstraction
101	The EU ensuring peace, prosperity and security for itself and its neighbours	It has this responsibility	Therefore, the EU doing this is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Theoretical rationalisation: explanation
101	Ferrero-Waldner outlining her policies	These policies serve the end of ensuring peace, prosperity and security for itself and its neighbours	Therefore, these policies are legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Instrumental rationalisation: means orientation
101	The EU being able to get things done	We may not always get the outcome we seek, but to paraphrase Archimedes, "Give me a firm place to stand and I will move the earth. The European Union is a firm place to stand	Therefore, the framing that the EU is able to get things done is legitimised	*EU foreign policy*	Moralisation: analogy